https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4189-0911
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ABSTRACT
Philosophers and cognitive scientists alike have recently been interested in whether cognition extends beyond the boundaries of skin and skull and into the environment. However, the extended cognition hypothesis has suffered many objections over the past few decades. In this paper, I explore the option of control extending beyond the human boundary. My aim is to convince the reader of three things: (1) that control can be implemented in artifacts, (2) that humans and artifacts can form extended control systems, and (3) that perhaps extended control ought to be preferred over extended cognition. Using the objections to extended cognition as constraints on my own extended theorizing and the example of autofocus systems in cameras, I mechanistically analyze the components of an autofocus system that realize the central properties of control from a plausible theory of control in the literature. I then provide criteria according to which control can be extended in a system. Finally, I consider how this theory of extended control ought to be preferred to theories of extended cognition.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1. This ultimately depends on whether you think control is a thick or thin notion. If thick, then control is morally, legally, and/or epistemically loaded – that is, the notion bears on these debates. If thin, then control does not bear on these debates at all. I am remaining agnostic on this point.
2. I don’t take myself to be offering necessary and sufficient conditions but, rather, describing the dimensions of extended control systems, particularly the minimal benchmarks for such a system to form.
3. I am not suggesting an intentional stance view toward systems by using Dennett here. Moreover, I should note the distinction between Cummins and Millikan functions. I am committed to the teleological notion of function, not mere efficient causes.
4. I should emphasize here that the derived–non-derived representation distinction is fairly loaded from the mental representation literature and that this distinction does a lot of work for Adams and Aizawa. See Huebner (2014, pp. 169–182) for an argument against the claim that mental representations in cognizers are necessarily or essentially non-derived.
5. See Rowlands (Citation2009) for an argument that the CC fallacy reduces to the ‘mark of the cognitive’ objection.
6. It is notable that some extended cognition theorists think that their theory goes some way toward understanding cognition, but Adams and Aizawa and Rupert criticize them for not adequately specifying the property they are (extended) theorizing about. Control has an upper hand here because, for the most part, it is well understood in areas such as cybernetics, engineering, and neuroscience, especially with relation to motor control. At least, control is better understood than cognition.
7. I realize that there are other theories of control available, but I do not have the space to consider them here. The fact that my view is supported by this major theory in the literature suffices for my purposes.
8. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to me.
9. For the sake of space, my discussion of auto-focus will be limited to phase-detection auto-focus systems (PDAF). PDAF are probably the most popular systems on the market. For that reason, when one talks about auto-focus, they are typically referring to phase-detection systems. There are other kinds of auto-focus systems available, for example, contrast-detection, and I think that the following arguments for the implementation of control will apply to those as well.
10. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out to me.
11. I understand that someone might disagree with this theory of semantic content, but I do not have the room to get into alternatives here.
12. I suppose, however, that if one were interested in successful action or perfect match actions, then knowing would be better than expecting. But again, knowing that the artifact will yield the right output neither negates nor entails a perfect match. There are other factors to consider. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this insightful and challenging objection.
13. HRI researchers Miller and Parasuraman (Citation2007) explicitly endorse a delegation model of supervisory control for human-automation systems. They characterize it as follows: “In short, delegation is a process of assigning specific roles and responsibilities for the subtasks of a parent task for which the delegating agent retains authority (and responsibility)” (p. 64).
14. I should note that some philosophers have expressed skepticism about the legitimacy of the CC fallacy (C. Craver, Citation2007; M. D. Kirchhoff, Citation2015; M. Kirchhoff, Citation2014; Ross & Ladyman, Citation2010). I am sympathetic to these criticisms, but I set them aside for now. As I claimed earlier, my plan is to use the objections to extended cognition as constraints on my theory of extended control. Thus, I assume here that the CC fallacy is a legitimate criticism and worth taking seriously.
15. Special thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this way of running the objection.
16. Wilson states the following: “To make the case that collective social agents are agency coincident with the collections of individuals that belong to them and that they represent is a large task that I do not propose to undertake here. But I would not raise it as a possibility if I thought that it had no prima facie plausibility” (2005, p. 23). I do not want to be interpreted as endorsing the claim that social agents are actually agency coincident with the collection of individuals that belong to them. I am borrowing this notion of coincidence to show that the photographer–camera system is agency coincident with the camera and the photographer. I remain agnostic about the truth of Wilson’s account.
17. Wilson has a similar but more radical view: “I take agents to be individual entities that are capable of acting in the world, and that they typically do so act. They are differential loci of actions. I am happy to be quite pluralistic about the kinds of agent there are in the world. There are physical agents, including elementary particles and atomic elements, everyday physical objects, such as tables and rocks, and larger and more distant objects, such as stars and tectonic plates” (2005, p. 11).