International development and the European Union's external policies: changing contexts, problematic nexuses, contested partnerships

Abstract

This special section explores and explains how the European Union's (EU's) overall approach to international development has evolved since the beginning of the twenty-first century. At the international level, the rise of a group of emerging economies has not only provided developing countries with greater choices, but has also further enhanced their agency, thus questioning the EU's leadership and even relevance in international development. At the European level, the various (paradigmatic) shifts in each of the three key external policies—trade, security and foreign policy—and the EU's aspiration to project a coherent external action have collided with the EU's commitment to international development. Numerous tensions characterize the various nexuses in EU external relations, which ultimately challenge the EU's international legitimacy and (self-proclaimed) identity as a champion of the interests of the developing world. Nevertheless, the EU has made more progress than is generally acknowledged in making its external policies more coherent with its development policy. Moreover, the EU's relationship with developing countries has gradually become less asymmetrical, though not because of the EU's emphasis on partnership and ownership but more because of the increased agency of developing countries.

Notes

¹ Academic studies portray a less optimistic but still overall positive view of the way the EU manages and implements its aid programme. In particular, the EU ranks ‘high’ on selectivity and ‘above average’ for transparency (Easterly and Williamson 2011) and ‘good’ on harmonisation and specialisation (Knack et al 2011).

² It should, however, be noted that some countries, most notably the UK, have decided to ring-fence foreign aid, though this may mean a more instrumental use of foreign aid.

³ Two notable applications are the Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, of March 2011, and the EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa, of November 2011.

⁴ Of course, a domestic politics approach to these issues would suggest that the electoral cycle does not incentivise policy-makers to make unpopular decisions. Politicians do not, or cannot, take into account the consequences that, for instance, trade protectionism and climate change may have for developing countries.

⁵ Unsurprisingly, the relevance of the Cotonou Agreement, in the run-up to its third review scheduled to be concluded by 2015 and its expiration in 2020, has been questioned not only in Europe but also in various ACP countries (Carbone 2013c).