‘That's not philosophy’: feminism, academia and the double bind

Abstract

In this paper I explore the situation of feminist academics, positing a tension between the demands of feminist research and the norms of academia. Feminist research, I suggest, may be subject to de-legitimisation on the grounds of supposed lack of objectivity, to marginalisation from the main body of a discipline and to conceptual hostility when operating within the main body of a discipline. I then show that the situation of feminist academics can be conceptualised as a double bind: a set of circumstances in which an agent is given a set of competing demands, with no possibility of receiving clarification as to which demands to pursue. I argue that this interpretation of the situation of feminist academics is helpful because it prompts constructive ways of thinking. It encourages feminist academics to adopt a non-judgemental attitude towards ourselves and towards others, and it reminds us to fix our sights on long-term strategies. These suggestions in turn lead me to urge a renewed solidarity between feminists in academia. The form of solidarity I advocate is action based and inclusive, spanning disciplines, genders and research specialisms. Such solidarity can enable positive responses to the double bind facing feminist academics.

Keywords::

• feminism
• academia
• double bind
• austerity
• philosophy
• solidarity

Acknowledgements

Thanks to Beatrice Balfour, Lorna Finlayson, Raymond Geuss, Jenny Saul and Clare Walker Gore for helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper. I am grateful to the editors of this edition of the Journal of Gender Studies, Helen Davies and Claire O'Callaghan, and two anonymous reviewers of the journal, for their insightful and constructive feedback.

Notes

^1. For further discussion of this critique of objectivity, see also Pateman (1988), MacKinnon (1989), Collins (1990), Young (1990), Harding (2004).

^2. See Dotson (2012) for an interesting discussion of ways in which the borders of philosophy as a discipline are policed through what she calls ‘a culture of justification’, and the negative implications of this dynamic for the diversity of the profession.

^3. Cudd (2002) has further argued that this marginalisation is part of an ongoing backlash against feminism in philosophy – a hostile response from others in the field that is closing off opportunities for feminist philosophers to occupy ‘top and mainstream’ positions in academia (p. 13). Burgess-Jackson (2002) identifies three specific tactics by which this hostility is expressed: lack of charity towards feminist philosophy, application of double standards and bullying attitudes. These arguments are convincing, and the topic of backlash is an important one. I note, however, that my analysis, although compatible with the existence of a backlash, does not rely on any of the tensions I discuss being understood as products of a backlash.

^4. I also note the interesting argument advanced by Rooney (2011) concerning the potential benefits of at least one of the tensions that I have identified. Rooney interprets the situation of the feminist epistemologist within epistemology more broadly as conferring an ‘outsider within’ status (Collins 1990) that can yield distinctive epistemic benefits. Rooney's argument is convincing, and my focus here on the problematic aspects of these tensions should not be taken as a denial that they can also have productive implications.

^5. There will also be double binds that specifically affect women academics, as distinct from feminist academics. For example. Superson (2002, p. 105) describes an experience she had as a woman academic that can be understood as a double bind situation. Recounting an incident when she was ‘crudely ogled’ first as a job candidate and subsequently as a new member of staff, she notes: ‘Complaining would jeopardise my chances of getting the job and foreclose the opportunity to form collegial relations. Acquiescing, though, perpetuates the view that women are sex objects and not competitive workers.’ However she responds, then, Superson's standing as a professional philosopher is going to be undermined by the gender-based harassment she experiences in this situation.

^6. There are many existing initiatives concerning women's involvement in academia; see, for example, the Society for Women in Philosophy UK. See also Wylie (2011) for an excellent discussion of micro-level discrimination against women in academia (the ‘chilly climate’) in relation to feminist standpoint theory.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Arts and Humanities Research Council [grant number AH/K503289/1].

Notes on contributors

Katharine Jenkins

Katharine Jenkins is currently undertaking a Ph.D. in the Department of Philosophy at Sheffield University. Her doctoral research concerns the metaphysics of social identity categories such as gender and race, and the relationship of these categories to justice. She holds an M.Phil. in Philosophy from the University of Cambridge, where she also took her BA.