Why Muslims join the Muslim wing of the RSS

ABSTRACT

The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) – the paramilitary corps that animates the contemporary Indian Hindu nationalist movement – increasingly relies on its Muslim wing to bolster its denials of extremism. The RSS claims hold that crowds of Muslims join its Muslim wing, the Muslim Rashtriya Manch, through organic nationalist awakenings that imply tacit acceptance of the RSS’ Hindu nationalist agenda. Based on a year of interview-based research in North and West India with more than 80 Manch members, defectors, critics and leaders, I provide empirical evidence that challenges the claim that the RSS is winning over Muslim minds. Instead, I suggest that Muslims join for largely instrumental reasons; for material reward and security, but also to rebuke traditional Muslim centres of power and to draw close to the charismatic leadership of Manch leader Indresh Kumar. While discussions of motivations are famously fraught, I rely on interviews not to conclusively list membership motivations, but to assess the claims made by the RSS. As Hindu nationalists consolidate and intensify their activities after the 2019 general election, understanding how the RSS does or does not ‘win over’ India’s Muslim communities is necessary groundwork to address the position of minorities in a Hindu nationalist future.

KEYWORDS:

• Hindu nationalism
• Indian Muslims
• ethnic conflict
• ethnic nationalism

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 The RSS has floated a small number of minority outfits in the past; the Rashtriya Sikh Sangat, the Rashtriya Isai Mahasangh and the Sarvapanth Samadar Manch. The only one active is the Rashtriya Sikh Sangat which operates a tiny clandestine network. Comparison between these membership motivations in these groups would be a useful topic for further research but is beyond the scope of this paper, particularly considering the unique position Muslims hold in Hindu nationalist imaginaries (Vanaik 2017).

2 For a more detailed exploration of the Manch’s organisational structure see Andersen and Damle (2018, 92–106).

3 All translations from Hindi to English are my own. Accordingly, so are any translation errors.

4 For more on male ashraf institutional domination see Alam (2009, 175–176).

5 For example, there is not one Shi’a in the Delhi pradesh convening committee, the Manch’s strongest. The belief of Shi’a dominance in the Manch is drawn from the perception of generalised Shi’a support for the BJP, largely evidenced from the close relationship between Lucknow’s Shi’a clergy and the BJP’s A B Vajpayee and Rajnath Singh, who both contested from Lucknow. Hindutva-sympathetic Shi’a groups are not uncommon in North India. For example, the Indian Shia Awami League, Shia Gauraksha Dal, Hussaini Tigers and the Rashtriya Shia Samaj.

6 See additional accounts of members’ attraction to the Manch in Agha and Munshi (2018).

7 This account was denied by a representative from the Jamaat e Islami in Delhi during an interview. At the very least, accounts of the interactions between RSS and Jamaat activists during shared internment are contested. A more detailed account of the RSS’ account can be found in The People Versus the Emergency: A Saga of Struggle (Sahasrabuddhe 1991) published through the RSS-run Suruchi Prakashan in Jhandewalan, New Delhi.

8 In his media comments though, Kumar is usually significantly more aggressive. See for example when he blamed beef lynchings on Muslim victims of lynching (Indian Express 2018), or when he said that the entirety of Pakistan would be a part of India by 2025 (Financial Express 2019).

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Felix Pal

Felix Pal is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political and Social Change at the Australian National University and a Yale Fox International Fellow (2019–2020). His research focuses on minority participation in, and the organisational structure of, the contemporary Hindu nationalist movement in India.