Globalisation, Transnational Political Mobilisation, and Networks of Violence

Abstract

This article examines how globalisation processes provide new incentives and opportunities for non-state political entrepreneurs to build transnational political movements. Drawing on the literatures on non-violent social movements and transnational networks, the article examines terrorism and political violence as components of the ‘repertoires of contention’ used by radical transnational groups seeking political change. Examples from both the pre- and post-9/11 periods are provided, and the implications for traditional models of state security are discussed. The article concludes by contending that the combination of increased levels of globalisation and the emergence of new networks of violence is creating a fundamental shift in the international security environment, in which the distinction between internal and external security threats is increasingly blurred. While state security strategies are reflecting these changes, less attention has been paid to the political implications of these changes. New security responses need to also be matched by new sets of political strategies at the global level.

Notes

² Anarchist and nationalist networks in the late 19th and early 20th century and anti-colonial movements of the 20th century are prominent examples of earlier manifestations of transnational networks that have employed political violence. See Adamson (2002) and Rapoport (2003).

³ I do not attempt to survey the vast literature on ‘globalisation’ in this article, nor am I making a claim that all processes associated with the current phase of globalisation are historically unprecedented. My use of the term throughout this article is informed broadly by works that take a ‘transformationalist’ position on globalisation. In other words, while recognising that globalisation is an ongoing historical process, this position nevertheless claims that the current stage of globalisation is unique in terms of both the quantity and quality of interactions and integration that are occurring on a global scale. For a discussion of this position and a review of the literature on globalisation, see Held et al. (1999, 1-28).

⁴ As others have pointed out, much has been written on the economic and cultural dimensions of globalisation, yet far less has been written on how globalisation processes impact on the security environment. For some useful discussions of globalisation and security, however, see Barkawi (2004), Cronin (2002/3), Kirshner (2004).

⁵ On repertoires of contention, and on the dynamics of political mobilization more generally, see Tarrow (1998) and McAdam and colleagues (2001).

⁶ I categorise militant Islamist groups that employ political violence as political groups rather than religious groups. A number of authors (e.g. Benjamin and Simon 2002; Cronin 2002/3; Rapoport 2003) have viewed al-Qaeda's use of terrorism in religious, rather than political terms, thus arguing that Islamist extremism constitutes a different type of terrorism. However, the grievances against the United States that have been articulated by bin Laden and al-Qaeda have been largely political, and not cultural. Similarly, tactics such as suicide bombings have been shown to be strategically, rather than arbitrarily, employed and are not limited to the repertoire of any particular religiously motivated group. For useful discussions see Anonymous (2002), Byman (2003) and Pape (2003).

⁷ Treating terrorism as a tactic in a broader political campaign is a common approach taken by experts in the field of terrorism, and is also in line with expert analyses of the al-Qaeda movement. See, for example, discussions in Hoffman (1998) and Anonymous (2002). Tilly (2003, 30) notes that ‘some contentious claims-making … takes the form of damage to persons or objects; rebels kill rulers, revolutionaries sack palaces’.

⁸ For discussions of how the globalisation of production has affected state interests, see Mittelman (2000), Rosecrance (2000) and Reich (1992).

⁹ For a discussion of the literature and examples of studies, see della Porta (1995, 167–68).

¹⁰There are also at least 25 Kurdish publishing houses based in Sweden, Switzerland, Germany and elsewhere. See Watts (2004).

¹¹ Although, it must be remembered, for example, that the GIA had planned to fly a hijacked Air France plane into the Eiffel Tower in the 1990s. They also engaged in subway bombing campaigns in Paris. The PKK threatened to use suicide bombing campaigns in Germany, as well as Turkey, as part of their struggle.

¹² For useful critiques, see David (1991) and Ayoob (1995).

¹³ On the former, see ‘Elite “Rapid Response Team” to Be Sent to World's Trouble-Spots’, Jane's Police Review, 24 November 2004, ⟨www.policereview.com⟩. On the latter, see the homepage of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police: ⟨http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/intpolicing/intpolicing_e.htm⟩ (accessed 28 November 2004). On the internationalisation of US civilian policing, see Nadelmann (1993). On the policing role of the US military see Andreas and Price (2001).