Abstract
At the Guangzhou Asian Games, the performances of China's athletes, the officials and the host city of Guangzhou were outstanding. China's journey to the Asian Games in Guangzhou and the accompanying political and sporting machinations throughout are considered in the initial discussion of this essay. The analysis subsequently focuses on Australia's metamorphosis as an ‘Asian’ nation and the sporting, cultural and diplomatic implications this could have for Australia and China. Would this signal Australia's egress from the Commonwealth Games and the Commonwealth per se, thus cutting the British Imperial umbilicus? The presence of Australia at the Asian Games may also enhance the soft power ambitions China has for its engagement in the Asian Games; succeeding in competitions that include a global sports ‘heavyweight’ like Australia would add kudos to the performances of Chinese athletes. How would Australia benefit from this shift? Considering Australia's geopolitical and economic ties with East Asia would an increased level of sporting engagement with China concomitantly produce cultural, economic and political successes? In the long term, Australia may inevitably become part of the post-colonial East Asian world: the future world of power, wealth and geopolitical influence.
Notes
1. See CitationHong and Zhouxiang, “China, The Asian Games and Asian Politics,” 98–112.
2.CitationHong, “Communist China and the Asian Games 1951–1990,” 479–92.
3. See CitationHong and Xiong, “Communist China: Sport, Politics and Diplomacy.”
4. For an informative overview of the final phase of the Chinese Civil War, see Lynch, The Chinese Civil War 1945–1949.
5. Guttmann, The Olympics, 91–4.
6. Hong, “Communist China and the Asian Games 1951–1990,” 480.
7. Guttmann, The Olympics, 144–5.
8. Hong and Zhouxiang, “China, The Asian Games and Asian Politics,” 100.
9. Ibid.
10. See CitationKurlantzick, Charm Offensive, 176–96.
11. See CitationHorton and Saunders, “The ‘East Asian’ Olympics: What of Sustainable Legacies?” 11–12.
12.CitationCha, Beyond the Final Score, 85–6.
13. See “CitationThe Xth Asian Games in Seoul: A Successful Venture,” 700–2.
14. Typically, little or no comment regarding this achievement could be found in the Australian media.
15. Cha, Beyond the Final Score, 90–3.
16.CitationXu, “Modernizing China in the Olympic Spotlight,” 94–5.
17. See CitationHorton, “Geopolitical Balance Post-Beijing 2008,” 2541–2.
18. See CitationIOC, Final Report of the IOC XXIX Olympiad, Beijing, 16.
19. Hong and Zhouxiang, “China, The Asian Games and Asian Politics,” 109–10.
20. This indicates that Guangzhou's GDP for 2009, which is nearly ¥950 billion, was larger than such as countries Vietnam. See “CitationChina to Close Asian Games After Spending More Money Than London Olympics” (Bloomberg News, November 26, 2010 12:49 PM GMTþ1000). http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-11-25/china-to-close-asian-games-with-budget-topping-london-olympics.html
21. Macleod, Calum, “China Turns to Youth for Asian Games” (USA TODAY, accessed June 21, 2012). http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2011-01-03-asia-games_N.htm
22. Ibid.
23. “GAGOC presents OCA with Citation16th Asian Games Archive.”
24. Hong and Zhouxiang, “The Politicisation of the Beijing Olympics,” 158–66.
25. See “Beijing's Bad Faith Olympics.” (New York Times, August 22, 2008), cited in Nafees A. Syed. “The Effect of Beijing 2008 on China's Image in the United States: A Study of US Media and Polls.” The International Journal of the History of Sport 27, no. 16–18 (2008): 2863–2892.
26. P. Waldmeir, “Shanghai: Expo has a Transforming Effect” (Financial Times.com, October 27, 2010, 10:45). http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/de3414cc-dfc8-11df-bed9-00144feabdc0.html#axzz243TyT1jzBy.
27. “Shanghai's World Expo to Close After Attracting Record 72 Million Visitors” (Bloomberg News, October 31, 2010 10:06 AM GMT+1000). http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-31/shanghai-s-world-expo-to-close-after-attracting-record-72-million-visitors.html.
29. “China to Close Asian Games After Spending More Money Than London Olympics.”
30. “Guangzhou Asian Games Shows China's soft power: Zardari” (People's Daily Online, November 14, 2010, 10:37). http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/7198667.html.
31. Ibid.
32. Hong and Zhouxiang, “China, The Asian Games and Asian Politics,” 188.
33. I. Ransom, “Chastened China Sees Tough Road ahead to Rio” (Reuters, accessed August 20, 2012). http://www.reuters.com/london-olympics-2012/articles/china/liu-xiang/2012/08/12/chastened-china-sees-tough-road-ahead-rio.
34. Ibid.
35. Attributed to Lao-tzu, who is traditionally regarded as the founder of Taoism. See, “CitationLao-tzu, The Father of Taoism.”
36. For an excellent overview see, CitationWang and Vangeli, “China's Leadership Succession.”
37. See CitationHorton, “The Asian Impact on the Sportisation Process.” 518–28.
38. Ibid., 521–4.
39. See CitationAustralia in the Asian Century: An Issues Paper, December, 2011, 3.
40. “CitationAustralia's Trade with East Asia,” 7.
41.CitationFitzgerald, “Australia and China at Forty,” 20.
42. Ibid.
43. In Guangzhou, there were 14 additional sports, while in Incheon, there were only 7. The established and idiosyncratically Asian sports of Kabaddi, Sepak Takraw, Karate and Wushu were included, while board games (Chess, Weigi and Xiangi), cue sports (Billiards and Snooker), Dragonboat racing, Cricket (because of the lack of facilities) Softball and Dancesports have been omitted. See “CitationThe Olympic Council of Asia.”
44. “China–Australia Trade Figures – Citation2011.” Australian merchandise trade with China, 2011:
45.CitationHorton, “Sport in Asia,” 131–9.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Peter Horton
Peter Horton is a senior lecturer in the School of Education at James Cook University and a fellow of the Cairns Institute. He is a member of the editorial boards of The International Journal of the History of Sport and International Sports Studies.