Public corporate governance of state-owned enterprises: evidence from the Spanish banking industry

Abstract

This article provides a framework for public corporate governance combining two main components: traditional corporate governance (via governing bodies) and multi-level governance (via regulation). We provide evidence from the publiclyowned Spanish savings banks (‘cajas’), which have a conflict between their two main goals: operating efficiently and maximizing the reach of their welfare projects. The case may have lessons for policy-makers in the 80+ countries that have some government ownership of banks, and for managers muddling through public corporate governance.

Keywords:

• Banking crisis
• corporate governance
• multi-level governance
• political influence
• state-owned enterprises

Acknowledgements

This article reports on work undertaken by the authors as part of MICINN Research Award CSO2009/11351, and AGAUR Research Award SGR1483. Earlier versions of this article were presented at the IRSPM Conference in Bern 2010, and the US/EU Dialogue Series: Finding common ground on issues of business & public policy, Georgetown University, March 2011. The authors would like to thank the editor and referees for their helpful comments.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Tamyko Ysa

Tamyko Ysa is an associate professor in the Institute of Public Management and Governance, and the Department of Business Policy at ESADE, Barcelona, Spain.

Mireia Giné

Mireia Giné is Director of Research at Wharton Research Data Services, University of Pennsylvania, USA.

Marc Esteve

Marc Esteve is a PhD candidate in the Institute of Public Management and Governance, and the Department of Business Policy at ESADE, Barcelona, Spain.

Vicenta Sierra

Vicenta Sierra is an associate professor in the Quantitative Methods Department at ESADE, Barcelona, Spain.