Free will: it unlikely exists in light of psychological theories; it “floats” in the complexity paradigm

ABSTRACT

This paper explores whether human proactivity can be considered an expression of free will. The discussion involves two paradigms, which are mutually complementary and encompass psychological proactivity and reactivity. Both paradigms raise the question of linear and non-linear determinism, which inevitably leads to the issue of free will. The analysis attempts to find a compromise between linear and non-linear determinism through the approach of human dialectical complexity (Lebed & Bar-Eli, 2013). This refers to the relationships of two types of complex subsystems within a human: the perceptual-motor dynamic system (PMDS), which is mostly determined by linear impacts and expressed through reactive behavior, and the “free-will”¹ complex system (FCS), which is mostly determined by non-linear redundant determinism and expressed through proactive dynamics. In summary, it is concluded that there cannot be a categorical assertion of the permanent existence of free will in human functioning. The human dialectical complexity expressed by both proactivity and reactivity causes the “floating” presence of free will depending on the prevalence of proactive control factors and the non-linear determination of a living human system.

KEYWORDS:

• free will
• nonlinear determinism
• activity theory
• action theory
• dialectical complexity
• behaviorism

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. The authors employ the term “free will” in a metaphorical sense and do not put forth philosophical arguments for this consideration.

2. The text of the article was edited with the help of AI ChatGPT. The task of ChatGPT was formulated as follows: “check the correctness and edit English in the following text:”.

3. Since this article is narrowly focused on the relationship between proactiveness and free will, the model presented relates only to basic postulates in cognitive questions and does not touch much on pedagogical or other practical applications of AT by contemporary authors (e.g., Bertelsen & Bødker, 2003; Blunden, 2007; Holzman, 2006; Wheelahan, 2007). The model’s clear cognitive bias also does not relate to L. S. Vygotsky’s (1978) CHAT, which is mainly concerned with the social-cultural roots of a person’s development. For instance, Engeström (1999) directly addresses Vygotsky’s “social rules-community-division of labor” factors in his discussion of a person’s output, rather than focusing on Leontiev or a more powerful group of Leontiev’s followers, such as Zinchenko (1996), Zaporozhets (2002), and Asmolov (2015), among others.

4. The Russian term “tsel”” is derived from the German word “Ziel”. Leontiev used the term extensively, and it can be translated into English in four ways: aim, goal, purpose, and intention. It is important to keep this in mind when interpreting Leontiev’s model. In my interpretation, his “tsel”” combines goal, purpose, and intention into one concept.

5. It is widely acknowledged that complex systems consist of a large number of elements, which can vary in complexity and simplicity, and interact with each other through energy or information exchange, creating direct and indirect feedback loops (Bar-Yam, 1997; Cilliers, 2005; Fuchs, 2014; Richardson et al., 2007; Thurner et al., 2018). The effects of these interactions can propagate throughout the entire system, even if specific elements only interact with a few others. Complex systems are both educable and adaptable, capable of (re)organizing their internal structure in response to external stimuli or without external intervention. Self-organization is the cornerstone feature of complex systems, which is responsible for the unpredictable and uncontrolled nature of live (human) systems that operate in conditions far from equilibrium, in a state of perturbing-disturbing dynamics. However, such systems are not solely dependent on environmental perturbations, as they can act anticipatory and generate “grown-from-within” activities (e.g., Dimitrov, 2005; Rozen, 1985). At any given moment, a complex system is attuned to a certain attractor (e.g., Morrison, 2002), which emerges from the subconscious as a dominant motivation. By choosing an attractor, the system begins to prioritize and narrow down its range of intentions, goals, and operations, even before selecting possible strategies from memory. This choice is then put into action and adjusted along the way by external influences, restrictions, or disruptive perturbations.

6. The concept of “redundant determinism” proposed here is derived from the idea of “redundancy of freedom,” which was introduced by Nikolai Bernstein, a renowned kinesiologist, to explain muscle coordination mechanisms (Bernstein, 1949/1996, 1967). This idea is still widely accepted in the field of kinesiology today (Dounskaia & Wang, 2014; Newell & McDonald, 1994; Steinkühler & Cruse, 1998; Turvey, 1990).

7. Even at the cellular level, elements of chaos (e.g., Elbert et al., 1994) and proactive processes occur through a phenomenon known as “autopoiesis”, which is distinct from regular reactive homeostasis. The latter term and theory were formulated by Chilean scholars Maturana and Varela (1973). The idea of autopoiesis developed from the view of a living organism as a network of interactions between elements that (a) reproduce themselves and (b) create a “whole” or unity (Varela et al., 1974, p. 187). Autopoiesis involves (a) self-organization in structural coupling with the environment (Maturana, 2002, pp. 15–18) and (b) a unique type of metabolism (Boden, 2000).

8. Hard determinism, hard incompatibilism, compatibilism, and libertarianism (e.g., Kane, 2011; O’Connor & Franklin, 2022).