From Myths of Victimhood to Fantasies of Violence: How Far-Right Narratives of Imperilment Work

ABSTRACT

Why is far-right rhetoric so dangerous? In recent years, scholars and policy makers alike have striven to unpack the black box of extremists’ online communication and the rise of far-right violence. Particularly the role of social media in spreading hate speech and fostering radicalization has caught a lot of attention; however, there has been little success in pinning down the drivers of violence. Drawing on the concept of dangerous speech, we take a step back from the violent effects of far-right online communication. Instead, we examine its logical functioning to illuminate the upstream processes that constitute hate and legitimize violence. More concretely, we study how far-right narratives employed on social media mobilize emotions that prepare for the acceptance or even use of violence. Analyzing the argumentative structures of two anti-immigration campaigns in Germany, we find a network of narratives where narratives of imperilment—supported by narratives of conspiracy and inequality—converge into a greater story of national threat and awakening. By constructing a situation of collective self-defense, violence becomes a logical option, even if violent action is not explicitly proposed. Counter-narrative efforts should thus not only focus on hate speech but also address the myths of victimhood, which are constitutive of (violent) palingenetic fantasies.

KEYWORDS:

• Far right
• radicalization
• political violence
• social media
• narratives
• hate speech
• dangerous speech

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Correction Statement

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Notes

1. See generally Daniel Köhler, “Anti-Immigration Militias and Vigilante Groups in Germany: An Overview,” Vigilantism against Migrants and Minorities, edited by Tore Bjørgo and Miroslav Mareš (London, UK: Routledge, 2019), 86–102.

2. A notable case is that of the conservative politician Walter Lübcke, who had been marked as a traitor in far-right milieus due to pro-refugee statements in 2015 and was eventually assassinated in 2019.

3. On far-right acting in digital spaces, see Julia Ebner, Going Dark: The Secret Social Lives of Extremists (London: Bloomsbury, 2020); on far-right benefits from digitalization, see Maik Fielitz and Holger Marcks, Digital Fascism: Challenges for the Open Society in Times of Social Media, CRWS Working Papers (Berkeley, CA: Center for Right-Wing Studies, 2019).

4. See, e.g., Karsten Müller and Carlo Schwarz, “Fanning the Flames of Hate: Social Media and Hate Crime,” Social Science Research Network (2017) (online publication), doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3082972.

5. Cf. Florian Cramer, “What is ‘Post-Digital’?” in Postdigital Esthetics: Art, Computation and Design, edited by David M. Berry and Michael Dieter (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 12–26.

6. See Mattias Wahlström and Anton Törnberg, “Social Media Mechanisms for Right-Wing Political Violence in the 21st Century: Discursive Opportunities, Group Dynamics, and Co-Ordination,” Terrorism and Political Violence 33, no. 4 (2021): 766–787, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/09546553.2019.1586676.

7. Thomas J. Holt, Joshua D. Freilich, and Steven M. Chermak, “Examining the Online Expression of Ideology among Far-Right Extremist Forum Users,” Terrorism and Political Violence 34, no. 2 (2022): 364–384, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2019.1701446.

8. Susan Benesch, “What is Dangerous Speech?” Dangerous Speech Project, released October 27, 2016, last modified October 21, 2019, http://dangerousspeech.org/about-dangerous-speech/ (accessed November 16, 2019).

9. On the term, see generally Roger Griffin, “Europe for the Europeans: Fascist Myths of the European New Order 1922–1992,” in A Fascist Century: Essays by Roger Griffin, edited by Matthew Feldman (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 132–180.

10. See generally Roger Griffin, The Nature of Fascism (London, UK: Pinter, 1991).

11. See Ruth Wodak, The Politics of Fear: What Right-Wing Populist Discourses Mean (London, UK: SAGE Publications, 2015); Bart Bonikowski, “Ethno-Nationalist Populism and the Mobilization of Collective Resentment,” The British Journal of Sociology 68, no. 1 (2017): 181–213.

12. Amitav Acharya, “How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism,” International Organization 58, no. 2 (2004): 239–75.

13. See Susan Benesch, “Vile Crime or Inalienable Right: Defining Incitement to Genocide,” Virginia Journal of International Law 48, no. 3 (2008): 485–528.

14. Kenneth L. Marcus, “Accusation in a Mirror,” Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 43, no. 2 (2012): 357–93.

15. Benesch, “What is.”

16. Chip Berlet, “Heroes Know Which Villains to Kill: How Coded Rhetoric Incites Scripted Violence,” in Doublespeak: The Rhetoric of the Far Right since 1945, edited by Matthew Feldman and Paul Jackson (Stuttgart, Germany: Ibidem, 2014), 303–29.

17. Jacob Davey and Julia Ebner, The “Great Replacement”: The Violent Consequences of Mainstreamed Extremism (London, UK: Institute for Strategic Dialogue, 2019); Barbara Perry, “‘White Genocide’: White Supremacists and the Politics of Reproduction,” in Homegrown Hate: Gender and Organized Racism, edited by Abby L. Ferber (New York, NY: Routledge, 2004), 71–91.

18. Matthias Quent, “Der ‘Volkstod’ und die Übriggebliebenen: Rechtsradikale Angebote und Machtgewinne in abdriftenden und dörflichen Regionen,” Berliner Debatte Initial 25, no. 1 (2014): 40–53.

19. See Gideon Botsch and Christoph Kopke, “Umvolkung” und “Volkstod”: Zur Kontinuität einer extrem rechten Paranoia (Ulm, Germany: Klemm + Oelschläger, 2019).

20. Davey and Ebner.

21. Oxford Dictionaries, s.v. “narrative,” (accessed October 22, 2019), http://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/narrative.

22. Actually, already in the 1980s, a kind of narrative turn in social science was observed; see generally William John Thomas Mitchell, foreword to On Narrative, edited by William John Thomas Mitchell (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1981), vii–x, ix. However, this tendency had no lasting effect and was largely ignored in research on social movements and political violence, apart from a few exceptions; see, e.g., Gary Alan Fine, “Public Narration and Group Culture: Discerning Discourse in Social Movements,” in Social Movements and Culture, edited by Hank Johnston and Bert Klandermans (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), 127–143; Francesca Polletta, “‘It Was Like a Fever’: Narrative and Identity in Social Protest,” Social Problems 45, no. 2 (1998), 137–159.

23. Kurt Braddock and John Horgan, “Towards a Guide for Constructing and Disseminating Counternarratives to Reduce Support for Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 39, no. 5 (2016): 381–404, 382.

24. Erving Goffman, Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1975), 21.

25. Mayer N. Zald, “Ideologically Structured Action: An Enlarged Agenda for Social Movement Research,” Mobilization: An International Quarterly 5, no. 1 (2000): 1–16.

26. Robert M. Entman, “Media Framing Biases and Political Power: Explaining Slant in News of Campaign 2008,” Journalism: Theory, Practice & Criticism 11, no. 4 (2010): 389–408, 391.

27. For this debate, see generally Joseph E. Davis, “Narrative and Social Movements: The Power of Stories,” in Stories of Change: Narrative and Social Movements, edited by Joseph E. Davis (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2002), 3–29.

28. Actually, in German discourse, this terminological amalgamation already takes place; see, e.g., “Masternarrativ: ‘Wir Werden Bedroht – Die Endzeit Naht,’” NetzTeufel, http://www.netzteufel.eaberlin.de/toxische-narrative/ (accessed November 11, 2019).

29. See Omar Ashour, “Online De-Radicalization? Countering Violent Extremist Narratives: Message, Messenger and Media Strategy,” Perspectives on Terrorism 4, no. 6 (2010): 15–19.

30. See David A. Snow, Burke Rochford, Steven K. Worden, and Robert D. Benford, “Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation,” American Sociological Review 51, no. 4 (1986): 464–481, 469.

31. Cambridge Dictionary, s.v. “Campaign,” (accessed May 19, 2020), http://dictionary.cambridge.org/de/worterbuch/englisch/campaign.

32. Jason Seawright and John Gerring, “Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options,” Political Research Quarterly 61, no. 2 (2008): 294–308.

33. The details of the network analysis leading to the identification of the most influential actors in the campaign can be requested from the authors.

34. Antónia Guterres, “Remarks to the Human Rights Council,” United Nations Secretary General, United Nations, released February 25, 2019, http://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/speeches/2019-02-25/remarks-the-human-rights-council (accessed November 25, 2019).

35. A vlogger is a person who produces a video blog.

36. Gerhard Wisnewski, “Globaler Migrationspakt: Die nächsten Millionen werden kommen!” YouTube, released September 7, 2018, accessed September 17, 2019 (115,781 views by then), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P9sa2ev8d-k.

37. Hagen Grell, “Köthen und Migrationspakt – Reise in den Untergang,” released September 10, 2018, accessed September 16, 2019 (65,346 views by then), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qCZhSbX1fyo.

38. Köthen is a small town in Saxony-Anhalt. In 2018, it became a far-right symbol for so-called foreigner violence after a German died in a confrontation with immigrants; though the death was due to a cardiac defect and not due to being kicked in the head as claimed by the far right.

39. Fabian Schmid, “Martin Sellner, der rechtsextreme Influencer,” Der Standard, March 30, 2019, http://www.derstandard.at/story/2000100472277/martinsellner-der-rechtsextreme-influencer-unter-terrorverdacht (accessed December 6, 2019).

40. Martin Sellner, “UN Migrationspakt stoppen – Nicht in unserem Namen!” YouTube, released September 16, 2018, accessed September 17, 2019 (168,216 views by then), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VK6h14l3A60.

41. AfD-Fraktion Bundestag, “AfD-Fraktion erklärt: Globaler Pakt für Migration,” YouTube, released July 19, 2018, accessed September 17, 2019 (37,352 views by then), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CXwcyznwps4.

42. AfD Kompakt TV, “UN-Migrationspakt | Meuthen – Der EFDD-Europa-Talk aus Straßburg,” YouTube, released November 1, 2018, accessed September 18, 2019 (775,477 views by then), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qsSN20ykEF8.

43. AfD Kompakt TV, “Das muss jeder zum UN-Migrationspakt wissen!” YouTube, released June 6, 2018, accessed October 15, 2019 (17,567 views by then), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YMcReYJrPe4.

44. AfD, “Wir entscheiden selbst, wenn wir reinlassen,” Leaflet, released December 10, 2018, http://cdn.afd.tools/wp-content/uploads/sites/111/2018/12/Flyer_GMC.Druck_Var3.pdf (accessed October 15, 2019).

45. Simone Rafael, “In Kandel demonstrieren rechte Szene und AfD Hand in Hand,” Belltower News, December 28, 2018, http://www.belltower.news/jahresrueckblick-rheinland-pfalz-2018-79419 (accessed October 15, 2019).

46. Ministry of the Interior and Sport (Rhineland-Palatinate), “Bilanz der Demonstrationen in Kandel,” answer to the parliamentary question of Martin Brandl (CDU) (Drucksache 17/7726, Landtag Rheinland-Pfalz, Mainz, November 13, 2018), http://dokumente.landtag.rlp.de/landtag/drucksachen/7726-17.pdf (accessed October 15, 2019).

47. Kandel ist überall, Facebook post, released November 25, 2018, accessed November 13, 2019, https://www.facebook.com/Kandelistueberall/photos/a.1504284096349407/1858992537545226 (accessed February 13, 2020).

48. Kandel ist überall, “Demoaufruf von Christina Baum für 17.2. Berlin und 3.3. in Kandel,” YouTube, released February 6, 2018, accessed October 15, 2019 (1,383 views by then), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EbfWt22Bv8c.

49. Kandel ist überall, “Einladung zur Demo am 3.3. um 15 Uhr nach Kandel/Pfalz,” YouTube, released February 25, 2018, accessed October 15, 2019 529 views by then), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y1St8LGdH8Y.

50. GermanDefence24, “Demo in Kandel am 24.03.2018 – Reden,” YouTube, released March 25, 2018, accessed October 15, 2019 (4,223 views by then), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v4vxfHo1U3c.

51. See generally Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, “Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment,” Annual Review of Sociology 26, no. 1 (2000): 611–39.

52. See generally Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism (London, UK: Verso, 1983).

53. Rudolf Speth, “Nation und Emotion: Von der vorgestellten zur emotional erfahrenen Gemeinschaft,” in Masse – Macht – Emotionen: Zu einer politischen Soziologie der Emotionen, edited by Ansgar Klein and Frank Nullmeier (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften), 287–307.

54. Amitav Acharya, “How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism,” International Organization 58, no. 2 (2004): 239–275, 239.

55. Benford and Snow, “Framing Processes,” 619–620.

56. Snow et al., “Frame Alignment Processes,” 469.

57. Bryant Welch, State of Confusion: Political Manipulation and the Assault on the American Mind (New York, NY: Thomas Dunne Books, 2008).

58. On the appeal of conspiracy theories, see generally Jaron Harabam, “The Truth is Out There”: Conspiracy Culture in an Age of Epistemic Instability (Rotterdam, Netherlands: Erasmus University Rotterdam, 2017).

59. See generally René Girard, The Scapegoat (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

60. These narratives are also dangerous because, due to their subliminal nature and victim rhetoric, they are neither indictable nor do they appear to be proactively aggressive; they can thus circulate and be picked up more freely in the mainstream.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the PANDORA research project and funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF).

Notes on contributors

Holger Marcks

Holger Marcks is a social scientist, researching at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg as a research associate in the PANDORA project. His focus is on virtual dynamics of right-wing extremism and Islamism, particularly on the nexus of extremist online propaganda and violence.

Janina Pawelz

Janina Pawelz is a political scientist, researching on political, collective and urban violence, with a focus on youth. As a researcher at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg she works in the PANDORA project on far-right campaigns of mobilization in the virtual and real world.