A dynamic strategic culture model and China’s behaviour in the South China Sea

Abstract

This paper provides a new theoretical framework to explain China’s strategic behaviour along with its rise and in doing so engages with the debate on strategic culture between Colin Gray and Alastair Johnston. We suggest that China’s behaviour is shaped by two variables: realpolitik realist threat perceptions on the strategic level and Confucian moralist cultural norms on the ideational level. In the case of a high strategic threat, China’s behaviour will be heavily influenced by the realpolitik variable in Chinese culture and become offensive in nature. Under low strategic threat, China’s policy will follow the Confucian tradition and thereby emphasize the non-use of force and resort to defensive principles. When external threats change from high to low, Chinese behaviour will feature a combination of ‘realpolitik’ and ‘Confucianism,’ that is, a self-constrained offensive policy. China’s foreign policy in the South China Sea after the Cold War is a case study that illustrates the utility of this new strategic culture framework.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes on Contributors

Huiyun Feng is Senior Lecturer in the School of Government and International Relations at Griffith University, Australia. She is the author of Chinese Strategic Culture and Foreign Policy Decision-Making: Confucianism, Leadership and War (Routledge, 2007) and the co-author of Prospect Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis in the Asia Pacific: Rational Leaders and Risky Behavior (Routledge, 2013). Email: [email protected]

Kai He is Professor of International Relations in Griffith Asia Institute and Centre for Governance and Public Policy at Griffith University in Brisbane, Australia. He is currently an Australian Research Council (ARC) Future Fellow (2017–2020). He is also a Visiting Chair Professor of International Relations at Zhou Enlai School of Government, Nankai University, China. Email: [email protected]

Notes

1 Original emphasis.

2 Media reports normally suggest that China’s claims cover 80–90 per cent of the SCS. However, as the US State Department points out, China’s nine-dash line includes 62 per cent of the area in the SCS. See US Department of State (2014).

3 It is worth noting that FON (freedom of navigation) is a longstanding policy of the US. The State Department issued a policy statement in 1995 that stated, ‘maintaining freedom of navigation is a fundamental interest of the United States’ in the SCS. Due to China’s limited presence in the SCS, the US position did not cause diplomatic tensions between the two states in the 1990s. Although the US did not change its FON position, its FON operations intensified US–China competition in the SCS after 2010. See Fravel (2014, 4).

4 This is a prevailing view among Chinese academics. For example, see Ge (2012) and Zhou (2016).

5 On China’s use of coastguard and civilian forces in the SCS see Erickson and Kennedy (2016).

6 It is worth noting that Johnston and Scobell hold different views on which strand of the two strategic culture matters for Chinese behaviour. While Johnston highlights the importance of the realpolitik strand, Scobell argues that both strands are active and have impacts on China’s foreign policy behavior.

Additional information

Funding

This project is supported by the Australian Research Council [grant number FT160100355] and the John D and Catherine T MacArthur Foundation [grant number 16-1512-150509-IPS].