Beyond anthropocentrism: A Watsujian ecological ethic

ABSTRACT

In this article, an ecological ethic is developed from the ethical philosophy and environmental phenomenology of the Japanese ethicist Watsuji Tetsurō. More specially, it is illustrated that reading Watsuji’s ethics and concept of fūdo (風土) in tangent and drawing out the implications of his ontology of emptiness, provides the means to overcome the ecological issue of anthropocentrism. The ecological ethic developed here also goes beyond Watsuji’s account by criticising his focus on land and advocates the importance of the sea for environmental ethics. Not only is it argued that a fully functional ecological ethic must account for all habitats, but that the sea can be seen to be more fundamental than the land in the formation of Watsuji’s concept of fūdo.

KEYWORDS:

• Anthropocentrism
• ecological ethic
• emptiness
• fūdo
• philosophy of the sea
• Watsuji Tetsurō

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. In Thinking Like a Planet (2013), J. Baird Callicott has posited three distinct forms of anthropocentrism: i) metaphysical—which entails that humans occupy a privileged position in the world, ii) moral—which suggests that only human beings possess moral value, and iii) epistemic—which maintains that all experienced values are human values.

2. Watsuji’s concept of aidagara (間柄) is developed further in the second volume of Ethics, where he illustrates that human relations are context dependent. He here demonstrates how different ‘virtues’ are required of different relations, in the family, local community, cultural community, and nation. For an overview and critical appraisal of this idea see Shuttleworth (2020).

3. Although Watsuji does not go into much detail regarding his rejection of what he perceives to be a major flaw in Heidegger’s approach in Climate, which has led to a great deal of misguided speculation in English-language scholarship, Watsuji does provide a thorough analysis and critique of Heidegger in ‘A Consideration of National Character’ (Shuttleworth, 2023).

4. Augustin Berque has challenged the translation of fūdo as ‘climate’, instead opting for the term ‘milieu’, and for fūdosei he has chosen ‘mediance’ rather than ‘the function of climate’ (2004, p. 389).

5. In ‘America’s National Character’ (1943) Watsuji articulates ‘America’ as a distinct form of fūdo. In his own words, ‘The first difficulty in colonizing America was the battle with the climate and the battle with the natives. As is common knowledge, Western Europe has a mild climate, which is rare elsewhere in the world. The range between hot and cold is narrow, and the same clothes can be worn throughout summer and winter. In addition to summer being a dry season and winter being a rainy season, rainfall is scarce, and thus only plants develop that are suitable to the climate. In comparison with America, the disparity between hot and cold is much greater, and deadly heat waves and cold waves strike even on the east coast’ (Shuttleworth & Shuttleworth, 2021, p. 1021). Watsuji elaborates upon this in Ethics III (1949), where he notes ‘the voluntary, rational, ranchman who emigrated to America became American by acquiring a monsoon and desert character’ (1992d, p. 186), and adds Eurasian ‘Steppe’ as a further form of fūdo. As Watsuji articulates, ‘the vast land of the Steppe, including the Russian Steppe, once the territory of the Mongol Empire, should be considered as a type of fūdo’ (1992d, p. 168).

6. In terms of attempting to support an existing environmental ethic with Watsuji’s ethics, Steve Odin has suggested the application of Watsuji’s thought to Aldo Leopold’s land ethic. In Odin’s own words, ‘Watsuji’s ethical philosophy is … one of the most suggestive Asian resources for environmental ethics as outlined by Aldo Leopold, in which morality is enlarged so as to include not simply individual/individual and individual/social relations, but also the encompassing human/nature relation as a major extension of practical ethics’ (2014, p. 253). As for the practical application of Watsuji’s environmental ethic, Bruce Janz has argued Watsuji’s concept of fūdo offers an alternative means to understand and address the problem of climate change, rather than attempting to resolve this problem with more technology. In his own words, Janz claims ‘the restoration and preservation of climate [through Watsuji’s thought] will first keep us from well- meaning mistakes that can happen when we imagine a technological fix to an issue’ (2011, p. 183). Jin Baek has articulated the concept of sustainability inherent in Watsuji’s concepts of fūdo and aidagara, and illustrated how this concept can be applied to the practice of cross-ventilation in Japanese residential architecture. According to Baek, ‘Watsuji’s theory leads us to reformulate and re-conceptualize the relationship between one room and another and the role of the corridors in maximising the benefits of such a passive sustainable method as cross-ventilation’ (2013, p. 597).

7. Inutsuka elsewhere claims her position is not dissimilar from ‘the “environmental pragmatism” and “weak anthropocentrism” of Andrew Wright, Eric Katz and Brian Norton, but it differs in that it is based on a shift in the view of human existence’ (2020a, p. 45). However, such views maintain the problem of anthropocentrism on the grounds that they are unable to comprehend how intrinsic values might be applied to non-human beings.

8. ベルクは和辻の風土論に影響を受け、文化と自然とが互いに不可分の関係にあるということを示す「通態性」という語を考え出した。そして彼は非―人間中心主義的な環境倫理学に代わる新たな「風土の倫理」というものを提唱している。.

9. This text was originally published in French under the title Êtres humains sur la Terre: Principes d’éthique de l’écoumène [Being Human on the Earth: Principles of Ecumenal Ethics] and translated into Japanese under the title 地球と存在の哲学――環境倫理を越えて [Philosophy of Earth and Existence: Beyond Environmental Ethics].

10. いかなる倫理もコブラに子供を噛んではいけないということを押しつけるわけにはいかない。.

11. Although Naess has the right intention, his approach is somewhat lacking. Despite basing his theory of Ecosophy on mere intuition, and attempts to systematize his intuition by appeal to Spinoza, and Gandhi, he fails to justify his extension to these philosophical aids. For an account which develops Watsuji’s ethical thought in relation to that of Arne Naess, see Shuttleworth (2022).

12. The relation between Watsuji’s concept of home ground and authenticity (honraisei 本来性) has been well articulated in Shuttleworth (2019), where it is illustrated how Watsuji’s concept differs from Heidegger’s and Taylor’s concepts of authenticity, as a consequence of Watsuji’s Buddhist ontology.

13. In articulating Watsuji’s ontology of emptiness, Isamu Nagami makes a similar claim to Lafleur and notes ‘Watsuji shares Nāgārjuna’s concern in this respect and stresses the absolute negation of the subject in the symbolism of kū’ (1981, p. 290). Anton Sevilla provides a more nuanced account of Watsuji’s Mahāyāna Buddhist commitments and notes Watsuji maintains the basic views on no-self, dependent arising, and morality from Nāgārjuna’s and Vasubandhu’s philosophies. However, Sevilla claims, ‘The only change that happens with his Mahāyāna is that he develops the notion of emptiness more thoroughly as the negation of discriminate dharmas (Nāgārjuna) and the return from emptiness back to the myriad dharmas (Vasubandhu)’ (2016, p. 623).

14. In Mahāyāna Buddhism, the concept behind codependent origination has been explained through the metaphor of Indra’s net from the Avatamsaka Sutra (Cleary, 1993). In Hinduism, Indra is the king of Svarga (Heaven) and the Devas (gods), and possessed a net that was used to trap and ensnare his enemies. On each corner of the net was a polished jewel, within which the image of each of the other jewels could be simultaneously observed. In Buddhism, the image of Indra’s net is metaphorically utilised to explain the way in which the universe is conceived of as a web of connections and interdependencies.

15. In Climate (1935), Watsuji presents the theory of transmigration as the most vivid picture of the Indian strength of imagination. Here he acknowledges, ‘All living beings, including humans, share the same life spirit. All living things whether in heaven or in hell, whether domestic or wild animal or even insect are the site of our being; we, now human, may be reborn as cows in the next life, we may have been serpents in the last one. Hence, what is now a cow or a serpent may once have been or may on another occasion be re-created as human. Thus, all such living beings, although they may well differ in respect of their phenomenal form, must all be of the same basic nature’ (1961, pp. 29–30).

16. In his examination of the emergence of cultural consciousness in Hong Kong and Macao, Andrew Ka Pok Tam has also noted the limitations of Watsuji’s concept of fūdo, though sought to supplement Watsuji’s position with Hegel’s account of the sea: https://www.academia.edu/video/kVYENl

17. Other examples of deserts formed by cold currents include the Sonoran Desert in North America [California Current], Atacama Desert in South America [Humboldt Current], Sahara Desert in North Africa [Canary Current], Namib Desert in South Africa [Benguela Current], and Outback Desert in Australia [West Australian Current] (Thorpe, 2009).

18. A similar criticism can be held against Aldo Leopold’s land ethic, which focuses exclusively on land at the expense of oceans, seas, rivers, and lakes.

19. ‘Pacific’ is in fact the Latin term for ‘peaceful’.

20. Nakashima Koji has criticised Watsuji on the grounds of national environmentalism, claiming the relationship between nature and nation is embedded in Watsuji’s thought. In Nakashima’s own words, ‘in Watsuji’s fūdo-ron, an ethical imperative of returning to the nation as an ultimate totality is interpreted as a geographical return to the nation-land’ (2002, p. 122).

21. The charge of geographical determinism is also dismissed by Anton Sevilla, who suggests what Watsuji is really arguing is that history and fūdo are inseparable. As Sevilla explains, ‘the kind of houses and parks in a village shape its people and their relationships over time, but the momentum of their relationships with each other forms the kind of houses and facilities they build, and how they give meaning to their milieu. Therefore, milieuity and historicity are co-determining’ (2017, p. 29).

Additional information

Funding

This research was supported by the International Research Fellowship awarded by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science.