Moral conformity and its philosophical lessons

ABSTRACT

The psychological and philosophical literature exploring the role of social influence in moral judgments suggests that conformity in moral judgments is common and, in many cases, seems to be motivated by epistemic rather than purely social concerns. We argue that there is strong reason to suppose that moral conformity leads to unreliable moral judgments, and, insofar as this is true, the prevalence of conformity proves a problem for both humility as a moral virtue and for some views in moral epistemology.

KEYWORDS:

• Conformity
• morality
• reasoning
• emotion
• moral Intuitionism
• humility

Acknowledgments

For helpful discussions and comments on earlier drafts, we thank Phil Costanzo, Lawrence Ngo, Meagan Kelly, Scott Huettel, and many members of the Moral Attitudes and Decisions Lab at Duke University and the Moral Psychology Research Group.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Vladimir Chituc

Vladimir Chituc is a graduate student in social psychology atYale University.

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

Walter Sinnott-Armstrong is Chauncey StillmanProfessor of Practical Ethics in the Department of Philosophy andthe Kenan Institute for Ethics at Duke University.