The breakdown of the EU’s strategic partnership with Russia: from strategic patience towards a strategic failure

The author thanks the anonymous referees, Alena Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira, Laura Cristina Ferreira Pereira, Gabrielle Peterson and the former editors of the Cambridge Review of International Affairs for helpful feedback during the writing of this article. Her gratitude extends also to all the EU officials, diplomats and desk officers who must remain anonymous but who generously shared their views and experiences of the EU–Russian relationship over the years.

Abstract

This article investigates the evolution of the European Union (EU)–Russia relationship to understand whether Russia’s violations of Ukraine’s territorial integrity in 2014 destroyed the EU–Russia strategic partnership. It uncovers fundamental differences in three key sectors—security, trade and energy—and regarding the broader design of their contractual relationship. Despite the appearance to the contrary, their relationship was never a well-functioning ‘partnership of choice’. Structural asymmetries contradictory approaches to and fundamentally different understandings of the role and utility of their relationship affected the EU–Russia relationship from the very beginning. The widening gaps were not addressed nor were the differences of the two actors acknowledged, let alone overcome. The confrontation over Ukraine was therefore not the cause but rather a symptom of deeply rooted problems. The blame for talking past each other and engaging in a marriage of convenience, rather than a real partnership, falls on both the EU and the Russian leadership.

Notes

The author thanks the anonymous referees, Alena Vysotskaya Guedes Vieira, Laura Cristina Ferreira Pereira, Gabrielle Peterson and the former editors of the Cambridge Review of International Affairs for helpful feedback during the writing of this article. Her gratitude extends also to all the EU officials, diplomats and desk officers who must remain anonymous but who generously shared their views and experiences of the EU–Russian relationship over the years.

¹ Author’s interviews with decision-makers in Brussels in May/June 2014.

² President Putin acknowledged in a film about the annexation of Crimea (constructed and re-enacted after the fact) which was screened on the first anniversary of the annexation that the decision to annex Crimea was taken on 22 February 2014, several weeks before the contested ‘referendum’ took place (see excerpts of his statements in Russian [state-controlled] media: for example, RT 2015; Sputnik 2015; Tass 2015).

³ The 33rd EU–Russia Summit was already pencilled in for 3 June 2014, on the eve of the G8 Summit in Sochi (Putin 2014, 28; EU Reporter 2014).

⁴ Original quotation: ‘Eine Politik der Konfrontation gegenüber Russland würde keine Früchte tragen. Wir müssen offen, aber respektvoll miteinander sprechen. Was wir brauchen, ist strategische Geduld und politische Kreativität.’Auswärtiges Amt ( 2013).

⁵ This delay was due to the EU’s internal difficulties in reaching an agreement among the member states on the negotiating mandate without which the European Commission could not start the formal negotiations with Russia. Poland and Lithuania used their veto power to block the adoption of the mandate, tying their agreement to the fulfilment of a set of demands they placed upon the Russian and the EU side (for details, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MFA] Lithuania 2007; 2008a; 2008b; 2008c; and see European Commission 2007).

⁶ Author’s discussions with representatives from the EU institutions in 2004, 2007 and 2011–2012.

⁷ Author’s interviews with representatives from the EU institutions.

⁸ For details, see Russian Mission to the EU (n.d.).

⁹ Author’s interview with an anonymous representative of one of the member states in 2007.

¹⁰ For details of the substance of bilateral negotiations, see Zimmermann (2007, 825–826).

¹¹ Author’s interviews with representatives (anonymous) of the EU institutions and member states in 2012.

¹² Author’s interviews with representatives (anonymous) of the EU institutions and member states in 2012.

¹³ This is a consensus view among EU and national trade officials who have dealt with Russia for many years and also finds support in the striking coincidence of the timing of restrictive measures against certain goods and products being traded from or to EU member states by Russia. Regular updates on SPS measures can be found on the Russian Federal Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary Surveillance’s official webpages (see Rosselkhoznadzor n.d.).

¹⁴ That Russia was deliberately breaking the rules was not explicitly stated, but was clearly implied in the way the issue was formulated.

¹⁵ Author’s interviews in 2007, 2011, 2012, 2014 and 2015 (conducted with the promise of anonymity) with national and EU officials possessing several years, in some cases decades, of experience in dealing with Russia.

¹⁶ For details and EU representatives’ views on the EEU, see the witnesses answers to Q134–Q136 and Q139–Q143 in House of Lords (2015).

¹⁷ See the witness statements to Q134–Q136 and Q139–Q143 in House of Lords (2015).

¹⁸ The directives for the liberalisation of the EU’s internal natural gas market were Directive 98/30/EC and Directive 2003/55/EC, and the key directives for the liberalisation of the internal electricity market were Directive 96/92/EC and Directive 2003/54/EC.

¹⁹ This included even intra-EU agreements, a case being investigated between French company Gaz de France and Italian ENEL and ENI.