Ukraine, Russia and the strategic partnership dynamics in the EU’s eastern neighbourhood: recalibrating the EU’s ‘self’, ‘we’ and ‘other’

Abstract

The present contribution explores the changing relationship between the European Union (EU) and the two largest countries in its eastern neighbourhood, namely Ukraine and Russia, between 1991 and 2014. Taking the differential between the existence of the EU Strategic Partnership (SP) with Russia and the absence of such an arrangement in the relationship with Ukraine as a point of departure, it investigates how the EU has dealt with different aspirations and challenges stemming from its two largest eastern neighbours. Adopting the Social Identity Theory perspective, the contribution analyses the interrelationship between the evolution of the EU’s SP approach towards the eastern neighbours and the development of (particular dimensions of) the EU’s identity. It demonstrates how the process of categorization relating to the ideational ‘self’, ‘we’ and ‘other’ took place; and how only the EU’s relationship with Russia and not that with Ukraine has accumulated the discursive markers of a strategic partnership. The contribution, furthermore, analyses the challenges to the EU changing approach stemming from the 2013–2014 Ukraine crisis.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

¹ Involving meetings between the president of the Council of the EU (assisted by the secretary-general of the Council/high representative for the CFSP) and the Commission, on one side, and the president of the Russian Federation/Ukraine, on the other (Hillion 2000, 1221).

² The Cooperation Council, composed of members of the Council of the EU and members of the Commission as well as Russia’s/Ukraine’s governments, was in charge of the implementation of the PCA and handled disputes referring to its application by issuing a non-binding recommendation (Hillion 2000, 1223). In 2003, it was replaced by the Permanent Partnership Council.

³ This is not to say that all EC/EU demands and proposals were accepted, or to argue against the fact that Russia managed to play its ‘weakness’ to its own advantage (Schmidt-Felzmann 2015, 24). Russian representatives, for instance, challenged the PCA’s ‘suspension clause’ (the latter linked upholding human rights and democracy to an increase in trade access and deepening of relations in general, while also stipulating a unilateral suspension of the agreement in the event of its ‘material breach’) (Hillion 2000, 1220; Haukkala 2010, 84). Nevertheless, the EU’s importance as part of Russia’s ‘generalized we’ was not contested.

⁴ The CSR referred to nuclear safety, combating organized crime and environmental hazards as common goals of the parties and called for a more efficient and permanent political dialogue, as well as joint foreign policy initiatives. The document also allowed for the possibility of EU/WEU (Western European Union) operations.

⁵ The cooperation of the four main participants in this initiative (EU, Russia, Iceland, Norway) has evolved around sector-specific partnerships in areas ranging from the economy to nuclear safety and natural resources.

⁶ Correspondingly, the price of gas would be reduced from over US$400 per 1000 cubic metres to US$268. Preferential loans and trade agreements were estimated to amount to US$17 billion (Haukkala 2015, 33).

⁷ Under President Viktor Yanukovich, the rate of alignment was lower: 26 out of 44 EU statements in 2010 (Zarembo 2011, 2).

⁸ Ukraine has contributed to the EU Police Mission (EUPOL) in Bosnia and Herzegovina (2003–2012), EUPOL Proxima (2004–2005) and the EU Naval Force Somalia (EUNAVFOR) operation (since 2010). Since July 2011, Ukrainian naval forces have been part of the Greek-led EU Balkan Battle Group (HELBROC), making Ukraine one of the first non-EU member states to join an EU battlegroup.

⁹ In line with the EU’s stipulating the improvement of the political situation in Ukraine to be a precondition for further rapprochement, in December 2012 the European Council made signature of the AA contingent upon Ukraine complying with international standards of electoral practice, ending selective justice and implementing previously agreed reforms. The so-called ‘Füle List’ of 19 EU demands was expected to pave the way to the signature of the AA in 2013.

¹⁰ For a detailed analysis, see Schmidt-Felzmann (2014, 51).

¹¹ The programme included EU sectoral budget support, macro-financial assistance, modernization of Ukraine’s Gas Transit System and coordination of EU actions with Russia regarding EU–Ukraine rapprochement (Yanukovych 2013).

¹² Armenia’s reorientation from the EaP/ENP towards the Eurasian Custom Union in September 2013 had similarly revealed the corresponding Russian challenge to the EU ‘potential we’ (Delcour and Wolczuk 2015; Babayan 2014, 86-88).

¹³ Later, the EU ‘self’ evidenced fragmentation, especially during the so-called ‘sanctions debate’ (Raik et al. 2014, Schmidt-Felzmann 2015, 217).

¹⁴ In 2014, the EU promised Ukraine €11 billion over seven years. The European Commission allocated €11 million of humanitarian assistance as well as €17 million in development aid for preparations for the winter and early recovery and an additional €4.5 million was provided to meet the recovery and integration needs of internally displaced persons. Humanitarian assistance from the member states was evaluated at €47 million (European Commission 2015).

¹⁵ The entry into force of further sanctions, adopted in September 2014 and in February 2015, was ‘deliberately delayed (Schmidt-Felzmann 2015, 216) to give the German and French negotiators a better brokering position.

¹⁶ The postponing of the DCFTA raised concern, in Ukraine and beyond. In Ukraine, Danylo Lubkivskiy, Ukraine Deputy Foreign Minister, resigned in protest at the delaying of the DCFTA, considered an indication of the EU giving in to Russia’s demands.