Overlapping regionalism and cooperative hegemony: how China and India compete in South and Southeast Asia

Abstract

This article examines the phenomenon of overlapping regionalism in South and Southeast Asia. Theoretically it rests on Thomas Pedersen’s ‘ideational-institutionalist realism’ approach. We argue that in the two sub-regions under study the proliferation of regional organizations has been greatly stimulated by hegemonic and counter-hegemonic dynamics involving Asia’s largest powers, China and India. We claim that sceptical world views highlighting vulnerability, victimization and national survival are deeply entrenched in the mental maps of the regions’ foreign policy elites. Regional institution building is thus informed by the tenets of realism. We trace how and why China and India seek to establish ‘cooperative hegemonies’ by building regional institutions for incorporating their neighbours into their sphere of influence while keeping rival powers at bay, and also show why smaller states in the region join these regional fora.

Acknowledgement

An earlier draft of this article was presented at the conference ‘Regionalism in the Global South and the EU in Comparative Perspective’, organized by the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence, EU in Global Dialogue (CEDI) at the University of Mainz, 10–11 November 2016. The authors would like to express their gratitude to the commentators and participants of the Mainz workshop and the anonymous reviewers for very helpful comments. For able research assistance we thank Raphael Steinhilber and Kai Vorberg, as well as Alec Crutchley for proofreading.

Notes

1 For a similar definition, see Panke and Stapel (2018, 2).

2 For exceptions, see Solis et al. (2009), Michael (2013) and most recently Freeman (2018).

3 For a critical overview of the older literature on Asian institution building, see Ravenhill (2010).

4 For a critique, see Johnston (1996), Barkin (2003) and Rother (2004).

5 On the importance of historical experiences for strategic culture, see also Malik (2011, 10).

6 On the legacies of colonialism and imperialism for China and India, see Miller (2013).

7 See also India’s former foreign secretary, Prime Minister’s Special Envoy for Indo-American civil nuclear issues and Special Envoy and Chief Negotiator on Climate Change, Chairman of the National Security Advisory Board under the National Security Council Shyam Saran (2017, 30).

8 Yet Yudhoyono’s worldview is more ambivalent than this formula suggests. See his equation of international politics with ‘turbulent seas’. The Jakarta Post, 2 January 2007.

9 The significance of the Ramayana and the Mahabharata in Indian strategic thinking was highlighted by Indian Ambassador (Retd) Pinak Ranjan Chakravarty in a lecture at the Defence Services Staff College (DSSC), Wellington, Tamil Nadu, 23 June 2014, <http://idsa.in/history>, accessed 27 March 2017.

10 Authors’ interview, 24 November 2006. The IDSA, India’s leading security studies think tank and an advisory body to the Indian government, is currently conducting research into ‘indigenous historical knowledge’, focusing on the influence of Kautilya on ‘traditions of strategic thought, defence and security’: <http://idsa.in/history>, accessed 2 November 2016.

11 See also South China Morning Post, 4 January 2013; The Diplomat, 7 February 2015; Shyam Saran, ‘Is a China-centric world inevitable?’, <https://thewire.in/diplomacy/china-centric-world-inevitable>, accessed 24 May 2018. For Indonesia, see diplomat Siswo Pramono, The Jakarta Post, 10 December 2003.

12 Thai politician Newin Chidchob, Bangkok Post, 6 March 2002.

13 See, for instance, Indonesian President Yudhoyono, Tempo Interaktif, 26 February 2009.

14 See also Laotian, Singaporean and Cambodian speeches in the general debate of the United National General Assembly, which frequently refer to vulnerability, victimization and survival: <http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/unms/cms.shtml>, accessed 23 January 2018.

15 For Kasem S. Kasemsri, Thailand’s foreign minister in the mid-1990s, ‘it has been in the Thai consciousness that national survival constitutes the most important criterion for interstate relations’ (Kasemsri 1989, 15).

16 See Batabyal (2006, 181); Chachavalpongpun (2010, 32).

17 ‘Vision and Actions an Jointy Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road’, <http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html>, accessed 21 May 2018.

18 Malik citing the Indian Minister of State for Defence, MM Pallam Raju (Malik 2011, 48). For more recent evidence, see also former Indian diplomat KC Singh, The Hindu, 2 December 2016, and Shrimati Chhaya Verma in the Indian Upper House, questioning the Minister of External Affairs whether China is laying ‘siege around India’s maritime boundaries’, Question No. 49, <http://www.mea.gov.in/rajya-sabha.htm/dtl/28659/question+no515+indian+participation+in+one+belt+one+road+projects>, accessed 22 February 2018.

19 The ‘string of pearls’ strategy refers to what China’s critics suspect to be a systematic establishment of military and commercial facilities in the Indian Ocean. A term downplayed by Chinese media; see Global Times, 3 July 2016.

20 C Uday Bhashkar, East Asia Forum, 6 February 2018.

21 Shyam Saran, ‘Is a China-centric world inevitable?’, <https://thewire.in/diplomacy/china-centric-world-inevitable>, accessed 24 May 2018.

22 Financial Express, 5 April 2018.

23 See also Asia Times, 13 March 2007.

24 For portraying Rao’s Look East policy in Kautilyan perspective, see also Indian Ambassador Pinak Ranjan Chakravarty, <http://www.mea.gov.in/distinguished-lectures-detail.Htm?87>, accessed 27 March 2017.

25 See also Yahya (2005, 398, 405), Batabyal (2006, 181 and 183), Scott (2008, 4), Murthy (2008, 1), Rehman (2009, 131).

26 For example, for former Indian diplomat G Parthasarathy these schemes served ‘to dilute China’s attempts to undermine India’s relations … in Southeast and East Asia’ (see New Straits Times, 24 October 2011) and think tank scholar Padmaja Murthy stated that ‘even among those groupings which claim to focus solely on the economic agenda, there is a definite influence of political and other strategic factors’ (Murthy 2008, 1).

27 See ‘PM’s statement at 3rd BIMSTEC Summit’, <http://archivepmo.nic.in/drmanmohansingh/speech-details.php/nodeid=1441>, accessed 21 May 2018.

28 However, India was unable to prevent the admission of China as a dialogue partner of IORA.

29 The Hindu, 7 October 2003.

30 For quotations from high-ranking Indian security officials highlighting ‘the growing Chinese footprint in the Indian Ocean’, see Scott (2015, 476).

31 See also Global Times, 28 August 2017.

32 The Diplomat, 7 September 2015; The Jakarta Post, 6 September 2016.

33 On China’s strategic goals, see Global Times, 29 November 2017.

34 South Asia Monitor, 17 September 2016.

35 Ibid.

36 The Hindu, 25 July 2001.

37 For comments in Indian, Chinese and Thai media unequivocally linking the grouping to the mainland Southeast Asian rivalry between New Delhi and China, see The Hindu, 12 November 2000; Global Times, 7 March 2018; and a Bangkok Post editorial cited in IPS Interpress Service, 17 November 2000.

38 Hindustan Times, 11 November 2000.

39 Hanoi Times, 9 January 2017.

40 Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 September 1994, p. 17. For a similar statement, see Hanoi’s ambassador to India, Vu Quang Diem, The Hindu, 5 January 2007.

41 Based on a defence agreement of 1994, which was upgraded in 2000 (Scott 2008, 10).

42 Times of India, 11 January 2018.

43 Eurasia Review, 17 September 2014.

44 ‘India sides with Philippines in South China Sea dispute’, <https://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/news/boundary_news//itemno=25874>, accessed 25 January 2018.

45 The Pioneer, 28 May 2015.

46 See Chinese scholar Liu Zongyi, Global Times, 25 January 2015.

47 New Straits Times, 24 October 2011.

48 As disapprovingly noted by Chinese observers. See Global Times, 6 January 2015.

49 Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, Ambassador (Retd) Ashok Sajjanhar, ‘From Look East to Act East: semantics or substance/’, <http://www.mea.gov.in/distinguished-lectures-detail.htm/213>, accessed 18 February 2017.

50 Pakistan Observer, 4 October 2017.

51 Global Times, 1 June 2017.

52 India Today, 14 May 2017; for a similar statement, see Long Xingchun, Director of the Center for Indian Studies at China West Normal University, Hindustan Times, 14 May 2017.

53 Times of India, 4 May 2017.

54 Global Times, 28 November 2017; 29 November 2017.

55 ibid.

56 Thethirdpole.net, 1 February 2016.

57 The Phnom Penh Post, 11 January 2018.

58 China Daily, 11 January 2018.

59 Globe and Mail, 12 January 2018.

60 The Diplomat, 31 October 2017.

61 Members, apart from Thailand, are Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam.

62 It was thus no coincidence that Vietnam was not among ACMECS’s founding members. Vietnam joined in 2004. People’s Daily, 22 November 2010.

63 Authors’ interview, 31 March 2017.

64 Eurasia Review, 21 June 2015.

65 For the slow pace of Indian infrastructure projects, see The Straits Times, 26 January 2018.

66 Observer Research Foundation, <https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/saarc-in-coma-china-throws-another-challenging-regional-initiative/>, accessed 29 September 2018.

67 IPS Interpress Service, 17 November 2000.

68 East Asia Forum, 11 January 2018.

69 Khmer Times, 7 December 2016.

70 Xinhua, 15 November 2010; Thai News Service, 4 July 2006; 13 March 2013.

71 New Indian Express, 20 April 2014.

72 South China Morning Post, 13 October 2016.

73 Indian Express, 5 January 2017; The Diplomat, 1 January 2018.

74 East Asia Forum, 16 July 2017.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Jürgen Rüland

Jürgen Rüland is is professor of Political Science in the Department of Political Science at the University of Freiburg, Germany. He is the author of The Indonesian Way. ASEAN, Europeanization and Foreign Policy Debates in a New Democracy (Stanford: Stanford University Press 2018) and ASEAN and its Cohesion as an Actor in International Forums – Reality, Potential and Constraints (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) (with Paruedee Nguitragool 2015). Email: [email protected].

Arndt Michael

Arndt Michael is senior lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the University of Freiburg, Germany. He is the author of India’s Foreign Policy and Regional Multilateralism (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). His most recent publication is ‘Cooperation is What India Makes of It - A Normative Inquiry into the Origins and Development of Regional Cooperation in South Asia and the Indian Ocean’, Asian Security 14(2) 2018: 119–135. Email: [email protected].