The unnecessary uprising: Jeju Island rebellion and South Korean counterinsurgency experience 1947–48

Abstract

This paper systematically analyzes the causes of the escalation of violence during the initial stages of the Jeju Island Rebellion and the failure of South Korean counterinsurgency operations. It is argued that four interrelated factors provided the conditions for armed insurgency in the small island of Jeju: inter-agency tension between the Korean National Police (KNP) and the Korean Constabulary; the mainlanders' misinterpretation of the insurgency; the effect of systematic police brutality; and the role of youth groups. Consequently, two counterinsurgency lessons will be drawn from this study: that inter-agency cooperation and coordination at the tactical level between security branches and the incorporation of local population at the micro-level is essential in conducting efficient and effective counterinsurgency operations.

Keywords:

• Jeju Island rebellion
• counter-insurgency (COIN)
• Korean National Police (KNP)
• Korean Constabulary
• inter-agency tension
• violence escalation
• pseudo-gangs/youth groups

Acknowledgements

The author is particularly grateful to Yoav Gortzak for his patience and tireless work in reviewing each of the earlier drafts. For constructive comments and criticisms, the author would also like to thank Stefan Borg, Jae-Wook Chung, Nick LaRowe, Kentaro Sakuwa, Sheldon Simon, Carolyn Warner, the members of the IR Reading Group at Arizona State University, and the anonymous reviewer for Small Wars and Insurgencies.

Notes

 1. The term ‘forgotten war’ is from Blair Jr, The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950–1953.

 2. According to the National Committee Report, the Jeju island insurgency is divided into six phases: Phase 1 – 1 March riots and the transition to armed resistance (1 March 1947 – 3 April 1948); Phase 2 – armed resistance and 10 May elections (3 April 1948 – 10 May 1948); Phase 3 – first suppression campaign (11 May 1948– 10 October 1948); Phase 4 – second suppression campaign and mass violence (11 November 1948 – 1 March 1949); Phase 5 – stabilization operations (21 March 1949 – 24 June 1950); and Phase 6 – Korean War and end of insurgency (25 June 1950 – 21 September 1954). This paper will concentrate on phases 1 and 2 of the Jeju Island insurgency. For a different way of dividing the insurgency operations, see Hae Gu Jung, ‘Jeju 4.3 Hangjeng-kwa Migunjung jungchaek [Jeju 4.3 Resistance and American Military Government Policy],’ in Historical Studies Institute, Jeju 4.3 Yeon-gu, 180–204.

 3. According to the Jeju Island Investigation Committee, the official identified death total is 14,373 persons. Among the 14,373 deaths a staggering 4,839 persons (or 33.7%) were victims aged either under 20 or over 60. For detailed study on the casualty reports, see National Committee for Investigation of the Truth about the Jeju April 3 Incident, Final Report of Investigation of Jeju April 3 Incident, section IV. Some scholars estimate the casualty rates as high as 80,000 people. For varying assessments, see Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 2: The Roaring of the Cataract 1947–1950, 251–2, 258; Moon-Seung Ko, Park Hun-Yong kwa 4.3 sakun, 7–20; Millett, The War for Korea, 1945–1950: A House Burning, 142–3; and Cumings, ‘The Question of American Responsibility for the Suppression of the Chejudo Uprising’.

 4. For the most recent study on the organization and structure of the People's Liberation Army in Jeju Island, see Yoon-Sik Jang, The Organization and Activity of ‘Jejudo Guerrillas’ in the Early Stages of the Jeju 4.3 Uprising: Focusing On ‘The Report on the Struggle of Jejudo People's Guerrillas’. For a more general pattern on guerrilla force organization, see Chum-Kon Kim, ‘Korean Communist Guerrilla Warfare (1948–1950)’.

 5. Even 2,000 guerrillas could be considered a very generous assessment. Even during the peak of the violence during April 1948 to March 1949, internal reports within the Korean administration indicate that there were no more than 600 guerrillas at any particular time, and only 240 men were armed with World War II 99-type Japanese rifles. National Committee, Final Report, 187–8, 295–7.

 6. ‘The rebellion stemmed from local factors on the island and was not part of the overall strategy of the SKLP. In this sense, it was an “adventurous charge” that stood no chance of success – as North Korean historians have claimed’ (Merrill, Korea: The Peninsular Origins of the War, 63). In one of the only written records left behind, ‘Report on the Struggle of the People's Forces’, the guerrilla forces also point out that the Cheju insurgency was spontaneous in nature and that it was caused not by a coordinated centralized movement but by local conditions during the years of 1947–48. For more of the guerrilla records, see Chan-Song Moon, Hallasan-eun Algo it-da: Moodhyeo-jin 4.3eui Jinsang, 77–8.

 7. Merrill, Korea, pp. 82–3.

 8. For example, during the second half of 1948 of the Malaya counterinsurgency – largely considered one of the most successful COIN operations – the Malayan People's Anti-British Army (MPABA) only had a strength of roughly 5,000 forces and were poorly armed (usually with Japanese WWII rifles). Yet, the British failed to suppress the guerrilla forces at this initial stage that ultimately led to violence escalation. On the initial weakness of the insurgent forces during the Malaya counterinsurgency, see Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, 64; and Newsinger, British Counterinsurgency: From Palestine to Northern Ireland, 44–5.

 9. Merrill, Korea, p. 67; Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 2, 240, 252; and Deane, The Korean War 1945–1953, 54.

10. Critical junctures (or turning points) represent ‘specifically those posed choice points that put countries (or other units) onto paths of development that track certain outcomes – as opposed to others – that cannot be easily broken or reversed’ (Goertz and Levy, Explaining War and Peace: Case Studies and Necessary Condition Counterfactuals, 30f).

11. Merrill, Korea, 83, 183.

12. For example, Steinberg, Korea: Nexus of East Asia, 18; Jeju 4.3 Institute, Eijaesa Malhemsooda, 1–2; Editorial Board, Jeju-Hangjaeng; Geun-Sik Jeon et al., Dongasia-wa Guendae Pokryuk 2; and Historical Studies Institute, Jeju 4.3 Yeon-gu. The one exception is John Merrill's work. Written in the early 1980s, his in-depth analysis of the Jeju Island case remains unmatched, and I have benefited enormously from his work. Nevertheless, there are two shortcomings with Merrill's work: (1) it relies heavily on US sources and does not incorporate more of the newly available Korean sources on the case; and (2) it merely touches upon the key points and does not systematically address the issues.

13. The Special Act for the Investigation of the Jeju April 3 Incident and Recovering the Hour of Victims (Article 3) was only enacted and promulgated on 12 January 2000, under Dae Jung Kim's administration. For more on the South Korean government project on the investigation of the Jeju Island Uprising, go to http://www.jeju43.go.kr/english/.

14. Soon-Sung Cho, Korea in World Politics 1945–1950: An Evaluation of American Responsibility; Chong-Sik Lee, The Politics of Korean Nationalism; Henderson, Korea: Politics of the Vortex, parts III–IV; and Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945–1947.

15. For more on postliberation period Korea under the American Military Government in relation to Yo Un-Hyung's attempts, see Bonnie B.C. Oh, ‘Introduction: The Setting,’ in Bonnie B.C. Oh (ed.), Korea Under the American Military Government, 1945–1948, 1–12.

16. Meade, American Military Government in Korea, 185. Also see p. 61.

17. Merrill, ‘The Cheju-do Rebellion,’ 151–2; and Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 2, 252.

18. Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 2, 252.

19. National Committee, Final Report, 72–4.

20. The 12 sub-stations that the insurgents attacked were: Sang-am, Hamduck, Sae-hwa, Shinum, Aewol, Wae-do, Jochun, Hanrim, Hawbok, Namwon, Daejung, and Sungsan police posts.

21. For more on the major counterinsurgency operations in 1948 and 1949, see Suk-Gyun Chung, ‘Jeju-do Rebellion and Counterinsurgency Tactics’; Suk-Gyun Chung, ‘Realities of the April 3rd Incident Based on New Resources’; Merrill, Korea, chapters 3–4; and National Committee, Final Report, section III.

22. National Committee, Final Report, 151–68.

23. Yoon-Sik Jang, The Organization and Activity of ‘Jejudo Guerrillas’ in the Early Stages of the Jeju 4.3 Uprising, 70–4; Merrill, Korea, 67, 82; and National Committee, Final Report, 151–6.

24. Young-woo Lee, The United States and the Formation of the Republic of Korea Army 1945–1950, 106.

25. Young-woo Lee, The United States and the Formation of the Republic of Korea Army 1945–1950, 106.

26. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War, 20–1.

27. ‘BAMBOO envisaged a constabulary-type police reserve established on a fixed post-camp-station basis under the Bureau of Police and was to be used as a supporting force and during periods of national emergency. Initially, one company would be formed in each of the eight provinces of South Korea and organized as infantry (US style), less weapons platoons.’ (Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War, 13).

28. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAG in Peace and War, 26. Also see, Lee, The United States and the Formation of the Republic of Korea Army 1945–1950, 81, 89–92, 112–13; and Nam-Sung Huh, The Quest for a Bulwark of Anti-Communism: The Formation of the Republic of Korea Army Officer Corps and Its Political Socialization, 1945–1950, 126.

29. Millett, ‘Captain James H. Hausman and the Formation of the Korean Army, 1945–1950,’ 510–11.

30. Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, 32.

31. Furthermore, this was also due to the fact that recruiting was done on a regional basis where sometimes the communist parties dominated. The Second Class of the Korean Constabulary ‘included a substantial number of radicals or revolutionaries – and members of the South Korean Labor Party – too many to be driven out by their rightist peers… The appearance of Communist-oriented officer candidates in the Second Class continued into the Third and Fourth Classes.’ (Millett, ‘Captain James H. Hausman and the Formation of the Korean Army, 1945–1950,’ 513–15).

32. Merrill, Korea, 84. Sawyer comes to a similar assessment: ‘Although the disputes were deeply rooted in professional jealously, politics also fanned the fires of dislike and distrust. Some of the Constabulary units were composed almost entirely of members of the old private armies, whose political philosophies were far too extreme for the more conservative police. Furthermore, a number of agitators and malcontents had now joined the Constabulary – some infiltrated by the Communists and other dissident parties, others drawn by the ease of getting into the organization.’ (Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, 26). Also, Millett, ‘Captain James H. Hausman and the Formation of the Korean Army, 1945–1950,’ 514.

33. Merrill, Korea, 68.

34. Merrill, Korea, 84–5.

35. Deane, The Korean War, 56.

36. Merrill, Korea, 85. Another point is the fact that American orders were confusing due to poor intelligence and communications with the South Korean Constabulary forces, especially the Bureau of Internal Affairs. Though the Major General gave orders to negotiate with the guerrillas, orders by General John Hodge soon reversed the initial decisions and ordered the suppression of the insurgency. It is clear that coordination and communication issues between the Korean Constabulary and the American military advisors existed, such as language barriers and incorrect intelligence reporting. For more on such problems, see Sawyer, Military Advisors in Korea, 65–6. For more on this confusing phase, see National Committee, Final Report, 136–7.

37. Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 2, 257.

38. National Committee, Final Report, 189.

39. ‘Although the police were capable of conducting these limited operations, they were not strong enough to attack the main guerrilla bases without the support of the constabulary.’ (Merrill, Korea, 68). The estimated population in 1947–48 was 275,899–281,000 people, while the Jeju Island police force (with the additional reinforcements) had fewer than 1,000 officers. National Committee, Final Report, 69, 122.

40. Merrill, ‘The Cheju-do Rebellion,’ 168.

41. Deane, The Korean War, 56.

42. Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 2, 256.

43. National Committee, Final Report, 106.

44. Merrill, ‘The Cheju-do Rebellion,’ 154.

45. National Committee, Final Report, 86–7; and Dae-Sik Im, ‘Jeju 4.3 Resistance and Right-wing Youth Groups,’ in Historical Studies Institute, Jeju 4.3 Yeongu, 228.

46. Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 2, 255–6.

47. Im, ‘Jeju 4.3 Resistance and Right-wing Youth Groups,’ 230–1.

48. National Committee, Final Report, 129–45. Also, see Millett, The War for Korea, 1945–1950, 144–5.

49. Im, ‘Jeju 4.3 Resistance and Right-wing Youth Groups,’ 231; Jo-Hoon Yang et al., 4.3eun Mal-handa 1, 256–7; and The National Committee, Final Report, 129–45.

50. National Committee, Final Report, 124–5.

51. National Committee, Final Report, 131–8.

52. National Committee, Final Report, 273–5, 296, 375.

53. For more on the Japanese police system in colonial Korea, see Chul-Woo Lee, ‘Modernity, Legality, and Power in Korea Under Japanese Rule’.

54. Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 1, 166; and Millett, ‘Captain James H. Hausman and the Formation of the Korean Army, 1945–1950,’ 509.

55. Merrill, Korea, 57.

56. Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1942–1976, 89.

57. Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 2, 242. Also, see Birtle, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1942–1976, 90.

58. Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 2, 252.

59. For example, from 1 March until 28 March in 1947 a total of 2,176 people had been arrested throughout the whole of Korea, out of which 230 arrests took place in the Jeju Island: National Committee, Final Report, 86–7. Also, see Yang et al., 4.3eun Mal-handa 1, 359–63.

60. ‘Report of Special Investigation – Governor Ryu, Hai Chin of Cheju-do Island,’ March 11, 1948, Report Special Investigation by Lt. Colonel Lawrence A. Nelson, USAMGIK. In National Committee, Final Report, 129–31.

61. National Committee, Final Report, 149–50.

62. Deane, The Korean War, 54–5.

63. Deane, The Korean War, 54.

64. National Committee, Final Report, 148.

65. A number of other right-wing youth groups existed in Jeju Island during this period and several members were targeted once the insurgency started. However, the group that exerted the most influence on the course of the uprising was the Northwest Youth Association.

66. Im, ‘Jeju 4.3 Resistance and Right-wing Youth Groups,’ 205–22. In mainland Korea, the youth groups were frequently mobilized as part of the security units. As Merrill notes, ‘The military government employed massive security precautions to prevent trouble at the polls. The most important measure was the formation in mid-April of Community Protection Associations, “composed of members of the rightist youth groups who volunteered to assist in maintaining order.” The groups were police auxiliaries to the Japanese patriotic organizations set up in Korea during World War II.’ (Merrill, Korea, 78).

67. Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, Vol. 2, 244.

68. Im, ‘Jeju 4.3 Resistance and Right-wing Youth Groups,’ 211–12.

69. National Committee, Final Report, 51.

70. Im, ‘Jeju 4.3 Resistance and Right-wing Youth Groups,’ 205.

71. Merrill, Korea, 66.

72. Im, ‘Jeju 4.3 Resistance and Right-wing Youth Groups,’ 206.

73. The report is originally from Hq. USAFIK, G-2 Weekly Summary, No. 123, January 23, 1948. In National Committee, Final Report, 148–49.

74. Deane, Korean War, 56.

75. More members of youth groups (8) were killed during the 3 April attacks than any of the police officers (4).

76. As Lee points out, ‘[i]n November 1945 there were 205 political or military organizations in South Korea and dozens of political organizations clamoring for recognition.’ (Lee, The United States and the Formation of the Republic of Korea Army 1945–1950, 78).

77. Oh, ‘Introduction,’ Korea Under the American Military Government, 1945–1948, 2. Likewise, Soon-Sung Cho argues that ‘it was the American lack of imagination and initiative, and American failure to understand the basic feelings of the people and the political realities within the country that contributed to those attitudes and increased the fractiousness of the Korean problem.’ (Cho, Korea in World Politics, 1940–1950, 90). Also, see Meade, American Military Government in Korea, 45.

78. Merrill, ‘The Cheju-do Rebellion,’ 196.

79. This is largely in support of the most recently updated US Army counterinsurgency field manual emphasizing joint inter-agency coordination. US Department of the Army, The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency field Manual: U.S. Army Field Manual No. 3-24: Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5, chapter 2.

80. Daniel L. Byman, ‘Friends Like These: Counterinsurgency and the War on Terrorism’; and Robert M. Cassidy, ‘The Long Small War: Indigenous Forces for Counterinsurgency’.

81. Yoav Gortzak, ‘Using Indigenous Forces in COIN Operations: The French in Algeria, 1954–1962,’ 330.