Abstract
In this paper, I flesh out an account of the inferential basing relation using a theory about how humans reason: the mental models theory. I critically assess some of the notions that are used by that theory to account for inferential phenomena. To the extent that the mental models theory is well confirmed, that account of basing would be motivated on empirical grounds. This work illustrates how epistemologists could offer explications of the basing relation which are more detailed and less empirically risky.
Notes
1. For example, see Moser (Citation1989, p. 157). For a causal account of basing in which causation is understood in counterfactual terms, see Swain (Swain, Citation1981, p. 74). For a more recent causal account of basing that purports to deal with deviant causal chains, see McCain (Citation2012).
2. For a recent proposal according to which the basing relation is a dependence relation, see Evans (Citation2013).
3. See also Johnson-Laird, Byrne, and Schaeken (Citation1992), and Johnson-Laird and Khemlani (Citation2013).
4. See Johnson-Laird et al. (Citation1992) for discussion.
5. There is more than one reason why certain possibilities are not represented through mental models. A very general one is that considering too many models overloads our working memories, so we strive for economy. Sometimes issues of relevance also creep in – for example, we may regard the possibilities in which the antecedent of a conditional is false irrelevant, for they would not tell us if there is any positive connection between the truth of the antecedent and the truth of the consequent.
6. See Manktelow (Citation1999, Chapter 3) for an overview of the literature on reasoning with conditionals.
7. The unified mental models theory of reasoning is articulated in Johnson-Laird and Khemlani (Citation2013).
8. We use italicization to represent mentally tokened sentences.
9. This is not to say that the empiricist is hereby trying to give an answer to the question: What does “2 + 2 = 4” mean? So far, this is just an approach to the nature of mental models, not an analysis of meaning.