Embedded memory wars: Italy’s 2019 Armenian Genocide recognition

Abstract

Scholars often associate the political instrumentalisation of memory with right-wing populists. But this focus somewhat obscures the fact that elected officials across the political spectrum instrumentalise memory in their efforts to shape perceptions and influence behaviours. In fact, the success of memory laws often depends on the fact that MPs from diverse political parties support the same projects not only to validate their own views but also to delegitimise those of others. I refer to the conflicts resulting from different political actors’ support of the same memory laws as embedded memory wars. Based on documentary analysis and fieldwork interviews, this article examines embedded memory wars through the illustrative case of the 2019 recognition of the Armenian Genocide in Italy's Chamber of Deputies. In supporting Armenian Genocide recognition, Italian MPs from both right and left-wing parties developed competing narratives to debate contemporary topics related to European integration, multiculturalism, and Turkey.

Introduction

Scholars of history, international relations, law, sociology, and other fields have explored various dimensions of memory laws in Europe (Kahn 2004; Levy and Sznaider 2006; Savelsberg and King 2007; Bán and Belavusau 2022). For example, researchers have examined the role of memory laws in facilitating European integration and establishing supranational European institutions (Sierp 2014; Sierp and Wüstenberg 2015; Kucia 2016; Koposov 2017; Barile 2021). However, researchers have also highlighted a different side of memory laws, particularly among right-wing populists¹ in Central and Eastern Europe (Mälksoo 2009; Belavusau and Gliszczyńska-Grabias 2017; Koposov 2017; Subotić 2019a). In part, this research pertains to the role memory laws play in what Nikolay Koposov calls ‘memory wars’ (2017). In these mnemonic conflicts, right-wing populists appropriate and instrumentalise memories to revise historical accounts of the Holocaust and other crimes against humanity, thereby eroding democratic traditions, exculpating titular nationalities, or creating space to discuss the crimes of communism (Subotić 2019a; Belavusau et al. 2021; Koposov 2022). On the supranational level, scholars have also noted how ‘memory entrepreneurs’ in the European Parliament and elsewhere have attempted to upend the singularity of the Holocaust and equate the crimes of Nazism with those of communism (Neumayer 2015).

While researchers have analysed various ways in which right-wing populists construct memory narratives to serve their specific purposes, this focus somewhat obscures the fact that memory law projects are instruments for actors across the political spectrum. Although their goals differ from those of right-wing populists, politicians on the left and the centre instrumentalise memory to pursue their own agendas. In supporting the same memory laws, diverse actors put forward competing narratives through which they attempt to influence others’ beliefs and attitudes about the political present.

In this way, political actors’ memory narratives resemble what scholars call ‘strategic narratives’, which seek to influence behaviours and perceptions through the creation of shared meaning of international politics (Miskimmon, Ben, and Roselle 2014, 6). As with strategic narratives, memory narratives are used to influence policies and project political actors’ values. In addition, memory narratives involve actors attempting to define collective identities and explain how the world is organised (Miskimmon, Ben, and Roselle 2017, 8). Furthermore, memory wars consist of competing or conflicting narratives – that is, narratives and counternarratives (Dimitriu and de Graaf 2016). But memory narratives can also differ from strategic narratives; in memory wars, narratives and counternarratives can, in some instances, work toward achieving the same end – that is, to support the same memory laws.

In their competing efforts to define the political present by instrumentalising the past, actors participate in what I call embedded memory wars. Embedded memory wars occur when different actors, who support the same memory law, instrumentalise the memory of historical events to validate their distinct views of the political present – and, in the process, delegitimise the views of other actors. Thus, this article unpacks an unexplored dimension of memory wars by shifting the focus from mnemonic contests taking place between different memory laws to those unfolding in the construction and establishment of individual state-sanctioned interpretations of the past.

Embedded memory wars often take place in Europe’s parliamentary recognitions of the Armenian Genocide.² While several of the existing recognitions took place before the early 2010s, since then, nativist, right-wing political actors have become particularly interested in developing narratives about the Armenian Genocide. These parties are not exclusively (or, in many cases, even remotely) responsible for most of Europe’s parliamentary recognitions. However, right-wing populists frequently construct narratives about the Armenian Genocide to pursue various ends, such as criticising Turkey and/or promoting anti-pluralistic, Islamophobic views of Europe (Fittante 2023a). Nonetheless, as stated, this tendency to instrumentalise memories of the Armenian Genocide in MPs’ conflicting efforts to promote a common European ethos occurs across the political spectrum. In their efforts to influence policies and perceptions, left-wing (or liberal) actors promote the same memory laws about Armenian Genocide recognition albeit for different purposes, such as combating Islamophobia, manifesting ‘mature’ foreign policy, or promoting multiculturalism (Fittante 2022; 2023b). These diverse actors’ competing narratives often clash, paradoxically, in their common support of the same memory laws.

One illustrative example of an embedded memory war is Italy’s 2019 recognition of the Armenian Genocide (in the Chamber of Deputies). While the Italian Parliament had recognised the Armenian Genocide once before (in 2000), MPs recognised the genocide a second time in response to a different political reality in Italy and Europe. Italy is a particularly illuminating case through which to analyse embedded memory wars because, despite the country’s high level of political fragmentation and radicalisation (Pasquino 2020; Dennison and Geddes 2022), MPs from the right and left united in their support of the motion to recognise the Armenian Genocide. Distinct from other contexts where Armenian Genocide recognition occurs (Fittante 2023a), Italy’s right-wing populist party, the Lega (Bull 2015; Albertazzi et al. 2018), spearheaded the initiative within the Italian Parliament. The 2019 resolution took place during the 14-month coalition government formed between the Lega and the more ‘eclectic’ party, the Movimento 5 Stelle (Five Star Movement or M5S) (Mosca and Tronconi 2021). The Lega’s central involvement supports scholarly expectations about the role right-wing populists play in instrumentalizing memory law projects. Nonetheless, left-leaning MPs also played significant roles in supporting the recognition.

Still, although no MPs dissented to the recognition,³ the rationales and motivations behind its support proved contentious. Among other reasons, some MPs pursued the recognition to create distance between Italy (or Europe) and Turkey, whereas others supported the resolution to promote multiculturalism in Italy (and Europe). In this latter conception, some contended Turkey has an important part to play in Europe. In their parliamentary speeches, MPs participated in an embedded memory war by seeking to legitimise their different interpretations of the political present and delegitimise competing accounts.

Memory laws and memory wars

Research on memory laws is an important subfield in the vast literature on the politics of memory. In a general sense, memory laws ‘enshrine state-approved interpretations of historical events’ (Belavusau and Gliszczyńska-Grabias 2017, 1). These laws encompass a wide range of measures, including Holocaust denial prohibitions, decommunisation laws, the establishment of state holidays, regulations for museums and school curricula, as well as legal acts recognising and commemorating historical events (Bán and Belavusau 2022, 5–6). Since the 1980s, memory laws in Europe have become increasingly commonplace. Scholars have noted that Germany and France played especially pivotal roles in establishing precedents of recognition (Koposov 2017; Lucksted 2022). In 1985, Germany became the first nation to pass a law prohibiting the denial of the Holocaust.⁴ Additionally, France’s Gayssot Act (1990) contributed to a European trend in the formulation of memory laws (Koposov 2017, 89). Danielle Lucksted argues that memory laws following those of Germany and France⁵ manifest ‘both mimetic and normative isomorphism’ (2022, 1453). However, other memory laws, particularly those emanating from Central and Eastern Europe, have served very different purposes.

Responding to pressures from Western Europe to forbid or punish Holocaust denial (and other crimes against humanity), several right-wing populists in post-communist Europe have used memory laws as instruments through which to signal compliance with the West while pursuing ulterior agendas (Koposov 2017; Subotić 2019b). Koposov summarises this tendency as follows:

‘Manipulative uses of memory have become the hard currency of populist politics all across the world. In particular, a distinctively different culture of memory has emerged in some of the former communist countries, which seek to promote their national narratives rather than the “cosmopolitan” EU-sponsored memory of the Holocaust’ (Koposov 2022, 273).

For Koposov and other scholars, the political instrumentalisation of memory has become the ‘hard currency’ of populists. As such, scholars often note that populists (particularly right-wing populists) use memory laws to ‘erode the foundational elements of liberal democracy, weaken constitutional orders as well as add fuel to nationalist tendencies’ (Belavusau et al. 2021, 4). For example, in describing Poland’s Institute of National Remembrance Act, Uladzislau Belavusau and others argue that,

‘the law depriving former officials associated with the communist regime of some of their social benefits, irrespective of the degree or time of their involvement in the regime, constituted a far-reaching interference in the fundamental rights and freedoms of an individual’ (2021, 9).

In examining the disputes arising over differing interpretations of the past (especially those relating to the Holocaust and Second World War), Koposov has introduced the concept of ‘memory wars’ (2017). Subsequently, researchers have developed the concept of memory wars by investigating the diverse contexts in which they occur. For example, Magdalena Saryusz-Wolska and others summarise existing research that examines the diverse states, which participate in these memory wars (Saryusz-Wolska et al. 2022). Within states, some examples include the commemoration of the Algerian War in France (McCormack 2011), Argentina’s dictatorship trials (Kaiser 2015), and the Spanish Civil War (Faber 2018). Between states, other examples include Russia and Ukraine (Kassianov 2022), Japan and China (Dian 2017), Latvia and Russia (Platt 2020) and Western Europe and Eastern Europe (Mälksoo 2021), among others. This research tends to investigate how right-wing populists use memory laws to contravene democratic traditions and debunk prevailing narratives (Sierp and Wüstenberg 2015; Neumayer 2015; Barile 2021; Belavusau et al. 2021).

While very valuable to the scholarship on memory wars, this recurrent conceptualisation of right-wing memory instrumentalisation is somewhat misleading. As the literature has shown, right-wing populists consistently instrumentalise memory to serve their specific purposes. But memory law projects are political instruments no matter who supports them. As such, they serve the strategic ends of left-wing actors (among others) as much as they do right-wing populists.

When scholars discuss the ‘liberal approach’ to memory, they tend to use rather fulsome language. For example, in unpacking ‘the rise of illiberal memory’, Gavriel Rosenfeld states the following: ‘The liberal approach to remembrance tends to be self-critical and seeks to confront painful episodes from the national past in order to affirm universal values, such as freedom, equality, and justice’ (Rosenfeld 2023, 820). Rosenfeld further argues that the liberal approach accepts responsibility, attempts to make amends, promotes healing, and embraces diverse perspectives (Rosenfeld 2023, 820). Although it is true that many liberal or left-wing actors approach memory projects in these ways, they also instrumentalise memory to pursue their own ulterior objectives.⁶ Based on existing assumptions, the scholarship on memory laws therefore tends to overlook some strategic ways in which left-wing or liberal (among other) actors use memory to serve different purposes. In this analysis, I seek to build on the existing research by arguing that a broad range of political actors instrumentalise memory to shape perceptions and behaviours, and, in supporting the same memory laws, these actors frequently delegitimise conflicting accounts.

Framed this way, memory narratives operate like ‘strategic narratives’ – that is, narratives that work ‘to create a shared understanding of the world, of other political actors, and of policy’ (Miskimmon, Ben, and Roselle 2017, 1). As with strategic narratives, memory narratives also provide ‘compelling storylines’ (Freedman 2006, 22) through which actors create shared meaning and influence public perceptions and behaviours (Miskimmon, Ben, and Roselle 2014). Furthermore, similar to strategic narratives, competing memory narratives – or memory wars (Koposov 2017) – often involve narratives and counternarratives (Dimitriu and de Graaf 2016).

But contentious narratives and counternarratives can play a different role in memory wars. On the topic of strategic narratives, Robin Brown argues that ‘in contentious cases narrative[s] mobilise supporters but the impact on outcomes is uncertain and depends on the influence of sympathiser networks rather than the properties of the narrative itself’ (Brown 2017, 165). As Brown notes, contentious narratives can lead to uncertain results and cause strategic narratives to fall short of achieving their intended objectives. In addition, George Dimitriu and Beatrice de Graaf explain that ‘the level of public support follows narrative dominance and that there is a correlation between narrative dominance and public opinion. Public opinion indeed depends on the strategic narratives formulated, but only when seen in conjunction with the counternarratives produced by opposing parties’ (Dimitriu and De Graaf 2016, 20). When competing narratives prevent a dominant narrative from prevailing, strategic narratives can have limited impact in terms of their influence – in this case, of changing public opinion. It is true that memory law projects probably also have limited impact in terms of changing others’ opinions or behaviours; however, the success of memory laws can sometimes depend on politically opposed actors lending their support to the same projects. These actors support memory laws by seeking to delegitimise others’ conflicting interpretations of the political present and, in the process, projecting their own values and objectives. Interestingly, the existence of narratives and counternarratives can at times facilitate the successful passage of memory laws. I refer to the clashing narratives put forward by political actors, who support the same memory laws as a means by which to attack and delegitimise conflicting interpretations of policy positioning as embedded memory wars.

In embedded memory wars, different actors construct memory narratives to promote competing values and goals. Paradoxically, they do so while supporting the same memory laws. As Jelena Subotić (2019b) has noted regarding the role of memory in delegitimising ‘dead states’– that is, former political realities – I argue, in embedded memory wars, actors instrumentalise the past to delegitimise others’ views of the political present. And the instrumentalisation of memory is not solely the prerogative of right-wing populists. Rather, elected officials across the political spectrum – including left-wing actors – rely on memory as an instrument to serve their own varied purposes. This analysis therefore builds on the existing memory wars scholarship by shifting the focus to the discursive contests behind the polyphonic instrumentalisations of individual memory laws. By shifting the focus to the narrative contests behind the support of individual memory laws, this analysis explores how actors use memory as a rhetorical instrument to debunk competing interpretations of the political present and posit their own.

In unpacking embedded memory wars, I examine Italy’s 2019 parliamentary resolution recognising the Armenian Genocide. This case study highlights how memory wars can occur within the construction of individual memory laws. In Italy, the initiative to recognise the Armenian Genocide (both in 2000 and 2019) was spearheaded by the right-wing party, the Lega (formerly Lega Nord). However, Italy’s 2019 recognition received nearly unanimous support among all of Italy’s MPs in the Chamber of Deputies. Many of Italy’s left-leaning MPs also played important roles in the recognition. However, the political motivations of MPs in supporting the recognition were distinct – many on the right sought to attack multiculturalism, promote Islamophobia, and/or isolate Turkey from Europe, whereas those on the left sought to condemn Islamophobia, promote multiculturalism, and/or cultivate ties with Turkey. Even the centre-right Forza Italia (FI) MPs, who abstained from the parliamentary vote, had their own motivations – namely, to steer Turkey away from ‘fundamentalist Islamism’ and praise the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Although MPs on opposing ends of Italy’s political spectrum supported the memory law, in their parliamentary speeches, they projected different values and pursued distinct agendas. In justifying their support of the recognition, the MPs sought to delegitimise the political motivations of others. Their narratives and counternarratives, I argue, exemplify an embedded memory war but also add nuance to some important cleavages polarising and fracturing both Italy and Europe – particularly regarding multiculturalism, Turkey, and Muslim immigrants.

Methods

For approximately three months in 2023, I collected data in Rome, Italy. While in Italy, I conducted 22 in-depth interviews and undertook documentary analysis of records pertaining to Italy’s Armenian Genocide recognitions – both in 2000 and 2019. I also undertook many informal conversations and corresponded with members of the Armenian community, Italian academics, and elected officials. Based on participants’ preferences, formal interviews ranged between 45 min and two hours. These discussions were largely conducted in English. In one instance, a translator was required. Interviews took place with a range of MPs from different political parties as well as relevant Armenian (and Italian Armenian) actors. Among Italian MPs, I interviewed those who had served (or were serving) in Partito Democratico (Democratic Party or PD), the Lega, and the M5S. I also corresponded with Italian MPs from other parties, such as Fratelli d‘Italia (Brothers of Italy or FdI) and FI.

To gain further insight and generate a list of prospective MPs to interview, I analysed parliamentary speeches and other official transcripts (such as motions and votes). These materials provided a fairly clear picture of the varied, often contentious constructions different Italian MPs used to instrumentalise Armenian Genocide memory. For this reason, the speeches provided insight into embedded memory wars. Nonetheless, the speeches alone lacked a great deal of explanatory context. So, using the speeches to generate a list of MPs to interview, I attempted to meet and speak with those who were directly involved in the creation and passage of the 2019 resolution (as well as those who abstained). I then relied on the method of snowball sampling to connect with relevant Italian Armenian activists as well as the serving Armenian Ambassador, Tsovinar Hambardzumyan. In addition, I corresponded with the genocide scholar (and historian), Marcello Flores. Hambardzumyan connected me with the Lega MP and chairperson of the Italy-Armenia Friendship Group, Giulio Centemero; Flores connected me with Andrea Romano (PD), who was serving as an MP in the Chamber of Deputies in 2019 and is a professor of history at the Tor Vergata University of Rome. In addition to providing invaluable insider perspectives (as both were co-signatories of the 2019 motion), Centemero and Romano helped me network with a diverse range of officials from various parties. In turn, several of those whom I met subsequently – such as former PD MP and president of the Associazione delle istituzioni di cultura italiane (Association of Italian cultural institutions) Flavia Piccoli Nardelli – helped me network among MPs with whom I was trying to speak. At each interview, I would ask for assistance getting in touch with people from my list of prospective participants. Based on this method, I was able to gain deeper insight into the parliamentary recognition from a range of perspectives.

With participants’ permission, I audio-recorded the interviews. Afterwards, I partially transcribed these conversations. In each interview, I sought to learn more about the personal and party reasons for supporting the recognitions. For those MPs I did not manage to interview, I instead drew from parliamentary speeches and other relevant archival content, which is available in the public domain. Based on consistencies gleaned from the diverse sources consulted, I was able to recreate the events leading up to the 2019 parliamentary debates and the motion’s successful passage.

Context: getting recognition on the agenda

According to several of the MPs I interviewed, the initial momentum for the 2019 parliamentary recognition began with the outreach efforts of the then Armenian Ambassador to Italy, Victoria Bagdassarian. MPs from different parties emphasised the integral role Bagdassarian played in spreading awareness among diverse Italian political insiders. For example, Emilio Carelli, who at the time was an M5S MP, shared the following with me: ‘I think Victoria played the most important role in this approval because she talked with everybody, every day, and she was in Parliament during the approval of the motion. So I think really that the most important role was played by Victoria Bagdassarian’. Bagdassarian’s efforts support what has been noted about the important yet largely understudied role diplomats from small states can play in compensating for power asymmetries and influencing international narratives (Fittante 2024).

Within the Italian Parliament, Bagdassarian found many supporters among those serving on the Committee on Foreign Relations. This included MPs across Italy’s political spectrum. In addition to Carelli, mentioned above, several others from this committee – such as Paolo Formentini (Lega), Maurizio Lupi (Noi con l‘Italia/Us with Italy), Laura Boldrini (Liberi e Uguali/Free and Equal or LeU), Lia Quartapelle (PD), Andrea Delmastro (FdI), and others – became vocal supporters of the recognition.^vi As this list of MPs attests, the insider support for a parliamentary recognition included politically diverse MPs. However, the recognition resonated with these Italian MPs for quite different reasons.

For the Lega MPs, the recognition proved to be another opportunity to reorient Italian foreign policy (Andornino 2023), particularly as it related to Turkey. This tendency to upset the existing status quo was articulated to me directly by several MPs. For example, PD MP Lia Quartapelle Procopio told me the following:

That government was a government that was very ready to give away with the traditional position of Italy in international relations. They were not scared of changing our foreign policy orientation…They came to power with the idea to get closer to Russia, get closer to China, and get further away from Brussels. And this meant also dismantling certain pivots of traditional Italian foreign policy, including our traditional relationship with Turkey. So that’s why the Lega had a free way to do that.

As Quartapelle Procopio explained to me, the then coalition government made a point of challenging Italy’s established foreign policies in relation to Russia, China, and Turkey. This assertion reinforces what scholars have noted regarding the policy legacy of the 14-month coalition government vis-à-vis Russia, China, and the EU (Andornino 2023). In fact, Armenian Genocide recognition proved, for many MPs, a useful instrument through which to articulate this new orientation towards Turkey. Given the role the Lega played in the coalition government and its effort to reorient Italian foreign policy, the timing proved particularly auspicious for the Armenian Genocide recognition.

Lega MP Paolo Formentini was the primary signatory of the motion (1/00139), which would eventually be voted on and passed. At the time, the Lega was well positioned to spearhead a recognition resolution. In a personal discussion, Formentini told me the following about how this came about:

We met with the Armenian Ambassador at the time, and we started to talk also with her. Of course we were authorised by the leader of our political party, Salvini, and Mr. Salvini and our head in the Chamber were really hopeful it would succeed…It was a coalition between the League and the Five Star Movement; it was something really new in the political environment in Italy…We proposed it and many political parties started to subscribe – and that was great – from the extreme left to the right…It [the recognition] wasn’t a good time at that time, because it was not easy to create a new view of this kind of government.

In addition to reaffirming the important role that the Armenian Ambassador played in initiating the momentum behind the recognition, Formentini noted to me the support the party received from the president of the Lega in the Chamber of Deputies, Riccardo Molinari, and party leader and then Deputy Prime Minister, Matteo Salvini. With support from the Lega leadership, Formentini and others from the Committee on Foreign Relations were able to ensure the motion made it onto the agenda. Formentini also emphasised the central role timing played during the 14-month window in which the Lega and the M5S formed a coalition government. Furthermore, he explained the coalition government’s specific take on foreign policy (‘it was something really new in the political environment in Italy’), particularly towards Turkey. As such, within parliament – especially from within the Committee on Foreign Relations – Lega MPs sought support among all political parties in the Chamber of Deputies.

But timing for an Armenian Genocide recognition also proved favourable for the other ruling party, the M5S. Often characterised as ideologically ‘eclectic’ or ‘hybrid’ (Coticchia and Vignoli 2020; Mosca and Tronconi 2021), the M5S does not boast a particularly consistent set of policies. Founded in 2009 by an Italian comedian, Beppe Grillo, it arose, in large part, as a reactionary party – that is, in response to both Italy’s centre-right and centre-left. For this reason, M5S party members sometimes self-identify as ‘post-ideological’ or ‘neither right nor left’ (Caiani and Graziano 2016; Musso and Maccaferri 2018; Mosca and Tronconi 2021). While reactionary politics might have helped propel the party into power, the array of policies supported and/or opposed by M5S very likely led, in some part, to a significant fracture shortly after its meteoric rise to prominence, with party leader Luigi Di Maio (and several others) leaving and forming a new group. By 2022, the M5S had lost 17.3% of its votes and dropped (from first) to third overall (Chiaramonte, Maggini, and Paparo 2022). Nevertheless, in 2018–2019, the incipient and ill-defined nature of the M5S proved important for the Armenian Genocide recognition. As several MPs noted in our discussions, the M5S had not formed a clearly defined political identity and lacked ties with other countries, which might complicate their interests on the topic of recognition. Former M5S party member and MP, Alvise Maniero,⁷ told me the following:

I think in that phase, the Five Star Movement was still quite free to express this position, which is, I think, the humane position – how could you not recognise a genocide? After that, in my opinion, I perceived a growing influence of energy [sic] policies, connection with Azerbaijan, and also relations with Turkey, in the outcome of Five Star Movement decisions in my political opinion. So, after that, I think it would have been a little different.

According to Maniero, timing played an important role in the passing of the recognition because, at that point, the M5S had not yet developed a clear agenda or ties to other state governments. According to Maniero, M5S MPs pursued the recognition for humanitarian reasons (‘the humane position’).⁸ Maniero’s assessment of the M5S MPs’ motivations, as distinct from those in the Lega, corroborates what scholars have noted regarding the party’s international outlook (Coticchia and Vignoli 2020; Mosca and Tronconi 2021).

Still, as developed further in the next section of this analysis, memory operates as an instrument for parties across the political spectrum. This proved true for M5S MPs, as well. In addition to the motivations of timing, party identity, and humanitarianism, Maniero also noted to me that the recognition had, for him, some larger geopolitical implications:

I believe that we should support the Armenian cause as it holds a strategic position in the Caucasus. It could pose an expensive obstacle to the Pan-Turkish influence agenda, spanning without interruption to the east from Turkey to Azerbaijan (or even Turkmenistan, enveloping the Caspian Sea and its resources). An unopposed Turkish influence in that region, on the other hand, would allow Turkey to project even more assets to the Mediterranean Sea (Cyprus-Greece area and underwater fossil resources), north Africa (i.e., Lybia) and the Balkans (i.e., Albania), causing even more instability for my country (Italy) and further limiting our access to resources in the Mediterranean Sea and North Africa.

In addition to a personal desire to recognise the Armenian Genocide, Maniero identified geopolitical considerations underlying his support. By aligning himself with Armenian-related causes, he saw a way to oppose, even if in some small way, Turkey’s regional influence, which, for Maniero, is proving increasingly disruptive for Italy by limiting its ‘access to resources in the Mediterranean Sea and North Africa’. As such, for Maneiro, the recognition of the Armenian Genocide proved to be one way to counter Turkey’s influence in the region.⁹

Formentini and Maniero’s comments reflect how memory laws operate as instruments for diverse MPs. The contentious parliamentary speeches Italian MPs gave – largely in support of the Armenian Genocide recognition – demonstrate how memory narratives also operate in political actors’ conflicting efforts to influence perceptions, policies, and behaviours. These speeches thus manifest the embedded war that resulted from Italian MPs’ largely ‘unified’ support of recognition.

An embedded memory war: Italy’s 2019 Armenian Genocide recognition

Although the 2019 recognition received nearly unanimous support, parliamentary speeches reveal that MPs from across Italy’s political spectrum pursued this memory law for different and openly opposing reasons. Parliamentary speeches in support of the recognition show how MPs attempted to delegitimise one another’s views and policies. In the process, they also projected their own values and goals. For different actors, Armenian Genocide memory acted as an instrument through which they could communicate their own competing narratives about what it means to be Italian or European. In other words, Armenian Genocide memory proved a useful vehicle through which to participate in an embedded memory war.

Similar to memory laws related to other crimes against humanity, right-wing populists appropriate and instrumentalise Armenian Genocide memory to create a space to pursue their own agendas (Fittante 2022; 2023b). In Europe, many actors use memory narratives about the Second World War to exculpate titular nationalities and create a platform to condemn the crimes of communism (Subotić 2019b). Similarly, Armenian Genocide memory narratives often provide MPs the space to the debate various issues, including the roles of Turkey and Muslims in Europe (Fittante 2023a). In Italy, right-leaning MPs instrumentalised Armenian Genocide memory to build lexical walls between Europe and the Middle East, positioning Turkey firmly in the latter. For example, the motion’s author, Paolo Formentinti (Lega), provided the following rationale in his parliamentary speech:

I was saying a battle of the Lega, but a battle of a whole people, the Italian people, an Italian people who have known the tragedy of the sinkholes, who have known the exodus (Applause from the deputies of the Lega-Salvini Premier group), and who therefore may not be close to the Armenian people. That martyrdom, made up of great marches, marches in which children, women, rapes, robberies died; those marches arrived in the Syriac desert, in Deir el-Zor. That Deir el-Zor which was later unfortunately violated: a place of memory, a symbolic place, where until today, until recently, in 2014 to be exact, the black flag of ISIS waved. That cloth which, with the contribution of many groups in this Parliament, we are helping to tear up today (Applause from the deputies of the Lega- Salvini Premier group): because history - we are intimately convinced of this - cannot be erased, history really must be that historia magistra vitae of the Latins.¹⁰

For Formentini, as well as for several other MPs from the Lega, recognising the Armenian Genocide was considered an effective way to confront and combat Islamic extremism (‘the black flag of ISIS’). Through this framing, the history of the Armenian Genocide serves as a lesson (‘history - we are intimately convinced of this - cannot be erased’) for shaping the appropriate response to extremist groups. Formentini’s speech geographically connects the history of the Armenian Genocide to contemporary events by referencing the Syrian deserts of Deir el-Zor, where hundreds of thousands of Armenians were sent on death marches.¹¹ This parallel creates continuity between the two events and their perpetuators, conditions a particular response and generates a moral imperative. In this framing, recognising the Armenian Genocide becomes synonymous with combating Islamic extremists (‘we are helping tear up today’).

Moreover, Formentini’s rhetoric emphasises the division between Italy/Europe (‘historia magistra vitae of the Latins’) and the Muslim world, including those who perpetuated the Armenian Genocide (‘a place of memory, a symbolic place, where until today, until recently, in 2014 to be exact, the black flag of ISIS waved’). This suggests that Formentini and other Lega MPs used the Armenian Genocide memory law to create a distinction between Italy (Europe) and Turkey/the Middle East by drawing misleading historical parallels.

Other MPs on the right, such as those from the right-wing populist party FdI (Baldini et al. 2022; Puleo and Piccolino 2022), also sought to distinguish Turkey from Italy and other European countries by drawing parallels with the Ottoman Empire. For example, Andrea Delmastro Delle Vedove stated the following:

I am proud to be in a parliament that has not submitted, I am proud that with this act we give truth and honour to the proud Armenian people but at the same time we tell the sultan that there are no Topkapi eunuchs here but proud representatives of the truth and of the Italian people (Applause from the deputies of the Fratelli d‘Italia group).And, then, I also want to thank those who, perhaps less enthusiastically than the Fratelli d‘Italia, have always raised the banner of the identity of the peoples and, therefore, also that of the identity of the proud Armenian people, have stood up and rejected the sender undue pressure, they denied the sender a sultan’s attitude who first summons us to Ankara and then crosses our palaces to make us deny a historical truth that the world has recognised. I thank those who essentially, together with the Fratelli d‘Italia, wanted to tell us that there is not just one of the eunuchs of Topkapi here because we will vote with conviction for the recognition of the Armenian Genocide, perpetrated treacherously, willingly and knowingly by Turkey one hundred years ago.¹²

In drawing historical parallels, Delmastro’s speech links the Armenian Genocide to Turkey’s ongoing denial (‘perpetrated treacherously, willingly and knowingly by Turkey one hundred years ago’). Furthermore, Delmastro criticised those who oppose recognition and kowtow to Turkey, referring to them as ‘Topkapi eunuchs’. This language shows a distinct reality from what scholars have noted on the topic of Turkish pressure (Mamigonian 2015; Der Matossian 2023) – it highlights that pressure can generate the opposite effect of what Turkish officials intended. For some Italian MPs, the pressure from Turkish officials to promote denialism created a feeling of indignation, which ultimately helped the recognition move forward. This pressure also provided Delmastro and others the opportunity to use Armenian Genocide recognition as a means to take a strong, oppositional stand against Turkey and its leadership (‘we tell the sultan’) – notably, the Turkish president, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, whom scholars consistently characterise as ‘(competitive) authoritarian’ and/or ‘populist’ (Esen and Gumuscu 2016; Akkoyunlu and Öktem 2018; Elçi 2019; Bechev 2022).

The parts of the speeches quoted reflect different emphases: Formentini drew historical parallels to essentialise Muslims, while Delmastro antagonised Turkey (and MPs who support Turkey) because of the pressure it asserted leading up to the recognition (and elsewhere). While Delmastro obliquely criticised some Italian MPs (‘perhaps less enthusiastically than the Fratelli d‘Italia’), other right-wing MPs engaged in the embedded memory war more directly.

For example, some MPs articulated unveiled criticism of the coalition government’s anti-EU initiatives. Federico Mollicone (FdI) argued the following:

In recent months, Italy has had anti-Western hesitations, applauding regimes contrary to freedom, which oppose minorities. Any reference to the thunderous applause for the Italy-China memorandum is not accidental. Proponents of Grillina’s faith motion clap their hands against Xi Jinping, who discriminates and persecutes Uyghurs and Tibetans, imposes repressive policies on freedom of expression and movement, jails dissidents…This motion, although not concerning any commercial or economic activity, is a small step towards confirming Italy’s position in the western camp, in the defence of freedom and minorities. Memory is identity, identity is history, a living history like that of the proud Armenian people.¹³

During his speech, Mollicone took direct aim at the coalition government for a memorandum it had signed with China (Andornino 2023). He criticised other Italian MPs for supporting authoritarian regimes in Turkey and China and asserted that Italy belongs firmly in ‘the western camp’. Interestingly, one of the main targets of this part of Mollicone’s speech was the Lega, another right-wing party in Italy. Mollicone’s speech is consistent with what scholars have noted regarding the FdI’s political positioning – specifically, promoting cooperation with Europe (Baldini et al. 2022). For Mollicone, recognising the Armenian Genocide was one ‘symbolic’ way to push back against the coalition government’s more Eurosceptical orientation. In supporting the recognition, he emphasised the significance of reasserting that Italy belongs in Europe. For Mollicone, supporting Armenian Genocide recognition was a strategic tool to counter another right-wing party’s foreign policy initiatives and make a statement about Italy’s political identity (‘Memory is identity, identity is history, a living history’). While Mollicone’s party supported the recognition, he put forward a rationale to do so that was directly opposed to those argued by other MPs. Thus, for some Italian right-wing MPs, Armenian Genocide recognition provided a platform to debate foreign policy and Italy’s role in the West (or Europe).

Italy’s 2019 parliamentary speeches reveal distinct memory conflicts (or embedded memory wars) among right-wing MPs. However, more left-leaning actors also instrumentalised Armenian Genocide memory to debate foreign policy and European integration concerning Turkey. For example, then LeU MP and former President of the Chamber of Deputies, Laura Boldrini,¹⁴ emphasised the important role Turkey plays in contemporary Europe and, contrary to those from right-leaning parties, sought to cultivate Italy’s relationship with the Turkish people:

This means genocide, nothing more than this: it is the extreme consequence of ethnic hatred, of exasperated nationalism, of the desire to overwhelm, to annihilate. Destroy someone because he is different from you, because he is different from me and because he was chosen as a scapegoat by the makers of terror. And so recognising the Armenian genocide is not a hostile act towards the Turkish people. I want to say this clearly in this house: it is not a hostile act towards the Turkish people, a people who are friends of the Italians, who are demonstrating in recent weeks also desire for change and attachment to the values of freedom and democracy[;] on the contrary, Madam President, this recognition is a message of friendship and peace at a time when unfortunately the word of weapons spreads too easily among many, too many countries and it is for this reason that the Liberi e Uguali group will vote in favour of this motion.¹⁵

Boldrini’s speech emphasises that Genocide recognition is not an indictment of Turkey. Rather, as articulated above, recognition is an act of solidarity with and friendship towards the Turkish people (‘this recognition is a message of friendship and peace’). Perhaps strategically, Boldrini emphasised the Turkish people rather than the Turkish government. Nonetheless, her speech praises the people’s advancements towards democratic values (‘desire for change and attachment to the values of freedom and democracy’). In this way, Boldrini’s rhetoric – also in support of Armenian Genocide recognition – indirectly counters the views of the previously mentioned MPs by situating Turkey within Europe. Thus, Armenian Genocide recognition becomes an instrument to foster the political relationship between Italy and Turkey by facilitating democratisation. In this framing, the Turkish people possess values similar to those of Europeans (‘desire for change and attachment to the values of freedom and democracy’); hence, her speech seeks to align Turkey and Europe. Boldrini’s approach to Turkey significantly differs from those of right-wing populists. Her use of Armenian Genocide recognition to cultivate ties with, and encourage democratisation in, Turkey reflects the instrumental nature of memory, even among left-leaning political actors. In contrast to right-wing populists’ instrumentalisation, Boldrini’s speech highlights a different use of memory laws; however, other left-leaning MPs participated in the embedded memory war even more directly.

For example, PD MP Andrea Romano argued that recognising the Armenian Genocide serves to fight against the discrimination and ethnonationalism pursued by right-wing actors:

Why does this factor concern us, dear colleagues? Aren’t we dealing with tragic events that took place more than a century ago, in a country far from us? This is not the case, because that factor, that causal factor - ethnonationalism - concerns us insofar as Italian politics in this precise historical period (the period that we are all experiencing, even in this parliament), has seen the powerful return of the ethnonationalism as an instrument of internal and international political struggle. So it is our duty, as we discuss together, across the board, the tragedy of the Armenian genocide, to recall the risks of ethnonationalism, that is, the dangers that derive not only from the claim to place an ethnic and religious group above other ethnic and religious groups, but especially the dangers that arise from the goal of ethnic and religious homogeneity, where minorities exist, because that goal - the goal of homogeneity, the ethnonationalistic goal - can only be achieved through different degrees of intolerance, oppression and, often, violence.¹⁶

In the parliamentary session, Romano noted how Armenian Genocide recognition operates as an instrument to combat the very values many right-leaning MPs use to support the same initiative (‘the period that we are all experiencing, even in this parliament’). Romano’s speech challenges his colleagues’ ethnonationalism and inverts their logic (‘the goal of homogeneity, the ethno-nationalistic goal - can only be achieved through different degrees of intolerance, oppression and, often, violence’). In this articulation, the Armenian Genocide serves as a lesson on avoiding the tendencies that right-wing populists are promoting in supporting the same memory law. This part of Romano’s speech is anchored in the present moment in Italy and Europe more generally (‘Italian politics in this precise historical period’). His speech focuses on the dangers of targeting groups on the basis of their ethnicity and religion – a danger, he noted, is unfolding in Italy. As such, Romano used Armenian Genocide memory as an instrument to combat democratic backsliding or illiberal tendencies, which right-wing populists pursued while promoting the same memory law. These narratives and counter-narratives (between actors on both the right and left) reflect the embedded memory wars occurring in the promotion of individual memory laws. In supporting the same memory law, Romano and other left-leaning MPs instrumentalised Armenian Genocide memory to promote multiculturalism in Italy and counter right-wing MPs’ more nativist or ethnonationalist agendas.

Still, it is worth noting that not all of Italy’s MPs voted in favour of the recognition. MPs from the centre-right party, FI, abstained. They also participated in this memory war over Armenian Genocide recognition. Although they did not vote in favour of the recognition, their speeches reveal yet another dimension of the instrumentalisation of memory. For example, FI MP Andrea Orsini gave a speech in which he said the following:

In recent years, Europe has lost a great opportunity with Turkey, which was trying to enter the European Union. We rejected them due to the short-sightedness of some European governments and, in doing so, we pushed Turkey towards our enemies, towards fundamentalist Islamism. But this is not an irreversible process. The historic ties in the Atlantic Alliance, the intelligent empiricism of President Erdoğan make him an interlocutor, certainly not an enemy. This is why we do not understand the need to use the Armenian question today, the just Armenian question, as a political instrument with an anti-Turkish function or for sovereign propaganda. The Italian Parliament has already said what it had to say on this issue since 2000; why, today, is there a need for another statement?¹⁷

Distinct from the critical positions put forward by right-wing MPs on the topic of Turkey, Orsini argued that Europeans had made a mistake by not engaging Turkey (‘Europe has lost a great opportunity’). Rather than following the right-wing actors’ tendency to conflate Turkish denialism with Islamic extremism, Orsini blamed European governments for pushing Turkey toward ‘fundamentalist Islamism’ (‘Turkey towards our enemies, towards fundamentalist Islamism’). In his speech, Orsini contended that it would be more prudent to bring Turkey back into discussions of European membership (‘but it is not an irreversible process’).

FI has long maintained positive ties with Turkey, partly due to the close relationship between the party’s founder and former Prime Minister of Italy, Silvio Berlusconi, and Erdoğan (Kesgin 2020). Several MPs I interviewed mentioned the relationship between the party/Berlusconi and Turkey/Erdoğan to explain why FI MPs most likely abstained. This positive relationship is evident in Orsini’s speech as well. Unlike Boldrini’s speech, which focuses on democratisation and the Turkish people, or Delmastro’s speech, which indicts Turkish leadership and its supporters, Orsini’s rhetoric praises Erdoğan’s style of leadership and relationship to the West (‘the intelligent empiricism of President Erdoğan make him an interlocutor, certainly not an enemy’). He also lauded Turkey’s historical and contemporary role in Western organisations (‘the historic ties in the Atlantic Alliance’). Furthermore, Orsini criticised the resolution not only because the Armenian Genocide had already been recognised (‘Italian Parliament has already said what it had to say on this issue since 2000’) but also because its recognition was being used as an instrument (‘a political instrument with an anti-Turkish function’). Orsini’s rhetorical position does not necessarily reject the Armenian Genocide recognition; rather, it denounces its instrumentalisation.¹⁸ Still, despite this denunciation, Orsini himself used the debates to express a favourable opinion of and counter other MPs’ positions on Turkey/Erdoğan – that is, to participate in the embedded memory war (albeit not in support of the recognition).

Discussion

Drawing on Italy’s 2019 recognition of the Armenian Genocide, this article demonstrates that the process of creating and passing a memory law is sometimes achieved through an embedded memory war. These wars pit different actors against one another, using the past to validate their specific interpretations of the political present. In the case of Italy’s 2019 parliamentary recognition of the Armenian Genocide (which saw abstentions but no dissenting votes), a debate arose about who belongs in Europe and what it means to be European (or Italian). Right-wing MPs sought to create a divide between Europeans and Turks/Muslims, whereas left-wing MPs sought to acknowledge the progress Turkish people have made and criticised their colleagues’ intolerance of religious minorities.

Most of the MPs agreed that the Italian Parliament should recognise the Armenian Genocide. However, behind this apparent consensus was a contest about policy and identity. MPs instrumentalised Armenian Genocide memory to craft their own narratives and promote distinct versions of foreign policy for Italy, concerning not only Turkey but also Europe, Russia, and China. Even among MPs on the same sides of the political spectrum, there existed considerable differences and conflicts in their efforts to project distinct values and objectives. Thus, the instrumentalisation of Armenian Genocide memory – in Italy as elsewhere – captures the political nature of memory laws for all those who support them (as well as those who reject or abstain from voting in favour of them).

Scholars have explored the memory wars of right-wing populists, who pursue illiberal policies or whitewash narratives about the past (Subotić 2019b; Belavusau et al. 2021; Koposov 2022). However, memory laws are inherently political (and controversial), even for centre and left-wing actors. As such, this analysis seeks to broaden the existing scholarship by examining the strategies of actors across the political spectrum in their efforts to shape perceptions by instrumentalising memory. As this article has shown, memory laws are not merely the ‘hard currency’ of populists (Koposov 2022); rather, as Romano’s speech reflects, they also serve as instruments for left-leaning actors to fight against these populists and pursue several other strategic ends.

This analysis invites further research on embedded memory wars. For example, this study has focused on one specific memory law in Italy. Scholars should build on this research by examining various other strategic uses of memory in Europe and elsewhere. Additionally, I have focused largely on parliamentary speeches. However, embedded memory wars also occur in the wording of motions. In Italy, Formentini from the Lega was the first signatory of the motion ultimately voted on and passed.¹⁹ However, MPs from other parties submitted separate motions. For example, MPs from the right-wing populist party, FdI, and centre-right party, FI, put forward their own motions.²⁰ The specific wording of these motions reveals interesting compromises. These compromises have been noted in Holocaust-related legislation in Baltic and Eastern European contexts (Fittante 2023c). I contend that these are also important, understudied aspects of memory wars. Future scholarship should examine the specific wording of memory laws and their competing motions.

In addition, this analysis offers some broader conceptual contributions. It builds on research that has unpacked the fraught role of memory politics in the unification of post-Second World War Europe (Sierp 2014; Subotić 2019b). In Europe’s increasingly polarised political arena, Armenian Genocide memory politics – similar to Holocaust-related memory politics – often embodies evolving dynamics. As with Holocaust memory laws, Armenian Genocide recognition debates typically involve appropriation and instrumentalisation by a wide range of political actors who pursue radically different values and goals for Europe. Scholars have noted the significant ways in which the perception of political polarisation functions to mobilise and even create supporters (Baldassarri and Bearman 2007; Hemmer 2016; McCoy et al. 2018).²¹ Memory laws have not been directly connected to this scholarship. However, I argue that they frequently operate, at least in Europe, as important tools in achieving these ends. Similarly, embedded memory wars show that there are important parallels between memory and strategic narratives (Miskimmon, Ben, and Roselle 2014; Dimitriu and de Graaf 2016). Even though scholars do not typically study memory wars (or memory narratives) as strategic narratives, there is considerable overlap. Future scholarship should continue investigating the diverse functions of memory laws, not only in driving actors’ efforts to cultivate polarisation but also as strategic narratives that serve to shape behaviours and perceptions.

As discussed in this analysis, memory law projects can lead to duelling alliances between opposed actors, who draw from the past in their competing efforts to define the political present. Scholars should examine other ways in which memory laws articulate these evolving dynamics across Europe and elsewhere. For example, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has reconfigured the geopolitical landscape far beyond Europe. Memory laws that have passed or will pass in the aftermath of Russia’s invasion will likely incorporate new objectives and ambitions. Future research can adopt a more constructivist and discursive approach not only to understand the contexts out of which memory laws have already passed, but also to examine those that are in process, such as those related to Holodomor in Ukraine (Zhurzhenko 2011; Soroka and Krawatzek 2019). These dynamics will almost certainly reveal new positions among MPs from different political parties. By developing embedded memory wars research, scholars can unpack the diverse motivations behind the polyphonic instrumentalisation of memory.

Grants from the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation and the National Association for Armenian Studies and Research made doing the fieldwork for this article possible.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s)

Additional information

Funding

This research was supported by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation and the National Association for Armenian Studies and Research.

Notes on contributors

Daniel Fittante

Daniel Fittante is a postdoctoral researcher in the Swedish School of Social Science at the University of Helsinki. Email: [email protected]

Notes

1 In this analysis, I consistently refer to ‘right-wing populists’; however, in Europe, parties characterised as ‘extreme right’, ‘radical right’, or ‘far right’ (Mudde 2019; Pirro 2023) also instrumentalise Armenian Genocide memory (Fittante 2023a).

2 At the supranational level, too, members of the European Parliament acknowledged the Armenian Genocide in a 1987 resolution. The 1987 resolution also introduced Armenian Genocide recognition as a precondition for Turkey’s accession to the European Union (EU). Armenian Genocide recognition as a precondition recurred in EU discussions with Turkey from the late 1980s until the early 2000s. For additional background on Armenian Genocide recognition as a precondition for Turkey’s EU accession, see Jennifer M. Dixon’s book, Dark Pasts: Changing the State’s Story in Turkey and Japan (2018).

3 MPs from the centre-right party, Forza Italia, abstained from the vote.

4 Qualifying this argument, Lucksted notes that Germany did not come to an all-out ban until 1994.

5 Such as those established in Austria (1992), Belgium (1995), Spain (1995), and Switzerland (1995).

6 It is also the case that, for some right-wing populists, instrumental factors are not always their exclusive motivations. In some cases, social relations also play an important role. For example, the chairperson of the Italy-Armenia Friendship Group, Lega MP Giulio Centemero, whose wife is Armenian, is a strong supporter of Armenian-related initiatives. Beyond instrumental considerations, he seemed, to me, to manifest a genuine interest in various matters related to Armenia. Interestingly, the Lega Nord MP, Giancarlo Pagliarini, who spearheaded Italy’s first parliamentary recognition (2000), was also married to an Armenian; she passed away in 2021. Her parents were Armenian Genocide survivors.

7 Maniero (as with many other former M5S party members) was forced out of the party for opposing the Draghi government, which held office between February 2021 and October 2022. For more information about this government and its resulting fallout, see ‘Super Mario 2: Comparing the technocrat-led Monti and Draghi governments in Italy’ (Garzia and Karremans, 2021).

8 Some MPs also referred to the Armenians’ long history in Italy and their many cultural contributions as motivating factors. For more information about Armenians’ history in Italy, see Boghos Levon Zekiyan’s Gli Armeni in Italia (Zekiya) and Agop Manoukian’s Presenza armena in Italia, 1915-2000 (Manoukian 2014). In addition, Antonia Arlsan’s novel, La masseria delle allodole (2004), has helped spread awareness about the Armenian Genocide in Italy. Some MPs referred to Arslan’s novel and its impact in their parliamentary speeches (https://www.camera.it/leg18/410?idSeduta=0160&tipo=stenografico#sed0160.stenografico.tit00100).

9 For more information on Italy’s role in the Mediterranean, see Valter Coralluzzo’s article, Coralluzzo (2008).

10 For speech in Italian, see appendix quote 1.

11 Of Deir el-Zor, Armenian American author, Peter Balakian, has said, ‘a place that has come to embody perhaps what Auschwitz has come to mean to the history of the Holocaust’ (Black Dog Fate, Preface).

12 For speech in Italian, see appendix quote 2.

13 For speech in Italian, see appendix quote 3.

14 Boldrini subsequently joined the PD.

15 For speech in Italian, see appendix quote 4.

16 For speech in Italian, see appendix quote 5.

17 For speech in Italian, see appendix quote 6.

18 It is worth noting, too, that Orsini has proven to be a vocal supporter of other Armenian-related initiatives (for example, see the following report: https://www.1lurer.am/en/2023/09/20/Any-attempt-to-displace-Armenian-population-of-Nagorno-Karabakh-cannot-be-accepted-by-international/999710).

19 For the motion, see the following: https://aic.camera.it/aic/scheda.html?numero=1/00139&ramo=C&leg=18.

20 The unsuccessful motions appear online on the following websites: https://aic.camera.it/aic/scheda.html?numero=1/00173&ramo=C&leg=18 (FdI) and https://aic.camera.it/aic/scheda.html?numero=1/00172&ramo=C&leg=18 (FI).

21 For a review of different types of political polarisation, see ‘Putting polarization in perspective’ (Hetherington 2009); ‘“I disrespectfully agree”: The differential effects of partisan sorting on social and issue polarization’ (Mason 2015).

Appendix

1. ‘Dicevo una battaglia della Lega, ma una battaglia di tutto un popolo, il popolo italiano, un popolo italiano che ha conosciuto la tragedia delle foibe, ha conosciuto l’esodo (Applausi dei deputati del gruppo Lega-Salvini Premier), e che quindi non può non essere vicino al popolo armeno. Quel martirio, fatto di grandi marce, marce in cui morivano bambini, donne, stupri, ruberie; quelle marce arrivavano nel deserto siriaco, a Deir el-Zor. Quella Deir el-Zor che poi purtroppo è stata violata: luogo della memoria, luogo simbolico, laddove fino ad oggi, fino ad anni recenti, nel 2014 per l’esattezza, sventolava il drappo nero dell’ISIS. Quel drappo che con il contributo di tanti gruppi di questo Parlamento, oggi noi contribuiamo a stracciare (Applausi dei deputati del gruppo Lega-Salvini Premier): perché la storia - ne siamo intimamente convinti - non si cancella, la storia davvero dev’essere quell’historia magistra vitae dei latini’ (https://www.camera.it/leg18/410?idSeduta=0160&tipo=stenografico#sed0160.stenografico.tit00100).

2. ‘Sono fiero di essere in un Parlamento che non si è sottomesso, sono fiero che con quest’atto rendiamo verità e onore al fiero popolo armeno ma che nel contempo raccontiamo al sultano che qui dentro non ci sono gli eunuchi del Topkapi ma fieri rappresentanti della verità e del popolo italiano (Applausi dei deputati del gruppo Fratelli d’Italia)./E, allora, io voglio ringraziare anche coloro che, magari meno entusiasticamente di Fratelli d’Italia che ha sempre raccolto la bandiera delle identità dei popoli e, quindi, anche quella dell’identità del fiero popolo armeno, hanno retto e hanno respinto al mittente indebite pressioni, hanno respinto al mittente un atteggiamento da sultano che prima ci convoca ad Ankara e poi varca i nostri palazzi per farci negare una verità storica che il mondo ha riconosciuto. Ringrazio coloro che sostanzialmente, unitamente a Fratelli d’Italia, hanno voluto raccontare che qui dentro degli eunuchi del Topkapi non ve n’è uno solo perché voteremo convintamente per il riconoscimento del genocidio armeno, perpetrato proditoriamente, con volontà e scientemente dalla Turchia cento anni fa’ (https://www.camera.it/leg18/410?idSeduta=0160&tipo=stenografico#sed0160.stenografico.tit00100).

3. ‘Negli ultimi mesi l’Italia ha avuto tentennamenti antioccidentali, plaudendo a regimi contrari alla libertà, che contrastano le minoranze. Ogni riferimento agli scroscianti applausi verso il memorandum Italia-Cina non è casuale. I proponenti della mozione di fede grillina battono le mani a Xi Jinping, che discrimina e perseguita gli uiguri e i tibetani, impone politiche repressive della libertà di espressione e di movimento, incarcera i dissidenti…Questa mozione, seppure non riguardante nessuna attività commerciale ed economica, è un piccolo passo verso la conferma della collocazione dell’Italia nel campo occidentale, nella difesa della libertà e delle minoranze. La memoria è identità, l’identità è storia, storia viva come quella del fiero popolo armeno’ (https://www.camera.it/leg18/410?idSeduta=0158&tipo=stenografico#sed0158.stenografico.tit00020).

4. ‘Questo vuol dire genocidio, nient’altro che questo: è la conseguenza estrema dell’odio etnico, del nazionalismo esasperato, della volontà di sopraffazione, di annientamento. Annientare qualcuno perché è diverso da te, perché è diverso da me e perché è stato scelto come capro espiatorio dai fabbricanti di terrore. E allora riconoscere il genocidio degli armeni non è un atto ostile verso il popolo turco, lo voglio dire con chiarezza in quest’Aula: non è un atto ostile verso il popolo turco, un popolo amico degli italiani, che sta dimostrando nelle ultime settimane anche volontà di cambiamento di attaccamento ai valori di libertà e di democrazia, è al contrario, signora Presidente, questo riconoscimento, è un messaggio di amicizia e di pace in un momento in cui purtroppo la voce delle armi si diffonde con troppa facilità in tanti, troppi Paesi ed è per questa ragione che il gruppo di Liberi e Uguali voterà a favore di questa mozione’ (https://www.camera.it/leg18/410?idSeduta=0160&tipo=stenografico#sed0160.stenografico.tit00100).

5. ‘Perché questo fattore ci riguarda, cari colleghi? Non si tratta forse di fatti tragici avvenuti più di un secolo fa, in un Paese lontano da noi? Non è così, perché quel fattore, quel fattore causale - l’etnonazionalismo - ci riguarda in quanto la politica italiana di questo preciso periodo storico (il periodo che noi tutti stiamo vivendo, anche in questo Parlamento), ha visto il potente ritorno dell’etnonazionalismo come strumento di lotta politica interna e internazionale. Allora, è nostro dovere, mentre discutiamo insieme, trasversalmente, la tragedia del genocidio degli armeni, ricordare i rischi dell’etnonazionalismo, ovvero i pericoli che derivano non solo dalla pretesa di porre un gruppo etnico e religioso sopra altri gruppi etnici e religiosi, ma soprattutto i pericoli che derivano dall’obiettivo dell’omogeneità etnica e religiosa, laddove esistono minoranze, perché quell’obiettivo - l’obiettivo dell’omogeneità, l’obiettivo etnonazionalistico - non può che essere raggiunto attraverso gradi diversi di intolleranza, sopraffazione e, spesso, violenza.’ (https://www.camera.it/leg18/410?idSeduta=0158&tipo=stenografico#sed0158.stenografico.tit00020).

6. ‘L’Europa, negli anni scorsi, ha perso una grande occasione nei confronti della Turchia, che provava ad affacciarsi all’Unione europea; li abbiamo respinti per la miopia di alcuni Governi europei e, così facendo, abbiamo spinto la Turchia verso i nostri nemici, verso l’islamismo integralista; ma non è un processo irreversibile, gli storici legami nell’Alleanza atlantica, l’intelligente empirismo del Presidente Erdoğan lo rendono un interlocutore, non certo un nemico./Per questo noi non comprendiamo la necessità di usare oggi la questione armena, la giusta questione armena, come strumento politico in funzione antiturca o di propaganda sovranista. Il Parlamento italiano ha già detto quello che doveva dire su questo tema fin dal 2000; perché, oggi, c’è bisogno di un’altra pronuncia?’ (https://www.camera.it/leg18/410?idSeduta=0160&tipo=stenografico#sed0160.stenografico.tit00100