‘A good investment?’ State sponsorship of terrorism as an instrument of Iraqi foreign policy (1979–1991)

Abstract

Governmental support for nonstate actors designated as terrorist organizations is not only a policy that carries significant international and domestic costs; it further poses a theoretical challenge to structural realist thinking about alliance politics in international relations. By debating, firstly, the utility of terrorism as a means to influence systemic power distribution, and, secondly, the functional equality of nonstate actors, this article considers under what conditions state sponsored terrorism occurs despite the expected security loss. Drawing on the example of Iraq between 1979 and 1991, the assumption that the interplay of external security challenges—as well as domestic dissent as an intervening, unit-level factor—affects governmental alignments with terrorist groups will be reviewed in the cases of the Iranian Mujahedin al-Khalq Organization, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and armed Palestinian factions. The article concludes by addressing whether state sponsorship of terrorism is inevitably linked to policy failure or whether it could be seen as a good investment to balance external and internal security challenges successfully.

Notes

¹ In contrast to this assumption of the former US Secretary of State, the types and levels of support provided by governments differ in various ways. Comparing different states that have assisted terrorist groups, they can be classified into several types of sponsorship based on the level of assistance, from passive supporters turning a blind eye to terrorist activities, to societal support for those actively and publicly supporting terrorist groups (Byman 2005, 15, 59–66). Governments can provide several modes of assistance for different groups at the same time. Iran, for example, has been a strong supporter of Lebanese Hezbollah since the early 1980s, but granted only lukewarm support to radical Shi'a groups in the Persian Gulf. Governments' commitment to a certain group can also change over time—a fact that has been revealed by events like the expulsion of Abu Nidal from Iraq in 1983 after almost a decade of close cooperation (Karsh 2002, 60).

² The expected costs (policy failure), however, can be contained through secrecy and denial, or the legitimacy gains derived from alignment with a legitimate resistance group.

³ These tensions stem from the assumption that external and especially military intervention is a major factor in the prolongation of interstate wars. As can be seen in the cases of Turkey in the 1990s, Afghanistan since 2001 and Iraq since 2003, the provision of resources and safe havens to groups launching terrorist campaigns reduces their willingness (and the pressure on them) to settle the conflict. Especially in the Iraqi case, targeting groups representing sectarian-political divisions has impeded the societal reconciliation process and exacerbated tensions. See Cunningham (2010), Regan (2002).

⁴ This definition directly points out the strategic and political objectives of the sponsoring states, yet lacks a clear distinction between those who encourage and assist and those who actually conduct a terrorist attack.

⁵ The level of threat is constituted by the variable's aggregate power, geographic proximity, offensive capabilities and aggressive intentions. See Walt (1985, 8).

⁶ On domestic politics and foreign policy, see also Bueno de Mesquita et al (2005), Harknett and VanDenBerg (1997), Miller (2006) and Morgan and Bickers (1992).

⁷ These groups vary significantly not only in their operational strength, perception and prestige as a transnational resistance movement, but also in the material and temporal extent of their support by Saddam Hussein. Only in the latter two cases is there a certain ideological bond between the anti-Israeli, (rhetorically) pan-Arabist and socialist outlook of both the Iraqi Ba'ath rulers and the groups supported by them. See Tripp (2002, 174ff).

⁸ The deep rift that developed in the late 1970s between the two Ba'ath branches and Syrian concerns over Iraqi intentions in the region were probably the main reasons why Assad joined the alliance with Iran in the first place, broke off ties with Iraq immediately after the Gulf War started in October 1980, and even tried to isolate Iraq by acting as a mediator between Iran and the Gulf monarchies. See also Fürtig (1992, 116), Rasoul (1987, 120) and Stäheli (2001, 160).

⁹ The NLA was disrupted and largely dismantled in 2003. See Cordesman (2005, 10).

¹⁰ To eliminate the SMB threat completely, the government declared the group ‘national enemies’ and passed a law making membership punishable by death. Allegedly weakened by massacres among prisoners and mass executions among potential sympathizers, the SMB carried out several car bomb attacks against government and military targets in autumn 1981 and took control of the city of Hama on 2 February 1982. The subsequent military response—killing up to 30,000 people—marked the SMB's defeat as a political force in Syria. See Carré and Michaud (1983, 148–158).

¹¹ In contrast, Saddam Hussein's linkage of the Arab-Israeli conflict to Iraq's own foreign policy adventures, for which he needed the alignment of PLO leadership, caused the most severe crisis of Palestinian relations with their financial and political backers in the Arab World (see Sela and Ma'oz 1997, 105).

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Notes on contributors

Magdalena Kirchner

Magdalena Kirchner (MA, Heidelberg) is a PhD candidate in political science at the University of Heidelberg. Her research interests include International Relations Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis in the context of political violence and terrorism as well as state-society relations in the Middle East. She has taught political science at the University of Heidelberg and serves as editor of the German Armed Forces journal Security Policy Reader. E-mail: [email protected].