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Abstract
From the perspective of Kosovo, this article contributes to a growing literature focusing on the substance of donor-driven democracy promotion. Drawing on extensive empirical research between 2010 and 2012, the research provides greater insights into which donors are providing what sort of assistance; how the content and focus of aid are decided and formulated; and the behaviour of the European Union (EU) and other large donors compared with small bilaterals and private foundations. By including the category of ‘governance-oriented’ assistance to classify donor initiatives, a more nuanced mapping of priorities and strategies is offered, which distinguishes between those measures designed to engage civil society (developmental), those focusing on institutions and elite level change (political), and interventions specifically designed to promote closer interaction between government and nongovernmental actors. The conclusion reached is that, although overall levels of aid to Kosovo have remained relatively stable since 2008, donor behaviour is in flux, with evidence of an emergent distinction between what larger donors offer and the provision of smaller bilaterals and private foundations. This, it is argued, has serious implications for the capacity of the EU to continue providing extensive aid across a wide range of issues and policy areas as part of its pre-accession assistance.
Notes
1 < http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/data-guides/datastore>.
2 For example, Lavenex and Schimmelfennig's definition of democracy as ‘the accountability of public authorities to the people … accountability of officials to the electorate through free and fair elections, the accountability of governments to parliaments, or the accountability of agencies to public scrutiny’ (2011, 888).
3 The terms ‘nongovernmental organizations’ and ‘civil society organizations’ (CSOs) are grouped together in this paper to encompass the diversity of associational forms ranging from small, enmeshed citizen collectives and social movement organizations to professional advocacy organizations with a more tenuous connection to civil society as such. They all claim to represent civil society and to act in its name.
4 European Union Office in Kosovo; Austrian Development Agency in Kosovo; Balkan Trust for Democracy; Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands; Friedrich Ebert Stiftung; Kosovo Foundation for Open Society; Olof Palme International Centre; European Fund for the Balkans; Rockefeller Brothers Fund; Royal Norwegian Embassy, Prishtina; Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency; Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation; Swiss Cultural Programme in the Western Balkans; United Nations Development Programme; United States Agency for International Development; World Bank Office in Kosovo; Embassy of the United Kingdom; Embassy of the Republic of France; Embassy of Germany; Embassy of Italy; Embassy of Finland; Liaison Office of the Slovak Republic.
5 In the electronic survey, respondents were asked to provide information on the period 2010–2011, but to forecast changes and to identify initiatives that had ceased or were about to end. Data were checked and cross-referenced with published information from websites and annual reports. Respondents were asked whether their organization or foundation prioritized various themes and strategies, and to answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’, or to state that a theme or focus was ‘cross-cutting’ (CC), that it was an outcome of other assistance initiatives, or was an objective that ran through all strategies (for example gender mainstreaming, concern for the environment, youth).
6 < http://www.tacso.org>.
7 < http://www.kcsfoundation.org>.
8 The only exception to this is the National Endowment for Democracy, which does not set an agenda for Kosovo in the United States, but is entirely ‘grantee driven’.
9 For example, the Balkan Trust for Democracy provides its assistance for Kosovo through a broad framework of intervention that was set by the establishing foundations a decade ago.
10 For example, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung identifies ‘credit proposals’ for particular issue areas; the British Embassy uses a Country Business Plan.
11 For example, Cultural Heritage without Borders.
12 In terms of donors reporting that local priorities were a driver of assistance agendas, the only exception is the Netherlands Embassy, which asserted that local priorities do not affect the general guidelines of their assistance agenda.
13 The Netherlands Embassy works closely with government ministries to formulate projects and set objectives, but the projects are delivered through nongovernmental implementing partners.
14 In Kosovo, the main formal mechanism is the Donor Coordination Forum, but not all donors participate (the British Embassy representative interviewed for this research was not aware of the Forum's existence). Several donors reported that such formal meetings ‘mostly do not work’, either because they are too big, or due to the fact that donors have different agendas and foci. Two of the donors interviewed claimed not to consult with donors at all (Cultural Heritage without Borders and KFOS); the EUOK also reported having irregular and limited contact with other donors.
15 I am referring here not to Serbs living in northern Mitrovica, but to Serb communities within the rest of Kosovo.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Adam Fagan
Adam Fagan is Professor of European Politics and Head of the School of Politics and International Relations at Queen Mary University of London. Email: [email protected]