Entanglement throughout Economic Science: The End of a Separate Welfare Economics

Abstract

In the 1980s, Amartya Sen (1987, p. 51) complained of ‘the impoverishment of welfare economics’. By 1993, Sir Partha Dasgupta (1993, p. 71), citing Hilary Putnam, had embraced the entanglement of theory, facts and values, and presented a theoretically rigorous, factually based, and deeply ethical social welfare function, which has rich non-utilitarian ethical elements sharply distinguishing it from the old ‘welfarist’ construction, and which he called a social evaluation function. Those things that the ‘new’ welfare economics had notoriously shied away from, above all interpersonal comparisons, are in full flower in Dasgupta's concept, and he is so confident of the moral support of his colleagues in the field that he seldom discusses ethical issues. Could one ask for anything more? We believe one can, and that framing this work as a separate branch of economics called ‘welfare theory’ limits its reach and influence, and offers its enemies an excuse for evading its message. What is more we argue that the logical entailments of entanglement render the concept of a separate ‘welfare’ economics meaningless.

Acknowledgments

The authors wish to thank Steven Pressman, Jane Hudak and Kristen Buodt, and Lisa Bendall-Walsh for her editorial advice and assistance. The usual disclaimers apply.

Notes

¹Dirac's statements about beauty are reported in many places. They are not in his published papers, which are purely technical. See Kragh (1990, pp. 275–292).