The ‘US Factor’ in the Satō Administration’s Diplomacy in the Indonesia-Malaysia Conflict, 1964-1966

ABSTRACT

Peace efforts to resolve the Indonesia-Malaysia conflict (1963–1966) became an important agenda in Japan’s Southeast Asia policy under Prime Minister (PM) Eisaku Satō. After a cautious start, the Satō government sought to create conditions for the Indonesians and Malaysians to end their armed confrontation (confrontation), which had become a source of destabilisation in Southeast Asia. Japan’s peace efforts began under PM Hayato Ikeda (1960–1964), marking the first time after World War II that Tokyo became involved in attempts to mediate a conflict. These endeavours were carried out in a region where mixed feelings lingered towards Japan for its wartime occupation. This paper investigates the factors that shaped the Satō administration’s engagement in efforts to resolve the confrontation and sheds light on how Japan’s relations with the United States (US) influenced its peace-making role – an aspect on which little has been written in previous studies. The findings indicate that considerations related to Japanese relations with the US were an important driver, although not the only one, of the Satō administration’s diplomatic initiatives to resolve the Indonesia-Malaysia armed confrontation. Furthermore, Japan’s peace efforts contributed to the US policy in Asia.

Efforts to resolve the Indonesia-Malaysia conflict (1963–1966) became an important agenda for Prime Minister (PM) Eisaku Satō and Japanese diplomacy in Southeast Asia. The Satō government, inaugurated in November 1964, actively sought to help Indonesia and Malaysia end their armed confrontation (‘confrontation’), a conflict that erupted as Indonesia opposed the establishment of the British-backed Federation of Malaysia in September 1963. This conflict significantly threatened Southeast Asia’s peace and stability. Japan’s endeavour began under PM Hayato Ikeda in 1963 and was carried out in a region where memories of the Japanese military invasion lingered. It represented the first time ever after World War II that Japan engaged actively in peace-making diplomacy. Why did the Satō administration act as a peacemaker in the confrontation?

The Satō administration’s diplomacy in addressing the confrontation has been examined in several studies from different perspectives. Nishihara discussed the issue as part of his broader examination of Japanese relations with Indonesia during 1951–1966, in which he analysed the roles of individuals and interest groups from several Japanese public and private sectors in fostering relations with Indonesia.¹ Miyagi presented a compelling examination of the Satō administration’s diplomacy in addressing the confrontation in the context of Japanese attempts to persuade Sukarno to shift the focus from decolonisation to development.² Llewelyn discussed the Satō government’s mediation efforts as part of ‘Japan’s return to international diplomacy’³ and in the context of Japanese relations with the UK, an important stakeholder in the dispute.⁴ Hatano and Satō’s study on post-war Japan’s Southeast Asia policy offered valuable insights on the Satō administration’s stance vis-à-vis President Sukarno’s Indonesia and the confrontation.⁵

One perspective on which little has been written is that of the impact of Japan-United States (US) relations on the Satō government’s policymaking on the Indonesia-Malaysia conflict. As Bowen noted, considerations concerning relations with the US have had ‘an enormous impact’ on post-war Japanese foreign policy, ‘both inhibiting and aiding Japan’s relations with other states’.⁶ Although studies have mentioned Japan-US relations in the context of the Satō government’s diplomacy on the confrontation, these mentions are brief and not a part of any systematic investigation of Japanese-American interactions in relation to the conflict. For example, Nishihara⁷ and Llewelyn⁸ briefly mentioned Washington’s positive predisposition vis-à-vis the Satō government’s peace efforts; however, both compelling studies examined the Ikeda and Satō administrations’ peace diplomacy without focusing on specific aspects of how relations with the US influenced Japanese choices. Miyagi touched upon American expectations around Japan’s role in supporting the emerging new Indonesian leadership in the aftermath of the attempted coup in 1965.⁹ Hatano and Satō contributed an interesting but brief mention of Tokyo’s decision in May 1966 to attempt mediation to help Jakarta and Washington improve their relations.¹⁰

What we know about the extent of and how US-Japan relations affected the Satō administration’s diplomacy on the confrontation is limited and circumscribed to specific episodes or points in time, rather than as action carried out throughout Satō’s premiership. To fill this gap, this article investigates if, why, and how considerations pertaining to Japanese relations with the US influenced the Satō government’s diplomacy on the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation. Focusing on the first half of 1965, when the Satō administration launched a major mediation initiative, this study utilises American, Australian, and Japanese diplomatic documents and memoirs of former Japanese and American diplomats. By introducing a new variable to the literature, this study aims to understand and explain the Satō administration’s active diplomacy in the confrontation. It is argued here that considerations around Japan’s relations with the US were among the important factors that motivated PM Satō’s government to attempt mediation. Tokyo’s peace efforts contributed towards Japan’s burden-sharing with the US to sustain regional stability, in a phase in which the Satō administration tried to persuade Washington to negotiate the reversion of Okinawa to Japan. This argument offers a different perspective on Japan’s motives to mediate by drawing comparisons with claims in the literature¹¹ that the Satō government’s determination to mediate resulted from a change in the negative British attitude towards Japanese mediation. The paper shows that given these Japanese motivations vis-à-vis the US – in addition to motivations, such as responding to domestic pressure, resuming peace and stability in Southeast Asia, preventing Indonesia’s tilt towards China, and enhancing Japan’s international profile – the Satō government was neither merely reacting to a change in British attitudes, nor was it simply accommodating American requests to mediate. It was mainly pursuing its foreign policy agenda. This study also highlights the often-overlooked Japanese political role in Southeast Asia during the Cold War, showing that Japan contributed to the US’ Asia policy through its peace efforts during the confrontation. Although it was a low-intensity conflict, the confrontation was a matter of concern for Japan, as it affected peace and stability in Southeast Asia, a region that was highly valued by the Japanese for its wealthy natural resources, markets, and presence of sea routes through which Japanese trade (including vital imports of Middle Eastern oil), was carried out. Hostilities ensued after the Federation of Malaysia – comprising Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak – was established in September 1963. Jakarta had long opposed the formation of the British-backed federation as it threatened Indonesian security. After the federation was formed, Jakarta did not recognise it and began guerrilla incursions into Malaysia, and the latter was supported militarily by the UK, Australia, and New Zealand.

The Japanese government viewed the establishment of the Federation of Malaysia positively, as it was expected to strengthen Southeast Asia’s stability and create additional opportunities for Japan.¹² However, Japan had to balance that stance with the need to avoid enraging President Sukarno, given that Tokyo valued its relations with Indonesia, the largest Southeast Asian country in terms of territory and population, rich in natural resources, and strategically located along shipping lanes crossing the Malacca Straits and the South China Sea. After the conflict erupted, Tokyo engaged in peace efforts, starting from PM Ikeda’s mediation attempts during his visit to Southeast Asia in September 1963 and followed by other endeavours and offers of good offices to persuade the disputants to resolve their issues peacefully.¹³ However, these attempts failed.

Indonesia’s non-aligned stance had long concerned Washington. According to the US Secretary of State Dean Rusk, American ‘traditional interest in Indonesia’ had been ‘to keep the country out of the hands of its domestic Communists and out of the orbit of Communist China’.¹⁴ The outbreak of the confrontation caused Jakarta’s relations with three US allies, namely the UK, Australia, and New Zealand to deteriorate. According to Howard P. Jones, the US ambassador in Jakarta during 1958–1965, Washington supported pro-Western Malaysia in the confrontation; however, ‘equally if not more essential to Western interests was that Indonesia not go communist’, as that country ‘was destined to play a leading role in the affairs of the region and it was vital that that role not be played against the West’.¹⁵ Therefore, Washington attempted mediation. For instance, in January 1964, when President Lyndon B. Johnson dispatched Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy to the region to facilitate talks among the warring parties, although to no avail.

In the second half of 1964, Jakarta-Washington relations became increasingly strained, with anti-US sentiments in Indonesia escalating as a result of the US’ intensified military involvement in Vietnam. As Miyagi noted, the US’ increased preoccupation with Vietnam resulted in greater American support for Malaysia and in the hardening of Washington’s stance vis-à-vis Jakarta.¹⁶ The US sought British help with the Vietnamese problem while the British expected US support in the Indonesia-Malaysia confrontation.¹⁷ Meanwhile, in a joint statement by President Johnson and Malaysian PM Tunku Abdul Rahman on 23 July 1964, the American leader announced that Washington would provide military training and possibly equipment to Malaysia.¹⁸

A few days later, the Gulf of Tonkin incident led to the increase in US military involvement in the Vietnam War, which provided additional ammunition to President Sukarno in his response to the US pledge of military support to Malaysia. On August 17, Sukarno delivered a speech in which he criticised the US and emphasised the legitimacy of the North Vietnamese government.¹⁹ As the then US Ambassador Jones wrote, Sukarno’s speech marked a watershed in US-Indonesian relations: it was followed by a surge in anti-American acts in Indonesia, the dispatch of additional Indonesian forces to Malaysia, and an Indonesian parliamentary resolution in September denouncing the American-Malaysian joint communique and demanding British and American military withdrawal from Southeast Asia.²⁰

Amid these developments, the US adopted a line of showing Jakarta its readiness to help Indonesia if it terminated military operations towards Malaysia and seriously worked to improve its domestic situation.²¹ However, President Sukarno did not seem interested in doing so: according to Marshall Green, who served as US ambassador to Indonesia in 1965–1969, ‘Sukarno’s grand international design was to make Jakarta the capital of the “newly emerging forces” of the world’.²² The ultimate goal of the Indonesian president, who had been leading his country towards ‘the socialist stage of the Revolution’ with the support of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI, the largest Indonesian political party by 1965), was to establish a regime based on nationalism, religion, and communism (Nasakom), which the Indonesia Army opposed.²³

For the US, the deterioration of its relations with Indonesia increased the importance of Japan as a bridge with Jakarta, as Japan, which had been providing significant war reparations and economic assistance to Indonesia, was among the few free world countries with some leverage on and a well-developed diplomatic channel with Sukarno. Shizuo Saitō, who served as Japanese ambassador to Indonesia during 1964–1966, confirmed that when Washington-Jakarta relations were at their worst, ‘on many occasions’ Japan ‘played a mediating role’ between both countries.²⁴ Saitō added that the Americans recognised the role that Japan played, owing to its special relationship with Jakarta, ‘as a mediator for dialogue between the Western camp and Indonesia’.²⁵ Marshall Green described Ambassador Saitō as having ‘a special entrée to the Palace’ – owing to President Sukarno’s third wife, who was Japanese – and as having been ‘of great help to me, especially during my first months in Indonesia’.²⁶ As the Vietnam War became the Johnson administration’s top priority in the region,²⁷ Washington increasingly sought Tokyo’s help to resolve the confrontation. Amid deteriorating Indonesian-Malaysian and US-Indonesian relations, and growing tensions in Vietnam, PM Satō’s government, inaugurated in November 1964, faced a challenging situation in Southeast Asia.

Before examining the Satō government’s diplomacy vis-à-vis the Indonesia-Malaysia conflict, it is worth mentioning the existence of pro-Indonesia positions among Japanese elites. In September 1964, Torao Ushiroku, director of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MOFA) Asian Affairs Bureau, stated that consensus existed among Japanese politicians, the business community, and important ministries on maintaining an engaging and friendly approach towards Indonesia. He noted the prevailing ‘softness and wishful thinking tinged with opportunism’ among Japanese politicians, business circles, and the press.²⁸ Ambassador Shizuo Saitō confirmed the presence of ‘not few Japanese – in the political and business world, and among former Japanese Imperial military personnel’ – who had close connections with influential Indonesians and high-ranking government officials, forming ‘a unique communication route’ between the two countries, which at times played a role in Indonesian-Japanese official interactions.²⁹ Relations with Indonesia were generally held in high regard within MOFA and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), which generally ‘saw eye to eye on the Indonesian question’.³⁰

Besides valuing Indonesia, Japanese decision-makers were aware of Southeast Asia’s importance to Japan. As Foreign Minister Shiina told the US Secretary of State Rusk in early December 1964, Japan had significant interests in Southeast Asia, given its natural resources and market, which absorbed a third of Japanese exports.³¹ Since the mid-1950s, Japan had been providing war reparations and economic assistance to several Southeast Asian countries. However, as Shiina noted, Japanese interests in Southeast Asia were jeopardised by ‘tensions and political instability’ resulting from ‘the extension of Chinese influence’.³² Left unaddressed, those tensions and instability had the potential to threaten Japan’s national security. To tackle the situation, Shiina stated that the Satō administration was determined to ‘make greater efforts’ in Southeast Asia ‘beyond more commercial transactions and including the development of economic and cultural ties with political overtones’.³³

A larger Japanese role for peace and stability in Southeast Asia was beneficial for the Satō government’s relationship with the US, given the latter’s demands on Tokyo to contribute more towards realising regional stability. As William Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, noted in November 1964, in the previous few years, the US had ‘quite properly stepped up pressures on Japan to increase significantly its assumption of international responsibilities’, including to provide assistance to South Vietnam and Laos, and to help with ‘economic denial policies against […] Communist China’.³⁴ The US government’s documents show Tokyo’s awareness of the need to do more for burden-sharing, noting that the Satō administration intended to increase Japanese non-military assistance to Southeast Asia not only because of Japan’s national interests in that region but also ‘to serve the twin objectives of strengthening the US-Japan partnership and increasing Japan’s influence in world affairs’.³⁵

Doing more for burden-sharing would also contribute towards Japanese efforts to persuade Washington to negotiate the reversion of the administrative rights on Okinawa, which the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty had transferred to the US, to Japan. The Okinawa reversion was a priority agenda for PM Satō, who, in August 1965, became the first Japanese PM to visit Okinawa after World War II and who later stated that the Okinawa problem was ‘very vital’ and that ‘I myself have staked my political life on the Okinawa negotiation’.³⁶ Realising the Okinawa reversion was important for the Satō administration’s diplomatic calculations vis-à-vis Washington, including those related to Southeast Asia.

Against that background, the Satō administration embarked on peace efforts, although it initially moved cautiously. According to Hatano and Satō, that caution was motivated by PM Satō’s belief that Japan’s leverage on Indonesia was limited, partly because of negative feelings in Indonesia for Japanese wartime deeds. Therefore, he thought that Japan had to avoid getting too involved in the confrontation. Satō’s reluctance was also motivated by the fact that ‘the stance of the British, Americans and Australians was not clear’.³⁷ On the latter, declassified US documents show that actually Washington had expectations of a Japanese role in the conflict. In late November 1964, Secretary of State Rusk told the Japanese ambassador in the US that ‘perhaps Japan could find a way to stimulate progress towards solution of the Malaysian-Indonesian problem’.³⁸ It is plausible that, given Satō’s objectives and US expectations of a Japanese role on the confrontation, Tokyo’s initially cautious attitude was also motivated by the absence of an appropriate opportunity to mediate. In December 1964, MOFA publicly stated that Japan ‘would be most willing to extend its good offices in facilitating a solution’ of the confrontation if an opportunity for a breakthrough emerged; however, at that time, there was no such opportunity.³⁹ However, it materialised a few weeks later, after President Sukarno decided to withdraw Indonesia from the UN, thus triggering a diplomatic crisis and escalating tensions related to the confrontation.

The year 1965 began with two important events that affected Japan’s diplomacy towards Indonesia. First, President Sukarno, angered by Malaysia’s election as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, announced Indonesia’s withdrawal from the UN on 31 December 1964. The move signalled the radicalisation of his stance and increased uncertainty in Southeast Asia. The second event was PM Satō’s summit with US President Johnson on January 12–13, where Satō expressed Japan’s desire to realise the reversion of Okinawa, whereas Johnson clarified US expectations for a larger Japanese contribution to Southeast Asian peace and prosperity.

Indonesia’s withdrawal from the UN created concern in Japan. The press was worried that such a withdrawal would impact the UN negatively.⁴⁰ To persuade Sukarno to reverse his decision, on January 5, PM Satō sent him a message and, a few days later, approved the dispatch of LDP Vice President Shōjirō Kawashima, who had close relations with Sukarno, to Jakarta.⁴¹ However, Satō’s letter failed and Kawashima’s mission was cancelled. Indonesia’s withdrawal from the UN and confrontation were discussed at the January 12–13 Johnson-Satō summit. The US sought a larger Japanese contribution to regional peace and stability. As the US government’s pre-summit analysis indicated, the Satō government reappraised its Southeast Asia policy for the purpose ‘of making greater efforts in this area beyond mere commercial transactions’; the aim was to protect Tokyo’s interests in that region and to serve ‘the twin objectives of strengthening the US-Japan partnership and increasing Japan’s influence in world affairs’.⁴² Based on this, at the summit, the US would urge the Japanese to increase economic assistance and diplomatic activities to promote regional peace, development, and stability.⁴³

US requests to Japan for more burden-sharing also concerned the Indonesian problem. US officials noted that Japan, which had several commercial exchanges with Indonesia and had extended considerable assistance to Jakarta including USD 223 million in war reparations and credits, had shown ‘an increased concern over Indonesia’ and was ‘inclined to favour a conciliatory approach as a means of keeping Indonesia “friendly” to Japan and the Free World’.⁴⁴ Building on this background, the US government decided that it would make a point at the Satō-Johnson summit that as US influence in Indonesia was waning, ‘it was correspondingly important that Japan’s moderating influence should be maintained and if possible expanded’.⁴⁵ Japan should ‘have all possible contacts with Indonesian leaders’, although it had to be careful not to give the Indonesians ‘the impression that Japan condoned their lawlessness and aggression abroad or irresponsibility at home’.⁴⁶ That stance was reflected and elaborated in Secretary Rusk’s talking points for his meeting with PM Satō; they mentioned that given the decreasing US influence in Indonesia, the US should ‘consider it all the more important that Japan continue to maintain contact with Sukarno and non-communist elements in Indonesia and use Japan’s influence in ways most conducive to discouraging aggression and promoting peace in the area’.⁴⁷

During his talks with President Johnson on January 12, Satō expressed concern for the Indonesia-Malaysia problem and said that it was necessary to ‘avoid actions which would drive Sukarno, and with him Indonesia, into the arms of communist China’; he also offered his government’s good offices, saying that Japan was ‘still on speaking terms with Indonesia’ and was prepared to do what it could; Johnson replied that ‘any contributions to a solution would be welcome’.⁴⁸ The Indonesia problem was also discussed during Secretary of State Rusk’s talks with Foreign Minister Shiina. The former stated that Indonesia had no chance of prevailing over Malaysia given Britain’s significant military deployment in support of Malaysia as well as Australian and New Zealand’s support to the Malaysians; however, he added that, based on the Australia, New Zealand and United States Security (ANZUS) Treaty, the US would get involved if the Australian or New Zealand military were attacked.⁴⁹ That was a scenario that Washington, which was already significantly involved in the Vietnam War, wanted to avoid. Echoing President Johnson, Rusk asked Shiina whether Japan, which was ‘one of the very few countries that seem to have some sort of influence over Sukarno’, could use that influence to persuade him ‘to adopt a more moderate course’; Shiina responded that Japan had already been acting on the matter, including to persuade Sukarno to re-consider withdrawal from the UN, but to no avail.⁵⁰

During his talks with Satō, Rusk stated that ‘it would be very useful if Japan could bring diplomatic pressure to bear in such capitals as Djakarta, Phnom Penh and Rangoon – where the United States is unable to do so – to improve the situation’; he stressed the US expectations for ‘greater diplomatic activity by Japan, particularly “silent diplomacy”’.⁵¹ In response to Johnson and Rusk’s requests ‘to exercise a moderating and restraining influence upon Sukarno’, Satō pledged efforts to help.⁵²

At the summit, a key agenda for the Japanese PM was to persuade Washington to negotiate the Okinawa reversion. Satō told President Johnson that both the Okinawans and the entire Japanese nation ‘ardently aspire to the return of administrative authority over the islands to Japan’.⁵³ However, Johnson was non-committal. In the joint statement, Satō expressed the desire for Okinawa’s return to Japanese administration as soon as possible, whereas Johnson stated that he looked forward ‘to the day when the security interests of the free world in the Far East will permit the realisation of this desire’.⁵⁴ Tokyo had to do more to convince Washington to discuss the Okinawan issue, including more burden-sharing. Playing a role in resolving the confrontation could help Japan accommodate Washington’s requests to help settle the confrontation, stabilise Indonesia and Southeast Asia, and enhance Japan’s international profile.

In addition to the Johnson administration’s positive attitude towards Japanese peace efforts, the deepening of Beijing-Jakarta relations following Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio’s visit to China generated momentum in Japan to act on the confrontation. While Indonesian military infiltrations in Malaysia continued and London announced military reinforcements,⁵⁵ between January 23 and 28, Foreign Minister Subandrio visited China for talks with Premier Zhou Enlai and other Chinese counterparts. On January 28, the two sides issued a joint statement criticising American and British ‘imperialism’ in Indochina and Malaysia, respectively, and expressed support for the Vietnamese, Lao, and Cambodian people’s struggle for independence. The statement pledged Chinese support to Indonesia if the latter was pressed into war by the US and UK; affirmed Indonesia’s determination to continue the confrontation with Malaysia; expressed China’s support for Indonesia’s withdrawal from the UN; and announced China and Indonesia’s decision to expand relations in the fields of technology, trade, and military.⁵⁶ Beijing agreed to provide economic assistance worth USD 50 million to Indonesia.⁵⁷

The Sino-Indonesian statement heightened Japanese concerns that an Indonesian alignment with China would aggravate the confrontation, destabilise the region, and affect Tokyo’s interests there. Consequently, several Japanese Diet members and pressmen urged their government to offset the ongoing tightening of Sino-Indonesian relations.⁵⁸As the Australian embassy in Tokyo reported in early February, although in the previous months, the prevailing view in Japan was that the time was not appropriate to attempt mediation in the confrontation, ‘the itch to play a part and the temptation to canvass possible solutions is now starting to be felt again’.⁵⁹ In particular, ‘many politicians and businessmen with connections in Indonesia, encouraged by some woolly-minded and weak-kneed press commentators’ wanted Japan to mediate.⁶⁰ The embassy reported that the Director of MOFA’s Asian Affairs Bureau Ushiroku indicated the recent Sino-Indonesian communique as a factor motivating the increased anxiety in Japan to do something to resolve the confrontation.⁶¹

Meanwhile, PM Satō—who had ‘a keen interest in the problems of defence of Asia against communist expansionism’⁶² and who believed that ‘Sukarno could be reasoned with and that every attempt should be made to persuade him to act in a more sensible fashion’⁶³—stated at the Diet on January 25 that it was Japan’s responsibility to contribute constructively towards relaxing tensions in Asia.⁶⁴ Foreign Minister Shiina elaborated that statement affirming that Japan wanted to undertake ‘proactive autonomous diplomacy’ for international peace, including to address the confrontation.⁶⁵ MOFA was more cautious; it felt that the Sino-Indonesian statement had complicated the realisation of Japanese mediation, and that therefore, for the time being, it would adopt a wait-and-see stance.⁶⁶ Director of the Asian Affairs Bureau Ushiroku explained that although the ‘growing identity of views between Peking and Djakarta’ – which could lead to ‘closer inter-connection of the Malaysian and Vietnamese situations’ – was concerning, the time was not ripe for third parties to make peace efforts.⁶⁷ Within MOFA, voices opposed Japan’s generally soft stance vis-à-vis Sukarno. For example, Shinsaku Hōgen, Director of the European, Afro-Middle Eastern, and Oceanic Affairs Bureau, opposed ‘the generally feeble Japanese posture towards Indonesia’, which he partly blamed ‘on venal politicians’.⁶⁸ He was likely referring to pro-Indonesia politicians, including LDP’s heavyweights such as former PM Nobusuke Kishi and Vice President Kawashima, or Morinosuke Kajima, head of the LDP Foreign Affairs Council and chairman of the Japan-Indonesia Association.⁶⁹ Among the LDP politicians favouring a Japanese diplomatic engagement was also future PM Takeo Fukuda who, in remarks at the Diet on January 27, called for Japan to mediate the conflict.⁷⁰

On January 28, Vice Foreign Minister Ōda confirmed the mounting pressure on the Japanese government to act to the British ambassador in Tokyo.⁷¹ Later, Ōda told foreign diplomats that behind Satō’s eagerness to mediate was the LDP politicians’ ‘prodding’ and that those favouring mediation viewed it as ‘an opportunity to display the PM’s often expounded independent and more activist Japanese foreign policy’; however, Ōda noted, within MOFA, there were officials who had been trying ‘to restrain [Satō’s] more vulnerable initiatives’.⁷²

Simultaneously, the Satō government faced pressure from the UK, which opposed mediation at that stage as it would corner Malaysia into taking disadvantageous steps. In early February, the British told the Japanese ambassador in London ‘in admonitory terms’ that they opposed ‘undue Japanese eagerness to help Sukarno with suggested compromises’.⁷³

Washington was cautious about hasty peace efforts that could harm Malaysia. However, it did not have preclusions towards Japanese attempts to end the confrontation and thus took a softer stance when compared to London. That attitude emerged in a message that, in late January 1965, President Johnson sent to British PM Harold Wilson, who voiced a concern that Indonesia was ‘moving rapidly towards more aggressive policies externally and towards communist domination at home’ – given the Indonesian Communist Party’s steadily growing power – and that the confrontation would likely intensify that trend.⁷⁴ To prevent Indonesia from continuing along that path, Johnson presented two options. The first was to resolve the confrontation through a four-country Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission, an initiative on which, as Johnson noted, Japan, which had some influence on Sukarno, ‘might be prepared to undertake a quiet initiative’.⁷⁵ He added that during the January summit, PM Satō had shown a willingness to help the Indonesian problem and that although Washington did not urge Japan to act at that specific moment, Johnson was now wondering ‘whether this may not be worth a try’.⁷⁶ The second option was to invite Sukarno to the US to convince him to soften his stance on the confrontation.⁷⁷ This did not materialise. However, it is noteworthy that, compared to Britain’s hard-line stance, the Americans – like the Japanese – were more open to a solution through an Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission and, especially, to a more engaging approach towards Jakarta. On the latter, the Americans sought to impress the British with the benefits of balancing deterrence with a more engaging stance vis-à-vis Sukarno. David Cuthell from the Department of State explained to British diplomats that Washington believed that in addition to maintaining a firm military deterrent vis-à-vis Jakarta, there were advantages to ‘being as forthcoming as possible’ about opportunities for mediation or negotiation, ‘with the aim of disadvantaging the Indonesians, showing them up as unwilling to negotiate reasonably […]’.⁷⁸ In other words, on the issue of mediation, the American stance was more flexible than the British one and had several similarities with the Japanese one.

Here it must be mentioned that opinions among American government officials regarding the approach to be adopted towards Sukarno were ‘divided and uncertain’.⁷⁹ According to Marshall Green, two major views existed. The dominant view was that if the US wanted to have any influence over Sukarno, it ‘had no choice but to find some way of getting along’ with him. Ambassador Jones and Under Secretary of State Harriman were the main advocates of this line.⁸⁰ The second view, supported by Marshall Green and other officials in the State Department and the US embassy in Jakarta, was sceptical about continuing with an accommodating line towards Sukarno, which, in their opinion, was not paying off.⁸¹ The former view became policy after the US government adopted the report submitted in April 1965 by the ‘Bunker mission’ (which President Johnson had dispatched to Indonesia with the task of formulating policy recommendations to deal with that country) which recommended to ‘continue efforts to work with Sukarno’, refrain from ‘taking actions that appeared to be punitive’, and ‘avoid becoming involved in any efforts to play on divisive regional feeling or get involved in efforts to split the country’.⁸²

However, despite the decision to continue with an engaging line towards Sukarno, the intensification of anti-American attacks and threats to expropriate American firms in Indonesia⁸³ increased voices in the US calling for a tougher stance towards Jakarta and ‘[p]ressures were building up in Congress to liquidate [American] assistance program to Indonesia entirely […]’.⁸⁴ Against that backdrop, considering it was difficult for Washington to show a too soft attitude towards the Sukarno regime, the Americans supported Japan’s engaging approach and overtures towards Sukarno. On this, several US government individuals shared President Johnson’s description of Japan as well-positioned to help resolve the confrontation. For example, Ambassador Jones in Jakarta believed that ‘Japan would be the best to take an initiative to get negotiations moving’ on the confrontation, as Indonesia and Malaysia would accept Japanese involvement and given that Tokyo ‘had shown a real interest in acting as a peacemaker’.⁸⁵ The State Department thought that ‘Japan would be the best choice’, although the time was not right to start negotiations.⁸⁶

In sum, the Japanese government faced domestic pressure to pursue peace efforts while also dealing with British attempts to discourage such actions. Meanwhile, Washington expected Japan to make peace efforts but not hastily. The Satō government’s eagerness to act prevailed, promoting Tokyo to transition from a wait-and-see attitude towards engagement in peace efforts. As Ōda told Australian diplomats, despite external pressure on Japan not to take action at that stage, Satō ‘was now very anxious to make some Japanese contribution to a settlement’.⁸⁷ MOFA, aware of the domestic pressure for action and of Satō’s inclination towards mediation, softened its cautious stance: as British Ambassador in Tokyo Rundall noted on February 4, MOFA was actively considering some means to mediate the conflict.⁸⁸ Between late January and early February, momentum gathered in Tokyo to make an attempt towards peace.

The diplomatic initiative on which the Japanese government began to work in late January included setting up a summit in Tokyo between President Sukarno and Malaysian PM Rahman to reach a consensus on the establishment of a four-country Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission,⁸⁹ which was then to make recommendations to resolve the confrontation. As a Japanese diplomat in Jakarta explained, the Satō government wanted to undertake ‘some independent mediation in the Malaysian dispute at this stage’ as it felt that it ‘had to do something and do it reasonably quickly’ if it was ‘to arrest the drift of Indonesia towards China’; for that purpose, Tokyo believed that establishing an Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission would be most appropriate.⁹⁰ LDP Vice President Kawashima, who the Australian embassy in Tokyo described as ‘betraying an itch to be doing something’, endorsed a solution through that commission, as it was necessary to rapidly resolve the confrontation given ‘the danger of Indonesia going communist and becoming completely dependent on Communist China for support’; according to Kawashima, China’s pledge during Subandrio’s visit to Beijing of significant economic assistance to Indonesia was an example of that trend.⁹¹

Against this background, on January 22, Vice Foreign Minister Ōda sought Australian views on a plan that included setting up the Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission in parallel with Indonesia and Malaysia’s commitment to terminate hostilities and hold ‘another “ascertainment” in the Borneo state in two years’ time’, respectively.⁹² As a preliminary step towards the establishment of the commission, Tokyo decided to survey Indonesian and Malaysian attitudes on the matter. In a document titled ‘Malaysian conflict: mediation work’ dated February 9, MOFA’s Asian Affairs Bureau (a major player in Japanese policymaking on Asian matters) clarified that the first thing to do was to establish the conciliation commission. Therefore, first, Japan would sound out the concerned parties on the matter. The bureau warned that the conflict was pushing Jakarta closer to Beijing (as Indonesia sought to break its isolation) thus strengthening the Chinese influence in Southeast Asia; the confrontation also negatively affected Japanese economic activities in Indonesia and Malaysia, ‘two countries with the greatest potential for economic development in Southeast Asia’.⁹³

While working behind the scenes on its plan, Japanese government publicly showed a cautious attitude towards mediating at that point. As PM Satō noted in his diary on February 12, he did not accommodate the Indonesian request for Japan’s mediation as the Malaysian, British, and American stances were not clear.⁹⁴ As for the UK’s stance, on February 18, British Ambassador Rundall expressed scepticism to PM Satō on the effectiveness of Japanese peace attempts if they were aimed at convincing Malaysia to negotiate while Indonesian military operations continued; yet, Rundall said that his government did not oppose mediation as long as they were ‘compatible with Malaysia’s sovereignty and independence’.⁹⁵ Referring to his meeting with Rundall, Satō wrote in his diary that the British had apparently changed their mind and now seemed to agree to peace efforts, which encouraged the Japanese PM to pursue mediation.⁹⁶ However, it was a conditional opening, as the British were open to welcoming a Japanese initiative as long as it, in London’s eyes, did not put Malaysia in a disadvantageous position. A cable dated February 23 authored by US Secretary of State Rusk shows that the British remained unenthusiastic about Japan attempting mediation. Rusk wrote that the British feared that Tokyo would likely be ‘too soft’ on Indonesia and ‘really do not want the Japanese to act at all’, even though London did not want to give the impression of being too rigid on the issue of mediation.⁹⁷

The US, which realised that Tokyo was about to take the initiative, continued to support a Japanese role for peace, but not a rushed one. On February 23, US Secretary of State Rusk sent a cable to American embassies in Tokyo and London with instructions for a possible Japanese mediation initiative. He noted that PM Satō was ‘anxious’ for Japan to mediate, although he did not want ‘to get out of step with the US’ Satō planned to send a fact-finding mission to Indonesia and Malaysia to sound out moods and possibly propose something concrete.⁹⁸ However, Rusk wrote, a Japanese initiative at the time would unlikely be effective and can disrupt the talks that Indonesia and Malaysia were considering to have in Bangkok. Nevertheless, Rusk emphasised that given that Japan was ‘among few remaining free world powers not yet in Sukarno’s bad graces’, it was well-positioned to play a key part when the time was ripe; accordingly, it was ‘important that the Japanese be encouraged to maintain active interest in the dispute even though we do not want them to plunge in prematurely at this stage’.⁹⁹ Rusk instructed the US embassies in Tokyo and London to explain to the Japanese that it ‘would be fruitless to attempt to pressure the Malaysians’ into negotiating with Jakarta while hostilities continued, as doing so would give an image of Malaysia being unwilling to negotiate; therefore, until Jakarta ceased hostilities, Washington deemed it ‘premature to consider the next step, whether it be the Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission or direct negotiations’.¹⁰⁰ Nevertheless, the US wanted to keep ‘the path open for [the Indonesians] to retreat gracefully from militant confrontation […]’.¹⁰¹ As the American influence on Sukarno was ‘clearly on the wane’ whereas Japan was ‘one of the last remaining major free world countries with appreciable unexpended influence that can be applied to the situation’, and as ‘this card is such a valuable one’, Washington believed that the card ‘should be played with greatest caution’; therefore, the Japanese were advised not to ‘commit their influence to any major extent at this time’.¹⁰² If Japan felt that the time was ripe to act, Rusk’s instructions noted, Tokyo’s best option would be to undertake ‘informal soundings’ with Jakarta without proposing any specific formula and try ‘to find out whether [the Indonesians] can be persuaded to halt their military attacks without insisting on unattainable commitments’ from Malaysia.¹⁰³ Rusk gave instructions to advise the Japanese to wait for a few weeks before undertaking these soundings, given that the Indonesians and Malaysians were considering holding talks in Bangkok.¹⁰⁴

However, the Japanese seemed to be moving faster than Washington wished. When Secretary Rusk sent the above-mentioned cable, MOFA’s Asia Affairs Bureau had indicated in a document dated February 24 that Tokyo would dispatch a special envoy to Malaysia as soon as possible to clear obstacles to PM Rahman’s May visit to Japan, to sound out Malaysia’s willingness to have talks with Indonesia and to ascertain Rahman’s stance on the establishment of the Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission. The bureau stressed the need to explain Japanese moves to the British, Australians, New Zealanders, and Americans; the UK continued to argue that as Malaysia was currently at an advantage, it should not be pressed to negotiate with Jakarta, and Tokyo had to explain to them that the Japanese envoy would go to Malaysia not to mediate but to feel out PM Rahman’s stance on preventing the situation from deteriorating.¹⁰⁵ From the Asian Affairs Bureau document, it is clear that Japanese policymakers did not consider London to have really departed from its critical position vis-à-vis Tokyo’s mediation. After the document was drafted, Director Ushiroku explained that establishing the conciliation commission would help ‘deter Sukarno from further aggression and persuade him that Indonesia had not passed into such complete isolation from the West that it must identify itself fully with Communist China’.¹⁰⁶ He added that the commission – whose headquarters could be located in Tokyo – did not need to ‘be particularly active’ or meet frequently as ‘its main function would be to just exist and be known to exist, but to leave any real solution to be worked out elsewhere, perhaps among the parties themselves’.¹⁰⁷

Meanwhile, on February 24, the Indonesian ambassador in Tokyo met LDP Vice President Kawashima and day after that, told the press that his government was ready to speak to the Malaysians and Filipinos and to select the commission’s three Afro-Asian member-countries that would then choose the fourth member (acting also as chair). The Indonesian ambassador stated that Jakarta would accept the commission’s recommendations ‘unconditionally’ and wanted Japan to be the commission’s chair.¹⁰⁸

Behind the scenes, the Japanese used diplomatic channels to promote their initiative. As the Australian Department of External Affairs noted on March 2, the Japanese government and LDP were ‘anxious to play an active part in mediation efforts’ and, in addition to considering the dispatch of a special envoy to Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur, PM Satō and MOFA senior officials had discussed the Indonesia-Malaysia issue with foreign diplomats.¹⁰⁹ In the background, domestic calls on the Satō government to engage in peace efforts continued. On March 12, socialist politician Kanichi Nishimura urged the government to actively help resume peace between Indonesia and Malaysia.¹¹⁰ Similarly, on April 7, LDP politician Yoshirō Kikuchi requested his government to make peace efforts and help Sukarno, considering his close relationship with Japan and the benefits that Japan would obtain from helping him.¹¹¹

Domestic pressure, American demands on Tokyo to do more for burden-sharing, and concern over the rising Chinese influence in Southeast Asia were shaping the Satō administration’s decision to engage in mediation. Japan did not act as cautiously as Washington wished and began peace efforts despite British scepticism about a Japanese initiative at that stage. Failure to hold Indonesia-Malaysian talks in Bangkok opened up the path to Japan’s launch of its diplomatic initiative; the first step was to try to set up a Sukarno-Rahman summit in Tokyo in the hope that, as PM Satō explained, the two parties could reach a consensus that would then make it easier to establish the Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission.¹¹²

On April 13, Kawashima led an official Japanese delegation to Bandung, Indonesia, to attend the celebrations for the 10^th anniversary of the first Afro-Asian Conference. In Indonesia, Kawashima had talks with Sukarno, who ‘repeatedly reaffirmed his desire for a peaceful settlement’ and agreement to arrive at a solution through an Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission.¹¹³ Sukarno confirmed his readiness to Kawashima to meet PM Rahman in Tokyo without pre-conditions, as proposed by the Japanese,¹¹⁴ and pledged in an ‘extremely informal way’, that he would reduce guerrilla activities during talks with Rahman.¹¹⁵

From Indonesia, Kawashima flew to Malaysia where, on April 20, he floated Japan’s proposal for Rahman-Sukarno talks in Tokyo to PM Rahman and Deputy PM Abdul Razak Hussein and mentioned that Sukarno was becoming increasingly convinced of resolving the confrontation through a conciliation commission. When Razak asked whether Indonesia would cease its guerrilla operations, Kawashima replied that Sukarno had shown an ‘affirmative but not straightforward’ attitude on that point and had asked Kawashima to inform PM Rahman that during the summit, ‘guerrilla activities will be quieter or die out’.¹¹⁶ Kawashima urged Malaysia to cooperate to de-escalate tensions because, as a result of the confrontation, Jakarta was becoming closer to the communist camp. He added that Japan was prepared to act as a member of the Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission. Given ‘the assurances that Kawashima himself had given of Sukarno’s sincerity’, Rahman agreed to meet Sukarno in Tokyo.¹¹⁷

The US State Department was cautious about the Japanese initiative, as Japan’s eagerness to ‘make the summit a success could cause trouble for the Malaysians’; in particular, in case of an impasse during discussions, Japan ‘could push Malaysia to make damaging concessions’.¹¹⁸ Therefore, Washington should ‘wish the Japanese success but make clear that the chances thereof are not great’ – although the US would officially support those peace talks as there was no useful role for it to play at the time.¹¹⁹

Eventually, the Sukarno-Rahman summit was not held, as Sukarno had changed his mind. On May 1, he announced that he would not go to Japan. He explained that it was insulting to him to be asked to travel to Tokyo to negotiate with Rahman while the latter was in Japan to attend a soccer event; his decision was also motivated by domestic political pressure¹²⁰ and frustration about some Japanese magazines’ articles featuring his Japanese wife.¹²¹ PM Satō sent a personal letter to Sukarno soliciting him to reverse his decision, but to no avail, as Sukarno stated that the decision reflected the Indonesian people and the political parties’ opposition to talks with Rahman before the Afro-Asian Conference (scheduled in June).¹²² The Japanese tried to salvage their initiative when, during talks in May with visiting Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio, Vice Foreign Minister Ōda conveyed Japan’s hope that the summit could be realised; but Subandrio rejected the Japanese overture.¹²³ As MOFA announced in late May, considering Indonesia’s unwillingness to change its stance, chances for a Japanese mediation before the Afro-Asian Conference were slim.¹²⁴ As Ambassador Saitō revealed, Sukarno’s rigid attitude inhibited progress in the negotiations, even though diplomatic interactions continued behind the scenes.¹²⁵

Despite the stalemate, the US maintained a positive attitude towards Japan’s peace attempts. During Japan-US policy planning consultations in May 1965, the director of MOFA’s Research and Analysis Bureau told US government officials Walt Rostow and Marshall Green that although no immediate opportunity for a settlement existed, his government felt that ‘it cannot give up on dealing with Sukarno; if Indonesia collapses communism will take over’, therefore, it was necessary to continue to bring about a Sukarno-Rahman summit.¹²⁶ Green reiterated the American position that given Washington’s very limited leverage with Indonesia, it was ‘all the more desirable for Japan to do what it can to promote constructive action along the lines of the Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission (AACC)’.¹²⁷ Growing anti-American sentiments in Indonesia were significantly reducing the American leverage with Jakarta. When Green arrived in Indonesia in July 1965 as the new US ambassador, ‘Sukarno’s anti-Americanism had reached new heights’ and demonstrations and attacks against the US embassy and consulates in Indonesia continued; Sukarno had been aligning Indonesia with Beijing, Pyongyang, and Hanoi, and had been urging African and Asian nations do to the same.¹²⁸

Sukarno’s radicalisation reduced opportunities for a conflict settlement; as MOFA officials remarked on 30 July 1965, at that stage, any Japanese attempt at mediation was premature.¹²⁹ Two weeks later, in his August 17 speech, Sukarno vehemently attacked the US and its involvement in Vietnam, and announced the formation of the Beijing-Jakarta-Pyongyang-Hanoi-Phnom Penh axis.¹³⁰ According to Ambassador Saitō, that announcement was the result of the confrontation, which had resulted in the Indonesian Communist Party’s significant tilt towards China.¹³¹ Later that year, the Indonesian situation was dramatically shaken by a failed coup in the early hours of 1 October 1965, triggering major domestic political changes that eventually paved the way for the settlement of the conflict with Malaysia. With the change in the Indonesian political landscape, the armed confrontation with Malaysia ‘continued in name only’.¹³²

Following the attempted coup, the military strengthened its power and cracked down on communist members, while significantly challenging Sukarno’s authority. The Japanese government, which had been growing dissatisfied with Sukarno, increasingly threw its support behind the Indonesian military and their leader, Major General Suharto. As Secretary Rusk wrote in late October 1965, Japan could play an important part in the transition towards a ‘more rational Indonesia’, and Tokyo was already taking the initiative on that, given its ‘vital national interest in the success of the Army’s campaign against PKI and in a stable and independent Indonesia’.¹³³ The consolidation of Suharto’s power in March 1966 facilitated Japan’s provision of assistance to the Indonesian military. Tokyo worked to support the new regime, including by helping bring about an agreement between Western creditors and Jakarta to reschedule Indonesia’s debt, thus facilitating donor countries’ provision of economic assistance to Indonesia. Japan was instrumental in the establishment and financing of the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI), a consortium of donors that held its first meeting in February 1967; Japan and the US each pledged one-third of the USD 200 million that IGGI provided to Jakarta in 1967, and in the following years, and became top donors to Indonesia.¹³⁴

Western support for Suharto was encouraged by the latter’s adoption of a ‘non-aligned and realistic foreign policy’ that took the distance from China while tilting towards the US-led camp; Suharto also moved to end the confrontation with Malaysia.¹³⁵ Following an Indonesian request in April 1966, Japanese Ambassador to Malaysia Fumihiko Kai met in Bangkok with Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik to discuss the resolution of the confrontation. Malik asked Kai to convey to the Malaysians Jakarta’s willingness to negotiate for peace, a message that Kai promptly delivered to PM Rahman.¹³⁶ Meanwhile, in a move beneficial for the peace process, in late May, PM Satō informed the Indonesians that Japan would provide economic assistance to Jakarta worth USD 30 million.¹³⁷ The Americans valued the Japanese gesture rather highly. On June 7, Edwin Reischauer, the US ambassador to Japan, conveyed to Foreign Minister Shiina the US government’s appreciation for Japan’s help in solving Indonesia’s external debt problem and for offering USD 30 million worth of assistance to Jakarta.¹³⁸ Secretary of State Rusk conveyed the US’ appreciation of Japan to MITI Minister Miki for its ‘good leadership on the question of rescheduling Indonesia’s debts’ in a phase in which the US had ‘stayed in the background’ in order not to ‘complicate the problem of the new Indonesian leaders’.¹³⁹

Following an agreement in late May between Foreign Minister Malik and Deputy PM Razak, on 11 August 1966, Indonesia and Malaysia signed a peace agreement in Jakarta.¹⁴⁰ The resolution eliminated a major source of regional instability, pushed away worries about a Beijing-Jakarta axis, and paved the way for a new phase in the relations among Southeast Asian countries, with the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967. Suharto’s Indonesia became one of the pillars of the ASEAN. In the years that followed, aside from playing a major role in IGGI, Japan supported the Suharto regime diplomatically; in October 1967, PM Satō became the first foreign PM to visit Indonesia since the inauguration of the Suharto government, and the following year, President Suharto’s first official overseas trip was to Japan.¹⁴¹ For the US, which in the latter half of the 1960s became stacked in the Vietnam War quagmire, Japan’s support to the stabilisation of Indonesia and, by extension Southeast Asia, was a welcome burden-sharing contribution.

After exercising caution initially, from January 1965, the Satō government became determined to engage in diplomacy to end the Indonesia-Malaysia conflict. Tokyo’s initiatives did not succeed in achieving a settlement, which was eventually realised only after President Sukarno’s regime ended. Yet, Japan distinguished itself for actively attempting to mediate between the warring parties, an unprecedented role for post-War Japan that Tokyo had begun to play since the confrontation began in 1963. Japan gained valuable experience in this new field of diplomacy and built on it in subsequent engagements as a peace-broker. This included the Vietnam War, a conflict that erupted in Cambodia in 1970, and a later outbreak of war in Cambodia between 1978–1993. In the latter case, Japan even dispatched its Self-Defense Forces for the first time ever to participate in the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Cambodia in 1992–1993.

This article showed that the Satō administration’s resolve to mediate was driven by its domestic and foreign policy agenda, rather than merely being a reaction to a change in British attitudes vis-à-vis Japanese mediation. Considerations pertaining to Japanese relations with the US contributed towards shaping the Satō administration’s decision to engage in diplomacy to resolve the confrontation. The intensified involvement of the US in the Vietnam War from the second half of 1964 escalated anti-US sentiments in Indonesia, where anti-US attacks and rhetoric intensified during 1965. Because division existed within the US government on how to deal with the Sukarno regime, it was difficult for Washington to show a too soft and engaging stance towards Sukarno. Therefore, the Americans increasingly sought Japan’s help to persuade Jakarta to end the confrontation and to ‘de-radicalise’ Sukarno’s Indonesia and push it away from China. Against this background, the meaning of Japan’s role can be understood both as one of a bridge between the Sukarno regime and the US and as an effort to help prevent the opening of a new front in the Cold War in Asia by avoiding Jakarta’s alignment with Beijing, especially when the Johnson administration was increasingly focused on the Vietnam War. Regarding the latter aspect, if the confrontation escalated, the risk existed that the US could be dragged into war,¹⁴² opening a new front for the Americans in addition to the Indochinese one. In the context of efforts to prevent that scenario from materialising, the Japanese played a part by trying to de-radicalise Sukarno. Regarding Japan’s bridging role, Ambassador Saitō stated that, given the increasingly deteriorating US-Indonesian relations, Japan acted as a ‘mediator’ between Washington and Jakarta on many occasions until the establishment of the Suharto administration.¹⁴³ Moreover, Japan, owing to its well-developed contacts with the Sukarno regime, had access to much information which it shared with the Americans – whose sources of information in Jakarta were limited comparing to the Japanese ones – thereby contributing to the US policy-making.¹⁴⁴ In sum, Japan’s diplomatic efforts during the confrontation contributed to Washington’s Asia policy and went beyond ‘burden-sharing’ through economic means. This finding highlights the fact that beyond the Japanese well-known economic diplomacy in Southeast Asia during the Cold War, Japan played also a political role.

By engaging in mediation and acting as a bridge between Washington and Jakarta, the Satō government wanted to impress upon Washington Japan’s importance as an ally, stemming from Tokyo’s unique feature of being one of the few free world countries with some leverage on President Sukarno. Japan’s peace efforts can be considered a part of its burden-sharing with the US: Tokyo’s attempts to settle the conflict – thus restoring Southeast Asia’s stability and avoiding Indonesia’s alignment with China – served Washington’s Cold War strategy well at a time when the US was getting increasingly involved in the Vietnam War and was eager to prevent the formation of a Beijing-Jakarta axis. PM Satō—who had set the reversion of Okinawa as a priority – viewed efforts for burden-sharing with the US in Southeast Asia as contributing towards persuading Washington to negotiate on Okinawa. As a political scientist and historian, Makoto Iokibe noted, the objective of realising the Okinawa reversion contributed to Satō’s positive attitude towards supporting US policy in Asia, including vis-à-vis Sukarno’s Indonesia.¹⁴⁵ Future research should add evidence to support this claim. As Hatano and Satō highlighted, China’s successful nuclear test in November 1964 motivated Tokyo to strengthen cooperation with Washington to ensure that the US would protect Japan with their nuclear umbrella. The Japanese sought to do more to share the burden with Washington and help it realise its Cold War objectives in Asia, including in Southeast Asia; by doing so, the idea of ‘Japan’s Southeast Asia policy as “a place for cooperation with the US” was strengthened’.¹⁴⁶ Thus, when the opportunity for mediation arose in early 1965, the Satō government, encouraged by the Johnson administration’s requests for Japan to use its leverage with Sukarno to resolve the confrontation, engaged in peace efforts.

Here it is necessary to point out that interpreting the Satō administration’s involvement in peace efforts as a reaction to US demands would be misleading. Notwithstanding Japan’s sensitivity to Washington’s requests and the Satō administration’s above-mentioned objectives vis-à-vis the US, Japan had its own agenda regarding Southeast Asia, which Tokyo had been rather consistently pursuing since the Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida government in the early 1950s. That agenda was based on recognising Southeast Asia’s importance to realise Japan’s post-war economic recovery. As Prime Minister Yoshida wrote in 1954, the existence of Japan ‘depends on the economic development of, and the maintenance of stability in, the Southeast Asian countries’.¹⁴⁷ Aligned with this thinking, which subsequent administrations shared, Japan launched several initiatives to promote Southeast Asia’s development and stability, including Prime Minister Yoshida’s proposal to the US in November 1954 for an ‘Asian Marshall Plan’; a similar plan presented by Prime Minister Ichirō Hatoyama’s administration (1954–56) to the Americans in early 1955; Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi’s (1957–60) ‘Southeast Asian Development Fund’ initiative of 1957; Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda’s (1960–64) inclusion of Southeast Asian countries in his idea for establishing an ‘Asian economic community’; and the Satō government’s establishment of the Ministerial Conference for the Economic Development of Southeast Asia in 1966.¹⁴⁸ Apart from promoting Southeast Asia’s economic development, these initiatives aimed to address Tokyo’s concern that the region’s difficult economic conditions facilitated the spread of communist China’s influence. Japan, which did not have official diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China nor with the Republic of Korea, urgently wanted to avoid ‘losing’ also Southeast Asia – in terms of that region going under Beijing’s influence. As MOFA warned in May 1954, following the significant economic disadvantages suffered by Japan as a result of the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, Japan’s ‘very existence may be menaced unless any further spread of communism in Asia is forestall […]. Thus, Southeast Asia’s economic development is of vital for Japan’.¹⁴⁹ Japan’s awareness of Southeast Asia’s importance was long-held. In the early 1940s, the region became integral part of Japan’s ‘Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere’ concept as a key provider of natural resources. In December 1941, Japan went to war with the US and its allies to take control of Southeast Asian territories and resources. After World War II, Japan continued to highly value Southeast Asia for the above-mentioned economic reasons, as it served as a vital maritime trade routes and offered opportunities for Japan to play a role commensurate to its growing economic power. A strong believer in the latter aspect was Prime Minister Kishi, who during wartime had been a supporter of the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere and who, after the war, became a prominent figure in the pro-Indonesia lobby in Japan. He envisioned Japan as a representative of Asia and believed that, by increasing Japanese influence particularly in Southeast Asia, such objective could be realised and Japan could strengthen its position in relation to the US.¹⁵⁰ Against this background, Kishi decided to support the Sukarno regime by reaching an agreement on war reparations in November 1957 (followed by the signing of a peace treaty the following year), despite the US was at that time supporting an anti-Sukarno rebellion in Indonesia.¹⁵¹ Prime Ministers Ikeda and Satō viewed Southeast Asia as a region where the Japan could play a larger role, enhancing its position in Asia and vis-à-vis the US.

Against that background, Japan worked to promote development and stability in Southeast Asia. When the Indonesia-Malaysia conflict broke out, it engaged in peace efforts to safeguard its interests in the region. In that context, the fact that Washington would appreciate Japanese efforts to resolve the confrontation was a further incentive for Japan to act – rather than being the primary motivation for Japanese involvement. In other words, there was similarity between Japan’s own objectives in mediating the confrontation and Washington’s requests to Japan to assist in that matter. In fact, Japan was even more proactive than what the Americans desired. For instance, Tokyo’s decision to launch the initiative of setting up a Sukarno-Rahman summit in May 1965, despite the Americans considering this move as premature and potentially counterproductive.

The Satō administration’s determination to engage in peace efforts was also influenced by domestic factors. First, it faced pressure, particularly from pro-Indonesia elements in the Japanese political (particularly several heavyweight politicians from the ruling LDP) and business communities (whereas MOFA was more prudent in engaging in mediation), to take action to help resolve the confrontation, which was destabilising Southeast Asia – where Japan had important economic interests and where vital sea routes for Japanese trade were located – and that was pushing Jakarta closer to Beijing, thus helping China expand its influence in Southeast Asia. Second, the Satō government, which, in July 1965 faced an Upper House election, was in a difficult position at home because its support for American policies in Vietnam contrasted with vocal opposition in Japan to US military operations in Indochina. Therefore, the Satō administration sought to project an image of itself as actively working for peace in the Vietnamese and Indonesia-Malaysian conflicts. Engaging in mediation also had the potential to help Japan enhance its international profile and PM Satō deliver on his pledge to make Japan a more active player in reducing regional tensions and realising stability in Asia. Finally, Tokyo’s decision in early 1965 to go ahead with its attempts for mediation despite American and British scepticism on the timing of those endeavours can be considered a case for Japan, which at the time was growing confident as an emerging economic power, seeking a larger autonomy in its diplomacy. As Ambassador Kai wrote in his memoirs, for Japan, which owing to its rapid economic growth in the 1960s was emerging as a ‘great power’, it was natural to aim at ‘having some visible achievement also in diplomacy’, such as mediating the Indonesia-Malaysia conflict.¹⁵² Tokyo’s role during the confrontation benefited Japan in terms of enhancing its position vis-à-vis the US. In particular, Japan showed the Americans that it had a ‘unique’ role to play in Asia, given that Japan was an Asian member of the Western camp with deeper knowledge and understanding of Asian realities comparing to Western countries.¹⁵³

This article demonstrates that although considerations around Japanese relations with the US contributed to motivating PM Satō’s government to engage in mediation, other factors also drove Japanese peace efforts, including responding to domestic pressure, geopolitical considerations related to stabilising Southeast Asia/Indonesia and countering China’s influence there, and enhancing Japan’s international role. In other words, the Satō administration was neither simply accommodating American requests to mediate, nor was it merely reacting to a change in British attitudes. Tokyo was mainly pursuing its foreign policy agenda. This study proposes that solid political will to realise domestic and foreign policy objectives, coupled with the US and Asian warring parties’ positive attitude towards Japanese peace efforts, contributed to Japan’s bold regional diplomacy.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by JSPS (Japan Society for the Promotion of Science) KAKENHI Grant Number [19K13625].

Notes on contributors

Andrea Pressello

Andrea Pressello is Professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Tokyo. His research interests include Japanese diplomacy toward Southeast Asia during the Cold War period. His publications include Japan and the Shaping of Post-Vietnam War Southeast Asia: Japanese Diplomacy and the Cambodian Conflict, 1978-1993 (Routledge, 2018).

Notes

^1. Nishihara, Masashi. The Japanese and Sukarno’s Indonesia: Tokyo-Jakarta relations, 1951–1966 (Honolulu, 1976).

^2. Miyagi, Taizō. Japan’s quest for stability in Southeast Asia: navigating the turning points in postwar Asia (London, 2017).

^3. Llewelyn, James. “Japan’s return to international diplomacy and Southeast Asia: Japanese mediation in Konfrontasi, 1963–66,” Asian Studies Review, 30:4, 355–74 (2006), https://doi.org/10.1080/10357820601052789.

^4. Llewelyn, James. “Nihon no chūkai gaikō to Nichiei masatsu. Mareshia funsō o meguru Nihon gaikō to Nichiei kyōgi, 1963–66,” Kokusai Seiji, no. 156 (2009).

^5. Hatano, Sumio and Satō, Susumu. Gendai Nihon no tōnan Ajia seisaku: 1950–2005 (Tokyo, 2007).

^6. Bowen, Roger. ‘Japan’s Foreign Policy’, PS: Political Science & Politics, 25:1, 57–73 (1992). DOI: https://doi.org/10.2307/419574.

^7. Nishihara, The Japanese and Sukarno’s Indonesia, 135, 144.

^8. Llewelyn, “Japan’s return to international diplomacy and Southeast Asia,” 370–71.

^9. Miyagi, Japan’s quest for stability in Southeast Asia, for example, 82–83.

^10. Hatano and Satō, Gendai Nihon no tōnan Ajia seisaku, 118.

^11. Hatano and Satō argued that the Satō government decided to engage in mediation when it judged that Great Britain, which had been discouraging Japanese mediation, shifted to a positive attitude towards Tokyo’s peace efforts; accordingly, in April 1965, Tokyo dispatched LDP Vice President Kawashima to Indonesia on the occasion of the celebrations for the 10^th anniversary of the Asia-Africa conference. See: Hatano and Satō, Gendai Nihon no tōnan Ajia seisaku, 108.

^12. Saitō, Shizuo. Nihon gaikō seisakushiron josetsu: gaikō kyōkun no shiteki kenkyū (Tokyo, 1981), 187.

^13. For a detailed examination of the Ikeda administration diplomacy, see, for example: Miyagi, Japan’s quest for stability in Southeast Asia; Llewelyn, ‘Japan’s return to international diplomacy and Southeast Asia’.

^14. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson. National Security Council Meeting, August 4, 1966. August 1, 1966, FRUS [Foreign Relations of the United States], 1964–1968, Volume XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines.

^15. Jones, Howard Palfrey. Indonesia: The possible dream (New York, 1971), 312–313.

^16. Miyagi, Japan’s quest for stability in Southeast Asia, 63–64.

^17. Nishihara, The Japanese and Sukarno’s Indonesia, 128.

^18. Jones, Indonesia, 342.

^19. Ibid., 343–44.

^20. Ibid., 345, 348–49, 351.

^21. From Australian Embassy, Tokyo. Savingram No. 91 – Confidential. 27 October, 1964, NAA [National Archives of Australia, Canberra] A1838/3034/11/89 Part5.

^22. Green, Marshall. Indonesia: Crisis and transformation, 1965–1968, (Washington D.C., 1990), 12, 31.

^23. Ibid.

^24. Saitō, Shizuo. Gaikō: watashi no taiken to kyōkun (Tokyo, 1991), 87.

^25. Saitō, Nihon gaikō seisakushiron josetsu, 177–178.

^26. Green, Indonesia, 26

^27. Jones, Indonesia, 297; Green, Indonesia, 31

^28. From Australian Embassy, Tokyo. Sav. 76. 4 September, 1964, NAA A1838/3034/11/89Part5.

^29. Saitō, Nihon gaikō seisakushiron josetsu, 180.

^30. External Affairs. Conversation with Mr. Katayama, 3^rd Foreign Market Section, Ministry of International Trade and Industry. Undated, NAA A1838/3034/11/89Part 5.

^31. From USUN New York. No title. December 3, 1964, IGM [Ishii, Gabe, Miyazato], DUSPTW [Documents on US Policy Toward Japan], 1964, VIII, Vol. 5, 302; Secretary’s delegation to the Nineteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. Japanese Policy towards Southeast Asia. December 3, 1964 (Part II of V), Ibid., 1964, VIII, Vol. 4, 181–182.

^32. Ibid.

^33. Secretary’s delegation to the Nineteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly. Japanese Policy towards Southeast Asia. December 3, 1964 (Part II of V), IGM, DUSPTW, 1964, VIII, Vol. 4, 181–182.

^34. From FE – William P. Bundy. Frictions in US-Japan Relations – Action Memorandum. November 9, 1964, IGM, DUSPTW, 1964, VIII, Vol. 5, 272.

^35. Visit of Prime Minister Satō, January 11–14, 1965; Background paper: Japanese relations with Southeast Asia. January 7, 1965, IGM, DUSPTW, 1965, IX, Vol. 9, 48.

^36. PrimMin Satō’s press conference, 8 November 1969, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, US, RG59, Box 2246.

^37. Hatano and Satō, Gendai Nihon no tōnan Ajia seisaku, 105–106, 108.

^38. Department of State, U.S.-Japanese Interests. November 25, 1964, IGM, DUSPTW, 1964, VIII, Vol. 4, 87.

^39. From Australian Embassy, Tokyo. Japan’s attitude to Malaysia dispute. 11 December 1964, NAA A9564/227/11/2/Part 7.

^40. From Australian Embassy, Tokyo. Savingram No. 2–Confidential. 9 January, 1965, NAA A1838/3034/11/89Part5.

^41. From Australian Embassy, Tokyo. Special Japanese envoy to Indonesia. January 12, 1965, NAA A1838/3034/11/89Part 5.

^42. Visit of Prime Minister Satō, January 11–14, 1965; Background paper: Japanese relations with Southeast Asia. January 7, 1965, IGM, DUSPTW, 1965, IX, Vol. 9, 47–48, 51.

^43. Ibid.

^44. Ibid., 50.

^45. From Australian Embassy, Washington. Indonesia/Malaysia. January 12, 1965. NAA A1838/3034/11/89/Part 5.

^46. Ibid.

^47. From FE – William Bundy. Talking paper: Your meeting with Prime minister Satō, January 12, 1965. January 12, 1965, IGM, DUSPTW, 1965, IX, Vol. 9, 470.

^48. Department of State. Current US-Japanese and world problems. January 12, 1965 IGM, DUSPTW, 1965, IX, Vol. 9, 158–159.

^49. Department of State. Current Situation in Indonesia and Cambodia. January 12, 1965, IGM, DUSPTW, 1965, IX, Vol. 9, 177.

^50. Ibid., 177.

^51. Department of State. US-Japan relations and related world problems. January 13, 1965, IGM, DUSPTW, 1965, IX, Vol. 9, 213.

^52. From Australian Embassy, Washington. Prime Minister Satō’s visit to Washington. 15 January 1965, NAA A1838/3034/11/89/Part 5.

^53. Memorandum of Conversation. Current U.S.-Japanese and World Problems. January 12, 1965, FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 2, Japan.

^54. ‘Joint Statement of Japanese Prime Minister and U.S. President Johnson’, Washington, January 13, 1965, ‘The World and Japan’, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies; Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, The University of Tokyo, https://worldjpn.grips.ac.jp/documents/texts/JPUS/19650113.D1E.html.

^55. From Australian High Commission, Kuala Lumpur. Saving. No. 4. 15 January 1965, NAA A1838/3103/11/108/Part 1.

^56. Asahi Shimbun. ‘Chūgoku Indoneshia ga kyōdō seimei. Gunji musubitsuki kyōka’ (January 29, 1965), 3.

^57. Asahi Shimbun. ‘Go sen man-doru shakkan kyōyo Chūgoku ga Indoneshia e’ (January 29, 1965), 3.

^58. Department of External Affairs. Inward Savingram, I. 4432. No date, NAA A1838/3034/11/89/Part 5.

^59. From Australian Embassy, Tokyo. Savingram No. 11. 2 February, 1965, NAA A1838/3103/11/104/Part 2.

^60. Ibid.

^61. Ibid.

^62. Department of State. Satō visit to the United States. January 25, 1965, IGM, DUSPTW, 1965, IX, Vol. 3, 27.

^63. Department of External Affairs. Indonesia. 14 January 1965, NAA A1838/3034/11/89/Part 5.

^64. Dai 14kai ni okeru Satō naikakusōri daijin shisei hōshin enzetsu. (Gaikō ni kansuru bubun). (Shōwa 40nen 1gatsu 25nichi), MOFADB [Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Diplomatic Bluebook] (1965), https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/1965/s40-shiryou-001.htm.

^65. Dai 48kai tsūjō kokkai ni okeru Shiina gaimudaijin no gaikō enzetsu. (Shōwa 40nen 1gatsu 25nichi), Ibid.

^66. Department of External Affairs. Inward Savingram, I. 4432. No date, NAA A1838/3034/11/89/Part 5.

^67. From Australian Embassy, Tokyo. Savingram No. 11. 2 February, 1965, NAA A1838/3103/11/104/Part 2.

^68. Ibid.

^69. From Australian Embassy, Tokyo. Relations with Indonesia. 15 January, 1965, NAA A1838/3034/11/89/Part 5. For a detailed discussion of pro-Indonesia groups in Japanese political and business circles, see: Nishihara, The Japanese and Sukarno’s Indonesia.

^70. Dai 48-kai kokkai Shūgiin honkaigi dai 5-gō, Shōwa 40nen 1gatsu 27nichi, National Diet Library, parliamentary minutes, https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/txt/104805254X00519650127/0.

^71. From Australian High Commission, London. Indonesia-Malaysia – Possible Japanese initiative. February 3, 1965, NAA A1838/3034/11/89/Part 5.

^72. Department of External Affairs, Canada. Japan as mediator in the Malaysian-Indonesian problem. 26 February 1965, NAA A1838/3103/11/106/Part 5.

^73. From Australian Embassy, Tokyo. Indonesia/Malaysia. February 8, 1965, NAA A1838/3034/11/89/Part 5.

^74. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom. January 25, 1965, FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines.

^75. Ibid.

^76. Ibid.

^77. Ibid.

^78. From Australian Embassy, Washington. Indonesia/Malaysia-Mediation. February 5, 1965, NAA A1838/3034/11/89/Part 5.

^79. Green, Indonesia, 15.

^80. Ibid., 12–13.

^81. Ibid., 13.

^82. Ibid., 15.

^83. Jones, Indonesia, 360; Green, Indonesia, 31.

^84. Green, Indonesia, 14.

^85. Department of External Affairs. Inward cablegram. 21 January 1965, NAA A1838/3034/11/89/Part 5.

^86. From Australian Embassy, Washington. Indonesia/Malaysia-Mediation. January 28, 1965, NAA A1838/3034/11/89/Part 5.

^87. From Australian Embassy, Tokyo. Subandrio visit. February 16, 1965, NAA A1838/3034/11/89/Part 5.

^88. From Australian Embassy, Tokyo. Indonesia/Malaysia. February 8, 1965, NAA A1838/3034/11/89/Part 5.

^89. The establishment of an Afro-Asian Conciliation Commission was proposed by the Philippines at the June 1964 Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines summit in Tokyo.

^90. From Australian Embassy, Djakarta. Confidential. February 1, 1965, NAA A1838/3034/11/89/Part 5.

^91. From Australian Embassy, Tokyo. Savingram No. 11–Confidential. February 2, 1965, NAA A1838/3034/11/89/Part 5.

^92. From Australian Embassy, Tokyo. Afro-Asian conference: participation of Japan and Malaysia. 22 January, 1965, NAA A1838/3034/11/89/Part 5.

^93. Ajiakyoku. Mareishia funsō chōtei kōsaku, 9 February 1965, RSTSNKGMKB [Rekishi shiryō to shite no kachi ga mitomerareru kaiji bunsho], DAMOFAT [Diplomatic Archives, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Tokyo], CD-ROM16, 04-482-19.

^94. Satō, Eisaku. Satō Eisaku nikki, Vol. 2 (Tokyo, 1998), 238.

^95. From Australian High Commission, London. Indonesia-Malaysia. 19 February, 1965, NAA A1838/3034/11/89/Part 5.

^96. Satō, Eisaku. Satō Eisaku nikki, Vol. 2 (Tokyo, 1998), 241.

^97. From Department of State. No subject. February 23, 1965, IGM, DUSPTW, 1965, IX, Vol. 2, 57–58.

^98. Ibid.

^99. Ibid.

^100. Ibid.

^101. Ibid.

^102. Ibid.

^103. Ibid.

^104. Ibid., 57–60.

^105. Ajiakyoku. Mareishia funsō ni tsuki Ra-man shushō no ikō dashing no tame no tokushi haken ni tsuite, 24 February 1965, RSTSNKGMKB, DAMOFAT, CD-ROM16, 04-482-22.

^106. From Australian Embassy, Tokyo. Indonesia/Malaysia: mediation. 25 February 1965, NAA A1838/3103/11/104/Part 2.

^107. Ibid.

^108. From Australian Embassy, Tokyo. Indonesia/Malaysia. 26 February, 1965, NAA A1838/3034/11/89/Part 5.

^109. Department of External Affairs, Canberra. 2 March 1965, NAA A1838/3103/11/104/Part 2.

^110. Dai 48-kai kokkai Shūgiin gaimuiinkai dai 6-gō, March 12, 1965, National Diet Library, parliamentary minutes, https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/txt/104803968X00619650312.

^111. Dai 48-kai kokkai Shūgiin gaimuiinkai dai 13-gō, April 7, 1965, Ibid., https://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/txt/104803968X01319650407.

^112. From Australian embassy, Tokyo. Gordon Walker’s visit. 30 April, 1965, NAA A1838/3034/11/89/Part 5.

^113. From Amembassy Djakarta. No title. April 22, 1965, IGM, DUSPTW, 1965, IX, Vol. 3, 139–140.

^114. Kai taishi. Kawashima-Rahman kaidan, 21 April 1965, RSTSNKGMKB, DAMOFAT, CD-ROM16, 04-482-26.

^115. Saitō taishi. Kawashima tokushi to Sukaruno daitōryō to no kaidan, April 20, 1965, Ibid., CD-ROM16, 04-482-25.

^116. From Australian High Commission, Kuala Lumpur. Kawashima’s visit. 22 March 1965 (Date should be 22 April 1965), 1965, NAA A1838/3034/11/89/Part 5.

^117. Ibid.

^118. From Australian Embassy, Washington. Indonesia-Malaysia: Japanese mediation. 27 April, 1965, NAA A1838/3034/11/89/Part 5.

^119. Ibid.

^120. Japan has agreed to participation of Malaysia and Soviet Union. From Tokyo. Tunku’s visit to Japan. 10 May 1965, NAA A1838/3027/11/89/Part 1.

^121. Saitō, Gaikō: watashi no taiken to kyōkun.

^122. From Australian Embassy, Jakarta. Malaysia. 11 May 1965, NAA A1838/3034/11/89/Part 5.

^123. From Australian Embassy, Washington. Subandrio’s visit to Tokyo. 27 May, 1965, NAA A1838/3103/11/104/Part 2.

^124. UPI article. No title. May 28, 1965, NAA A1838/3103/11/104/Part 2.

^125. Saitō, Nihon gaikō seisakushiron josetsu, 189.

^126. Amembassy Tokyo. Second Japan-US policy planning consultations. May 22, 1965, IGM, DUSPTW, 1965, IX, Vol. 6, 119–130.

^127. Ibid., 119–30.

^128. Green, Indonesia, 11–12, 34.

^129. From Australian Embassy, Tokyo. Savingram 54. 30 July 1965, NAA A1838/3103/11/104/Part 2.

^130. Green, Indonesia, 36.

^131. Saitō, Nihon gaikō seisakushiron josetsu, 179.

^132. Green, Indonesia, 71.

^133. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia. October 29, 1965, FRUS, 1964–1968, Volume XXVI, Indonesia; Malaysia-Singapore; Philippines.

^134. Green, Indonesia, 115, 118.

^135. Kai, Fumihiko. Kokkyō o koeta yūjō: waga gaikō hiwa (Tokyo, 1990), 77.

^136. Ibid., 78–80.

^137. Satō, Eisaku. Satō Eisaku nikki, Vol. 2 (Tokyo, 1998), 430.

^138. From Gaimushō to Takeuchi-taishi. Tai Indoneshia enjo mondai ni tsuite, June 8, 1966. RSTSNKGMKB, DAMOFAT, CD-ROM16, 04-488-3.

^139. From Embassy Tokyo. Communist China and Vietnam; Indonesia; Cambodia; Japan and SEA Development. July 6, 1966, IGM, DUSPTW, 1966, X, Vol. 3, 46.

^140. Kai, Kokkyō o koeta yūjō, 80.

^141. Saitō, Nihon gaikō seisakushiron josetsu, 201.

^142. Jones, Indonesia, 298.

^143. Saitō, Gaikō, 87; Saitō, Nihon gaikō seisakushiron, 177–178.

^144. Saitō, Nihon gaikō seisakushiron, 177–178, 195–196.

^145. Llewelyn. ‘Japan’s return to international diplomacy and Southeast Asia’, 371.

^146. Hatano and Satō, Gendai Nihon no tōnan Ajia seisaku, 105.

^147. Yoshida, Shigeru. ‘Japan’s Place in Asia’, Atlantic Monthly, 101–102, (January, 1955).

^148. Pressello, Andrea. Japan and the Shaping of Post-Vietnam War Southeast Asia: Japanese Diplomacy and the Cambodian Conflict, 1978–1993 (Abingdon, 2018), 13, 15–16, 18–22, 35.

^149. Gaimushō. Tōnan Ajia to no keizai kyōryoku, 19 May 1954, in ‘Yoshida sōri Ōbei hōmon kankei ikken’, DAMOFAT, microfilm A-0137, DAMOFAT.

^150. Pressello, Japan and the Shaping of Post-Vietnam War Southeast Asia, 17–18.

^151. Green, Indonesia, 7.

^152. Kai, Kokkyō o koeta yūjō, 49.

^153. On Japan’s efforts to show the ‘uniqueness’ of its role in Asia, see: Miyagi, Japan’s quest for stability in Southeast Asia, 57.