ASEAN in the twenty-first century: a sceptical review

Abstract

Over the past few years, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has undertaken institutional reforms in the hope of rejuvenating itself for the twenty-first century. This paper utilizes the theory of subaltern realism (SR) to examine these initiatives. SR emphasizes that developing world states are weak and internally divided. As such, they formulate regional relations from the perspective of doing what is needed to further the state-building process. This paper assesses two of these reforms—the ASEAN Charter and the idea of the ASEAN Community idea—from the SR perspective and concludes that these measures are unlikely to have the desired rejuvenating effect. The ASEAN Charter envisions an ASEAN that is more intrusive than most of its members will tolerate. The ASEAN Community is not supported by a strong ASEAN identity. However, the regional environment of East Asia creates a political space wherein a unified and motivated ASEAN has the potential to exercise considerable influence. ASEAN member states are faced with the dilemma of determining how to balance their demands for sovereignty with the real advantages they will gain by supporting ASEAN. SR needs to be further developed before it can offer guidance in evaluating this situation.

Introduction

As the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) enters its fifth decade, scholars continue to debate the significance of the institution. The Asia Pacific is in the midst of a new wave of state-supported institutionalism and regionalism. Networks of private citizens, businesses and non-governmental organizations are bringing the region together. At the same time, historical forces of nationalism, ethnicity and socio-economic developmental pressures act as obstacles to greater regional integration ((Pempel 2005; Frost 2008). The role that ASEAN plays in these processes and how they are affecting ASEAN's development remain unclear.

In recent years, ASEAN's international credibility has been eroded by its inability to deal with several important regional events and situations. In an effort to address this loss of prestige, ASEAN has pursued significant institutional reforms. In particular, it has promulgated and ratified a new ASEAN Charter, a document that, for the first time, accords ASEAN a legal personality. It has also introduced measures designed to create an ‘ASEAN Community’. Reform supporters argue that ASEAN's relevance as a regional actor and its survival as an institution are contingent on its ability to strengthen its organizational capacities (Wesley 1999; Kahler 2000; Severino 2006).

This paper is an effort to assess ASEAN's efforts at reform and their implications. Can these measures achieve the goal of rejuvenating the organization or are they aspirations that transcend ASEAN's structural and political capabilities? If the latter point, then what are the long-term prospects for ASEAN's regional relevance? This paper draws on Mohammed Ayoob's (1998) theory of ‘subaltern realism’ to examine ASEAN's development as a regional actor. Subaltern realism argues that concerns with nation-building are the most significant factors shaping the foreign policies of developing world states. This theory offers some key insights into ASEAN's evolution and limitations.

This paper approaches the question of ASEAN's continuing and future viability by undertaking a two-part analysis. Drawing on subaltern realism, the paper examines the content of the ASEAN Charter and ASEAN's goal of creating an ‘ASEAN Community’. Subaltern realism suggests that both of these efforts are at odds with the political realities of most ASEAN members. The analysis bears this out. The ASEAN Charter embodies norms and values that, in practice, are in contradiction. It juxtaposes a traditional ASEAN emphasis on non-intervention with commitments to human rights and democracy. There is little reason to think that most ASEAN states will respect these commitments. Similarly, creating an ASEAN Community is, at best, a long-term project and one that faces many practical limitations. From this argument, it may seem that ASEAN's days as a functional institution are limited. However, such a conclusion is premature. The second prong of the argument shows that while the strength of ASEAN's identity may be at issue, the unique qualities of the East Asian political environment in which ASEAN operates allow it a prominent and meaningful role in the regional architecture. The rivalries between China, Japan and the United States (US)—and, potentially, India and Russia—create a political space within which ASEAN may exercise significant regional influence. The caveat to this argument is, however, that ASEAN's ability to exploit this advantage is partly contingent on the organization's internal unity. There are reasons to doubt the level of unity that ASEAN can maintain. However, if ASEAN can sustain itself into the future, it may gain the time to develop the economic, political and socio-cultural linkages necessary for it to evolve into a strong community of states. Whatever emerges, ASEAN will follow an atypical path of institutional development.

The paper is divided into three parts. First, it defines the theoretical and normative dimensions of the discussion by examining subaltern realism and ASEAN's established norms. Next, it uses theory to assess ASEAN's efforts to rejuvenate itself through the reforms exemplified by the ASEAN Charter and the idea of the ASEAN Community (AC). The paper then examines ASEAN's necessary and influential role in regional institution-building and its implications.

Subaltern realism, the English School and ASEAN's normative evolution

Most contemporary theoretical analyses of ASEAN are either of realist or constructivist persuasion. Most scholars of ASEAN regard liberal institutionalism as seriously limited in explaining ASEAN (Peou, 2002; Kawasaki, 2006; Ruland and Jetschke, 2008). This paper adopts neither a realist nor constructivist perspective—though it may be argued that the theoretical perspectives utilized are variations on both of these theories. Instead, it draws primarily on Mohammed Ayoob's theory of ‘subaltern realism’ (SR) and complementary arguments about international society drawn from the English School of international relations.

Realists exaggerate the difficulty of international cooperation between self-interested states and the level of inter-state threat that exists within most regions. This is certainly the case in Southeast Asia, where much of the regional cooperation is between self-interested states that recognize that their mutual interests are served through cooperative endeavours. Most constructivist analyses of ASEAN go to the other extreme. In practice (though there is no theoretical necessity to do this), constructivists exaggerate the intensity of a distinct ASEAN identity. They also overestimate the sense of community in the region and often underestimate the influence of more important, competing ethnic and religious identities (Brown 2002; Narine 2004). Constructivism explains a great deal about ASEAN, but understanding ASEAN's normative contribution to regional stability means embedding it in the multiple, domestically-rooted identities of the region, not trying to isolate its influence at the international level. As we shall see, the ASEAN identity is weakly held among its member states. It is the pursuit of other identities and associated interests, which encourage the regional states to support ASEAN and its international/regional role.

This paper utilizes Mohammed Ayoob's theory of ‘subaltern realism’ to explain ASEAN and its relationship with its members. Subaltern realism draws on three traditions: classical realism, historical sociological studies of state-building in Europe and the ‘normative insights’ of the English School of international relations, especially its analysis of the expansion of international society (Ayoob 1998; Ayoob 2002b; Narine 2004). Ayoob argues that developing world states are, first and foremost, relatively ‘weak’. That is, their abilities to assert their authority and perform the necessary functions of states are challenged by their institutional and political limitations. They are preoccupied with trying to create national identities out of disparate ethnic, religious and other identities. As a result, they practise a form of realism that is, essentially, the classical realism of Machiavelli or Hobbes, who were most concerned with how to create stable domestic political structures in their home states. The international behaviour of third world states is motivated primarily by nation-building concerns. Understanding and filtering the actions and interests of most ASEAN states through this lens yields useful insights into ASEAN's operation. SR ideas are most useful for explaining why pressures for reform within ASEAN are often unable to generate the sought-after changes.

The English School (ES) emphasizes the full range of cooperation that is possible between self-interested sovereign states within the international system. It underlines that states exist within a society of states and that cooperation in the international system is not unusual. Indeed, most states follow the systemic rules because they recognize their self-interest in doing so. The traditional Westphalian norms of the international system are subject to debate and reformulation, but they have also served as the foundation for an evolving international society for about two centuries. These norms may be under pressure now, but they enjoy the support of most developing world states and they remain the values underpinning ASEAN (Narine 2006).

Michael Barnett offers a number of criticisms of subaltern realism. Most relevant to this paper is his observation that the theory is deeply statist and, as such, privileges the state in both normative and functional terms. It tends to ignore or underestimate the influence of non-state actors and forces on the developing world. It also oversimplifies the multi-dimensional interactions that constitute the international realm (Barnett 2002, 58–59). These objections will become more relevant as we consider the relationships of ASEAN's members to the international level of state activity.

Subaltern realism leads us to expect that ASEAN consists of states that are dominated by domestic political concerns but that can still function cooperatively within a regional organization, so long as their major domestic political priorities are not challenged by that organization. Historically, this is what we have seen when we look at ASEAN. Today, ASEAN is under serious internal pressure to become a more institutionalized, formal and binding arrangement. However, there is little to suggest that ASEAN has moved beyond the concerns of subaltern realism. The norms and values of ASEAN are at the heart of the debate over what ASEAN is and what it can (or should) become.

Amitav Acharya distinguishes ASEAN's legal-rational from its socio-cultural norms. He defines ‘legal-rational’ norms as: ‘formal rationalistic principles of law’. ‘Socio-cultural’ norms are ‘the basis of informal social controls and social habits’ (Acharya 2001, 24). ASEAN's legal-rational norms are the following:

1.	a prohibition against the use of force and a commitment to the pacific settlement of disputes;
2.	regional autonomy;
3.	the doctrine of non-interference;
4.	no military pacts and a preference for bilateral defence cooperation.

A commitment to sovereignty is common to most states, but a credible case can be made that ASEAN's emphasis on non-intervention is distinctive (Haacke 2003, 5) ASEAN's relative compliance with, and support for, these norms varies. The norm of ‘regional autonomy’, for example, is one that ASEAN has never pursued vigorously—most ASEAN members entrust their national security to alliances with external powers—and today seems to have fallen by the wayside as ASEAN seeks to engage the great powers in the region. ASEAN's socio-cultural norms are designated ‘the ASEAN Way’. The ASEAN Way emphasizes informal interactions, minimal institutional development and the peaceful settlement of disputes (Severino 2006, 1–37)

Sarah Eaton and Richard Stubbs argue that realists measure ASEAN's ‘power’ on the basis of its ability to enforce compliance with its norms, values and objectives. The ability of the organization to set and successfully achieve goals is indicative of its effectiveness. However, they reject this formulation and go on to argue that ASEAN's real power lies in its ability to shape the normative structures of the Asia Pacific region (Eaton and Stubbs 2006). ASEAN helps to create the context in which regional interaction takes place. According to Stubbs, ASEAN's commitment to Westphalian norms constitutes a distinctive approach to international relations that challenges the existing and evolving Western paradigm. Stubbs argues that China's commitment to the same international perspective is one of the major reasons that China has conspicuously supported ASEAN's high-profile role in many of the new regional institutions that have evolved over the past ten years (Stubbs 2008).

Recent developments within ASEAN itself have muddied the waters of this analysis. There is considerable controversy within the organization over its existing approach to intra-ASEAN relations. The Asian economic crisis of 1997–1999 exposed the vulnerability of Southeast Asia to powerful global forces. According to supporters of ASEAN reform, managing those forces requires larger, unified and coordinated regional institutions. Modifying the non-intervention principle and ASEAN's associated practices seems to be a reasonable—maybe even a necessary—course of action.

The awkward development of democracy in Southeast Asia and changing international norms regarding the nature of state legitimacy and its relation to democracy have also had a powerful impact (Ayoob 2002a; Finnemore 2003; Weiss 2007, 17–24). Across Southeast Asia, domestic discussions on greater democracy and liberalization have taken hold in most ASEAN countries, with varying degrees of acceptance on the part of authorities. Jorn Dosch argues that ASEAN's deliberations on democracy are ‘the inevitable indirect consequence of democratic norms and values diffusing from the domestic to regional political spheres’ (Dosch 2008, 530). However, the willingness to accept democratic values does not necessarily translate into a willingness to promote and enforce those values, as indicated by ASEAN's continuing tolerance of Myanmar and its apparent reluctance to enforce the human rights norms codified in the ASEAN Charter (Dosch 2008, 538–543). It is important to note that there is no inherent contradiction between the ASEAN Charter's support for human rights, democracy and sovereignty all at the same time. However, when a good proportion of ASEAN states are not democracies and/or display limited respect for human rights, the Charter's concurrent emphasis on sovereignty seems to create, in practice, a contradiction. In terms of Eaton and Stubbs' analysis, it is no longer clear what norms and values ASEAN is actually trying to promote. The new ASEAN Charter and the ASEAN Community idea, with their emphasis on meeting standards and attainable goals, seem to move ASEAN towards a more ‘realist’ understanding of organizational efficacy.

The limits of ASEAN: the problems of institutional reform

The 1990s were a pivotal decade for ASEAN. The cessation of the Cold War ended ASEAN's confrontation with Vietnam over the latter's 1978 invasion and subsequent occupation of Cambodia—an event that gave ASEAN focus for more than a decade. ASEAN needed new purposes. It found them by promoting regional economic integration in the form of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), trying to manage regional security through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and expanding its membership to include Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia (the CLMV states) by the end of the decade. But in 1997, ASEAN's efforts to redefine itself ran into problems. Human-caused forest fires in Indonesia created a ‘regional haze’ that ASEAN could not address effectively.1 The inclusion of Myanmar in its ranks undermined ASEAN's relationships with many of its Western allies. Cambodia's membership was delayed as the country was wracked by political upheaval. Most significantly, the Asian Economic Crisis of 1997–1999 devastated the regional economies and seriously compromised ASEAN's carefully cultivated international image. ASEAN lacked both the economic resources and institutional structures necessary to deal with economic upheaval (Narine 2008b).

Expecting ASEAN to deal with the crisis was unreasonable (Narine 2002a). Nonetheless, this expectation existed, and ASEAN was left looking impotent in the face of the economic collapse. This raised unwelcome questions in the international community about exactly how important ASEAN really was. The Indonesian military's rampage across newly independent East Timor in 1999, and ASEAN's inability to manage this crisis, further strained ASEAN's international credibility and prestige. Over the next few years, ASEAN struggled to reassert itself despite various political and economic initiatives. It realized that the organization's credibility and therefore its ability to be an effective and respected international actor were at stake. The ASEAN Charter and the ASEAN Community are the most recent and ambitious efforts to address these concerns by redefining and strengthening ASEAN for the twenty-first century (Narine 2008a).

The Asean Charter

At the eleventh ASEAN summit in Kuala Lumpur on 12–14 December 2005, the ASEAN leaders signed the Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the ASEAN Charter. The Charter was envisioned as a ‘constitutional document embodying fundamental principles, goals, objectives and structures of ASEAN cooperation capable of meeting the needs of the ASEAN Community and beyond’ (Chairman's Statement 2005). A ten-person Eminent Persons Group EPG), with representation from each ASEAN member, drafted the Charter. The EPG was expected to produce ‘bold and visionary’ recommendations for the leaders. It was also encouraged to consult with civil society organizations (CSOs) and business groups as part of ‘the new thrust of (ASEAN) to become a more inclusive organization’ (Caballero-Anthony 2008, 72).

The EPG presented its recommendations to the twelfth ASEAN summit in Cebu, the Philippines, 9–15 January 2007. The report attempted to integrate all of ASEAN's various stated norms, scattered in various declarations and treaties over forty years, into one coherent document. It also called for ‘the active strengthening of democratic values, good governance, rejection of unconstitutional and undemocratic changes of government, though the respect and institutionalization of the rule of law, including humanitarian law’ (Report of the EPG 2006, 2). The EPG recommended the creation of a formal dispute mechanism to resolve political and economic issues; decision-making by majority vote, rather than the traditional consensus, in areas other than security and foreign policy; and monitoring mechanisms to gauge members' compliance on ASEAN's objectives, principles and policies. The EPG proposed sanctions against members in ‘serious breach’ of ASEAN principles, including loss of membership rights and even expulsion. All of these measures represented a radical departure from established ASEAN norms and practices.

The report was accepted and endorsed by the ASEAN leadership but, over the next several months, political support for the recommendations eroded. This occurred particularly over the issue of sanctions for non-compliance with ASEAN goals. A High Level Task Force (HLTF) was assigned the task of preparing a draft of the Charter, to be ready for ASEAN's thirteenth summit in Singapore in November 2007, where ASEAN's fortieth anniversary would be celebrated. The HLTF was told by the ASEAN senior officials to exclude the discussion of sanctions and ensure that the consensus decision-making approach was not altered (Cabballero-Anthony 2008, 75).

The final ASEAN Charter was formally adopted by ASEAN's leaders on 20 November 2007, at the thirteenth annual ASEAN summit in Singapore. The leaders welcomed the new Charter as a milestone in ASEAN's history—the first document to ‘codif(y) organic Southeast Asian diplomacy, and (list the) key principles of and purposes of ASEAN’ (Cabballero-Anthony 2008, 76). Supporters of the Charter argued that it would make ASEAN more of a rules-based organization. The Charter was not supposed to replace the ‘ASEAN Way’ so much as ‘(supplement it) by a new culture of adherence to rule … a culture of taking … obligations seriously’ (as quoted in Cabballero-Anthony 2008, 77). However, if truly implemented, this change means a significant transformation in the consensus-based approach to decision-making. By November 2008, the Charter had been formally ratified by all of ASEAN's member states.

The Charter established an ASEAN human rights body but did not give that body any enforcement capability and left the terms of its operation to be determined by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting. Any serious violation of the Charter's obligations by members will be addressed at the ASEAN summit, but the Charter gives no indication or guidance as to what the summit should do and does not provide for the expulsion of violators. The Charter reaffirms all of the fundamental principles contained in all of ASEAN's past treaties, agreements and other instruments, and it explicitly underlines the need for ASEAN members to respect each other's sovereignty and independence, in a number of different articles (ASEAN Charter 2007).

At the same time, however, the Charter makes clear commitments to the idea of democracy and human rights within ASEAN. The preamble to the Charter identifies ASEAN as ‘ADHERING to the principles of democracy, rule of law and good governance, respect for and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms’. Article 1.7 states one of the purposes of ASEAN as being:

to strengthen democracy, enhance good governance, and the rule of law and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, with due regard to the rights and responsibilities of the Member States of ASEAN. (ASEAN Charter 2007)

Nonetheless, CSOs and other groups were severely disappointed with the Charter's final form, particularly when it was compared to the recommendations of the EPG (Arnold 2007). They were particularly unhappy at the Charter's lack of enforcement capacity. Tellingly, just two months before ASEAN was scheduled to receive the Charter, Myanmar engaged in particularly brutal campaign of repression against its democratic opposition. ASEAN's other members strongly condemned Myanmar's actions but they did not block the country's attendance at the November meeting. Moreover, ASEAN was embarrassed when Myanmar strongly objected to allowing UN envoy to Myanmar, Ibrahim Gambari, to address the meeting. ASEAN was put in the humiliating position of having to rescind Gambari's invitation (Caballero-Anthony 2008, 75). This incident seemed to demonstrate the severe limitations of ASEAN's supposed turn towards a more coherent and democratically supportive organizational ethic. There are many other examples of ASEAN's unwillingness to deal harshly with Myanmar (Dosch 2008, 538–542).

The ASEAN Charter encompasses principles and purposes that, in practice, contradict each other. Most of the ASEAN states are not democracies—or, at least, possess questionable democratic credentials—and are selective in following international human rights standards (Jones 2008). If all the ASEAN states agreed on what ‘democracy’ and the protection of human rights entailed, there would be no difficulty. It is conceivable that ASEAN could make a commitment to these values but then define them in such a way as to accommodate its more traditional norms and practices. However, such a consensus does not exist.2

The ASEAN Charter, as it now stands, is a ‘maximum achievement’ for the organization (Khalik 2008). However, the potential for the Charter to undermine ASEAN's international standing is very real. It could do this by graphically demonstrating the gap between what ASEAN professes to be and what it actually is if—as seems likely—the Charter proves to be ineffective in promoting the democratic and humanitarian values it has so prominently championed. At a deeper level, the Charter indicates a real and growing ideological divide within ASEAN. Democratic values have taken root in some ASEAN states and these countries do not wish to be alienated from the international democratic community. For the first time in ASEAN's history, the domestic nature of member states is beginning to matter.

The Asean Community

In October 2003, ASEAN held the ninth annual ASEAN summit in Bali, and issued the Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali II). The Declaration states:

an ASEAN Community shall be established comprising three pillars, namely political and security cooperation, economic co-operation, and socio-cultural co-operation that are closely intertwined and mutually reinforcing for the purpose of ensuring durable peace, stability and shared prosperity in the region. (Declaration of ASEAN Concord II)

These ‘three pillars’ have manifested as the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), the ASEAN Security Community (ASC) and the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) (Severino 2006, 342–371; Freistein 2005, 177–203).

Economic regionalism in the Asia Pacific is, by far, the most advanced of the three kinds of regionalism. Intra-Asian trade has exploded over the past three decades (Chia 2004; Pempel 2005; Park 2006). The AEC is the latest in a long line of ASEAN economic initiatives (Severino 2006, 212–255; Narine 2002b, 24–31). From its inception, ASEAN has aspired (at least on paper) to further economic ties between its members. However, it has been most notable for its failure to do this. The substantial economic integration that has taken place in the Asia Pacific has been driven almost entirely by private actors pursuing their own arrangements. Government- and ASEAN-sponsored initiatives have had very little impact. In the post-Cold War era, ASEAN began a more serious effort to define itself as an economic institution, but the results remain unimpressive (Narine 2008b; Ravenhill 2008, 483)

The ideas of an ASEAN security community and an ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community are closely intertwined and must be examined in concert. Acharya has argued that ASEAN is not a ‘Deutschian security community’, which is typified by its members completely foregoing the use of fear or force in their relations with each other. Rather, he argues that ASEAN is a ‘nascent security community’ and that the organization is experiencing a halting process of socialization that may be leading to a meaningful sense of community (Acharya 2001, 208). Nonetheless, the bulk of the evidence supports the contention that the sense of ASEAN regional community is weak and can account for very little of ASEAN's actions.

Important aspects of building an ASEAN Community intersect with building a socio-cultural community. As Rodolfo Severino notes,

taking a long-term perspective, one would say that the core of the ASEAN Community is the Socio-Cultural Community, if one conceived of the Socio-Cultural Community as a vehicle for developing a sense of Southeast Asian identity, building a regional awareness and fostering mutual understanding among the people of ASEAN. That identity, that awareness and that understanding would contribute greatly, indeed would be essential, to the building of a security community in Southeast Asia. They would be necessary for common norms to be adopted and common values to be shared. They would make regional cooperation easier on a broad range of security concerns. They would also smooth the path to regional economic integration by cultivating mutual trust and, thereby, building confidence in regional institutions, arrangements and understandings. Many of the hopes for and obstacles to the ASEAN enterprise lie in the mind, the minds of ASEAN's people. (Severino 2006, 368)

The creation of a socio-cultural community is absolutely essential if ASEAN is to evolve into a more institutionalized and effective regional actor. However, of the three pillars of the ASEAN Community, the ASCC was the one given the least time and attention. As Severino notes, ‘(t)he Socio-Cultural Community was apparently brought in almost as an afterthought, at the Philippines’ suggestion, in the interest of rounding out the concept of a community' (Severino 2006, 368–369). Promoting a sense of regional identity among the ordinary people of ASEAN should be a fundamentally important issue for ASEAN, but it is one that has not received the resources that it merits.

Research done on the question indicates that the sense of ASEAN identity remains quite weak within ASEAN states, even among the elites and within the long-time member states. Christopher Roberts, in a series of interviews conducted with over 900 people within all the ASEAN countries between 2004 and 2007, demonstrated that the level of distrust within ASEAN remains surprisingly high. Moreover, a majority of ASEAN elites feel that the non-interference principle is as important today as it was a decade ago (Roberts 2007).

Acharya is correct in suggesting that ASEAN has shown signs of evolving new norms and practices, but the organization remains primarily a collection of individual states that are cooperating for the purposes of mutual interest (Acharya 2001). Tobias Nischalke has explicitly tested constructivist claims about the strength of regional identity in ASEAN by examining numerous examples of ASEAN states' behaviour throughout ASEAN's post-Cold War history and assessing the extent to which considerations of ‘regional community’ have affected their actions (Nischalke 2002). He concludes that

ASEAN has constituted a rule-based community that is based on the norms of regional conduct enshrined in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation. Those norms that underpin the status quo in the region have provided the foundation for community action rather than shared identity. (Nischalke 2002, 112)

Allan Collins argues that ASEAN is not a security community. Instead, its patterns of interaction fit the profile of a ‘security regime’:

A security regime exists where states interact through norms of behaviour that, by regulating or constraining their behaviour, create a degree of certainty in their relationship. This certainty enables regime members to pursue more than their short-term self interest … the regulating effect of the norms enables states to accept short-term sacrifices, which they hope will yield long-term gains …. A security regime therefore dampens or mitigates the effects of the security dilemma by reducing the uncertainty statesmen have about others' intentions … (Collins 2007, 206)

None of this is surprising. Indeed, ASEAN's traditional norms actually work against the idea of regional community. Other factors that usually contribute to regional identity, such as shared domestic political norms and culture, or extensive economic interactions, are not at play in Southeast Asia.

In Europe, the experience of two devastating world wars, combined with the enforced peace of the Cold War and the economic difficulties faced by individual states in rebuilding in the post-WWII era, led most Western European states to support an increasingly supranational body such as the European Union (Milward 1992). While World War II and its associated wars were terribly destructive in East Asia, the regional states fought hard for their independence. As Peter Preston points out,

European elites had the experience of a general crisis in the period 1914-1945—plus division and occupation thereafter—before they agreed on the goal of unification…The ASEAN elites came to power in the context of dissolving foreign empires. There were no states and no nations, and the first task for the replacement elites was to makes states and nations. Their historical experience means that there is no equivalent moral impulse to institutional convergence. Rather, the moral impulse is towards mutual differentiation … it can be suggested that talk of unification in Europe runs with the historical and cultural grain, whereas such talk in Southeast Asia cuts across the grain, and thus talk of integration is intrinsically more difficulty. (Preston 2007, 79)

The inclusion of the new ASEAN states has exacerbated the tensions and the problems associated with building a strong regional identity. The CLMV states joined ASEAN with absolutely no expectation that their domestic politics would be subject to regional scrutiny, and there is no indication that they have changed their minds on this point (Jones 2008, 749). Moreover, as the continuing political unrest in Thailand demonstrates, even some of ASEAN's most established members continue to struggle with the problems of domestic political consolidation and democratic compromise. Democracy is not a panacea; it introduces numerous problems of its own and not all states may be ready or suited to deal with those difficulties.3 In addition, ASEAN states are still capable of engaging in violent conflict, as demonstrated by the October 2008 gun battles between Thai and Cambodian forces (Reuters 2008).4

The sense of ‘we-feeling’ needed to underpin both the ASC and ASCC is weak. The economic relations that will be necessary to support the AEC remain unformed. ASEAN norms serve the interests of sovereign states. ‘ASEAN identity’ is simply one identity—and a relatively weak one—among the many other identities that shape the policies and actions of the ASEAN states. From this perspective, the ASEAN Community is a distant objective and the ASEAN Charter is pushing the limits on what ASEAN can reasonably accommodate. Indeed, the Charter cannot afford to be a binding document. At best, it is aspirational and, even then, the issue of how to interpret or pursue some of its aspirations is debatable.

Seen through the lens of subaltern realism, the problems of the ASEAN Charter and the ASEAN Community and the difficulties of implementing them are not unexpected. A survey of the states of Southeast Asia reveals that most are still preoccupied with developing coherent nation-states out of disparate groups, although the levels of instability and state legitimacy vary from country to country. The fact that most ASEAN states were willing to quickly ratify the Charter suggests that they do not believe that its democratic and human rights provisions will prove to be problematic for their continued exercise of sovereignty. They feel that the non-interventionist guarantees of the Charter trump its other provisions or their understanding of ‘democracy’ allows for considerable leeway in their actions.

SR suggests that the only way states in the process of state-building would agree to restrain their sovereign rights is if doing so could enhance the state-building process. The most successful ASEAN countries have benefited greatly from economic globalization and are aware that their political stability and the success of the state-building process are directly related to their dealings with the international system. This suggests that the leading ASEAN states should be willing to make sacrifices of sovereignty to the organization if doing so enhances their international influence. The fact that they are highly ambivalent on this question indicates two possibilities. First, in keeping with SR, they may simply feel that they are too fragile to take such a risk. The other explanation is more ominous for the continued survival of ASEAN: its members may feel that they can best negotiate international forces either on their own or through other arrangements developed outside of ASEAN. The proliferation of economic agreements between individual ASEAN members and the outside world, as well as the willingness of Myanmar to defy its ASEAN allies, may indicate this is not a far-fetched concern. Nonetheless, the positive impact that a unified ASEAN can have on its members' international standing is a powerful argument in favour of the organization. We now turn to a consideration of this factor.

ASEAN as mediator: managing great power relations in East Asia

The following analysis argues that ASEAN is, even now, serving a useful and even essential role as a mediator between the great powers of the region. East Asia constitutes a unique security environment wherein several great and rising powers will compete with each other for followers and influence into the foreseeable future. As a bloc of ‘follower’ states, this reality provides ASEAN with the opportunity to influence regional events. It also provides a powerful incentive for the ASEAN states to maximize their diplomatic influence by speaking with a common voice within the ASEAN structure.

Subaltern realism leads us to expect that the ASEAN states will assess the diplomatic opportunities afforded by a unified ASEAN entirely through the narrow lens of their state-building preoccupations. However, the situation may not be this clear. SR focuses too narrowly on the state perspective, assuming that foreign policy always originates in the context of domestic interests (Barnett 2002). It may be underestimating the extent to which considerations in the international system generate and affect interests at the domestic level. This is particularly important given the obvious effects of global forces on domestic political and economic stability.

During the Cold War, ASEAN engaged in a complex interactive process incorporating its internal and external purposes. From its inception, ASEAN's major concern was to smooth relations between its members. It found, however, that directly addressing intra-ASEAN sources of contention was difficult and disruptive. The Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978 gave ASEAN an external issue on which to focus its energies while also providing a forum in which it could pursue the more crucial long-term interest of building a community in Southeast Asia. At the same time, the Vietnam situation gave ASEAN the rewarding experience of having a significant voice on the international stage. This demonstrated to the ASEAN states the advantages of organizational unity, a disposition they managed to maintain for more than a decade.

Ultimately, ASEAN's unity over Vietnam broke down as the different strategic and economic interests of key members created irresolvable tensions. In the end, the SR expectation of developing states following the paths dictated by their preoccupation with state-building was borne out. However, it is relevant that ASEAN was able to maintain a united front for so long, despite these other pressures. For a period of time, the political and diplomatic advantage of speaking with a single voice was enough to keep ASEAN committed to a common front. Can this logic be duplicated today, or has ASEAN's changed membership and the much more complex post-Cold War environment negated this dynamic?

The most important institutions in the AP over the past decade have been built around ASEAN. The strongest example of this is the ASEAN Plus Three (APT)—the ‘three’ being China, Japan and South Korea. The APT is at the heart of a new regionalism. The East Asian Summit (EAS) and the possible East Asian Community (EAC) are both connected to the APT. ASEAN is also at the heart of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), an active regional security body and the only region-wide structure dealing with security issues, though its effectiveness is debatable (Stubbs 2002). We shall consider the APT and the ARF, and ASEAN's role within them, in turn.

ASEAN occupies a foundational position in the regional security and political architecture largely by default. Regionalism in Northeast Asia (China, Japan, North and South Korea and Japan) is ‘stunted’ by the ongoing and historical tensions between the northern states. (Rozman 2004) China is in conflict with Taiwan (despite recent positive overtures) and it is deeply suspicious of Japanese economic power and possible military aspirations (Overholt 2008). It is also conscious of Japan and South Korea as American proxies in the region. North Korea is at odds with every other regional state except China.

Beyond the relations of the East Asian states themselves, the region is the backyard of most of the world's real or potential global powers. This is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. The US and China will likely be regional rivals for decades to come. Japan is still the second largest economy in the world, a major source of intra-Asian investment and unmatched in technological prowess. It will be a major player for the next several decades and may eventually free itself from its subservient position to the US. India is emerging as another Asian superpower and will make its presence felt in East Asia over the next several years. Russia remains a Pacific Power with considerable potential and enormous resources. While it is presently toiling in China's shadow, this may change. In short, the great powers will continue to be active in East Asia and, so long as they do not form a ‘Concert of Powers’, they will be competing for influence and followers. In this environment, ASEAN stands as a unifying and mediating force in East Asia. Its regional prominence is directly attributable to the fact that it is relatively small player that can serve as a bridge between the much larger and more powerful actors in the region. Within the context of the APT, China and Japan have learned to cooperate and coordinate policy to a limited degree. Similarly, the ARF brings together the many different regional powers on a regular basis.

The APT first came together as an effective organization in 1997, during the start of the Asian economic crisis. The APT had been organized in 1994 as a way for Asian countries to coordinate strategies before the annual Asia-Europe Meetings (ASEM) (Terada 2003, 261–262). In 1997, however, the crisis provided an opportunity for regional states to discuss the coordination of a response to the economic upheaval. The APT did little during the crisis, and Japanese efforts to create an effective regional financial institution were blocked by the US, China and South Korea, all of which opposed an increase in Japan's influence. The intensity of the crisis, however, combined with the inept response of the IMF and the nonchalant reaction of the US convinced most Asians that they needed to create a regional instrument that could protect them against future financial instability. The APT is the preliminary form of that instrument (Stubbs 2002; Narine 2003).

A series of regional financial mechanisms and instruments evolved in affiliation with the APT. The Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) is a regional currency swap arrangement that was created in 2000. The Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI) is another preliminary financial initiative. The ABMI is designed to create a regional market for government bonds, thereby keeping Asian investment and savings in the region and providing investors with lucrative financial instruments (Amyx 2004).

The development of the APT has been largely driven by China. Before 1997, China was uneasy with multilateral fora, believing that these structures provided other states the opportunity to join forces against Chinese interests. The Economic Crisis changed China's perspective. During the crisis, China was widely credited by regional states with displaying a level of leadership and consideration for the effects of its actions on its smaller neighbours that had not been shown by the US or Japan. China realized that multilateral institutions could be instruments through which it could exert regional leadership (Ba 2003).

China's prominent role in the APT does not mean that the organization is simply an instrument of Chinese policy. Rather, it is indicative of the complex interplay of relationships in the region. ASEAN is able to play a meaningful and independent role within the APT. Indeed, ASEAN is the glue that holds the APT together. ASEAN is an established regional structure with norms and practices that are compatible with the interests of its Northeast Asian neighbours, particularly China. The rivalry between China and Japan means that neither of them could operate within an institution founded by the other. The interests of the other Asian states in maintaining their independence, combined with the unresolved historical problems with Japanese leadership and a lingering suspicion of China's support for regional insurgency in the past and concerns about Chinese domination in the future, mean that any institution founded by these great powers would have difficulty recruiting members in Asia. ASEAN, as an independent organization founded by the weaker states of the region, is an ideal compromise. ASEAN and China are involved in a mutually beneficial relationship (Ba 2006). By supporting ASEAN's role, China reinforces its own regional values, shows respect and deference to the ASEAN states thereby gaining considerable goodwill, and also guarantees ASEAN's prominent standing in the region.

In a similar way, ASEAN plays a pivotal role within the ASEAN Regional Forum. The ARF was created by ASEAN in 1994. The ARF was ASEAN's way to ensure that ASEAN remained in ‘the driver's seat’ in regards to regional security and institutions. Since its inception, many of its participants have questioned the efficacy of the ARF. It is still locked into its first stage of development—that is, confidence-building between members—and shows few signs of moving on to more advanced activities, such as directly managing regional problems. The ARF is also very limited in what it can address. Many of the most important regional security issues in the AP—for example, tensions between China and Taiwan, concerns over North Korea and its nuclear programme—are off the agenda at ARF meetings. The major states involved in these situations are not prepared to discuss them. Nonetheless, Hiro Katsumata argues that the ARF is a ‘norm brewery’. Drawing on constructivist theory, he places the ARF's importance in its long-term influence in creating and testing the normative structures that shape regional security relations (Katsumata 2006). Even if this is true, it is a long-term project of identity formation.

At present, the ARF's ability to deal directly with conflict is non-existent and, while ASEAN may accept this and regard this limit as part of a Pacific-wide identity-building process, this is not a limitation that sits well with many Western members. Still, once again, China's support of ASEAN accords the ARF significance beyond its concrete accomplishments. The ARF is the only regional security forum in which China participates. The ARF's prominence is justified by this fact alone, though it is not active in the same way as the APT and, in all likelihood, will never be as effective.

The fact that ASEAN's unique position in the East Asian environment affords it a level of influence is not, in itself, enough to ensure that the organization's members will capitalize on the opportunity. The logic of approaching the East Asian security and economic environment as a united front seems irrefutable. However, a good argument does not guarantee good policy. As noted, there are a great many forces operating against a deepening of ASEAN's identity and its ability to maintain cohesion. In the Vietnam era, ASEAN members were united by common ideology and most were semi-authoritarian states. Today, the political and ideological diversity within ASEAN is much greater. Moreover, the nature of the external ‘threats’ is not as easily defined. Vietnam's ‘threat’ to Southeast Asia was indirect and fit comfortably into the dominant discourse of the Cold War. Today, the challenges to ASEAN's unity come from powerful states that are also real or potential benefactors.

In their competition for support, the great powers could easily divide the organization along political, geographical, ethnic and other lines. An example of this was the ASEAN response—or lack thereof—to the American invasion of Iraq. In that case, ASEAN could take no institutional position on the issue because its membership was too divided. Reflecting their own security interests, Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines actively supported the American invasion, even sending troops to assist in the occupation. By contrast, Malaysia and Indonesia, as predominantly Muslim states, vehemently opposed the American action. It is not difficult to imagine other conditions under which great powers could offer incentives for individual ASEAN countries to side with them against other ASEAN states. Despite these dangers, it is premature to assert that ASEAN cannot unify in the face of international pressures.

As Barnett notes, subaltern realism gives considerable ‘causal primacy’ to domestic politics and is also intensely state-centric, overlooking or underestimating the importance of non-state actors (Barnett 2002, 55). As a result, it offers limited guidance in assessing the top-down impact of international forces on the developing state. The operation of international economic forces has been crucial to the political and economic development of most of the ASEAN states. Given this fact, we cannot immediately conclude that domestic level national interests will prevent regional cooperation. Indeed, those interests may mitigate in favour of regional cooperation. The internal weaknesses of ASEAN cannot overshadow the reality that having international influence in a world where such influence matters is not an advantage to be set aside lightly. So long as the regional alignment of forces provides ASEAN space in which to assert itself, the organization will have a powerful reason to act as a unit. Admittedly, it is possible that internal pressures will cause ASEAN to undermine itself by demonstrating its own divisions on the international stage. But it is also conceivable that unity on that stage will hold ASEAN together enough to allow its longer term goals of building an internal community and fostering a regional identity will have time to develop.

Conclusion

Subaltern realism emphasizes the argument that developing world states are generally weak and internally divided and, therefore, preoccupied with overcoming those weaknesses as they consolidate their ability to function as states. Historically, this interpretation fits the states of ASEAN quite neatly. ASEAN's traditional norms, values and structures all underline the principle of an organization created to support its members' national goals while simultaneously refusing to challenge or question those goals. However, the changing and complex nature of the relationship between developing world states and the international system is not so easily encapsulated. Exactly how the relationship between the state and the international system will affect the nation-building capabilities of the state is unclear. How developing world states will assess and navigate this tension is beyond the parameters of the theory.

ASEAN is currently in this situation. Efforts to reform the organization and make it more effective and its members more accountable to each other seem doomed to failure. Too many ASEAN states are clinging—perhaps with good cause—to a narrow understanding of sovereignty. However, dealing effectively with the international system is a fundamentally important part of the development strategy of any developing world state. Doing so from within the confines of an organizational structure is a sensible approach to the problem. The most recalcitrant ASEAN states are, therefore, faced with the difficulty of determining how much of their sovereignty they can afford to hold onto when faced with the need to empower ASEAN in its dealings with the outside world. Each state will make different calculations to arrive at its conclusion, but it is in this uncertainty that ASEAN has the greatest prospects of surviving and evolving in the twenty-first century.

Notes

¹ The ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution came into effect on 25 November 2003. However, it has not been ratified by Indonesia and did not stop other regional haze events from occurring in 2005 and 2006 (Severino 2006, 112–113).

² Roberts supplies some anecdotal evidence that different ASEAN states may understand ‘democracy’ in different ways, providing some explanation for why statements supporting democracy have found their way into ASEAN documents with less contention than one might expect (Roberts 2007).

³ In Thailand, problems of democratic consolidation include the Muslim insurgency in the South.

⁴ It is relevant that the border conflicts were sparked, in part, by the Thai government's need to respond to nationalist pressures from the political opposition. In this case, democracy led directly to the exchange of gunfire between the militaries of two ASEAN states.