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Abstract
This article bridges the gap between referenda and foreign policy, emphasizing the role of non-state entities as (f)actors of change in the formulation of foreign policy. Using a multi-layered (rather than a normative) analysis, it examines the Kurdistan Region of Iraq as a novel, non-state case in the international relations and foreign policy analysis literature. It argues that referenda can be pursued by non-state entities, not just state actors, and analyses the parameters of the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG’s) unilateral declaration and conduct of the 2017 referendum. It perceives referenda as tools for the formulation and possible facilitation of foreign policy objectives and, in particular, claims to the formation of statehood undertaken by a non-state entity. The study, therefore, pursues a multi-level analysis looking at the contributing dynamics at the domestic, regional and international levels which demonstrate the impact of referenda on foreign policy-making and examines the catalyst role of the unit level that stands out as a determining factor.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes
1 ‘In 2016 … [a] monumental event occurred … the referendum by the British electorate to leave the European Union (EU).’
2 ‘The year 2014 with the rise of IS was a turning point that pushed towards an independence referendum.’
3 This paper’s argument is in line with Frank A Stengel and Rainer Baumann (Citation2017), according to whom ‘foreign policy needs to take account of the growing importance of non-state actors’.
4 ‘E.g. the cutting of the federal budget to the KRG or the non-formation of the Federation Council constitutes examples of these violations.’
5 ‘Referendums on borders are relatively uncommon—or rather, they have become rare. It used to be the case that most ethno national referendums concerned the drawing of borders. This was certainly the case before World War I. Since then right-sizing referendums have become rare. The reasons for this are manifold. One of the reasons is that borders have become fixed.’
6 ‘Of the 56 referendums on independence since 1860, 50 have been held after 1944. But the vast majority of these (39 in total) were held after 1990.’
7 ‘The referendum may also be initiated i.e. by the president or a parliamentary minority.’
8 ‘a) Secessionist Referenda happening following the lift of a long-standing imperial hegemony; b) Right sizing referenda happening in the wake of a major conflict or a regime change.’
9 The goal was ‘the US [to] respect Taiwan and China would not act like a bully’.
10 ‘The reaction to any Referendum is an ad hoc case and determinant but also subject to different manners.’
11 ‘Federalism or any other form of power sharing implies distributing rather than concentrating political authority.’
12 This referendum was unilaterally by the Autonomous Region of Catalonia based on the 2012 mandate to hold a referendum on the question: ‘Should Catalonia be a state and if so whether it should be an independent one?’
13 That is the border-violating coup d’état on 16 October 2017—the night of Kerkuk—led by the region’s Shi’a elements (domestic militias and neighbouring armies) both inside and outside Iraq, which, in coordination with Kurdish opposition forces allied with a certain circle from the PUK, were supported by the Iraqi army. Yet, a small group of PUK peshmerga forces stood against this coup.
14 Literature on the Record of the process of the Referendum.
15 ‘The Iraqi 2019 budget bill dedicates 50 billion Iraqi dinar ($42 million) for reopening Article 140 offices in Kirkuk and Nineveh and an additional 800 billion dinar ($672 million) for implementation of the article.’
16 ‘The issue of the disputed areas and in particular Kirkuk is not just a local issue but a regional and international problem.’
17 Massoud Barzani said (on 3 July 2014) that he no longer felt bound by the Iraqi constitution, which enshrines the unity of the state, and asked the parliament (of Kurdistan) to start preparations for a vote on the right for self-determination.
18 ‘The parliament was set to reconvene on September 15, 2017 for the first time in two years’ following a parliamentary crisis ‘with the Kurdish referendum at the top of the agenda’.
19 ‘Preserving Iraq’s territorial integrity and political unity is one of the fundamental principles of Turkey’s Iraq policy.’
20 Al-Abadi replaced al-Maliki as early as September 2014.
21 According to Massoud Barzani, ‘the decision to hold the referendum was postponed due to the rise of the Islamic State in the same year’.
22 ‘The commander of Al Quds force was instrumental in retaking Kirkuk.’
23 ‘Based on: Article 117(1) Iraqi Law between 1992 and 2003 all decisions taken in KR haven been institutionalised and as such accepted.’
24 ‘Currently, 67 percent of automobile imports to the Kurdistan Region are brought through the Iranian border. There are 359 Iranian companies and 135 Iranian factories in the Kurdistan Region.’
25 ‘14 brigades have been merged under the Ministry of Peshmerga Affairs and there is law in the parliament according to which all financial sources will go under the ministry. Thus there will be no financial issues connected to these forces.’
26 Cases like Quebec’s referenda are indicative of the fact that, despite referenda’s outcome, discussion and political negotiations other than the use of military force can constitute pillars of peaceful co-existence. Despite two successive referenda, including the adoption of a new constitution and two rounds of constitutional negotiations, the aftermath of the 1995 referendum resulted in failed constitutional talks that rendered constitutional amendments undesirable (Rocher 2013, 33–34, 43).
27 ‘It was a long week … during which we would go to Kirkuk [and] the decision was to defend.’
28 ‘Popular Mobilisation Units deployment plan to attack the Gwer-Dibege-Dibid road connecting Mosul to Kirkuk.’
29 ‘Hash-Al Shaab and Hezbollah took part and the US had all details of that.’
30 ‘Kurdistanis like people of other nations vary by dialect, region and religion’ (O’Leary et al Citation2005, 22).
31 ‘Weber distinguishes between three kinds of authority: the traditional—based on upon history and custom; the charismatic—the power of the personality; legal/rational authority derived from the formal powers of a post.’
32 ‘The emphasis on individual decision makers in Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) led scholars to focus on psychological and cognitive factors as explanatory sources of foreign policy choice.’
33 In this case—and in opposition to Hudson (Hudson, 2013: 503)—I view both the individuals and the structures as a starting point for change. The relation between structural constraints and actions of agents does not necessarily have to be always interlinked.
Additional information
Notes on contributors
Marianna Charountaki
Marianna Charountaki is a Senior lecturer in international politics in the School of Social and Political Sciences, University of Lincoln. Her research interests range from international relations and foreign policy analysis to the international relations of the broader Middle East. She is the author of the books The Kurds and US foreign policy: international relations in the Middle East since 1945 (Routledge, 2010) and Iran and Turkey: international and regional engagement in the Middle East (IB Tauris, 2018). Email: [email protected]