A new model of Asian regionalism: does the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation have more potential than ASEAN?

Abstract

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is an established player in Southeast Asia, while the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is an emergent force in Central Asia. This article comparatively assesses ASEAN and SCO to investigate the nature of each organization's model of cooperation and their utility in the contemporary political landscape in Asia. It argues that SCO differs from ASEAN on a few significant points: its composition and level of institutionalization. At the same time, both organizations have similar agendas and models of cooperation, emphasizing a common spirit, flexibility and a focus on regime security. The paper concludes that ASEAN's model of cooperation continues to be relevant to the contemporary Asian landscape, and its brand of loosely codified, informal and norm driven multilateralism continues to be durable and robust.

Introduction

The accompanying analysis in this special issue demonstrates that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a leading player in the international relations of Asia. Although ASEAN has received a lot of attention from scholars, it is not the only interesting regional organization in Asia. Amongst the other organizations, the most notable is the emergent Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which comprises China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.1 While increasingly capturing the attention of analysts in Eurasia, SCO has not been the subject of much theoretically informed analysis. This article seeks to address this imbalance by providing an explicit comparison of ASEAN and SCO. In this way it contributes to this special issue by highlighting important similarity and diversity, in order to shed light on the nature and relevance of ASEAN's model of cooperation, as well as asking whether SCO might replace ASEAN as the most prominent organization in Asia.

An important area of scholarly investigation with regard to ASEAN has been to explain the longevity of its model of cooperation. The European Union (EU) is commonly perceived as the example of regionalism that all other organizations should seek to replicate. As a result, most theoretical insights and concepts on regional cooperation tend to be drawn from the experience of EU. However, ASEAN is quite different to this EU-inspired theoretical model. Therefore, its durability challenges some of the assumptions contained within mainstream theory about the nature of regional cooperation and applicability of EU-type models to regional cooperation outside of Europe. Indeed, an alternative literature on regional cooperation has been formed around ASEAN. It seeks to develop theoretical insights more applicable to regions distinct to the West European context (Busse 1999; Acharya 2001; Alagappa 2003; Sharpe 2003; Beeson 2005; Fort and Webber 2006; Acharya and Johnston 2007; Wunderlich 2007). Therefore, a comparative analysis of SCO and ASEAN provides a forum to consider not just the merit of both organizational frameworks but also the validity of the conceptual insights developed on the basis of ASEAN with regard to another organization in Asia.

The comparative empirical analysis of this article starts from the assumption that the nature of regional cooperation within ASEAN and SCO is broadly comparable, at least relative to EU. Both SCO and ASEAN are composed of member states that have been characterized by regional elites and scholars as weak states and have similar approaches to multilateral formats. To a certain degree, the political cultures of the two regions are comparable. Governments in neither region actively promote or pursue ‘Western-style’ liberal democracy, instead prioritizing stability and economic growth over political freedom. As a result, the types of organization that the leaders in the two regions have endeavoured to construct are based on similar priorities. Therefore, although certain differences are evident and will be discussed, in general ASEAN and SCO are much better suited for comparison with one another than either is with EU. To this end, this article will outline an analytical framework for systematic comparison of ASEAN and SCO in order to bring out insights about the nature of each organization's model of cooperation.

ASEAN and SCO: a framework for comparative analysis

A lot of theoretical literature on regionalism contains an implicit assumption that regional cooperation is only meaningful between liberal democracies similar to those in Western Europe. As Acharya states, there is ‘a widespread assumption among liberal theorists that such [regional] communities require a quintessential liberal-democratic milieu featuring significant economic interdependence and political pluralism’ (Acharya 2001, 31). From this perspective, meaningful cooperation is based on sovereign integration between members to create a supranational body. In this way, EU is seen as facilitating meaningful cooperation because it is perceived to have ‘transformed the exercise of political authority in Western Europe by embedding the national in the European and the European in the national’ (Laffan 1998, 250).

According to these assumptions, regional cooperation should not be prevalent or effective in regions without liberal democracy. However, a variety of regional organizations and cooperative mechanisms exist throughout the non-Western world, involving nation-states with models of governance different from those found in Western Europe. While it is true that most of these are intergovernmental organizations that have not progressed in terms of political integration and coordination to the degree of EU, they should not simply be dismissed as worthless mechanisms of regional cooperation. As Hurrell argues, ‘there is no evidence that Europe is indicative of some sort of generalisable post-Westphalian order or that it is likely to serve as a model for other regions’ (Hurrell 2007, 143).

As a result of this Western bias, much of the literature for assessing regional organizations excludes important variables for explaining the utility of organizations in regions of weak nation-states. Notably, the role of common normative mechanisms to enhance members’ regime security and legitimacy is not sufficiently taken into account.2 Instead, many of the conceptual insights are built on the superiority of, and inherent progress towards, political integration via pooling of sovereignty. Yet, this logic is not prominent among the architects of regional projects in much of the world. ASEAN is notable for taking a very different path of institutional development to EU. In this respect, it ‘is a unique organization in many ways … a rare example of an influential, indigenous “Third World” organization and it is one of the few Cold War-inspired organizations to have survived beyond 1989’ (Sharpe 2003, 231). In addition, SCO is rapidly developing into an important player in the Asian regional landscape (Allison 2004; Chung 2006; Bailes et al 2007; Oldberg 2007) and, as noted in the introduction, is similar to ASEAN in a number of respects. Both ASEAN and SCO question the utility of certain assumptions often contained within mainstream theoretical literature that meaningful regional cooperation is only possible if states in a region are Western liberal-democratic in nature and the form of this cooperation is codified sovereign integration, similar to the model of EU.

In order to evaluate the comparative aspects of ASEAN and SCO, this article will incorporate a mix of traditional and alternative literature on regional organizations and regional cooperation, drawing on insights from Western-orientated models and on concepts developed by scholars familiar with the context of Asia. In particular, it will draw on the model for analysis of regional organizations developed by Acharya and Johnston in their 2007 work Crafting cooperation: regional international institutions in comparative perspective, which enables a comparative assessment of regional institutions across the world. It seeks to marry concepts borrowed from the theories of liberal-institutionalism and social constructivism by drawing on rational-choice models and socialization theory.3 It regards institutional design as ‘those formal and informal rules and organizational features that constitute the institution and that function as either the constraint on actor choice or the bare bones of the social environment with which agents interact, or both’ (Acharya and Johnston 2007a, 15–16). Furthermore, it acknowledges that a legalistic sovereign integration model such as that of EU may not be the most effective type of organization in all regions of the world. Instead, organizations that serve to enhance sovereignty and legitimacy are more likely in regions where nation-states are more concerned about the preservation of existing regimes.

This article aims to investigate the nature of SCO and ASEAN by comparing their main features and characteristics in order to consider their utility and compatibility. It does not explicitly seek to explain the constellations of the dynamics driving the development of the organization, but consider the credentials of the frameworks currently in place. In structuring this comparative analysis, the article uses five categories of institutional design as outlined by Acharya and Johnston (2007). These variables are membership, scope, rules, norms and mandate. The dynamics accounting for the development of the organizations will only be considered where relevant to the analysis of the comparative elements of both organizations.

ASEAN and SCO: a comparison

Mandate

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and ASEAN were formed in very different international contexts. ASEAN was supported by the West as an important bulwark against communism during the Cold War, and has had positive relations with the West ever since. The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, however, was formed to address security in a newly independent region created by the collapse of the Soviet Union, and has been viewed with great suspicion in the West, interpreted by many analysts as a Russian and/or Chinese anti-Western vehicle.4 Nonetheless, there is a distinct similarity in the central organizing principle of the two organizations, which stems from the nature of their respective member states. As noted by many scholars in regions of less developed states, internal security is usually more significant than the traditional inter-state rivalry (Job 1992; Ayoob 1995; Glen 1997; Roe 1999). Most of the nation-states of both Southeast Asia and Central Asia can be classified as ‘weak’ in the sense that their political elites do not command overwhelming legitimacy and recognition from within their own populace.5 Narine (2005, 423) outlines that ‘a significant majority of the states of East Asia see themselves as actively engaged in the process of creating coherent nations out of the disparate ethnic, religious and political groups within the state’. The republics of Central Asia also meet such criteria, albeit to differing extents. They are weak in terms of political legitimacy, economic development and social cohesion. As pointed out by Grzymala-Busse and Jones Luong, in many of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) successor states ‘no one single agent has uniform influence or authority across all state sectors, and state action is neither centralized nor coherent’ (2002, 532–533).

Both ASEAN and SCO adopt a more ‘political elite’ driven model—the agendas of both organizations are imposed by the preferences of elites—of cooperation, than we associate with EU. The desire for regional stability among the national elites of nation-states in the developing world is driven by the aim of eliminating challenges to their political authority and legitimacy. Given that domestic regime security is on the top of the agendas of regional elites in both organizations, they prioritize the same issue of security at a regional level as well. Acharya and Johnston identify the domestic political context of ASEAN as one in which ‘regime legitimacy and survival is critical’ (2007b, 248). That is, ASEAN seeks to bolster its members’ leaderships’ sovereignty against challenges to their authority in their domestic affairs (Acharya 1992, 162). Allison highlights regime security as integral to SCO: he argues ‘the solidarity it offers provides symbolic political legitimacy and equality to Central Asian regimes that struggle to assert this on the broader international stage’ (2008, 196). Indeed, SCO and ASEAN members ‘share interlocking beliefs about the major security referents (especially regime and state security) and the importance of maintaining regional stability in order to allow governments to pursue their domestic political and socio-economic agendas’ (Haacke and Williams 2008, 218). SCO analysts note that the context in which ASEAN was formed was not dissimilar to SCO, stating that the original members of ASEAN had experienced ‘many years of isolation and even confrontation’ and ‘were striving primarily for stability’ (Arunova and Goriunkov 2004).

To address these concerns about regime security, SCO claims to present a new holistic conception of security (Aris 2008). ASEAN's approach to security is based on a comprehensive understanding of security that ‘builds on similar historical experiences of colonial subjugation, past experiences of intraregional strife, and a perceived sense of vulnerability or state weakness’ (Haacke and Williams 2008, 218). Thus, ASEAN and SCO proceed from a similar approach to similar ends. In this way, they are ‘two organisations that should be able to complement each other well in consolidating Asia's multilateral security mechanism’ (Len 2007, 165).

Both organizations insist that they are not directed against any particular external threat, and place greater emphasis on the maintenance of internal security, taking similar approaches to realizing this aim. The driving force behind the development of ASEAN was the reduction and management of intra-state regional tension and rivalry: the governments of the five original ASEAN members ‘decided to form ASEAN as a mechanism for regional rapprochement, anticipating that participation in the Association would help moderate the currently unrestrained competitive dynamics between their countries’ (Khong and Nesadurai 2007, 35). This approach would allow them to address their most pressing security concerns, which were domestic in nature, with greater confidence that other regional actors would not pose an additional challenge to national security.

The development of SCO has proceeded from a very similar outlook on security and similar regional circumstances. The Central Asia Republics consider regime security—the protection of the existing regimes from internal challenges—their primary security concerns. There also exists a certain degree of historical animosity and mutual suspicion between the Republics. Bohr (2004, 485) notes that ‘behind the rhetoric of cooperation the states of the region [the Central Asian Republics] have been embroiled with increasing frequency in conflicts among themselves, including trade wars, border disputes and disagreements over the management and use of water and energy resources’. For instance, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have been depicted as rivals for regional dominance ever since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan have had several military clashes over access to water resources.

However, SCO's formula for addressing these internal security challenges and regime security is different from that of ASEAN. Instead of emphasizing regional harmony between its member states as its main aim, SCO explicitly targets the sub-state security actors and dynamics deemed by the regional elites to be the greatest threats to regime security. These threats— terrorism, extremism and separatism—have been termed ‘the three evil forces’. In essence, SCO addresses domestic security issues more directly than ASEAN even though the latter has recently intensified cooperation among its member states on internal security challenges and placed less prominence on the mechanisms for inter-state communications. This difference in approach is partially explained by the differing membership dynamic of the organizations. As nation-states of relatively equal standing, ASEAN members sought to develop a mechanism to manage their intra-regional rivalry. In Central Asia, the post-Soviet Republics are confident that Russia and China will play a balancing and organizing role in SCO, seeing them as a tool to enable regional cooperation without the need for any significant negotiations among the Republics. Central Asian analyst Allison argues (2008, 188) that ‘one explanation for Central Asian leaders’ interest in these macro-regional groupings is the need to manage tensions within the Central Asian security sub-complex. … From this perspective, meetings in the EAEC, CSTO or SCO have a socializing function, which serve to mitigate tensions between state leaders’. Indeed SCO offers the opportunity for the Central Asian Republics to balance external dependence between two big powers, providing them more room to manoeuvre and more leverage to extract the best deal from each of them (Maksutov 2006).

Thus, two distinct logics towards similar aims are evident in ASEAN and SCO. ASEAN was created as a mechanism to aid mutual understanding to assuage the fear of war between relatively equal states by cooperating against sub-state security dynamics. SCO was created to directly address sub-state security dynamics rather than explicitly targeting an increase in collaboration and understanding between the Central Asian Republics themselves.

Norms

The frameworks of ASEAN and SCO are comparable. Consensual decision-making drives the mechanisms of both organizations. Neither organization possesses any formal legal remit to enforce its decisions within the domestic realm of any of its members. Instead, both are reliant on volunteerism. Khong and Nesadurai (2007, 33) state that ‘notwithstanding the expansion in the scope of ASEAN institutions, institutional design in ASEAN remains wedded to state sovereignty as an initial preference, which results in a high degree of autonomy for national governments in determining in domestic policy’. A similar framework and principle is found in SCO. For instance, its Charter outlines: ‘the decisions taken by the SCO bodies shall be implemented by the member states in accordance with the procedures set out in their national legislation’.6 In addition, SCO decisions are taken on the basis of consensual agreement during informal discussions between the relevant state representatives before they are endorsed by the heads of state (Aris 2009).

A clear set of normative values are upheld in both organizations as an integral element of their functionality. Officials and analysts identify a set of key characteristics within ASEAN that are often referred to as the ‘ASEAN Way’. These values include an emphasis on informality and consensus building, and ‘the absence of any highly institutionalized legal framework’ (Sharpe 2003, 232). Similar characteristics are present within SCO, in its self-identified normative and value base that is known as the ‘Shanghai Spirit’. This spirit has been hailed by SCO as the backbone to a definitively new model of cooperation.7 In this way, both organization's frameworks for cooperation are less legalistic and more reliant on common norms than a Western liberal democratic undertaking, and the norms that are evident correspond to what both SCO and ASEAN proclaim as ‘Asian values’ rather than reproducing those in EU.8 These frameworks position the regional elites as the predominant influences on both organizations, and ingrains a non-integrationary culture into the framework. According to Len (2007, 169), the ‘ASEAN Way’ ‘is in many ways, similar to the SCO's “Shanghai Spirit” of mutual trust and benefit, equality, consultation, respect for different civilizations, and common prosperity’.

This loose and flexible approach to the design of both SCO and ASEAN stems from a common aim to build a sense of trust between the leaderships in their respective regions to overcome mutual suspicion and also their reservations with regard to multilateral organizations. The national elites in both regions are highly protective of their national sovereignty, and in many cases retain historical suspicion of their neighbours. Therefore an organization that attempts to legally bind them and develop sovereign control over areas of domestic policy is not likely to win the favour of the region's political actors. Instead, both organizations have been constructed to reassure the elites that they represent no threat to their national sovereignty and security vis-à-vis one another. To engender this, both have concentrated on an informal normative approach that takes into consideration the nature of their specific regional context. In the case of ASEAN ‘regionalism is supported by both legal and social norms’, whereby ‘legal norms are derived from conventional international norms, which are themselves derived from the principles of the Westphalian state system’ and ‘socio-cultural norms, by contrast, are particular to Southeast Asia and focus around the processes of consultation and consensus needed to reach common organizational positions’ (Narine 2006, 203).

To overcome a similar sense of mutual suspicion, SCO, like ASEAN, has relied on an informal and flexible normative base and on codified regulations for enforcing collaboration. In this way, ‘like ASEAN “the SCO began as a state-centric fraternal association of neighbouring nations in a developing region, collectively concerned about internal disruption and possible mutual friction. Thus a friendship grouping built on dialogue was formed, emphasizing security cooperation and economic development among members”’ (Len 2007, 169). This model is a more effective approach than adopting EU model for the state leaderships of both ASEAN and SCO, which are, to varying degrees, more authoritarian in system than states in Europe and whose primary security concerns are defined as the defence of their regimes within their domestic affairs.

In much of the literature on regionalism and regional organizations, the longevity of EU and its level of integration are often attributed to the strength and depth of its enshrined legal parameters, which are seen as ensuring its jurisdiction over certain areas of policy at the expense of its member states’ governments. As a result, when comparing EU and other regional organizations, ‘a particular focus of this debate has concerned institutional design, and involves contrasting the bureaucratic and legalistic model of European regionalism with the informal and non-legalistic approach of Asian regional organisations’ (Acharya and Johnston 2007a, 11). If judged on an European legalistic criteria, both ASEAN and SCO do not fare favourably. However, several ASEAN scholars argue, from a social constructivist perspective, that ASEAN's development is an example of the importance of common norms and regional identity in sustaining regional cooperation (Busse 1999; Acharya 2001; Alagappa 2003). They present a counter-argument that ASEAN's framework for cooperation simply adopts a different form of organizational discipline among its members to the sovereign integration model. By highlighting the importance of norms in regional cooperation, they argued that it is possible to create ties between nation-states in the same region not only via legal treaties and charters but also through the generation of common principles and patterns of behaviour on the basis of shared values and beliefs. These scholars argue that

the incentive for member states to comply with ASEAN's key principles would be that they see it as in their own interests. If a contrary incentive exists, compliance would be encouraged not through fear of sanction alone but because these principles would form part of a common identity and a long-term interest in perpetuating a mutually beneficial community. (Sharpe 2003, 232)

Regional SCO analysts have sought to answer criticism of SCO's ineffectiveness by referring to ASEAN as an example of the utility and effectiveness of this model of cooperation. Arunova and Goriunkov (2004) argue that ASEAN has ‘been repeatedly subjected to difficult tests, and been criticized for its inefficiency and doomed to imminent disintegration’, but it has existed for 40 years.

The examples of both ASEAN and SCO highlight the importance of creating a regional institution in line with the nature of the nation-states and values specific to that region. Both ASEAN and SCO are constructed on a similar idea of emphasizing a commonality of context, approach and political system between members, but these contexts, approaches and systems are different from Western liberal-democracies. As Acharya puts it,

it may be argued that while common values are necessary for community building, these need not be liberal democratic values. A shared commitment to economic development, regime security and political stability could compensate for a lack of a high degree of economic interdependence. (Acharya 2001, 34)

Indeed, a loose and informal model of cooperation containing specific norms is ‘presented by some Asian leaders as a culturally-rooted notion, focussing on organizational minimalism, the avoidance of legalism, and an emphasis on consultations and consensus decision-making’ (Acharya and Johnston 2007a, 11). This claim is also notable from members of SCO (Putin 2006).

The difference in approach to regional cooperation in Central and Southeast Asia from EU can be partially explained by the fact that

while Europe's commitment to multilateralism and rule of law in international affairs is born out of a determination to transcend the sovereignty-bound nation-state system, Asia's interest in multilateralism is born primarily out of a desire to preserve the existing rules of international relations, especially those related to sovereignty. (Acharya 2006, 318)

In general, nation-states outside of Western Europe—including members of SCO and ASEAN—are more preoccupied with ensuring the stability of their members’ territorial integrity and protecting national leaders’ grip on sovereignty. While ‘Europeans increasingly live in a post-sovereign world, believing it to be more efficient and morally desirable; Asia remains firmly beholden to sovereignty, taking it as the fundamental basis of their stability and identity’ (Acharya 2006, 318). As a result, ASEAN and SCO adopt a different model of cooperation from EU that is not based upon supranationalism. Instead, as noted by Narine (2005, 423), with regard to the states of East Asia ‘the regional attitude towards multilateral institutions is that they should assist in the state-building process by enhancing the sovereignty of their members’. Therefore, in contrast to Western organizations, ‘Asian regional organisations are geared to sovereignty enhancement, not sovereignty pooling’ (Higgott 1997, 177). This desire to bolster rather than sacrifice national sovereignty is at the heart of the distinction between Asian regional cooperation and European regional integration. It differentiates ASEAN and SCO from EU but also highlights the similar outlook or mindset with which the frameworks of ASEAN and SCO have been constructed. These frameworks place the key concerns of the member states’ leaderships, regime security and sovereign enhancing regional cooperation at the heart of both organizations. As a result, both organizations have a similar underlying principle and dynamic.

Membership

Although exhibiting a degree of similarity with ASEAN in terms of its overriding mandate and the structural values underpinning the organization, the dynamics between members in SCO differ greatly from those in ASEAN. SCO is composed of a much more disparate group of nation-states, with Russia and China dwarfing the other members in terms of power and capability. Russia, China and the post-Soviet Republics of Central Asia encompass a wide range of interests, cultures, traditions, political systems, societal structures and geographical locations. Various analysts have noted the stark differences in the attributes of the member states of SCO. For instance, Zhao points out that

disparities in terms of population and geographical size are very significant among member states. In particular, both China and Russia have huge populations and territories compared to the Central Asian member states. Every country also has a different profile in terms of politics, society, religion, culture, not to mention the different pace of economic growth. (2006, 114)

Therefore, SCO has to manage issues emerging from its composition of two great powers, a mid-level state and three other members with huge internal challenges. As Uzbek analyst Farkhad Tolipov (2004) points out, SCO composes of two global powers and four relatively small states and thus ‘these are not just six states, but rather six unequal states’. As a result of this power differential among members, the bilateral relationship between Russia and China casts a wide shadow over SCO. Indeed, it is possible to see SCO as a barometer of the state of Russo-Chinese relations, as up to the present time the development of SCO has mirrored the evolution of their bilateral relationship (Aris 2008). The significance of the Russo-Chinese relationship for SCO raises an additional structural question for creating a framework to overcome mutual suspicion than those facing ASEAN: can the Central Asian Republics hope to influence SCO given their relative power disadvantages? This question has caused SCO problems in terms of its development due to the concerns of the smaller member states that they may be dominated within its framework and are thus not inclined to cede authority to it (Zhao 2006, 111). However, this limitation in enforcing collective decisions is a consequence of the design that has made the SCO the main regional organization in Central Asia, reassuring the Central Asian Republics that SCO will not undermine their national sovereignty, but leaving it inherently limited in terms of functional impact.

An important element of continuity between SCO and ASEAN is the participation of China. In recent years, a significant change in mindset among the Chinese leadership can be discerned, from a preference for unilateralism and isolationism to a more active pursuit of multilateral cooperation.9 China's initial foray into multilateral institutional arrangements came with Beijing's active participation in the formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994 and subsequently ASEAN +3. This experience perhaps emboldened and reaffirmed the commitment of China to play an integral part in the development of SCO, with Beijing promoting its positive experience of the cooperation model of ASEAN in SCO. This preference for an ASEAN-style approach over EU is a consequence of China's understanding of its identity in the international system. As Ba argues (2006, 168), ‘while China and ASEAN's experiences are by no means the same they do share an outsider's view of the international system, as well as a historical sense of vulnerability vis-à-vis advanced industrialised powers’. Therefore, common principles in ASEAN and SCO are evident because of China's participation in both.

The Chinese leadership's decision to investigate multilateralism has resonance beyond the functions of the regional organizations within which it participates. Yahuda argues (2007, 76), in embracing ‘multilateral associations of states … China has not only changed fundamentally the character of its relations with neighbouring countries, but it has also begun to challenge, and perhaps change, the character of international order within its region.’ As highlighted the nature of these normative frameworks are distinct from the Western liberal-democratic model that pervades the international system at present, and the ASEAN and SCO frameworks clearly have more in common with one another than this dominant paradigm.

However, while the presence of two superpowers draws attention to SCO, ASEAN, with its membership of mid or small sized powers, has also been developing a very different paradigm for international relations in Southeast Asia. Stubbs (2008, 464) argues that ‘over the last 40 years ASEAN has developed a set of goals and norms with regard to the conduct of regional and international relations that provide an alternative paradigm to the dominant Western, liberal approach to contemporary global governance and the world order’. Although SCO may be more overt in promoting a different perspective on international conduct and values than ASEAN10, the content of this perspective is to a large extent inspired by the norms and values developed within ASEAN. Indeed, Stubbs argues that it is the ASEAN model that other organizations are attempting to replicate, stating that

support for the ASEAN paradigm is also growing among other countries of the South. For example, no doubt encouraged by China, members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) have echoed aspects of the ASEAN paradigm in recent Summit pronouncements … as have representatives of countries of the South in key UN debates. (Stubbs 2008, 464)

Rules

Although the legal/normative balance of ASEAN and SCO are broadly comparable, there is a distinct difference in models. The SCO framework is built on flexible values and a normative basis similar to ASEAN's—indeed the former arguably drew on the latter. Nonetheless, a more rapid process of formal institutionalization is evident in SCO. With seven bodies now established and a permanent functioning bureaucracy in place, the SCO model represents a relatively deep degree of institutionalism in the context of a region of ‘weak’ nation-states and the short time period since it formation. In less than a decade, SCO ‘has experienced transformation from being traditional security- to non-traditional security-orientated, single dimensional to comprehensive, and a non-institutional meeting mechanism to a formally institutionalized structure’ (Wang 2007, 119). Even if this institutionalization represents no significant growth in political or legal authority for SCO, it does stand in contrast to both the low-level formal institutional arrangements in ASEAN forty years after its creation and ASEAN's preference for a slowly evolving process of institutionalism. While SCO is clearly inspired by ASEAN and similarly does not aim to ‘pool’ its members sovereignty, its level of institutionalization and the speed of this development positions SCO somewhere between the highly codified EU and informal model of ASEAN.

An important factor in explaining the more institutionalized rigid framework of SCO compared to ASEAN, in spite of their being driven by similar aims, is the more disparate membership of SCO. The relative divergence in power resources between members in SCO creates a landscape in which distrust between stronger and weaker members is a possibility. However, although holding greater influence on the development of SCO, both Moscow and Beijing have been careful not to appear overbearing within the organization. To this end, Russia and China have sought to encourage the Central Asian Republics to play an active role in order to counter concerns amongst their leaderships that their influence on the direction of the organization will always be a distant second to Russian and Chinese interests. Chinese President Hu Jintao stated in 2006 that

though there are big differences among the SCO member states in ideology, culture and level of economic development, the reason why the SCO has made such rapid progress and outstanding achievements lies in our insistence on the Shanghai Spirit. (cited in Chinese Government's Official Webportal 2006)

As a result, the model of cooperation within SCO is based on a loose model comparable to ASEAN but with a more rigid edge to guarantee principles of equality. In this way, SCO aims to reassure the leaderships of the Central Asian Republics of their ability to act unrestrictedly in their domestic affairs as well as to address their concerns that the organization will be too weak to ensure them substantive influence against their much larger co-members.

Another influential factor in explaining the greater speed of institutionalization of SCO compared to ASEAN is the role of China. Although China is an external participant in ASEAN offshoot organizations, ASEAN +3 and the ASEAN Regional Forum, SCO is the first organization on which Beijing has had a strong influence from its formation. As a result, the SCO is seen by the Chinese leadership as a tool for increasing their influence on the regional and international landscape, by way of expanding its ‘soft’ or normative power (Wang 2007, 119; Cabestan 2008, 206). SCO is important to the Chinese leadership in this regard. Beijing considers that it has significant influence on SCO and is very interested in developing a functioning and effective regional mechanism fashioned out of the main facets of its foreign policy, and deems a fast institutionalization as beneficial to this (Wang 2007, 119). China's experience in the ASEAN frameworks has a definite effect on the nature of SCO, but it also seems that China has sought to push SCO to supplement this model with a more ambitious pace of institutionalization in order to illustrate its capability as a multilateral organization builder. As Wang highlights (2007, 120) ‘in the Southeast Asia and the broadly defined Asia-Pacific region, China evidently prefers a loosely structured and open-ended multilateralism, but in the case of Shanghai Five-SCO, China spared no effort to push for institutionalization’.

Although both the model and focus of SCO are viewed very favourably among all members, it is arguable that the speed of institutionalization is driven by China and is against Russia and the Central Asian Republics’ desire for it to evolve slowly (Aris 2008, 14). The governments of Russia, and in particular the Central Asian Republics, are concerned about the potential dominance of China in the region as a result of its growing economic power. In this way, ‘just like the Russians, or perhaps even more, the Central Asian nations are afraid of the growing Chinese economic strength … and have therefore opposed the Chinese wish for free trade’ (Oldberg 2007, 35). As a result, China and the other members have sought to strike a balance between the loose and flexible approach of the organization via the promotion of norms and the maintenance of the effectiveness of the framework through standing organs, charters and agreements.

Within ASEAN there is potential for relationships between particular members to overshadow the organization, but in comparison with SCO's membership ASEAN is composed of a set of nation-states of a similar power capacity and standing. In ASEAN there is no equivalent dominant actor or potential hegemony that is seeking to demonstrate the utility of its vision of international relations as an emerging regional and world superpower, providing a beneficial landscape for finding consensus. ASEAN's organizational momentum comes from more varied sources and does not bear the hallmarks of an individual member state's foreign policy to such a degree as Russia and especially China does on SCO. By contrast, SCO needs to contain a least a degree of rigid rules in order to assure the Central Asian Republics that the organization will not be hijacked by an agenda of either or both of their huge neighbours.

Scope

Another distinction between ASEAN and SCO is their orientation at present. Initially, formed to address the landscape of mutual suspicion between five geographically congruent nations, ASEAN has expanded its membership to ten, covering a greater region and as a result a wider agenda, representing a transformation from an exclusive to a more inclusive style organization. SCO also characterizes itself as a broad umbrella-type organization. However, its membership has remained unchanged since its formation, and as a result, the identity of the organization and its mandate remain clearly defined. The SCO member states pursue a relatively narrow array of interests in regional cooperation that revolve around ensuring regime security by targeting non-traditional security challenges and large-scale economic cooperation programmes. A small membership and a shared mindset towards regional cooperation has enabled the SCO to function according to its loose framework. By contrast. the increased membership of ASEAN has, to some extent, created a two-track system within ASEAN (Simon 2007). The expansion of ASEAN's membership made inter-state consultation a complex process and the development of a clearly defined direction and agenda more difficult.

Although focused more on intra-regional challenges than ASEAN, SCO may have more of external impact on the international system, simply by virtue of the membership of Russia and China within it. Russia and China as world powers pay more attention to shaping the normative base of the international system than the mid-level powers of ASEAN, for whom this process would be much more complex. Indeed the Russo-Chinese relationship is partially constructed on a common perception that the existing international system's rules and norms have an inherent Western bias, and shares common interest in creating a more mutually conducive system. China in particular sees SCO as an important tool for this aim and ‘has an interest in showing that it can build an international bloc independent of the West and organized on non-Western principles’ (Bailes and Dunay 2007, 13). The Chinese leadership has often touted the significance of the SCO as a model of ‘new interstate relations’, ‘new security concept’ and ‘new model of regional cooperation’ (Wang 2007, 119). China and Russia reject the idea promoted by some Western states that cooperation is only possible between nation-states with liberal-democratic systems of governance. Therefore,

Beijing attempts, among other things, to demonstrate through SCO that, first, countries with different civilizations and social systems could coexist in peace without democratizing domestic systems, as the democratic peace advocated would argue. (Wang 2007, 118)

Thus, while sharing many of the same ideals and values, SCO's promotion of these norms in a wider regional or even global context differentiates it from ASEAN. It also affects how Western states perceive the two organizations, with ASEAN seen as a natural ally and SCO as a grouping to be feared because it is questioning certain Western values.

However, this difference in Western perception masks a high degree of synergy between the two models of cooperation, as well as their focus. There is significant potential for inter-regional cooperation between ASEAN and SCO on a number of common interests and within a framework of common perceptions and values (Len 2007). The secretariats of the two organizations have already signed a Memorandum of Understanding in 2005, which ‘paves the way for both secretariats to initiate substantive cooperation on issues of mutual interest to their respective organisations’ work priorities, specifically through exchange of information and best practice’ (ASEAN Secretariat 2005). Both SCO and ASEAN are interested in ensuring regional stability to create a landscape for economic development and regime security, and both target non-traditional security challenges as a key element to this end. Collaboration would also be mutually beneficial in a wider sense. For ASEAN, it would give its framework of international relations a wider audience and a greater visibility by virtue of the diplomatic significance of Russia and China. For SCO, cooperation with ASEAN in energy or normative fields ‘would go some way to dispel the notion that the SCO is a “rogue organization” that seeks hegemony in Eurasia and monopoly over Central Asia's energy resources … and promote the reputation of China and Russia as responsible regional actors’ (Len 2007, 198). From a Western perception, SCO is looked upon as a threat while ASEAN is interpreted as a positive influence on the Southeast Asian region. Therefore, cooperation between the two can only serve to enhance the legitimacy of SCO in many Western actors’ eyes.

Conclusion

SCO is a growing regional player, and at the present time its focus, structure and value base are perceived positively by all its members. Its model of cooperation is in large part a copy of ASEAN's, with a number of distinctions relevant to its context. As a result, it has the potential to emulate ASEAN in becoming an important established player in its region, and perhaps develop a wider global impact than ASEAN itself. On the basis of a comparison with SCO, ASEAN's focus upon regional stability and economic development and its loose, informal model for cooperation remain relevant for its own region and the wider Asian regional landscape. The two organizations share very similar underlying principles (consensus, flexibility, informality, sovereign enhancing cooperation) as well as focus (regime security, economic development and stability over promotion of democracy). In this way, both SCO and ASEAN provide evidence to challenge the ‘universalist’ assumption of some mainstream theory inspired work on regional cooperation and organizations.11 These two organizations represent significant players in their respective regions and are facilitators of greater cooperation between their members than would occur otherwise.

Given their similarity and compatibility, any growth in regional and global importance of SCO will not threaten ASEAN's place as a leading player in the wider Asian region but would complement it. For ASEAN, the emergence of SCO and its adoption of a framework of cooperation broadly similar to its own is a positive dynamic that appears to vindicate its evolution and continued utility as a regional organization in Asia. It also enables ASEAN and SCO to learn from each other in order to improve models of cooperation and gain potential partners in the promotion of common values and non-interference style cooperation. An expansion in links between the two appears likely, especially given Chinese interest in maintaining positive relations with its Southeast Asian neighbours and participation in ASEAN.

Notes

¹ The SCO is the institutional outcome of a process of cooperation begun almost 20 years previously. From a limited framework for negotiation of border demarcation, the scope of cooperation between these states grew firstly into the Shanghai 5 mechanism, and then in 2001 into the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The SCO remit has now been expanded significantly, and covers security, economic, cultural and humanitarian collaboration between its members. It has also developed an institutional structure, which at present includes seven bodies and contains ‘an internal mechanism which organizes regular meetings for member states’ and this ‘mechanism constitutes an integral part of discussions and policy-making within the SCO’ (Zhao 2006, 110).

² For an account of this utility with regard to the Central Asian Republics see Allison (2008).

³ The authors themselves state that ‘we did not want the project to assume the superiority of one particular theoretical orientation’ (Acharya and Johnston 2007a, 16).

⁴ Views of SCO serves primarily as a geopolitical counterweight to the US are not uncommon (see for instance, Cohen 2006).

⁵ Mohammed Ayoob (1995) characterizes third world states (or less developed states) as those that are weak (lack of internal cohesion and legitimacy), vulnerable (marginalized and easily permeated by external actors) and insecure (susceptible to internal and interstate conflict) (Ayoob 1995, 15–16).

⁶ Article 3, Charter of Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, available at: < http://www.sectsco.org/EN/show.asp?id = 69>

⁷ The Chinese foreign ministry states that ‘in the course of development, a Shanghai spirit gradually took shape, a spirit characterized by mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, cooperation, respect for diversified civilizations and common development’. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2004)

⁸ Personal interviews with officials in the SCO Secretariat in Beijing (July 2007).

⁹ See Wu and Lansdowne (2007).

¹⁰ It should be emphasized SCO is predominately an internally focused organization (see Aris 2009)

¹¹ The majority of liberal-institutional, as well as other rationalist, theories of institutionalism and regional cooperations, assert that multilateral institutions are only sustained via integration of sovereignty.