Exploring the utility of armed force in peace operations: German and British approaches in northern Afghanistan

Abstract

The robust approach of the American forces in for example Afghanistan and Iraq is often criticised and compared to the more soft approach of the British forces. However, there are surprisingly few systematic studies on the relationship between the conduct of force and the outcome of peace operations. Two kinds of military conduct in Afghanistan have been explored in this article, one that could be called ‘minimum force’ and one that could be called ‘show of force’. Contradicting the commonly held idea of the superiority of ‘minimum force’, ‘show of force’ correlated with a better outcome than the ‘minimum force’ approach. However, before arguing that a ‘show of force’ approach is a better way to conduct peace operations, more reliable data on the outcome, and additional case studies, are needed.

Keywords:

• peace operations
• counterinsurgency
• tactics
• minimum force
• show of force
• Afghanistan

Notes

 1. Jones, ‘Averting Failure in Afghanistan’, 111–6.

 2. Byman and Seybolt, ‘Humanitarian Intervention and Communal Civil Wars: Problems and Alternative Approaches’, 33.

 3. Peace operations is an umbrella term for different kinds of operations, for example, peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-building, peace-enforcement and humanitarian operations (e.g., in the US doctrine Peace Operations (2007), 1–7, and the US doctrine Counterinsurgency (2006), 1–20). Lately, the similarities between peace enforcement and counterinsurgency (COIN) have been discussed and COIN is considered part of peace operations in some doctrines (e.g., in the NATO doctrine Peace Support Operations (2001), 6–7, and in the UK doctrine on The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations (2004), 2–7). It could also be argued that there are several similarities between the strategic intent of PSO and COIN, as well as between some determinants of success (see below). The term peace operations can, in this light, also include COIN. Mockaitis, ‘From Counterinsurgency to Peace Enforcement: New Names for Old Games?’ 40–57; Hills, ‘Hearts and Minds Or Search and Destroy? Controlling Civilians in Urban Operations’, 2.

 4. Thornton, ‘The British Army and the Origins of its Minimum Force Philosophy’, 83–106.

 5. Chin, ‘Examining the Application of British Counterinsurgency Doctrine by the American Army in Iraq’, 8.

 6. Chin, ‘Examining the Application’, 5–10; Van der Kloet, ‘Building Trust in the Mission Area: A Weapon Against Terrorism?’, 433; Peter V. Jakobsen, PRTs in Afghanistan: Successful but Not Sufficient; Bellamy and Williams, ‘Introduction: Thinking Anew about Peace Operations’, 2; Thornton, ‘The British Army and the Origins of its Minimum Force Philosophy’, 83–4; However, the true nature of this approach has been extensively discussed. See, for example, Bennett, ‘The Mau Mau Emergency as Part of the British Army's Post-War Counter-Insurgency Experience’, 143–163.

 7. For example, Counterinsurgency, 1-25, A-5; Military Contribution, A-6; Peace Operations, I-1–I-2; Peace Support Operations, 3-1–3-6.

 8. Downs and Stedman, ‘Evaluation Issues in Peace Implementation’.

 9. Mueller, ‘The Banality of “Ethnic War”’, 65; Fearon and Laitin, ‘Neotrusteeship and the Problem of Weak States’, 23.

10. Downs and Stedman, ‘Evaluation Issues in Peace Implementation’, 43.

11. Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle, 18.

12. Harkavy and Neuman, Warfare and the Third World, xi–xii.

13. Smith, The Utility of Force.

14. Biddle, Military Power, 17–9.

15. Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, Understanding Peacekeeping, 95, 128–33; Findlay, The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations, 15.

16. Dobbie, ‘A Concept for Post-Cold War Peacekeeping’, 124, 133; Woodhouse, ‘The Gentle Hand of Peace? British Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution in Complex Political Emergencies’, 30.

17. Hills, ‘Hearts and Minds’, 2; Peace Support Operations, 2-4–2-5.

18. Counterinsurgency, A-5.

19. , ‘Peacekeepers and Local Social Actors: The Need for Dynamic, Cross-Cultural Analysis’, 3; Pouligny, Peace Operations Seen from Below: UN Missions and Local People.

20. Heiberg, ‘Peacekeepers and Local Populations: Some Comments on UNIFIL’.

21. Heiberg, ‘Peacekeepers and Local Populations’.

22. Gizelis and Kosek, ‘Why Humanitarian Interventions Succeed Or Fail: The Role of Local Participation’, 363–83.

23. Peace Operations, I-5–1-6; Peace Support Operations, 3–4.

24. Peace Support Operations, 3–5.

25. According to Stedman, spoilers are ‘leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it’. Stedman, ‘Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes’, 5.

26. Höglund, Violence in the Midst of Peace Negotiations: Cases from Guatemala, Northern Ireland, South Africa and Sri Lanka; Stedman, ‘Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes’, 5; Kydd and Walter, ‘Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of Extremist Violence’, 263–96.

27. In this article, minimum force is not the same as the British ‘minimum necessary force’. Minimum force is rather about the appearance of the forces, than about how much violence they actually use.

28. Chin, ‘Examining the Application’, 9.

29. Pushkina, ‘A Recipe for Success? Ingredients of a Successful Peacekeeping Mission’, 134; Downs and Stedman, ‘Evaluation Issues in Peace Implementation’, 47–9.

30. Downs and Stedman, ‘Evaluation Issues in Peace Implementation’, 49.

31. Downs and Stedman, ‘Evaluation Issues in Peace Implementation’, 45, 49–50.

32. Bullock, ‘Theory of Effectiveness Measurement’, 20.

33. Bullock, ‘Theory of Effectiveness Measurement’, 20

34. Byman and Seybolt, ‘Humanitarian Intervention’, 35.

35. Byman and Seybolt, ‘Humanitarian Intervention’, p. 35; Brooks, ‘Making Military might: Why do States Fail and Succeed?: A Review Essay’, 153.

36. Pushkina, ‘A Recipe for Success?’, 134; Downs and Stedman, ‘Evaluation Issues in Peace Implementation’, 47.

37. Single case studies within a conflict are quite common in War Studies. See for example, Malkasian, ‘The Role of Perceptions and Political Reform in Counterinsurgency: The Case of Western Iraq, 2004–05’, 367–94; Hills, ‘Fear and Loathing in Falluja’, 623–39; Chin, ‘British Counter-Insurgency in Afghanistan’, 201–225. Unfortunately, comparisons between cases within one and the same conflict are not common. One exception is Malkasian, ‘Did the United States Need More Forces in Iraq? Evidence from Al Anbar’, 78–104.

38. As for example, differences in mandate or implementation strategies, the difficulty of the mission, underlying causes of the conflict, or the salience of a given conflict for international public opinion. Pushkina, ‘A Recipe for Success?’, 134; Downs and Stedman, ‘Evaluation Issues in Peace Implementation’, 43, 53.

39. Sedra, ‘Civil-Military Relations in Afghanistan: The Provincial Reconstruction Team Debate’.

40. According to research on military cultures, militaries in different states often have different approaches to the conduct of war. See for example, the discussion on the ‘way of war’ in history and on ‘strategic culture’ in International Relations. Hanson, Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise of Western Power, 5–13; McInnes, ‘The British Army's New Way in Warfare: A Doctrinal Misstep?’, 128; Thornton, ‘The British Army and the Origins of its Minimum Force Philosophy’, 83–106.

41. Sedra, ‘Civil-Military Relations’; Perito, The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan; Jakobsen, PRTs in Afghanistan.

42. In addition, several officers working with the Quick Reaction Force in Mazar-e Sharif have also been interviewed.

43. All interviews were conducted on the basis of confidentiality, and the names of interviewees are withheld by mutual agreement. Transcripts are available from the author.

44. Perito, The U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan, 2–3; Lopez, ‘Engaging Or Withdrawing, Winning Or Losing? The Contradictions of Counterinsurgency Policy in Afghanistan and Iraq’, 246; Maloney, ‘Afghanistan Four Years on: An Assessment’, 23. These teams were initially called Joint Regional Teams (JRTs).

45. Jakobsen, PRTs in Afghanistan, 13.

46. Security Council, Resolution 1386 (2001), 2.

47. Security Council, Resolution 1510 (2003), 2.

48. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ‘Expansion of NATO's presence in Afghanistan’. Available at: http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/expansion/index.html (accessed 3 March 2008).

49. Forward support bases ‘are essential logistic installations, created to provide supply, medical and transport hub in each region to assist the PRTs in their mission to extend the Government of Afghanistan's authority’. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ‘ISAF Regional Command Structure’. Available at: http://www.nato.int/isaf/structure/regional_command/index.html (accessed 3 March 2008).

50. Security Council, Resolution 1510, 2.

51. Bennett, ‘The Mau Mau Emergency’, 145–6; Thornton, ‘The British Army and the Origins of its Minimum Force Philosophy’, 83–106.

52. Bennett, ‘The Mau Mau Emergency’, 145.

53. Cassidy, ‘The British Army and Counterinsurgency: The Salience of Military Culture’, 53–9; Chin, ‘British Counter-Insurgency’, 202; The Military Contribution to Peace Support Operations, 1–4.

54. Jakobsen, PRTs in Afghanistan, 13; Swedish Armed Forces, ‘Afghanistan’. Available at: http://www2.mil.se/sv/Insatser/Afghanistan/ (accessed 31 March 2008).

55. Bogland and Bedford, Sveriges bidrag till PRT i Afghanistan: En utvärdering inför övertagandet av ledningen för PRT i Mazar-e-Sharif, 18; Interview with officer at PRT Mazar-e Sharif.

56. Central Statistics Office Afghanistan, ‘Settled Population by civil division (Urban and Rural) and sex 2005–2006’. Available at: http://www.cso-af.net/cso/documents/estimated%20population%201384.xls (accessed 1 April 2008). For a discussion on the number of forces vs. civilians, see Malkasian, ‘Did the United States Need More Forces’, 80.

57. Jakobsen, PRTs in Afghanistan, 21–2; United States Institute of Peace, ‘Afghan Experience Project, Interview #26’. Available at: http://www.usip.org/library/oh/sops/afghanistan/gov/26.pdf (accessed 5 May 2007); Interview with officer at PRT Mazar-e Sharif.

58. United States Institute of Peace, ‘Afghan Experience Project, Interview #18’. Available at: http://www.usip.org/library/oh/sops/afghanistan/gov/18.pdf (accessed 5 May 2007).

59. Bogland and Bedford, Sveriges bidrag, 33–4; Jakobsen, PRTs in Afghanistan, 21 United States Institute of Peace, ‘Afghan Experience Project, Interview #18’; United States Institute of Peace, ‘Afghan Experience Project, Interview #26’.

60. Interview with officer at PRT Mazar-e Sharif.

61. Interview with officer at the QRF.

62. Interview with officer at PRT Mazar-e Sharif.

63. Interview with officer at PRT Mazar-e Sharif

64. Bogland and Bedford, Sveriges bidrag, 35.

65. Merz, Still on the Way to Afghanistan? Germany and its Forces in the Hindu Kush.

66. Merz, Still on the Way to Afghanistan?, 9; Jakobsen, PRTs in Afghanistan, 25.

67. Central Statistics Office Afghanistan, Settled Population.

68. Jakobsen, PRTs in Afghanistan, 24; Interview with officer at PRT Kunduz.

69. Interview with officer at PRT Kunduz.

70. Interview with officer at PRT Kunduz

71. Jakobsen, PRTs in Afghanistan, 25; Merz, Still on the Way to Afghanistan?, 9.

72. Interview with officer at PRT Kunduz.

73. Interview with officer at PRT Kunduz.

74. Jakobsen, PRTs in Afghanistan, 25.

75. Interview with officer at PRT Kunduz.

76. Interview with officer at PRT Kunduz

77. The collection of data for the FAST Event database is conducted by local staff, so called Local Information Networks, and coded by a Country Coordinator, based on a standardised coding scheme. Swiss Peace, ‘About Swiss Peace's Early Warning Program – FAST International’. Available at: http://www.swisspeace.ch/typo3/en/peace-conflict-research/early-warning/about/index.html (accessed 31 March 2008).

78. Höglund, Violence in the Midst of Peace Negotiations, 58.

79. Jones, ‘Averting Failure in Afghanistan’, 112.

80. Terrorism is defined ‘by the nature of the act, not by the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of the cause. Terrorism is violence, or the threat of violence, calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm. These acts are designed to coerce others into actions they would not otherwise undertake, or refrain from actions they desired to take.’ MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, ‘Purpose and Description of Information Found in the Incident Databases’. Available at: http://www.tkb.org/RandSummary.jsp?page = method (accessed 31 March 2008).

81. For example Norris, Kern and Just, ‘Lessons from Framing Terrorism’, 281–302; Jones, ‘Averting Failure in Afghanistan’, 111–27.

82. MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, ‘Purpose and Description’.

83. Norris, Kern and Just, ‘Lessons from Framing Terrorism’, 281–302; Jones, ‘Averting Failure in Afghanistan’, 113.

84. The incidents included in the categories are: armed battle, artillery attack, mine explosion, missile attack, other ‘bombing’, riot or political turmoil, suicide bombing, vehicle bombing, other ‘armed actions’, other ‘force use’, give ultimatum, small arms attack and assassination. However, the actual attacks during this period consisted of artillery attacks, mine explosions, other ‘bombings’, riots or political turmoil, suicide bombings, other ‘armed actions’, small arms attacks' and assassinations.

85. An alternative time frame would be from when both PRTs transferred to ISAF command, i.e. July 2004. However, if choosing this time frame, the conduct of the Swedish forces might have influenced the outcome of operations during the last four months in the AO of PRT Mazar-e Sharif. If the conduct of the Swedish forces was different from the British forces, it could have had another influence on the outcome of operation. Since the Regional Command North moved to Mazar-e Sharif, the number of international personnel increased to around 3000, at the same time as the command of the PRT was transferred to Swedish forces. Since some argue that the Swedish forces acted more like the German forces than the British, the chosen time frame will be from 1 March 2004 to 28 February 2006. See Interview with officer at PRT Mazar-e Sharif.

86. Even if choosing the timeframe from when NATO received the command over the two PRTs as a starting point, i.e. from 1 July 2004–30 June 2006, the tendency is the same. According to the FAST Event Database there is an increase from 4 to 16 attacks (300%) during this time in the AO of PRT Mazar-e Sharif and an increase from 5 to 6 attacks (20%) during this time in the AO of Kunduz. The corresponding data from the RAND®-MIPT database show an increase of attacks in the AO of PRT Mazar-e Sharif from 1 to 16 attacks (1500%) and a decrease of attacks in the AO of PRT Kunduz from 2 to 1 attacks ( − 50%).