The Neurocomputational mind meets normative epistemology¹

A version of the first third of this paper was presented at the 16th Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, College Park, Maryland, on June 10th, 1990. David Kirsh and Robert Millard both made valuable comments on that earlier draft. Subsequently, Janet Andrews, Bill Bechtel, Paul Churchland, Jerry Fodor, Bob McCauley, Doug Winblad, and two anonymous reviewers contributed unusually thoughtful and extensive comments. I am deeply indebted to them all.

Abstract

The rapid development of connectionist models in computer science and of powerful computational tools in neuroscience has encouraged eliminativist materialist philosophers to propose specific alternatives to traditional mentalistic theories of mind. One of the problems associated with such a move is that elimination of the mental would seem to remove access to ideas like truth as the foundations of normative epistemology. Thus, a successful elimination of propositional or sentential theories of mind must not only replace them for purposes of our psychology, it must also replace them for purposes of the evaluation of our theories and explanations, psychological and otherwise. This paper briefly reviews eliminativist arguments for doubting the correctness of sentential accounts of explanation, understanding, and normative evaluation. It then considers Paul Churchland's (1989) proposed alternative norms, which are framed neurocomputationally. The alternative is found wanting in several specific ways. The arguments for eliminating propositionally‐based norms are then re‐examined and it is suggested that the need for wholesale elimination is overstated. A clear gap in the traditional epistemological story is identified, however, and a more modest set of norms is proposed as a way of filling this gap, rather than as a way of entirely replacing the traditional framework.

Notes

A version of the first third of this paper was presented at the 16th Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology, College Park, Maryland, on June 10th, 1990. David Kirsh and Robert Millard both made valuable comments on that earlier draft. Subsequently, Janet Andrews, Bill Bechtel, Paul Churchland, Jerry Fodor, Bob McCauley, Doug Winblad, and two anonymous reviewers contributed unusually thoughtful and extensive comments. I am deeply indebted to them all.