Regulating HRM: the limits of regulatory pluralism

ABSTRACT

Ideas about regulatory pluralism provided an intellectual foundation for the post-1980s transformation in regulatory frameworks from predominantly state-centric regulation to a growing emphasis on the alternative regulations now abundant in HRM and IHRM. Regulatory pluralism, which maintains that a diversity of alternative regulatory institutions and tools provide more responsive, relevant and legitimate regulation than traditional state regulation, emerged alongside the political ascendancy of neoliberalism. Recent IHRM research on global supply chain regulation largely explains weaknesses in non-nation-state forms of regulation in terms of the relationships of power and commitment among stakeholders and other contextual factors. This article argues that the theory of regulatory pluralism, can contribute both to an understanding and critique of how the growing profusion of regulatory forms populating various HR functions impacts on the quality of HRM policy and practice. The article’s empirical focus is on the national setting, and in particular, regulatory frameworks applying to OHS management. We argue that a pluralist mix of regulators, often overlapping and competing, is less effective in achieving policy objectives and normative change in HRM, than traditional state-oriented regulation.

Keywords:

• Regulatory pluralism
• voluntary regulation
• occupational health and safety
• alternative regulation

Acknowledgement

The authors would like to express their immense gratitude to the Anonymous Referees and Editor for their generous and thoughtful advice in the development of this article.

Data disclosure statement

The research on which this paper is based contains data which is subject to a confidentiality with the Funding Body and is not available for open access.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interests was reported by the authors

Data availability statement

The data for this project is confidential to the Organisation which provided the grant for the research.

Notes

1 The RLSC (Scheme 1) was owned by the Australian Logistics Council (ALC), an industry lobby group (Although the RLSC has since been replaced by the Master Code, the ALC continues to organise auditing and accreditation); TruckSafe (Scheme 2) is administered by a corporate entity owned by the Australian Trucking Association; and the NHVAS (Scheme 3) operates under the Heavy Vehicle National Law (HVNL) Qld 2012 - Part 4 (ss 94-201) and Part 6 (ss.220-399), with certification a voluntary commitment.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by a research grant from the Transport Education Audit Compliance Health Organisation.