In error we trust: an apology of abductive inference

Abstract

The recent surge of pragmatist scholarship in International Relations emphasizes the need for a shift towards a more practical social science. Abductive reasoning is supposed to serve as one of the tools of such reorientation. This article pays closer attention to this form of inference and shows that it represents our deep trust in the role of error within a scientific enquiry. Although abduction stands for a converse error of affirming the consequent, it also enables us to generate new explanations of many complex problems. Instead of attempting to apply abduction to International Relations as a discipline, we simply show that this inferential practice is already being implemented to a large extent thanks to the agent-based modelling that frequently follows pragmatist tenets. In fact this function of suggesting plausible explanations for further examination in the following stages of scientific enquiry may be easily seen as one of the crucial purposes of this kind of modelling. Three examples illustrate this claim.

Notes

This research was supported by the Slovak Research and Development Agency grant for the project APVV-0484-10: ‘Changing patterns of EU foreign policy and the small member states’. I would also like to thank Barbara Galovicova, my wife Denisa Ballova and the anonymous reviewers for their useful comments and help.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Matus Halas

Matus Halas is an assistant professor at the Institute of European Studies and International Relations in Bratislava. He received a PhD in International Relations from the Charles University in Prague and his research is focused on ABM and political geography. Email: [email protected]