Love’s place in the spectrum of affect, one of 24 secondary emotions: implications for psychiatry

Abstract

Love is defined and examined as an emotion, using the psychoevolutionary theory of emotions developed by Robert Plutchik and extended to social psychiatry by Henry Kellerman. This theory posits a fourfold ethogram, representing the valanced adaptive reactions to problems of life which define the eight primary emotions. The problem of identity is addressed by acceptance and disgust; temporality, by joy–happiness and sadness. Using a hierarchical classification system, love is defined as a secondary-level emotion, a mixture of joy and acceptance. Examination of the brain infrastructure of these emotions supports their interpretation as basic emotions. In romantic and other forms of love, there is a global acceptance–incorporation, of the other, together with the joy of sexual pair-bonding. This can rise to the level of a clinical disposition that is both histrionic and manic, akin to a Durkheimian collective effervescence. The emotions of acceptance and joy are in everyday life constrained by ego-defense mechanisms: acceptance is constrained by a more critical, less idealised, view of a potential love object; uninhibited joy of sexuality is defended against by sublimation, in which libidinal energy is deflected into an emphasis on correct and proper behaviour, and purposive and productive activities.

Keywords:

• Love
• joy–happiness
• acceptance
• personality traits
• ego-defense mechanisms

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 The author has revised Plutchik’s model of the secondary model (TenHouten, 2021a, p. 12) and has been working on classification of tertiary emotions, including jealousy, resentment, ruthlessness, disdain, despair, and sanguinity (TenHouten, 1996; TenHouten, 2013, pp. 19–22; TenHouten, 2017a, 2018, 2020, 2021c, 2022).

2 This secondary emotion has been interpreted elsewhere as shock (TenHouten 2017a; TenHouten, 2020, pp. 180–181).

3 With justification, Plutchik excluded the four opposite primary emotions from his inventory of secondary emotions: thus, for example, the simultaneous experience of anger and fear might trigger a state of tonic immobility, but this affect-laden, ‘frozen’ state is difficult to claim as an emotion. As a second example, feelings of both acceptance and disgust of another is a kind of ambivalence, but ambivalence is not considered an emotion. The resulting hierarchical classification of the emotions consists of 8 primary, 24 secondary, and 32 tertiary emotions, 64 in all.

4 Plutchik (1962/1991) defined the opposite of love as “sorrow + disgust = misery, remorse, forlornness” (p. 118).

5 In addition to the striatum, the nucleus accumbens is also involved in the brain’s reward structure, which also included cortical structures, the insula, anterior cingulate, and hippocampus. This system adds to the happiness of love a dopaminergic feeling of exhilaration and euphoria (Zeki, 2007).

6 This table is close to that of Plutchik (1995), which he presented as “elaborated in part from the description provided by Kellerman (1979, p. 28)”, but which is in fact largely the product of Kellerman’s theorizing, and, more specifically, very closely resembles tables presented by Kellerman (1979, p. 235), Kellerman (1980, p. 379).

7 This table is similar both to Kellerman’s and Plutchik’s version. Perhaps their most significant difference pertains to surprise.