Scaffoldings of the affective mind

Abstract

In this paper we adopt Sterelny's (2010) framework of the scaffolded mind, and his related dimensional approach, to highlight the many ways in which human affectivity (and not just cognition) is environmentally supported. After discussing the relationship between the scaffolded-mind view and related frameworks, such as the extended-mind view, we illustrate the many ways in which our affective states are environmentally supported by items of material culture, other people, and their interplay. To do so, we draw on empirical evidence from various disciplines (sociology, ethnography, and developmental psychology), and develop phenomenological considerations to distinguish different ways in which we experience the world affectively.

Keywords::

• Affectivity
• Extended Mind
• Incorporation
• Niche Construction
• Scaffolded Mind

Acknowledgements

Many thanks to the participants of the Biology Interest Group in Exeter, especially Sabina Leonelli, Tom Roberts, Adam Toon, and Elena Walsh, for comments on earlier versions of this paper. Thanks also to Andy Pickering and Matthias Varul for reading suggestions, and to three anonymous referees for their constructive advice.

Notes

^[1] Aside from Griffiths and Scarantino (2009), there is little work in the philosophy of situated cognition that addresses affectivity. Of the 26 chapters of The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition (Robbins & Aydede, 2009), Griffiths and Scarantino's is the only one that does so. The literature on ExM has also been concerned primarily with cognition (e.g., Clark, 2008; Menary, 2010b; Rowlands, 2008), with some recent exceptions (Colombetti & Roberts, 2014; Krueger, 2014; Stephan, Walter, & Wilutzky, 2014).

^[2] Menary (2010a), Sutton (2006), and Wilson and Clark (2009) identify further dimensions of situated cognition that could also be applied to affectivity. Sutton (2006) provides an especially helpful high-level taxonomy of resources that scaffold not only cognitive but also potentially affective processes—external cultural tools, artefacts, and symbols systems; natural environmental resources; interpersonal scaffolding; embodied skills and capacities—as well as a consideration of various dimensions and times-scales along which these resources vary (enduring versus one-off scaffoldings, etc.). Here we focus only on Sterelny's account, mainly for reasons of space, and we do not claim that our dimensional analysis of scaffolded affectivity is exhaustive.

^[3] There is evidence that older children are responsive to “socially intelligent robots” (Dautenhahn, 2007). Yet this evidence does not undermine our point, as these robots reproduce important features of human agency, which can explain why children trust and engage with them. Socially intelligent robots can express and/or perceive emotions, distinguish agents from objects, and reliably use natural cues—gaze, facial expressions, gestures, etc.—to exhibit distinctive personalities and evoke social responses from others.

Additional information

Funding

Giovanna Colombetti is supported by a grant from the European Research Council under the European Community's Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007–2013), ERC grant agreement number 240891 (EMOTER).

Notes on contributors

Giovanna Colombetti

Giovanna Colombetti is Associate Professor at the University of Exeter.

Joel Krueger

Joel Krueger is a Lecturer at the University of Exeter.