Navigating differences: transatlantic negotiations over Galileo

Abstract

The European global navigation satellite system, Galileo, entered its development phase in 2002 and is scheduled to become operational in 2012. Since its inception, Galileo has been yet another contentious issue in transatlantic negotiations. American concerns spanned economic and security-related issues, but, despite considerable tensions, a comprehensive agreement was entered into in 2004. This paper analyses the roots of the transatlantic dispute, as well as the negotiations that led to its resolution. It points out the vital and wide-ranging lessons that may be gleaned from this case. The European Commission has become a notable actor in the security realm via dual-use items such as Galileo. Technological progress has, in itself, become a bargaining instrument whereas time-honoured negotiation tactics have failed. Galileo sheds light on the ongoing recalibration of the transatlantic partnership in which autonomy has become a powerful motivation for European policy-makers. Constructive engagement, triggered by shared interests, only occurred when parties accepted each other as equals.

Notes

¹ The author would like to thank Davis Bobrow, Andrew Brookes, Josh Busby and Tim Oliver for their comments on entire drafts or aspects of the article. Furthermore, this work has greatly benefited from the comments and suggestions of five anonymous reviewers.

² This is usually referred to as ‘asymmetric use’: continued access to some signals while denying access to other signals on a local or global level.

³ Galileo is a particularly interesting case to study because it is an example of the European Commission negotiating directly with the US government. It thus bears some similarity to trade negotiations and can indeed be seen as an example of strategic trade.

⁴ GLONASS is not fully operational due to funding problems. Between 1995 and 2001 the number of workable satellites fell from 24 (the full system strength) to eight. Russia planned a return to full strength in 2011. However, in December 2004 India joined Russia in the effort and in 2006 the Russian government decided to make additional funding available for GLONASS, thereby speeding up the process. A return to full strength, enabling global coverage, is now expected in late 2009. See Ivanov (2004; 2007), Bedi (2005).

⁵ GNSS, for example, can increase the capacity of communication networks through precise network synchronization. For an overview of civilian applications for Galileo see < http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/energy_transport/galileo/applications/index_en.htm>, accessed 18 May 2006.

⁶ During the 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom, Blue Force Tracking was used successfully to minimize friendly-fire accidents and increase situational awareness. Both the US and French militaries, for example, have developed uniforms with integrated GPS technology (Beidleman, 2005, 131; EUPolitix.com 2004). The Council of the EU has declared that ‘precise and secure knowledge of the position of own troops, that is essential for the conduct of operation and the safety of our personnel, is heavily dependent upon satellite radio navigation systems (GPS, Galileo, GLONASS) and reliable communications’ (Council of the EU, 2004, 5).

⁷ This basis, the public–private partnership, was put in jeopardy when the companies in the consortium failed to agree on the division of labor by a May 2007 deadline. As a result, the EU may decide to scrap the arrangement and opt for a set-up that is fully public at an additional cost to EU taxpayers estimated to be between €1.2 billion and €2.4 billion (Bounds, 2007).

⁸ See Jane's Defence Weekly (2006a). At least four satellites are necessary to verify location and positions using GNSS (see Beidleman, 2005, 122).

⁹ This European Commission's optimistic reading of the commercial case for Galileo has been questioned by industry representatives, who doubt Galileo's ability to displace GPS and worry about liabilities in case of malfunction (Bounds, 2007).

¹⁰ Compare Schrader (2003), Karner (2003) and Beidleman (2005, 124–125).

¹¹ The same will be true if Russia succeeds in fully replenishing and upgrading GLONASS.

¹² This logic has been advanced with direct reference to space assets by Xavier Pasco (2004, 22–23) and Stefano Silvestri (2003, 29). Given that the US is very reluctant to share intelligence with European allies (the United Kingdom is an exception to this rule), it may seem surprising that the EU is limiting itself to GNSS as opposed to more far-reaching satellite-based intelligence. Numerous nationally owned systems are currently under development and a few already exist (for an overview, see Hitchens, 2006). However, in accordance with the intergovernmental principles of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the Council of the EU asserted that military space assets ‘will continue to remain within the remit of Member States’, and that ‘exploratory talks with Member States owning or developing military space systems for EU access to their products’ would be encouraged (Council of the EU, 2004, 6). In fact, the EU Satellite Centre relies to a large extent on data provided by member states and as such enjoys little organic capability. However, the GMES initiative of ESA and the EU may begin to bridge this divide. For information on GMES, see < http://ec.europa.eu/comm/space/gmes/index_en.htm>, accessed 19 May 2006.

¹³ See Johan Lembke (2002a, 126–127; 2002b, 115–116). At the same time, European militaries have been unwilling to become involved financially in any significant way. See Becher (2004, 91) and Pasco (2004, 28).

¹⁴ Trying to preserve American dominance in the GNSS field has been a longstanding policy goal. A 1995 report commissioned by the US Department of Defense argued that ‘it is in the U.S. interest to see GPS become widely accepted and employed around the world’, for economic, technological and security reasons (National Academy of Public Administration, 1995, 42).

¹⁵ The agreement between the Commission and China provides for co-operative activities in a wide range of Galileo-related sectors, such as science and technology, industrial manufacturing, and service and market development.

¹⁶ The motivations underpinning this mutual interest obviously differed on each side of the Atlantic. A precondition for the prevalence of mutual interest was an increasing realization on the part of the US government that it could not stop the EU from building Galileo.

¹⁷ For a good overview, see Elisabeth Pond (2004).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Bastian Giegerich

1  1 The author would like to thank Davis Bobrow, Andrew Brookes, Josh Busby and Tim Oliver for their comments on entire drafts or aspects of the article. Furthermore, this work has greatly benefited from the comments and suggestions of five anonymous reviewers.