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Abstract
The eleventh and twelfth centuries have traditionally been interpreted as the era when the Byzantine navy declined, and then was allowed to disappear. Historians often mark the death knell of the Byzantine navy with Emperor John II Komnenos ending the collection of taxes for localized defence fleets. Niketas Choniates describes the act as a money-hungry measure devised by the finance minister John of Poutza, whereby fleet taxes would be collected and spent centrally, leading to the end of localized fleets as funds were diverted to other sectors. This reform has traditionally been interpreted as one that led to losing a war with Venice in the 1120s, provincial insecurity, the eventual outsourcing of the Byzantine navy to the Italians, and finally the sack of Constantinople itself by the forces of the Fourth Crusade when the Italians turned against them.Such an interpretation does not however sit easily with the reign of John II Komnenos, during which on numerous occasions the navy is referenced as playing a crucial part in the emperor’s campaigns, a feature that began in Alexios’ reign and continued into Manuel’s. Though Pryor and Jeffreys have previously expressed doubt that such a centralising naval reform could really spell the end of the Byzantine fleet, and possibly the empire itself, this paper will build upon that doubt with evidence that necessitates a re-evaluation of the traditional interpretation. First, the narrative of John’s war with Venice in the 1120s will be examined, followed by how the subsequent naval reform was shaped by these events, which themselves only confirmed the experiences of the Byzantine Navy in previous decades, and so highlighted the need for reform. This analysis will demonstrate that a centralising reform was a coherent measure undertaken to increase the efficiency of the fleet, and to recognize officially trends in organization that had already emerged under Alexios. Subsequent fleet operations in John and Manuel’s reigns reveal that the role of the navy did indeed change in the early twelfth century, but the narrative of decline is false. Throughout this section it will also be shown that analysis of the Byzantine navy has been overly shaped by use of hostile sources. The second part of this paper will then move on to highlight three major uses of the fleet that have been undervalued by scholars focused on traditional sea battles: its use on rivers as well as the sea, its use for transport and logistics, and its ‘soft power’ diplomatic capacity. The combination of these factors reveal a Byzantine navy that was a crucial part of the Komnenian restoration of Byzantine fortunes in the twelfth century, and that its decline after the death of Manuel must be seen as a product of other factors, rather than a cause of the late twelfth-century imperial decline in itself.
Notes
1. Choniates, Historia, 54. I would like to thank Prof. Jeffreys, Prof. Pryor and the anonymous reviewers for their feedback on this paper, as well as Prof. Otsuki and JSPS for funding this research.
2. Ahrweiler, Byzance et la mer, 175–294; R-J. Lilie, Handel und Politik, 613–43; Devaney, ‘Byzantine-Venetian Conflict’, 137; Herrin, ‘Collapse in the Twelfth Century’, 114–6, 119, 122–4; Herrin, ‘Realities of Provincial Government’, 84–8; and Empire of Manuel, 233. Malamut, ‘Insulaires des 10e–12e’, 70–1.
3. Pryor and Jeffreys, Age of the ΔΡΟΜΩΝ, 111, n. 198.
4. God’s Regents on Earth, Curated by J. Shea, and Devaney, ‘Byzantine-Venetian Conflict’, 127.
5. William of Tyre, Chronicon, 12.9–12, 556–62; Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana 3.3, 621–3; Tafel and Thomas, ‘Handels- und Staatsgeschichte’ 1, No. xxxviii, 78; Dandolo, ‘Chronicon Venetum’, 232; ‘Historia Ducum Veneticorum’, 73; ‘Translatio Isidori’, 322–3; Riley-Smith, ‘Venetian Crusade of 1122–1124’, 339–50; Queller and Katele, ‘Venice and the Conquest of Jerusalem’, 29; and Devaney, ‘Byzantine-Venetian Conflict’, 135.
6. Choniates, Historia, 54; H. Ahrweiler, Byzance et la mer, 175–294; Lilie, Handel und Politik, 613–43; and Devaney, ‘Byzantine-Venetian Conflict’, 137.
7. Sathas, ‘Synopsis Chronikē’, 22–2; Herrin, ‘Realities of Provincial Government’, 86, n. 144. Sathas and Herrin give 1135 as the most likely date. Indeed, Poutza is not attested as Megas Logariastes until Manuel’s reign, and his continued high office in 1157 suggests that the 1130s were the earliest he could have been in a position to shape such a policy, particularly in light of his lowly origins and assumedly longer path up the career ladder. Sakellion, ‘Council of 1157’, Πατμιακὴ Βιβλιοθήκη, 316. On the question of whether Venice knew about the state of the empire’s naval defences, see n. 16.
8. Evidence of Venetians trading in Constantinople between 1118 and 1122 is found in: Della Rocca and Lombardo, eds., Documenti del commercio veneziano, Nos. 41, 42, 45, and 46.
9. Nicol, Byzantium and Venice, 79; T. Madden, Enrico Dandolo and the Rise of Venice, 16–17; Devaney, ‘Byzantine-Venetian Conflict’, 139; Queller and Katele state that they merely left because the job was done and the other allies had also dispersed, rather than deliberately antagonizing the empire: Queller and Katele, ‘Venice and the Conquest of Jerusalem’, 37.
10. Dandolo, ‘Chronicon Venetum’, 234; and ‘Historia Ducum Veneticorum’, 74.
11. Devaney, ‘Byzantine-Venetian Conflict’, 139.
12. Ibid., 140; and Pryor, ‘Water, Water Everywhere’, 23–4.
13. Fulcher of Chartres, Historia 3.41, 758–60.
14. Dandolo, ‘Chronicon Venetum’, 234–5; ‘Historia Ducum Veneticorum’, 74; ‘Translatio Isidori’, 323–4; ‘Annales venetici breves’, 71; Kinnamos, Epitome, 281; and Cessi and Bennato, eds., Venetiarum historia, 106–7.
15. Devaney, ‘Byzantine-Venetian Conflict’, 139.
16. Böhm, Flota i polityka, 144–54, 171–2. Here he references fleets built and anchored on Chios, a fleet built near Smyrna, pirate fleets from Tzachas’ subordinates built on Chios, Rhodes and unspecified other islands; and at one point a Byzantine fleet disembarking on Samos, hauling their ships ashore and tarring them, again suggesting naval facilities of some sort. Zonaras, Epitome historiarum, vol. 4, XVIII, 22, 14, 737; Anna Komnene, Alexias, XI, 222, 335, 350–1. (My thanks to Böhm for providing me with English translations of his work.) Such an argument is also supported by the only reference to shipbuilding in John’s reign after this being on Cyprus, see n. 60.
17. Prodromos, Historische Gedichte. Poem IV, lines 270–3. For further analysis of these poems, see Lau, ‘Power of Poetry’, 195–214; Magdalino, ‘The Triumph of 1133’, 53–70.
18. ‘Ὧ νἰκη Λαοδικεινή, νίκη Σωζοπολῖτις, / ἑτέρα νίκη Σκυθικὴκαὶ Δαλματῖτις ἄλλη, / ἑτέρα δ᾽Ἀμωριανή, Λημναϊκὴ δ᾽ἑτέρα, / ἀπλῶς ὁπόσας κατὰ γῆν καὶ θάλασσαν καὶ νήσους’, ibid.
19. Actes des Lavras I, Nos. 20, 79.
20. Basilakes, ‘μέγαν Δομέστικον’, 117; Prodromos, Historische Gedichte, V, l. 19; XI, l. 120; XV, ll. 67–70; XVI, l. 213; XVII, ll. 130, 348; XXV, ll. 42, 64; all reference victories at sea, in sea battles, or dominion over the sea and islands. Axouch was made Megas Domestikos at John’s succession in 1118 according to Choniates, having been John’s childhood friend and companion for his military training according to the same Basilakes oration, and he is attested in that office commanding troops throughout John and Manuel’s reign by Choniates, Kinnamos, Prodromos and in the sigillographic record until his death around 1150. Choniates, Historia, 9–10. For an overview, see ‘Ioannes Axouch, megas domestikos’, Prosopography of the Byzantine World: http://db.pbw.kcl.ac.uk/pbw2011/entity/person/109,598.
21. Dandolo, ‘Chronicon Venetum’, 236.
22. Devaney, ‘Byzantine-Venetian Conflict’, 141.
23. Birkenmeier, Komenenian Army, 85, 138; and Lau, ‘Case for an Alliance’, 19–35.
24. Mas’ud: Michael the Syrian, Chronicle. 16.2, 608. Álmos: The date of Álmos’ flight is the subject of debate, with Moravcsik and Chalandon believing that he fled immediately after being blinded by Coloman c. 1116. However, Makk establishes uncontroversial termini on the basis of three facts: (1) the Hungarian Chronicle tells us that Álmos fled ‘from King Stephen’; (2) both Kinnamos and Choniates place Álmos’ flight in the reign of John; (3) he died in Constantinople in 1127. He narrows this range of 1118–27 down however by noting that Álmos’ sister Adalheid was married to the Bohemian prince Vladislav I and was welcomed at court in 1123. This would be unlikely if Álmos was a persona non grata. Finally, Choniates tells us that the war started directly because of Álmos’ flight, and that therefore it would not have been many years in advance of the war starting. This must mean Álmos arrived in Constantinople around 1125, a date supported by Fine, though he advocates the Hungarian wars started before the flight. Kinnamos, Epitome. 9; Choniates, Historia, 17; ‘Chronicon Pictum’, 459; Chalandon, Jean II Comnène, 57; Moravcsik, Byzantium and the Magyars, 77–8; Fine, Early Medieval Balkans, 234–6; Makk, Árpáds and the Comneni, 22–3; Gradinja, Priest of Diokleia, Χρονικό. XLV, 174–6; Fine, Early Medieval Balkans, 233.
25. Devaney, ‘Byzantine-Venetian Conflict’, 141.
26. Dandolo, ‘Chronicon Venetum’, 236.
27. Date of Gabras’ rebellion: Choniates in the context of the recovery of Trebizond in 1139 merely tells us that Gabras had long been a tyrant there, but in a monody by Prodromos for his teacher Stephen Skylitzes, who had been made Metropolitan of Trebizond in 1140, he tells us that the province had been detached for 14 years before his arrival, giving us a clear date of 1126 for the rebellion. Petit, ‘Monodie’, 3. This argument was first advanced by Chalandon, Jean II Comnène, 37, 84; and Cahen, ‘Une Famille byzantine’, 145–9.
28. Kekaumenos, Strategicon, 87, 297, Roueché translation: 87, 10; Pryor and Jeffreys, Age of the ΔΡΟΜΩΝ, 89.
29. Ibn al-Athir, ‘A.H. 245’, 162; Theophanes continuatus, VI, 29; Eickhoff, Seekrieg und Seepolitik, 325–43. Indeed, the thematic fleets had joined Bardas Skleros and Bardas Phokas in revolt against Basil II in the late tenth century and had to be defeated by the imperial fleet. As such, the benefits to the emperor of a centralised navy and the neglect of the provincial fleets may date from as early as Basil II. Skylitzes, 16–8. Synopsis historiarum, 314–27, 334–8; Zonaras, Epitome historiarum, vol. 4. XVII.5–7, 107–10, 112–7; Pryor and Jeffreys, Age of the ΔΡΟΜΩΝ, 72–3.
30. Ahrweiler, Byzance et la mer, 209–10; Pryor and Jeffreys, Age of the ΔΡΟΜΩΝ, 100–1. See below for discussion of the Megas Doux under John.
31. Anna Komnene, Alexias, XI.x.1–8; Malamut, ‘Insulaires des 10e–12e’, 65; Pryor and Jeffreys, Age of the ΔΡΟΜΩΝ, 109–10.
32. The exact typology of ships used, and the superiority of the Latin galea over the Byzantine dromon by the end of the twelfth century, has been fully outlined in Pryor and Jeffreys, Age of the ΔΡΟΜΩΝ, 76–122 and 407–44. More recently, the evolution of the dromon between the fifth and the tenth centuries has been outlined in: Zuckerman, ‘On the Byzantine Dromon’, 57–98.
33. Choniates, Historia, 54–9, see 57–8 for the specific anecdotes; Papadoupoulou, ‘Problem of Small Change’, 206; Magdalino, Empire of Manuel, 254; Böhm, Rola flot obcych, 34–42.
34. For further discussion of Athens and whence naval taxes came, see the final section of this paper. For Michael Choniates, see Setton, ‘Michael Choniates’, 234–6.
35. See Malamut, ‘Les Insulaires des 10e–12e’, 70–1, for a conclusion that takes Choniates at his word.
36. See Kaldellis, ‘Paradox, Reversal and the Meaning of History’, 75–99; Simpson goes so far as to say John is portrayed ‘as an Ioannes imaginaire’. Simpson, ‘Introduction’, Niketas Choniates, 45.
37. Terminology used for different ships is a subject fraught by evolving use and the literary use of classicizing terms to further complicate the picture. The generic terms trireme and dromon are used for not only the smaller galeai class vessel, which this article mainly concerns, but also the larger chelandion bireme variant, originally used for transporting horses and cargo, and the smaller akatia, see n. 48. All of these are referred to as triremes or dromoi in the sources, see: Pryor and Jeffreys, Age of the ΔΡΟΜΩΝ, 164–73, 188–92; Zuckerman, ‘On the Byzantine Dromon’, 57–98.
38. See Figs. and , from Pryor and Jeffreys, Age of the ΔΡΟΜΩΝ, Figs. 19 and 20, 193 and 205.
39. Ibid., Figs. 30, 31, 297, 301.
40. Pulak et al., ‘Byzantine Shipwrecks from Yenikapı’, 62–8, storm reference on 62.
41. Ibid. See 67 for the oarage system, and 70 for conclusions.
42. Bockius, Die spätrömischen Schiffswracks aus Mainz; Museum für Antike Schiffahrt, Mainz Website.
43. Choniates, Historia, 17–8.
44. Stephenson, Byzantium’s Balkan Frontier, 209; Madgearu, Byzantine Military Organization, 149 and Birkenmeier, Komnenian Army, 90–1.
45. Kinnamos, Epitome, 10–1.
46. ‘ἥπλωσεν Ἴστρος ὑπτιάσας τὴν ῥάχιν καὶ τοῖς ἐμοῖς πλώϊμος ὤφθη ναυμάχοις’, Prodromos, Historische Gedichte, Poem XXV, ll. 41–2.
47. Prodromos, Historische Gedichte, Poem XXX, ll. 120–229; Kinnamos, Epitome, 98, 113, 278, 300; Choniates, Historia, 160. For discussion of the Komnenian navy from the 1160s onwards, see Pryor, ‘Venetian Fleet’, 108–9, and Pryor and Jeffreys, Age of the ΔΡΟΜΩΝ, 76–122.
48. Kinnamos, Epitome, 92, 113–4, 116.
49. Ibid. For a discussion on ‘akatia’, see Böhm, Rola flot obcych, 189–92.
50. Ibid., 120–1.
51. Iasos: Cornieti ‘Iasos di Caria’, 449–57. Anaea: Müller-Wiener, ‘Mittelalterliche Befestigungen im Ionien’, 70; Foss and Winfield, Byzantine Fortifications, 146. Trebenna and Yarbaşçandır: Deluigi, Winter in the Land of Rûm, 72–4, based on the archaeological surveys of Akyürek, ‘Bey Dağları’, 6–7. Yarbaşçandır Kalesi: Akyürek, ‘Pamphylia‘da Bizans’, 234. Antiocheia-ad-Cragum: Rosenbaum et al., Coastal Cities, 21; Deluigi, Winter in the Land of Rûm, 123. Kızılcaşehir: Redford, Landscape and the State, 16–8; Doğan, ‘Byzantine Surveys around Alanya’, 65; Deluigi, Winter in the Land of Rûm, 75–6. Syedra and Iotape: Rosenbaum et al., Coastal Cities, 38; Redford, Medieval Anatolia, 19; Deluigi, Winter in the Land of Rûm, 123; Kalanoros: Redford, Medieval Anatolia, 14–5; Krabbenhöft, Walls of Alanya, 51–2; Deluigi, Winter in the Land of Rûm, 74–5.
52. Aylward, ‘Byzantine fortifications at Pegae’, 179–203; his conclusions are supported by Deluigi, Winter in the Land of Rûm, 76–7.
53. ‘Expedition of the Emperor Frederick’, 96; Foss and Winfield, Byzantine Fortifications, 154.
54. Ibn Al-Athir, Crusading Period, 337.
55. Italikos, ‘Λόγος βασιλικὸς’, 251; Edwards, Fortifications of Armenian Cilicia, 161–7; Hild and Hellenkemper, Kilikien und Isaurien, 191. Seleukeia dominates the river crossing at the River Kalykadnos, while Tarsos is on the coast – John overwintering there in 1137–8 so as to maintain contact with the fleet to provide supplies and communication back to Constantinople may also be significant: William of Tyre, Chronicon, 702; Lilie, Byzantium and the Crusades, 138; Foss, ‘Defences of Asia Minor’, 59.
56. Kinnamos, Epitome, 24; Choniates, Historia, 38; Italikos, ‘Μονῳδία εἰς τὸν σεβαστοκράτορα’ and ‘Πρὸς τὸν βασιλικὸν γραμματικόν’, 130–1, 181–3 respectively; and William of Tyre, Chronicon, 15.19, 700.
57. Choniates, Historia, 34–6; Kinnamos, Epitome, 21. See in particular an entire court poem devoted to how John and his army survived despite the conditions: Prodromos, Historische Gedichte, Poem XIX, in particular ll. 92–111 for how they lived in constant fear of attack with no water to drink in blazing hot days and freezing nights.
58. Sestini, Viaggio da Costantinopoli, 83.
59. For further analysis of Lopadion and John’s fortress network, see Lau, ‘Ioannoupolis’, 435–63.
60. It also would have allowed John’s and Manuel’s army to spend less time foraging, according to Haldon’s calculations on Byzantine logistics, a study that though invaluable on the logistical support that an army would require from pack animals and a baggage train, does not consider the effect of resupply by sea on an army’s speed of movement while on campaign, which must be seen as a significant factor in John and Manuel’s successes, and indeed failures in the case of the Neokaisareia campaign. Haldon, ‘Roads and communications’, 131–58.
61. ‘Τί φὴς ὁ τῶν Σικελῶν ἀρχηγέτης, ὁ διαπλοϊζόμενος κιβδήλοις βουλαῖς.
καὶ ἀδοκίμοις ἐννοίαις ἐπινηχόμενος; ὁρᾷς τὸ του βασιλέως προβούλιον,.
τὴν ἑτοιμασίαν τὰς τριήρεις τοὺς στρατιώτας’, and ‘ὁ θρασὺς Ἀλαμανὸς ὁ τὴν ὀφρῦν ὑπὲρ τὸν κρόταφον αἴρων καὶ ὀνειροπολῶν τὰ κενώτατα καὶ ἐπὶ κενοῖς ἐρειδόμενος καὶ ἀνεμώλιά τινα διανοούμενος σκέμματα, πείρᾳ μαθών σου τὴν μεγαλονίκου ἡμῶν αὐτοκράτορος εὐανδρίαν καὶ γενναιότητα’, Basilakes, ‘λογος εἰς τὸν Δομέστικον’, 118.
62. See: Malamut, ‘Insulaires des 10e–12e’, 65–6. Here it is noted that after Cyprus revolted against Alexios in 1092 he put Eutathios Philokales in charge with naval forces, with which he fought the possibly unhistorical engagement with the Genoese and Pisans mentioned in n. 31. From here Cyprus appears as a source of men and materials in support of both crusader and imperial expeditions in the Levant, and in 1186 when Cyprus revolted under Isaac Komnenos, Isaac II Angelos sent 70 boats against him, implying he had naval forces at his command. Anna Komnene, Alexias, XI.x.1–8; Kinnamos, Epitome, 178; Choniates, Historia, 369–70; Documents Arméniens I, 187.
63. Herrin, ‘Realities of Provincial Government’, 277; Magdalino, Empire of Manuel, 234.
64. Magdalino, Empire of Manuel, 235; Haldon, ‘State Structures and Administration’, 544. See n. 67 for Euthathios Philokales, who was both praetor and Megas Doux in 1118, though the same man never held this position again.
65. Ahrweiler, Byzance et la mer, 276–9; Magdalino, Empire of Manuel, 174–5, 235, 257, n. 99.
66. Magdalino, Χαρτουλαράτα; Magdalino, Empire of Manuel, 235.
67. Choniates refers to John dividing his army into ‘Keltic’ (western), Macedonian and Pecheneg divisions at Shayzar: Choniates, Historia, 29–30. Serbian, Turkish and Anatolian forces are mentioned in other engagements, but never troops from Hellas-Peloponnese, the Aegean islands, or Cyprus.
68. In 1118, Eumathios Philokales, the former Doux of Cyprus, is attested as both praetor of Hellas-Peloponnese and Megas Doux, but due to his age (having first been made governor of Cyprus in 1093 and held that position until c. 1112) he cannot have held these positions long. DO 2, Seal 22.15, 68; Miklosich and Muller, Acta Diplomatica graeca, 96. His successor as praetor is a certain Kouropalates named Michael, and the praetor-ship was never again linked with the position of Megas Doux: Catalogue of Byzantine Seals, Seal 8.33; Zacos, Byzantine Lead Seals II, No. 1,010, 444; Magdalino, Empire of Manuel, 234. There is no known Megas Doux until Stephanos Kontestephanos under Manuel, however.
69. ‘Καί ποτε τὴν τῶν κατ᾽αὐτὴν ποιουμένου ἐνέργειαν Ἰωάννου τινός, τὸ ἐπίκλην Στραβορωμανοῦ, ἐξυπηρετουμένου τῷ ἐπὶ τῆς βασιλείας Μανουὴλ τοῦ Κομνηνοῦ μεγάλῳ δομαστίκῳ ἐκείνῳ Ἰωάννῃ τῷ Ἀξούχῳ, οὗ δηλαδὴ δικαίῳ καὶ τὴν τοιαύτην διεῖπεν ὁ δηλωθεὶς Στραβορωμανὸς διοίκησιν’, Life of Leontios, 67. This quote is discussed extensively in n. 30 on 179–80 in the same volume. Also see Magdalino, Empire of Manuel, 257, n. 99. This latter reference notes how Theodore Mavrozomes, a future mezazon, or ‘prime minister’ had experience of organizing the oria and commanding ships before coming into that role, demonstrating a continued link between the role (though not the title) of prime minister that Axouch held and organising naval taxes. Equally, the fact that there was a ‘Doux of Crete’ tells us that by Manuel’s reign at least, that there were provincial Doukes subordinate to the Megas Doux in these provinces.
70. Magdalino, ‘Triumph of 1133’, 56–7.
71. Herrin, ‘Realities of Provincial Government’, 86–8.