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Abstract
South Korea has performed well in international sporting competitions over the past quarter of a century, as revealed by Olympic Games medal counts. Although a growing body of literature has investigated the elite sport systems of Western countries and China, few sports scholars have examined South Korea. This article begins this analysis by examining how the South Korean government has used elite sport for nation-building and promoting national identity; how it has employed a strategy for hosting major events; and assesses these factors and the role of business as significant contributors for the success of Korean elite sport.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Dr. Mahfoud Amara and Dr. Paul Downward, School of Sport, Exercise and Health Sciences, Loughborough University, for their constructive comments and intellectual guidance on the draft of this article.
Notes
1. In this article, Korea will be adopted to refer to the Republic of Korea (South Korea). Green (see Green, ‘An Analysis of Elite Sport Policy Change’), suggested that an operational definition of ‘elite sport’ can be adopted from the Canadian definition by Semotiuk, ‘High Performance Sport in Canada’, 7.
2. Im, H.B., ‘From Affiliation to Association’, 75.
3. Ok, ‘The Political Significance of Sport’, 665.
4. Im, Y.T., Fifty-Year History of the Republic of Korea, 21–9.
5. Irma and Kim, ‘Econometric Model of the Korean Economy’, 77–108.
6. Wade and Kim, Economic Development of South Korea, 21.
7. See Moran, ‘Corruption and NIC Development’, 165–71. The most significant of these was the disposal of repatriated property. After the Second World War and liberation from Japan, the American Office of the Property Custodian took control of many previously Japanese-owned assets. Rhee's regime claimed the rest. Rhee then tried to develop a patron-client structure by influencing foreign aid and the domestic economy.
8. Lee, Y.H., The State, Society and Big Business in South Korea, 23–4.
9. Eckert et al., Korea Old and New, 347–87.
10. Song, The Rise of the Korean Economy, 62.
11. Paik, The Crisis and Response in Korean Political Economy, 91–108.
12. Im, Y.T., Fifty-Year History of the Republic of Korea, 91–6.
13. Ibid., 147.
14. See Cumings, ‘Civil Society in East and West’, 23. It lasted for nine days and became a major tragedy. Reports of the number of people killed varied from 600 to 2,000. It was a spontaneous demonstration by students and other citizens in protest against the new martial law regime that Chun had just announced.
15. Shorrock, ‘South Korea’, 95–110.
16. Kihl, Y.W., Transforming Korean Politics, 8.
17. Cotton, ‘Korea Under Roh Tae Woo' 170–84.
18. Lee, Y.H., The State, Society and Big Business in South Korea, 46–77.
19. Eckert et al., Korea Old and New, 347–87.
20. Kihl, Y.W., Transforming Korean Politics, 82.
21. See Im, Y.T., Fifty-Year History of the Republic of Korea, 356. Kim Young Sam's government is no longer called the Seventh Republic because the president himself and other senior central-government officials were not military people, which implies that it was a democratic regime
22. Song, The Rise of the Korean Economy, 83.
23. Kihl, Y.W., Transforming Korean Politics, 79.
24. Eun, ‘State and Power in East Asian Development’, 182.
25. Montes, ‘Three Complications in Asian Economic Recovery’, 87–92.
26. See the World Alliance of Reformed Churches (WARC), http://www.warc.ch/pc/rw002/03.html.
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29. Kihl, Y.W., Transforming Korean Politics, 9.
30. See Canada Asia Commentary, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/apcity/unpan018746pdf.
31. Mo and Moon, ‘Business-Government Relations under Kim Dae-Jung’.
32. See Han, Internet, Social Capital, and Democracy in the Information Age, 14–16. When Chung Mong Joon, Hyundai's president and another candidate, who had pledged to withdraw from the campaign in favour of Roh, and then renounced that pledge at the last minute, young people used the Internet and mobile phones to persuade their peers to vote for Roh, directly affecting the results and making those in their twenties and thirties a major political force in Korea. These young voters formed a youth group called No-sa-mo to support Roh and to oppose the conservative Grand National Party's Lee Hoi Chang.
33. See International Monetary Fund, http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2005/121405a.htm.
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39. Ha and Mangan, ‘Ideology, Politics, Power’.
40. Kim, S.Y., ‘A Study of the Sports Policies of Korean Regimes’, 13–61.
41. Jeong, Korean Sports Fantasy, 119–24.
42. Ha and Mangan, ‘Ideology, Politics, Power’, 231.
43. Kim, S.Y., ‘A Study of the Sports Policies of Korean Regimes’, 54–61.
44. Lee, W.Y., The Politics of Sport in the 21st Century, 113–17.
45. Im, Y.T., Fifty-Year History of the Republic of Korea, 236.
46. Lee, W.Y., The Politics of Sport in the 21st Century, 122–3.
47. Park, S.J., The Seoul Olympics, 3–15.
48. Kihl, Y.W., Transforming Korean Politics, 79–82.
49. Ahn, The 1988 Seoul Summer Olympic Games.
50. Ha and Mangan, ‘Ideology, Politics, Power’, 231.
51. Ibid, 236.
52. Im, Y.T., Fifty-Year History of the Republic of Korea, 235.
53. Choi, ‘Building Bridges’.
54. See IT Times, http://www.ittimes.co.kr/en/node.asp?em=M&mcode=200505&idx=500.
55. Jeong, Korean Sports Fantasy, 145–69.
56. Park, Y.O. ‘The Political Economy of Sport’.
57. Im, Y.T. Fifty-Year History of the Republic of Korea', 236–8.
58. Ha and Mangan, ‘Ideology, Politics, Power’.
59. Kim, S.J., ‘Sport and Politics in the Republic of Korea’, 197.
60. See Ha and Mangan, ‘A Curious Conjunction’, 343–7. The political state of affairs during the early 1900s naturally provoked nationalistic feelings and impetus within education. This nationalistic attitude towards sport could be observed prominently within physical education sectors in schools, particularly Christian schools, which were leading the nationalistic movement. While the mission schools taught sport to Korean children, the foreign language schools brought sport to the community. The YMCA was the central place for the promotion of mass participation in sport. When the Japanese authorities attempted to suppress athletic events organised by Koreans in the years following the occupation, the YMCA, organised by non-Koreans, guaranteed the survival of the sports introduced by non-Koreans, in the late nineteenth century. A significant force propelling YMCA sport was nationalism and the leaders of the independence movement as well as a few enthusiastic and determined missionaries contributed to this proliferation of sport.
61. Roche, Mega-Events and Modernity, 194–235.
62. Koh, ‘South Korea and the Asian Games’.
63. Whang, ‘Korea and Japan 2002’; Kyrolainen, ‘Approaches to the Study of Sports in International Relations’.
64. Horne and Manzenreiter, ‘Accounting for Mega-Events’, 193–203.
65. Park, Y.O., ‘The Political Economy of Sport’.
66. According to data from an interview with a senior official in Samsung Sports Bureau on 12December 2007. Lee Kun Hee, a former chief executive officer (CEO) of Samsung, played a key role in maintaining sport teams. Lee served as the president of the Korean Wrestling Federation from 1982 to 1997 and has been a member of IOC since 1996.
67. Lee, H.L., A Study of Korean Sport History, 697.