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Abstract
This report sheds new light on the CIA and US Special Forces' covert campaign alongside Afghan Northern Alliance leader General Dostum's horse-mounted Uzbeks during 2001's Operation Enduring Freedom. In 2003 and 2005 the author traveled over the Hindu Kush Mountains to the plains of Northern Afghanistan and lived with the legendary Northern Alliance opposition leader General Dostum. His aim was to recreate Dostum's campaign alongside the CIA and Special Forces to seize the holy city of Mazar i Sharif from the Taliban in November 2001. Based on interviews with Dostum and his Uzbek commanders, this article recreates this proxy offensive that saw the Northern Alliance opposition break out of the mountains, seize this shrine town and bring the Taliban house of cards falling down in a matter of weeks. Up until now the indigenous Afghan Uzbeks, who played a crucial role as a ‘boots on the ground’ fighting force for Centcom, have been cast as a mere backdrop for American heroics. Now their side of the story and their links to the mysterious shrine of Mazar i Sharif are for the first time revealed.
Notes
1. See the account by CIA leader ‘Hank’ Crumpton who led the CIA operations in Afghanistan in 2001 for more. Henry Crumpton. ‘Intelligence and War. Afghanistan 2001–2002’, in Jennifer Sims et al., eds., Transforming US Intelligence, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2005, 162–79.
2. See, for example, the riveting account of the charge found here: Romash Ratnesar, ‘The Afghan Way of War’, Time, 11 November 2001.
3. See, for example, Eric Blehm, The Only Thing Worth Dying For: How Eleven Green Berets Forged a New Afghanistan, New York: Harper Collins, 2010; Doug Stanton, Horse Soldiers: The Extraordinary Story of a Band of US Soldiers who Rode to Victory in Afghanistan, New York: Scribners, 2008; Gary Schroen, First in: An Insider's Account of How the CIA Spearheaded the War on Terror in Afghanistan, New York: Ballantine Books, 2005; Gary Bernsten, Jawbreaker. The Attack on Bin Laden and Al Qaeda: A Personal Account by the CIA's Key Field Commander, New York: Crown Publishers, 2005.
4. See Central Command head General Tommy Frank's account, for example, wherein he states ‘Facing determined enemy resistance, terrible weather, and mounting casualties among their indigenous troops, these (12) Green Berets used maneuver and air power to destroy a (Taliban) army the Soviets had failed to dislodge with more than half a million men.’ Tommy Franks, American Soldier, New York: Regan Books, 2005, 217.
5. For photographs from these expeditions to visit Dostum, see http://www.brianglynwilliams.com under ‘Field Research’ Afghanistan 2003 and 2005.
6. The remainder of Afghanistan's population is made up of small ethnic groups like the Turkmen, Nuristanis, Balush, Pashai, and Aimaq.
7. For an insightful account of the Pashtuns' brutal conquest of the Uzbeks see: J.L. Lee, The Ancient Supremacy: Bukhara, Afghanistan and the Battle for Balkh, 1731–1901, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996.
8. Dostum is a nom de guerre which means ‘my friend’ in Uzbek.
9. Yavuz Selim, Dostum ve Afganistan, Ankara: Grafika, 2004 (in Turkish).
10. For a fascinating video report on Dostum's realm at this time, see ‘Dostum the Kingmaker’. Available at http://www.journeyman.tv/?lid = 9054
11. While the word ‘warlord’ is a relatively recent addition to the English language, probably based on the German word Kriegsherr, the concept itself is not new See Antonio Giustozzi, ‘The Debate on the Importance of Military Legitimacy’, Crisis States Research Centre, Discussion Paper no. 13, October 2005
12. For the best account of these events, see Ahmed Rashid, The Taliban, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000.
13. For more on Dostum's struggles, see Brian Glyn Williams, ‘Writing the Dostumname. Field Research With an Uzbek Warlord in Afghan Turkistan’, Central Eurasian Studies Review 6, no. 1/2 (Fall 2007), 2–8. Available at http://www.cesr-cess.org/pdf/CESR_06_12.pdf
14. While most people focus on the al-Qaeda sleeper cells like the Hamburg Cell, which attacked the US on 9/11, al-Qaeda also fielded a conventional fighting force of several thousand fighters known as the 055 Brigade.
15. Interview with Batur Dostum, General Dostum's son, Sheberghan, Afghanistan, July 2005.
16. Interview with General Dostum in his compound in Sheberghan, Afghanistan, August 2003.
17. Dostum's claim was to a degree based upon the Afghan ‘snow-ball’ effect that would come from his seizure of the shrine of Mazar i Sharif. When Afghan fighters believe that the ‘mandate of power’ has passed to their opponents, they typically defect en masse.
18. George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm: My Life at the CIA, New York: Harper, 186.
19. See the actual suggestion made by Richard Clarke in the recently declassified memo ‘A Comprehensive Strategy to Fight Al-Qaeda?’ National Security Archive, 9. Available at http://www.gwu.edu/∼nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB147/index.htm
20. Hy Rosenthein, Afghanistan and the Troubled Future of Unconventional Warfare, Annapolis; Naval Institute Press, 2006, 176.
21. Tenet, At the Center of the Storm, 207.
22. For extraordinary video footage of Dave Tyson that made it on a CNN Presents ‘House of War. Uprising at Mazar e Sharif’. Available at http://www.cnn.com/CNN/Programs/presents/index.house.of.war.html
23. Max Boot, ‘Special Forces and Horses’, Air Force Journal (November 2006). Available at http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/11/2146103/
24. ‘Interview. US Special Forces. ODA 595’, Frontline, Public Broadcasting Service. Available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/campaign/interviews/595.html
25. Robert Young Pelton, ‘The Legend of Heavy D and the Boys’, in Nate Hardcastle, ed., American Soldier Stories of Special Forces from Iraq to Afghanistan, New York; Thunder's Mouth Press, 2002, 2.
26. Bob Woodward, Bush at War. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2002, 274.
27. Interview with General Dostum, Mazar i Sharif, Afghanistan, July 2005.
28. Robin Moore, The Hunt for Bin Laden. New York: Random House, 2003, 65. ‘Interview. US Special Forces. ODA 595’.
29. Ibid.
30. Charles Briscoe et al. Weapon of Choice: ARSOF in Afghanistan. Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2003, 123.
31. I was told by several Uzbeks who rode with the Americans in the campaign that they good naturedly made fun of the American soldiers who had a hard time fitting into the Uzbeks' wooden saddles. Interviews carried out in northern Afghanistan in 2003 and 2005.
32. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 125; And ‘Interview. US Special Forces. ODA 595’.
33. The Taliban were far from being a group of tribal thugs. They had a small air force, the best artillery in Afghanistan, and approximately 100 tanks and 250 armored fighting vehicles, For an analysis of the Taliban army's fighting strength, see, ‘The Taliban's Military Strength Prior to Hostilities’, Jane's Intelligence Review. Available at http://www.janes.com/defence/news/misc/jwa011008_2_n.shtml. For more on the 055 Brigade, see Brian Glyn Williams, ‘The Al Qaeda we don't Know. The 055 Brigade’, World Policy Review (January–February 2009). Available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/19784878/The-AlQuaida-We-Dont-Know
34. Story relayed by Lal Mohammad, General Dostum's second in command, Sheberghan, Afghanistan. July 2005.
35. Briscoe, Weapon of Choice, 127.
36. Interview with Bart Decker, a US Air Force Specialist from the 23rd Special Tactics Squadron that fought alongside Dostum and provided close air support for him and his forces, Hurlburt Air Field, FL, December 2008.
37. Stephen Biddle, Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare. Implications for Army and Defense Policy, Strategic Studies Institute, 2002, 10.
38. This first paragraph was not released to the press but appears in Moore, The Hunt for Bin Laden, 71.
39. Jim Garamone, ‘Wolfowitz Shares Special Forces’ Afghanistan Dispatches', American Forces Press Service, 15 November 2001. Available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/newsarticle.aspx?id = 44448
40. The pictures Rumsfeld showed of US Air Force ground controller named Bart Decker can be found at http://www.defenselink.mil/photos/newsphoto.aspx?newsphotoid = 3741
41. ‘Remarks by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, New York Stock Exchange, Wednesday, February 12, 2003.’ U.S. Department of Defense Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs). Available at http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid = 328
42. For more on the aerial role in the campaign, see Benjamin Lambeth, Airpower Against Terror: America's Conduct of Operation Enduring Freedom, Santa Monica, CA: Rand. 2005.
43. Moore, The Hunt for Bin Laden, 76–7.
44. Schroen, First In, 249–55.
45. Interview with General Dostum, Sheberghan, Afghanistan, July 2005.
46. The battle Dostum was referring to was eerily similar to Dostum's modern day campaign. In both battles a small group of Uzbeks moved against much larger enemies with ‘divine’ protection. This battle known as the Battle of Kul i Malik, 1512, pitted 3,000 Uzbeks against 40,000 Timurid troops. Dostum reckoned he had 2,000 versus 50,000 Taliban. For more on the battle of Kul i Malik, see Muhammad Dughlat, A History of the Moghuls of Central Asia; Being the Tarikh-i-Rashidi of Mirza Muhammad Haidar, Dughlát, translated by E. Denison Ross. London: Curzon Press, 1893, 260, n.2.
47. Moore, The Hunt for Bin Laden, 77–8.
48. Woodward, Bush at War, 291.
49. Ibid., 292.
50. ‘Secretary Rumsfeld Speaks on “21st Century Transformation” of U.S. Armed Forces’, Speech given at Fort McNair, Washington, DC, Thursday, 31 January 2002. Available at: http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid = 183
51. For rare combat footage of this campaign, see my video at http://www.youtube.com/dostum2008
52. Moore, The Hunt for Bin Laden, 69.
53. ‘Interview. US Special Forces. ODA 595’.
54. ‘Legislature Honors Kansas Warrior’, Capital Journal (12 April 2002).
55. US Air Force close air support specialist Bart Decker who served with Dostum in the campaign showed me photographs taken of the destroyed column a few days after the attack. The images were of dozens of destroyed pickup trucks, many of them burned and twisted beyond recognition. Interview with Bart Decker, a US Air Force Specialist from the 23rd Special Tactics Squadron, Hurlburt Air Field, FL, December 2008.
56. Ratnesar, ‘The Afghan Way of War’.
57. In our interviews Dostum grumbled that Atta had broken their agreement and entered Mazar i Sharif first in an attempt to claim it for himself.
58. Tony Karon, ‘Rebels: Mazar-i-Sharif is Ours’, Time (9 November 2001).
59. Raymond Whitaker, ‘Fall of Strategic City Would Alter Course of Conflict War on Terrorism’, Independent (UK) (10 November 2001).
60. ‘The Death Convoy of Afghanistan’, Newsweek (25 August 2002). For more on Dostum's depiction as ogre in the Western media, see Williams, ‘Writing the Dostumname’.
61. Brian Glyn Williams, ‘Dostum. Afghanistan's Embattled Warlord’, Terrorism Monitor 7, no. 8 (17 April 2008), 1–4.
62. Brian Glyn Williams, ‘The Return of the Kingmaker. Afghanistan's General Dostum Returns from Exile’, Terrorism Monitor 7, no. 26 (20 August 2009), 9–11.