Learning as we go: the US army adapts to counterinsurgency in Iraq, July 2004–December 2006

Abstract

The US military went into Iraq with no clear understanding of or preparations for counterinsurgency. This fact, combined with poor postwar planning and failure to recognize the early development of the insurgency, severely hamstrung the American effort to secure and stabilize the country. Nevertheless, the US Army demonstrated the ability to adapt effectively from the bottom-up at the operational and tactical levels during General George Casey's tenure as commander of Multinational Force-Iraq from 2004 to 2006. Yet despite the success of population-security measures and the development of counterinsurgency doctrine, the military's top leaders in Iraq resisted the implementation of a true population-centric counterinsurgency strategy, opting instead to focus on a ‘transition’ exit strategy. It was not until after the transition approach collapsed amid the chaos of 2006 that counterinsurgency, and the utility of force in securing the will of the population, was embraced by America's strategic leadership.

Keywords:

• counterinsurgency
• learning, Iraq
• Casey

Notes

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 2. Gen. (ret.) Barry McCaffrey, US Army, Newshour with Jim Lehrer, 30 June 2008. Available at: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east/jan-june08/iraqreport_06-30.html

 3. Gen. (ret.) John Keane, US Army, NewsHour with Jim Lehrer, 18 April 2006. Available at: http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/jan-june06/rumsfeld_4-18.html

 4. For detailed accounts of the flawed approach during Sanchez's command see Ricks, Fiasco, and Hashim, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, passim.

 5. Wright and Reese, On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign, 569. Available at: http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CSI/OP2.asp; Gordon, ‘Occupation Plan for Iraq Faulted in Army History’.

 6. Smith, The Utility of Force, 19.

 7. Ricks, Fiasco, 392–3.

 8. Woodward, State of Denial, 410.

 9. Ricks, Fiasco, 392–4; Burton interview with Kalev Sepp, Monterey, CA, 2 March 2007; Sepp, ‘Best Practices in Counterinsurgency’, 8–12. Sepp now serves as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations.

10. Woodward, State of Denial, 315–6.

11. Metz, Learning from Iraq, 51–2.

12. O'Hanlon and Campbell, ‘Iraq Index: Tracking Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Iraq’, 21.

13. Woodward, State of Denial, 410–1.

14. Woodward, State of Denial, 319, 426

15. Woodward, State of Denial, 417–48; Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, ‘Iraq and US Policy’, Opening Remarks before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 19 October 2005, available at: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/55303.htm.

16. National Security Council, ‘National Strategy for Victory in Iraq’, The White House, 30 November 2005, 8. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/iraq/iraq_national_strategy_20051130.pdf

17. National Security Council, ‘National Strategy for Victory in Iraq’, 28–9.

18. Ricks, ‘The Lessons of Counterinsurgency’.

19. The 3rd ACR's performance in Tall Afar was so impressive that it was used as the case study illustrating ‘Clear, Hold, and Build’ in Field Manual 3-24. See pp.182–4.

20. Ricks, ‘The Lessons of Counterinsurgency’; Ricks, Fiasco, 419–24; Packer, ‘The Lesson of Tal Afar’, The New Yorker, 10 April 2006.

21. A similar learning process in the direction of population-centric counterinsurgency was occurring concurrently among US forces deployed to Afghanistan. See Phillips, ‘To Woo Afghan Locals, US Troops Settle In’.

22. Ricks, Fiasco, 414–6.

23. Chiarelli and Michaelis, ‘Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations’, 15.

24. Chiarelli and Michaelis, ‘Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations’, 16.

25. Gibson, ‘Battlefield Victories and Strategic Success’, 48.

26. Gibson, ‘Battlefield Victories and Strategic Success’, 49–53.

27. Brown, ‘Commander's Assessment: South Baghdad’, 31–3.

28. Burton interview with Army Capt. Forrest Cook, Stanford, CA, 28 February 2007; Burton interview with Army Capt. Chad Caldwell, Stanford, CA, 5 March 2007; Burton interview with Army Maj. Keith Walters, Stanford, CA, 26 February 2007.

29. Ricks, Fiasco, 416–7.

30. Burton interview with Army Lt. Col. Chris Gibson, Stanford, CA, 13 March 2007; Gibson, ‘Battlefield Victories and Strategic Success’.

31. Ricks, ‘The Lessons of Counterinsurgency’; Ricks, Fiasco, 423.

32. Brown, ‘Commander's Assessment: South Baghdad’, 28.

33. Ricks, Fiasco, 394; Cordesman, Iraqi Force Development, 90; ‘MNSTC-I Information’, Multinational Security Transition Command – Iraq. Available at: http://www.mnstci.iraq.centcom.mil/mission.htm (accessed 16 March 2007).

34. Cordesman, Iraqi Force Development, 90–1, 103–7.

35. Cordesman, Iraqi Force Development, 128–9, 131–2.

36. Lardner, ‘Roots of Iraq Weapon Probes Date to 2004’, USA Today, 27 September 2007.

37. Government Accountability Office, ‘Stabilizing Iraq: An Assessment of the Security Situation’, GAO-06-1094T, 11 September 2006, 16. Available at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d061094t.pdf

38. Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Fact Sheet: President Bush Received Briefing from Military Commanders’, The White House, 17 February 2006. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/02/20060217-2.html.

39. Government Accountability Office, ‘Stabilizing Iraq’, 17.

40. Cordesman, Iraqi Force Development, 423–7.

41. Metz, Learning from Iraq, 56–7; Michael Moss, ‘How Iraq Police Reform Became Casualty of War’, New York Times, 22 May 2006.

42. Metz, Learning from Iraq, 56–7.

43. Burton interview with Army Capt. Forrest Cook, 28 February 2007.

44. Burton interview with Army Capt. Chad Caldwell, 5 March 2007.

45. Hashim, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 40–7.

46. Ricks, Fiasco, 413–4; O'Hanlon and Campbell; ‘Iraq Index’, 15 March 2007, 14.

47. O'Hanlon and Campbell, ‘Iraq Index’, 15 March 2007, 11; Hashim, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq, 49.

48. Moss, ‘How Iraq Police Reform Became Casualty of War’.

49. Metz, Learning from Iraq, 54–5; Tavernise, ‘Iraqi Death Toll Exceeded 34,000 in 2006, UN Says’, New York Times, 17 January 2007; Ricks, ‘Shrine Bombing as War's Turning Point Debated’, Washington Post, 13 March 2007; UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), ‘Human Rights Report: 1 November–31 December 2006’. Available at: http://www.uniraq.org/FileLib/misc/HR%20Report%20Nov%20Dec%202006%20EN.pdf.

50. Baker and Hamilton et al., The Iraq Study Group Report, 4.

51. O'Hanlon and Campbell, ‘Iraq Index’, 15 March 2007, 13; Tavernise, ‘Iraq Death Toll Exceeded 34,000 in 2006, UN Says’; UNAMI, ‘Human Rights Report: 1 November–31 December 2006’.

52. O'Hanlon and Campbell, ‘Iraq Index’, 15 March 2007, 23.

53. Ricks, ‘US Counterinsurgency Academy Giving Officers a New Mindset’; Burton interview with Army Capt. Chad Caldwell, Stanford, CA, 5 March 2007.

54. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 41–5; Metz, Learning from Iraq, 58–63. Special operations units include ‘Delta Force, Army Rangers, Navy SEALs, and Army Special Forces (Green Berets)’.

55. Metz, Learning from Iraq, 64–5; Cone, ‘The Changing National Training Center’, 70–9.

56. Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency Operations, FMI (Field Manual Interim) 3-07.22.

57. Petraeus and Amos, ‘Foreword’, FM (Field Manual) 3-24/MCWP (Marine Corps Warfighting Publication) 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency.

58. FM 3-24, 1–22.

59. Sanger, Gordon, and Burns, ‘Chaos Overran Iraq Plan in ’06, Bush Team Says'.

60. Spiegel, ‘Lt. Gen. Raymond Odierno Embodies “Surge” in Iraq’.

61. Sanger, Gordon, and Burns, ‘Chaos Overran Iraq Plan in ’06, Bush Team Says'; Baker III et al., Iraq Study Group Report.

62. Gordon, ‘New Iraq Strategy Emerges: Security, Then Politics’; Gordon and Sanger, ‘Commander Said to be Open to More Troops’.

63. Gordon and Shanker, ‘Bush to Name a New General to Oversee Iraq’; Gordon, ‘A New Commander, in Step with the White House’.

64. Smith and MacFarland, ‘Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point’, 44.

65. O'Hanlon and Campbell, ‘Iraq Index’, 13.

66. Smith and MacFarland, ‘Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point’

67. Smith and MacFarland, ‘Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point’, 23. In Defense Department reporting, attacks are defined as any known attack on US or Coalition forces, Iraqi security forces, or civilians and typically include improvised explosive devices (IEDs), small arms fire, and indirect weapons fire. Exact column date intervals: 29 August 2005–20 January 2006; 11 February–12 May 2006; 20 May–4 August 2006; 12 August–10 November 2006; 11 November 2006–9 February 2007.

68. MacFarland, ‘Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point’, 14., 20.