Conflicting Principles in the Organisation of Aid Policy for Political Purposes: A Case Study of the European Union's Mediterranean Aid

Abstract

This paper applies concepts from organisational theory to the use of aid as a public policy instrument. It does this through isolating two key principles, organisational cohesion and organisational intelligence. Organisational cohesion refers to the degree of unity of purpose and strategic leadership of an aid agency. Organisational intelligence refers to an entity's ability to manage knowledge and learning within its system. These two principles, organisational cohesion and organisational intelligence, need not automatically conflict, but in practice this is likely. A case study is made here of the EU's MEDA programme, which has the ‘political’ objective of supporting transition in neighbouring Mediterranean states. This analysis argues that the increased cohesion (political leadership) of aid policy has not helped cultivate organisational intelligence in the deeper sense of the term. The tension between these principles is not likely to fade through any new policy initiatives or organisational revamps.

Cet article applique des concepts provenant de la théorie des organisations à l'étude de l'utilisation de l'aide en tant qu'instrument de politique publique. Pour ce faire, l'auteur utilise le principe de cohésion organisationnelle et celui d'intelligence organisationnelle. La cohésion organisationnelle correspond au degré d'unité et de direction stratégique d'une entité. L'intelligence organisationnelle concerne la capacité d'une organisation à profiter des connaissances et des informations disponibles et à les gérer. Ces deux principes ne sont pas nécessairement contradictoires bien que le risque soit réel. L'étude de cas présentée ici porte sur le programme MEDA de l'UE, qui a pour objectif ’politique’ de soutenir le processus de transition des pays méditerranéens voisins. Cette analyse fait le constat qu'une amélioration de la cohésion (au niveau des dirigeants) de la politique d'aide n'a pas développé l'intelligence organisationnelle. Cette tension entre les deux principes ne disparaîtra pas du seul fait d'une quelconque initiative politique ou réforme organisationnelle.

Notes

 1. This includes 24 interviews with European Union officials in the External Relations directorate, other relevant units in Brussels and Country Delegations, as well as 16 interviews with other parties (including member state government officials, partner government officials and European and Arab NGOs).

 2. This perspective has been taken by a variety of scholars from different perspectives (Galtung, 1973; Ginsberg, 1989) even before ‘external relations’ had become explicitly politicised by the EU.

 3. Including the internal structures of third countries.

 4. The French acronym stands for aid for economic restructuring in Poland and Hungary (the original recipients.

 5. In the case of MEDA, the relevant countries for the period in question are Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and to a lesser extent Turkey. The Palestinian Authority is also a recipient.

 6. Throughout the EU as an aid donor is described as an organisation rather than an institution. This is because the focus here is on its capacity to perform a certain task – which fits in with the standard definition of an organisation (Bedeian and Zamnuto, 1991) – rather than its broader characteristics.

 7. This discussion of the EU, as with the article in general, focuses on EU level (Brussels managed) aid and does not explore the quality of cooperation with autonomous member state agencies. In other words, it focuses on vertical (internal) cohesion and coherence rather than horizontal coherence (Tietje, 1997).

 8. The External Relations and Development DG. See Figure 1.

 9. This, to an extent, involves assuming that entities such as the Commission and national governments can be said to have interests. This is a necessary assumption for policy driven research such as this, but it is further tested in the course of the research.

10. And indeed in private sector or other public institutions.

11. This is summarising somewhat Coombes' argument but the key principle of conflicting functions and organisational form is what is important in this case.

12. The level of ‘implementation’ in terms of actual funding of projects and day to day management of activities funded is not considered.

13. The NIPs written in 2004 were actually for two years (2005/6) as a new budgetary framework and aid programme is being established in 2006.

14. Comitology is the term used to describe the various member state committees used to monitor and control (to a varying degree) Commission policy in areas where it has been given responsibility.

15. Summaries of these meetings are publicly available (Secretariat General, 2004a–d).

16. For example, states strategically important to member states, such as Morocco and Egypt, receive high allocations.

17. Most famously it blocked Mediterranean aid to Syria and Morocco in 1992 over human rights issues (Monar, 1998: 57–8). This was under a previous Mediterranean aid system, however, and it cannot do this with MEDA.

18. When this task is fully devolved to the Delegations its role will become more ‘intellectual’; it will function as a source of advice and guidance for the Delegation (EuroMed, 2002).

19. Certain types of programmes, specifically direct budgetary support mechanisms, are still partly managed from Europeaid in Brussels.

20. There is one case of a programme being altered to take into account the wishes of the Delegation: this was for a human rights aid project in Morocco. In this case, however, the sum of money was small and the request was in tune with a general Brussels policy to focus more on human rights.

21. This includes the introduction of ‘activity based management’ and the controversial reform of the personnel system. Activity Based Management involves the altering of an organisation's financial system to allow for administrative costing to reflect the organisation's qualitative strategic priorities.

22. Two caveats must be made here. This cohesion and coherence is in terms of economic reform rather than ‘democracy promotion’. Also this refers to the EU system: member states retain their own autonomous aid policies, which are not highly coordinated at the strategic level.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Patrick Holden

Patrick Holden is Lecturer in International Relations, School of Sociology, Politics and Law, University of Plymouth, UK.The author would like to thank Professors Nicholas Rees and Bernadette Andreosso at the University of Limerick and Dr Stephen Dearden at Manchester Metropolitan University. Thanks are also due to the editor and the anonymous reviewers for their insights. The author is grateful to the following for financial support: The Irish Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences (2001–2004) and The European Commission (via a Marie Curie Research Fellowship at the Cambridge Programme for International Research on Europe 2004–2005).