Assessing violent nonstate actorness in global politics: a framework for analysis

Abstract

This article begins with the assumption that the most important shift that is taking place in contemporary global politics is the shift in polity power from the predominance of the state to the rising importance of nonstate actors. It goes on to argue that disciplinary understandings of this shift and, in particular, the nature of the actors driving it, remain dispersed. This article aims, therefore, to provide a framework for evaluating the global political potential—or actorness—of one type of nonstate actor, the violent nonstate actor, positing it as that most overtly challenging states' authority, and therefore with the potential to play a uniquely stimulating role in the shifting of power. Based on three principles of autonomy, representation and influence, the framework provides broad criteria for understanding violent nonstate actors, as well as a means for evaluating violent nonstate actorness and for exploring its potential in global politics.

Notes

¹ If we look back to pre-Westphalian days we see evidence of a similar polity shift in reverse, with the gradual decline of the feudal system (of largely autonomous actors) and the increasing consolidation of actors into what would become states (Osiander 2001).

² Although private military groups or companies may seem to remain outside of the definition, and, indeed, they are not a part of all typologies (Williams (2008, 9), for example, excludes them for being ‘inherently limited’ since they ‘rarely challenge state authority and legitimacy’), their more obvious bonds with state governments do not necessarily rule out their being evaluated with this framework. However, the first component of the framework, autonomy, when applied to private military companies, will reveal that this reliance on states for primary funding makes such groups weaker in terms of their potential global actorness.

³ Pablo Escobar of the Medellin Cartel worked to build up his own ‘Robin Hood’ image by constructing hospitals and sports facilities (Escobar and Fisher 2009).

⁴ Interview with Turkish Jihadist who served in Afghanistan, November 2001, in Istanbul.

⁵ Since VNSAs are the weaker party in any conflict with states, a natural means for them to use is terror—the ancient war-waging ‘weapon for the weak’ (Hoffman 1998, 4).

⁶ In cases where nonviolent groups have successfully negotiated political change, it has to be recognized that the targeted states/societies have generally not come to the negotiation table or decided to make concessions in a ‘nonviolent vacuum’. Rather, there is usually a violent alternative group or the potential of the nonviolent group turning violent, which leads them to change. In other words, the influence of the nonviolent group increases because of the possibility of violent alternatives waiting in the wings, or the possibility of the nonviolent actor becoming violent itself. For example, Sinn Fein was ‘better’ than the IRA, Arafat gained acceptance in the presence of Hamas, the political wing of the Basque separatists was preferred to the military one, and even Martin Luther King could be seen as having gained strength from his position as a better alternative to Malcolm X or the Black Panthers.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Ersel Aydinli

Ersel Aydinli is an Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations at Bilkent University in Ankara. His current research interests focus on nonstate security actors and transnational relations, home-grown IR theorizing, and Turkish politics and foreign policy. His latest book is Violent non-state actors: from anarchists to Jihadists (Routledge, forthcoming 2013)[email protected]