From conscious experience to a conscious self

Abstract

In his book The Opacity of Mind, Peter Carruthers (2011) presents the Interpretive Sensory Awareness theory (“ISA”), which holds that while we have direct access to our own sensory states, our access to “self-knowledge” is almost always interpretive. In presenting his view, Carruthers also claims that his account is the first of its kind; after a cursory examination of major theories of mind, he concludes that “transparent access” accounts of self-knowledge—the alternative to ISA—have been endorsed throughout history. This paper challenges this latter claim. Contrary to Carruthers’ view, the paper argues that Buddhist theories of mind are not “transparent access” accounts. Instead, they not only have an analysis of sensory processing and conscious experience similar to that of ISA, but also share what Carruthers sees as ISA’s central tenet: individuals lack transparent, conscious access to most of their propositional attitudes. Given this fundamental alignment, the Buddhist perspective can offer us fresh responses to ISA’s critics, as well as approaches to ethics and free will that are aligned with ISA’s conclusions.

Keywords:

• Buddhism
• confabulation
• conscious awareness
• self knowledge
• theory of self

Notes

¹ A propositional attitude, in this context, is an attitude “of standing thought or form of active thinking that has a conceptual or propositional content” (Carruthers, 2011, p. xiii).

² As described by Dreyfus and Thompson, Abhidharma is

one of the oldest Buddhist traditions, which can be traced back to the first centuries after the Buddha (566–483 BCE) … the Abhidharma contains the earlier texts in which Buddhist concepts were developed and hence is the source of most philosophical developments in Indian Buddhism. (2007, p. 93).

In particular,

The object of the Abhidharma is to analyze both the realm of sentient experience and the world given in such experience into its components in language that avoids the postulation of a unified subject. This analysis concerns the whole range of phenomena, from material phenomena to nirvana (the state of enlightenment, understood as the direct realization of the nature of reality; including especially the lack of any essential self and the consequent liberation from suffering). (Dreyfus & Thompson, 2007, p. 93)

³ Methodological note: In order to ensure that my objection is well tailored to Carruthers’ account, I cite the same sources that Carruthers cites, and the sources cited therein. Specifically, Dreyfus & Thompson (2007) and Guenther (1976) are two key sources, as well as Bodhi (1993).

⁴ The “strong” version of these claims is as follows:

(1_s) One’s knowledge of one’s own mental states is infallible (necessarily, if one believes that one is undergoing a given mental state, then so one is). (2_s) Mental states are self-presenting (necessarily, if one is undergoing a given mental state, then one knows or is in a position to know that one is; hence if one believes that one is not undergoing a given mental state, then one isn’t). (Carruthers, 2011, p. 13)

⁵ As Dreyfus points out elsewhere, a “significant minority” of Buddhist thinkers reject the no-self view, and even among the majority, “there are substantial differences about the ways in which the person is conceptualized within a no-self paradigm” (2010, p. 116).

⁶ Other elements necessary for consciousness under the Buddhist view include contact, feeling, intention, and discernment (see Dreyfus & Thompson, 2007, pp. 98–99).

⁷ Examples of what may enter through the mind door include what had been directly perceived earlier, inferences based on prior sensory experience, what was learnt from oral report, inferences based on oral reports, and the disturbance of bodily humors (Bodhi, 164).

⁸ For analysis of Buddhist views of the unconscious, see Waldron (2003).

⁹ One possible response to this argument is that, under the Buddhist view, we may still have “momentary beliefs,” which coincide with the momentary thoughts that enter our consciousness through our mind door. This approach would still align with Carruthers’ analysis; as discussed above, he believes that our unconscious beliefs may influence our conscious processing via internal speech (2011, p. 54).

¹⁰ For a more in-depth discussion of Buddhist views on causality, see Santina (2002).

¹¹ For a more in-depth discussion of Buddhist views on emptiness, see Tsering and Jamyang Buddhist Centre (2009).

¹² For a more complete treatment, see Carruthers (2013) on knowing belief, and opacity of mind); for responses, see Frankish (2012).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Vishnu Sridharan

Vishnu Sridharan is an independent scholar in Oakland, California.