Sen’s Economics in The Idea of Justice: Induction vs Deduction

ABSTRACT

In The Idea of Justice, Amartya Sen revealingly differentiates his capability approach from the mainstream in terms of structure: comparative vis-à-vis transcendental. Instead of constructing models based on fundamental principles and questing for perfection, Sen seeks to compare feasible options and to choose one from among them. What lies behind this strategy is respect for a plurality of values and reasoning in society. In this context, description plays a key role in this approach, given that plural values and reasoning can be reflected only in an inductive manner which requires rich description. The purpose of this article is to examine how Sen’s approach is related to the Cambridge tradition, which typically embraces inductive methods of reasoning, with a particular focus on the influence of Maurice Dobb. In relation to this, some possible extensions of his approach will be discussed.

KEYWORDS:

• Amartya Sen
• capability approach
• Cambridge tradition
• inductive methods
• Maurice Dobb

JEL CODES:

• A130
• B120
• B310
• B410
• B500
• I310

Acknowledgments

We thank the anonymous referees and the participants of the 2015 HDCA annual conference for their valuable comments, and also the Telecommunications Advancement Foundation and HDCA for financial support to attend the conference.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1 Martins (2009) demonstrates that Sen’s capability approach follows the Cambridge tradition together with post-Keynesian economics, from the perspective of ontology. The focus of this article is instead on an examination of Sen’s work in terms of the inductive methods traditionally employed at Cambridge.

2 Before Sen’s clear argument about structure had been stated, the difference in informational space was prominent, as Nussbaum (2003, p. 416) points out: ‘Sen simply extracted the list of primary goods from Rawls’s overall theory, and did not ask about the rest of the structure; he strongly suggests that if we simply replace primary goods with capabilities, all will be well.’ Similarly, Martins (2007a, p. 41) remarks: ‘Sen does not criticise any feature of Rawls’s theory of justice other than the use of primary goods as a space, and does not even provide any alternative criterion – only an alternative space.’

3 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this point. This overview rests on an understanding that induction and deduction are complementary. That being so, the present classification is made for the purpose of narrative. It follows Sen’s distinction between two lines of reasoning, although such a classification would not be so clear-cut, as discussed in Ege, Igersheim, and Le Chapelain (2016).

4 Instead of ‘neoclassical’, Dobb (1973) suggested an alternative term, ‘counter-classical’, to represent the inconsistency of the orthodoxy with the classical theory.

5 Despite the tendency of the revival of classical theory in Cambridge, Harcourt and Mongiovi (2001) lament the situation in the Faculty of Economics:

Nearly all the Faculty appointments come out of the American graduate schools. And that’s a deliberate policy. The object is to make Cambridge a clone of what the majority of the Faculty regard as a good American school, like Stanford or Harvard or MIT. So an important Cambridge tradition has just been knocked out. (p. 517)

6 Sraffa influenced Wittgenstein in terms of the significance of social convention (anthropology) in philosophical problems, which resulted in the transformation from the ‘early Wittgenstein’ (formalism typically found in the Tractatus) to the ‘later Wittgenstein’ (natural languages in the Philosophical Investigations). For details, refer to Sen (2003). For the relevance of this transformation to Keynes’ view, see Carabelli (1988) and Coates (1996). The implication of social convention is based on the concept of common sense and natural language (as opposed to formalism), since Gramsci (who influenced Sraffa) argued that ‘the starting point must always be that common sense which is the spontaneous philosophy of the multitude’ (1971, p. 421). Related to this transformation, the following remark by Wittgenstein on the concept of comparison is remarkably consistent with Sen:

Our clear and simple language-games are not preparatory studies for a future regularization of language—as it were first approximations, ignoring friction and air-resistance. The language-games are rather set up as objects of comparison which are meant to throw light on the facts of our language by way not only of similarities, but also of dissimilarities. (Wittgenstein [1953] 1963, p. 50^e (section 130), original emphasis)

7 Value has many types other than prescription. In Sen’s (2005, p. 109) words:

It is, of course, a kind of valuation to be interested in human imagination or human effort over other features that could have figured in the description, but it would be a mistake to reduce the reach of that valuation to mainly ethical or prescriptive interest.

8 Note that his theory is constituted by the accumulation of description and statements and is thus inductive, unlike theories typical of mainstream economics, which are based on prior principles.

9 According to Sen (2003), the descriptive importance of the production side had already been presented by Sraffa (1960), unlike the common understanding of it as minimalist and thus as formal analysis without value.

10 A similar interpretation can be found in Wittgenstein’s writing: ‘What we call “descriptions” are instruments for particular uses’ ([1953] 1963, p. 99^e (section 291), original emphasis). In this respect, Coates (1996) analyses Wittgenstein’s similarity to Sen:

Sen makes the same point as Wittgenstein that words, or more specifically descriptions, are not picture-like representations of a fact; words and descriptions have different characteristics depending on their purposes. … For both Wittgenstein and Sen description is an activity, and picture-like reflections of facts need to be brought alive by a purpose. (1996, pp. 162–163)

11 More precisely, what Sen criticises are Platonic but not necessarily Aristotelian approaches to ontology. In this light, Martins’ (2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2011) view of Sen’s approach as ontological may well be possible in the latter sense (e.g. ‘one can see why Sen’s capability approach is an ontological exercise’ (Martins 2006, p. 674); ‘only with a commitment to ontological realism can the descriptive potential of the capability approach enable us to make objective value judgments, such as saying whether someone is objectively in a situation of deprivation or not’ (Martins 2007a, p. 38). We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.

12 It is no accident that the Cambridge Journal of Economics, the flagship journal of the Cambridge school of economics, has welcomed Sen as its Patron, together with Pasinetti.