The Economics of Regulating Cross-border Finance: Two New Views

Abstract

For much of the 20th century the dominant view in macroeconomics was that cross-border finance needed to be regulated in order to balance the ‘impossible trinity’ first sketched by John Maynard Keynes in his two books on monetary theory. The dominant view in development economics during the same period was that cross-border capital flows need to be regulated for similar reasons but also to mobilize domestic resources for economic development. The view that capital mobility was something to be constrained fell out of favor in mainstream economics by the 1980s and 1990s. The experience of numerous financial crises in the past 20 years has spawned new economic theories that reintroduce the notion that cross-border finance can cause financial instability. One strand of new theory in this realm picks up from Ragnar Nurkse, Hyman Minsky, and others, and has become popular in many emerging market capitals and in the United Nations system. Another strand of new theory comes from modern welfare economics and is gaining ground in mainstream economics, central banks, and the Bretton Woods institutions. This paper examines these new breakthroughs and traces them to their origins in economic thought. Coupled with new econometric evidence on the efficacy of capital account regulation, the regulation of capital flows is justified now more than ever.

Notes

¹Minsky defines hedge, speculative, and Ponzi units as: ‘Three distinct income-debt relations for economic units, which are labeled as hedge, speculative, and Ponzi finance, can be identified. Hedge financing units are those which can fulfill all of their contractual payment obligations by their cash flows: the greater the weight of equity financing in the liability structure, the greater the likelihood that the unit is a hedge financing unit. Speculative finance units are units that can meet their payment commitments on “income account” on their liabilities, even as they cannot repay the principle out of income cash flows. Such units need to “roll over” their liabilities: (e.g., issue new debt to meet commitments on maturing debt). Governments with floating debts, corporations with floating issues of commercial paper, and banks are typically hedge units. For Ponzi units, the cash flows from operations are not sufficient to fulfill either the repayment of principle or the interest due on outstanding debts by their cash flows from operations. Such units can sell assets or borrow. Borrowing to pay interest or selling assets to pay interest (and even dividends) on common stock lowers the equity of a unit, even as it increases liabilities and the prior commitment of future incomes’ (Minsky, 1992, pp. 7–8).