What Went Wrong with NATO?

Abstract

This article provides a perspective on strategic trends in the NATO alliance and the broader transatlantic relationship. It evaluates the extent of NATO's successes and failures over the last 15 years in the areas of the Balkans, NATO enlargement, and the international campaign against terrorism. The central conclusion is that, while NATO's members have significant technical reforms available that could help to reinvigorate the institution, none is likely to come to fruition without a major change in strategic concepts on both sides of the Atlantic.

Notes

¹ Off-the-record interview with former high-level NATO military official, 2001.

² When NATO intervened in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, it sent 60,000 troops. In 2004, the NATO Afghanistan force in 2004 numbered around 7,000, and the alliance struggled to get its members to supply more than six helicopters. This was to secure a country the size of California and one of the most important theatres in the War on Terrorism.

³ This training was limited, however, because as with Afghanistan the NATO allies authorised a mission but did not all offer forces to support it. As a result, NATO fielded only about 300 trainers to train the Iraqi military. While that force would work for some time, it would not be sustainable without a regular rotation process, for which there was nothing to draw on at the onset of the mission.