Debate: The role of intermediaries between demand and supply of performance information—the missing link?

The challenge is to work for a better match between demand and supply (van Dooren, 2004, p. 512).

Performance management in the public sector is a ‘perennial issue’ or an ‘ultimate challenge’ (Arnaboldi et al., 2015), with the academic literature pointing towards unintended consequences and hidden costs of inadequate systems and uses (Smith, 1995; van der Kolk, 2022). Studies of performance information differentiate between a ‘supply’ and a ‘demand’ side (Hammerschmid et al., 2013; van Dooren, 2004). Recent research has focused on the latter, i.e. the (actual) use by different actors, and its drivers, for example in a Public Money & Management (PMM) theme on ‘Politicians’ use of accounting information’ guest edited by Tjerk Budding and Jan van Helden and published in PMM’s April 2022 issue, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Budding & van Helden, 2022); see also Haustein et al. (2019); Kroll (2015); Moynihan and Pandey (2010).

The supply side of performance information

The shift of attention to the supply side is quite new, with research investigating the actions of preparers concerning provision and communication of performance information (for example Jethon & Reichard, 2021). As well, the debate article by Sneller and Snels (2022) in PMM is an account of how the Dutch government changed the way in which performance information is communicated in draft budgets. Supply-side research also investigates the ways, often using experimental methodologies, that performance information can create more meaningful insights by applying techniques such as framing, format, and rhetoric (Baekgaard et al., 2019; Demaj, 2017; George et al., 2020).

‘Intermediaries’ for performance information

A so far neglected area is the role of ‘intermediaries’ for performance information (van Helden & Reichard, 2019), i.e. ‘technical bodies that support the use of budgetary and financial information’ (Jorge et al., 2016, p. 515). These bodies can link the supply and demand sides given their dual role as users and prepares of performance information and thus understanding of both sides of the process. They have also been referred to as ‘information brokers’ (Jorge et al., 2016) and ‘boundary spanners’ (Williams, 2002), spurred, for example, by observations that only a limited number of politicians engage with financial performance information, but prefer verbal briefings by finance officers (Lapsley, 2022). Intermediaries can be found in the legislative, the executive, and the non-profit sector, or they can be set up as independent bodies. They also differ with respect to their remits: while some of these bodies have an advisory or agenda-setting role, some have narrow mandates with aggregating and summarising performance information for stakeholders (Jorge et al., 2016).

Intermediaries’ translation practices

Notable exceptions from the scarcity of research on information brokers are the studies by Jorge et al. (2016) on the situation in Portugal and by Ferry et al. (2021) on the Parliament Scrutiny Unit in the UK. In Austria, where the authors are most familiar with the context, the Parliamentary Budget Office (PBO) was established in 2012 (Steger, 2010). This intermediary is concerned with the following ‘translating’ activities (PBO Austria, 2018):

• Combining financial and non-financial performance information to integrate information from separate reports.

• Consolidation of multiple sets of information from different governmental (for example the Austrian ministry of finance) and non-governmental (for example European Commission, IMF, research institutes, think tanks) sources to provide a comprehensive, better-informed and bipartisan view.

• Strengthening the readability of performance information (by using charts, providing ‘reading instructions’, or explaining in non-technical language) and complementing information with additional data requested from the ministry of finance and line ministries.

• Suggesting improvements for the design of government documents to enhance transparency (for example with respect to reporting on Covid-19 spending).

• Undertaking in-depth studies that are not conducted by other players on policy measures (for example impact assessments, distribution analyses).

• Generating ad hoc analyses and information requests for members of the budget committee in parliament.

• Co-ordination with other ‘watchdogs’ (for example the court of audit, the fiscal council, Statistics Austria) to promote information and knowledge exchange, resulting in mutual use of assessments (for example PBO findings are used as input for audit reports).

Boundaries for translation success

A number of boundaries exist for the work of such ‘translating’ units to be effective. First, as Heald (2003, p. 748) noted, when information brokers are not independent in terms of their institutional embedding, they are unlikely to be regarded as ‘neutral players, in the sense that they are pursuing their own agendas, whether in support of interest groups, spending lobbies, academic careers or some particular vision of the public interest’. This is an issue to be reduced by getting the governance constellations right. A second boundary relates to insights into how political decisions are taken. Leshner (2021) recently pointed out that policy decisions are based on facts, values, and personal experience—and when there is a controversial issue, core values often win out over scientific evidence (see also Bogumil, 2022; Lapsley, 2022).

Therefore, drawing on performance information from different sources and combining financial with non-financial information, seems a possible way forward for translators to present a more holistic picture to users and to bridge the gap between the supply and demand of performance information. There are ample opportunities for investigating this array of linking organizations; thus we call for further research on the outputs, and the outcomes and use of the work of intermediary organizations.

Disclaimer

This article embodies the views of the authors and does not represent the views or policy of the Austrian Parliamentary Budget Office.