Transnational citizenship: problems of definition, culture and democracy

Abstract

There is widespread disagreement over whether transnational citizenship provides defensible extensions of, or meaningful complements to, national citizenship. A significant strand of criticism relies upon empirical arguments about political motivation and the consequences of transnationalism. This paper addresses two questions arising from empirical arguments relating to the nation state and democracy. Do the alleged cultural requirements for effective political action provide an insuperable barrier to transnational citizenship? Does transnational citizenship necessarily require a commitment to transnational democracy? I argue that these largely empirical criticisms do not succeed in casting doubt upon the normative plausibility or practical viability of transnational projects. On the first question, I point to a growing transnational political culture that serves to motivate transnational citizens. On the second question, I argue for a legitimate category of transnational citizenship that, although inspired by cosmopolitan morality, is different from it, and that does not require transnational democracy.

Notes

See e.g. Archibugi and colleagues (1998); Carter (2001); Dower (2003); Heater (1996; 2001); Hutchings and Dannreuther (1999); Linklater (1992; 1998; 1999).

I am grateful for the valuable comments on this paper contributed by April Carter, Karen Gillen, Peter Haeusler, Michael Leach, Roderic Pitty and Steven Slaughter. The suggestions made by the anonymous reviewers were also invaluable in improving the argument. Any errors and misinterpretations, however, remain my own.

Some writers, such as Charles Beitz, distinguish somewhat differently between moral and institutional, or political, cosmopolitanism on the grounds that the moral kind does not justify the creation of global institutions, but simply provides ‘the basis on which [international] institutions should be justified or criticized’ (1999, 287).

For a more radical historical interpretation, see Anderson (2002).

The following section draws on earlier discussions in Stokes (2000; 2002).

Whether this is an essential precondition for global citizenship is doubtful, especially if one regards global citizenship as a practice that is generally ahead of its time.

Carter (2001, 175) points out that, in a discussion of the obligations towards prisoners of war, Walzer concedes that they ought to be treated like ‘citizens of the world’.

On Lincoln and the political significance of America in the history of liberty, see Kane (2001, 56, 60).

See the references to fundamental rights in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993.

Similar arguments could have been made under the Roman Empire and the Holy Roman Empire.

For an account of the intergovernmental conflicts see Whitlam (1997, 171–216).

See also the more extensive arguments on such matters in Brock (2002).

The bombing by French security forces of the Greenpeace yacht, the Rainbow Warrior, in New Zealand in 1985, with the death of one of the crew, is a salutary reminder of such problems.

On this topic, see also Carter (1997).

See the extensive discussion by Dower (2003, 103–20).