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Abstract
The Pakistani Taliban, factionalized into some 40 groups, form a decentralized insurgent movement, often characterized by infighting, divergent motivations, and a shifting web of alliances. The Pakistani Taliban remain little understood because most scholars have avoided a serious treatment of the insurgent movement and instead focused on analyzing the geopolitics of the region and Pakistan's ‘double game’. This article seeks to fill this gap by dissecting the movement through selected theories of organization and mobilization. First, I explain the various dimensions of the conflict and the origins of the insurgency. Next, I discuss the Pakistani Taliban's political organization, categorizing it as composed of various warlord regimes. I further list the Taliban's component groups and numerical strength and chart the leadership structure. Lastly, I analyze insurgent recruitment strategies, accounting for the role of selective incentives, coercion, and genuine grievances.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank the Indiana University School of Liberal Arts (IUPUI) for funding this research and Dr Scott Pegg for mentoring this project; also, a special thanks to Dr Paul B. Rich for his helpful comments.
Notes
1. CitationWeinstein, Inside Rebellion, 145; CitationAbbas, Pakistan's Troubled Frontier, 38.
2. Citation‘Naval Base Attack: Blaming It on the Foreign Bogey’; Citation‘Hamid Gul: Taliban is the future’. The author also discovered this during several personal conversations in Pakistan.
3. See CitationTellis, ‘Pakistan's Record on Terrorism’; CitationFair, ‘Pakistan's Relationship with Central Asia’; CitationBehuria, ‘Fighting the Taliban’.
4. CitationGiustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop; CitationFranco, ‘The Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan’.
5. The current insurgency in Afghanistan is no longer confined to the 1990s' Taliban, but comprises several religious factions, jihadi outfits from the 1980s and 1990s, and tribal militias. Therefore, the term ‘Neo-Taliban’ is used to describe the resistance. For more, see CitationCrews and Tarzi, The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan, 274–310.
6. CitationAhmed, Religion and Politics in Muslim Society, 20.
7. CitationJohnson and Mason, ‘No Sign Until the Burst of Fire’, 53.
8. Ahmed, Religion and Politics in Muslim Society.
9. Abbas, Pakistan's Troubled Frontier, 187.
10. CitationNawaz et al., FATA – A Most Dangerous Place, 174.
11. ‘Pakistan: Countering Militancy in FATA’, Citation5.
12. ‘Pakistan: Countering Militancy in FATA’, Citation5, 5, 6, 7.
13. Nawaz et al., FATA – A Most Dangerous Place, 9, 13.
14. Nawaz et al., FATA – A Most Dangerous Place, 15, 26.
15. Nawaz et al., FATA – A Most Dangerous Place, 15.
16. CitationHussain, Frontline Pakistan, 148.
17. CitationHussain, Frontline Pakistan, 122, 58.
18. CitationHussain, Frontline Pakistan, viii, 47; Abbas, Pakistan's Troubled Frontier, 4.
19. The US and NATO forces failed to ensure that the border region with Pakistan would be secure and halt any fighters from escaping. Jehangir Karamat, Personal interview, 16 July 2009.
20. Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop, 11, 37–8; Behuria, ‘Fighting the Taliban’, 531–2.
21. Hussain, Frontline Pakistan, 143–4, 148.
22. CitationKilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, xiv.
23. Hussain, Frontline Pakistan, 120–2, 143–7.
24. Hussain, Frontline Pakistan, 151–2; Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, 238.
25. Abbas, Pakistan's Troubled Frontier, 32–3.
26. CitationMcCormick and Fritz, ‘The Logic of Warlord Politics’.
27. CitationMcCormick and Fritz, ‘The Logic of Warlord Politics’, 81–4, 88.
28. CitationRich, ‘Review Article: Counterinsurgency or a War on Terror?’, 421.
29. CitationGunaratna, ‘Al-Qaedastan’, 14. Whereas it's not clear how Gunaratna got the figure of 40, it is quite possible that when these groups are added with the Punjabi Taliban – an umbrella group composed of militant outfits groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, Hizb-ul Mujahidin, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi that formerly operated inside Indian-held Kashmir with the sponsorship of the Pakistani intelligence – the Haqqani Network run by Afghan rebels Jalaluddin and Sirajuddin Haqqani, and militants of the IMU, the total number of militant groups comes to 40.
30. Abbas, Pakistan's Troubled Frontier, 32.
31. Tarzi, The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan, 306.
32. Abbas, Pakistan's Troubled Frontier, 117–18, 88.
33. Whereas the rise of the mullah has been a gradual process the almost complete displacement is a recent phenomenon. The rise of the militants has been facilitated by the rise of the mullah and militancy over the past 30 years. This background has been briefly documented by many sources now. See Nawaz, FATA – A Most Dangerous Place, 14–15, 23–8; Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, 235; CitationMarten et al., ‘Correspondence: Misunderstanding Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas’, 183.
34. Abbas, Pakistan's Troubled Frontier, 32, 50, 124; Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, 38.
35. Nawaz, FATA – A Most Dangerous Place, 18.
36. CitationKhan, ‘Bajaur Agency’.
37. Abbas, Pakistan's Troubled Frontier, 33, 120; Ahmed, Religion and Politics in Muslim Society, 20.
38. McCormick and Fritz, ‘The Logic of Warlord Politics’, 104–5.
39. Abbas, Pakistan's Troubled Frontier, 33, 34, 139, 187, 189.
40. Abbas, Pakistan's Troubled Frontier, 6, 8, 117, 40; Citation‘As if Hell Fell on Me’, 40, 43, 60; CitationRoul, ‘Gems, Timber and Jiziya’.
41. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, 40, 44, 144, 145.
42. CitationWolfe, ‘The Pakistani Taliban's Suicide Bomber Trainer’.
43. Abbas, Pakistan's Troubled Frontier, 124, 186–9; CitationRoggio and Dupee, ‘The Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan’.
44. Fair, ‘Pakistan's Relationship with Central Asia’, 206; CitationHaq et al., ‘Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan’.
45. Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop, 35.
46. Gunaratna, ‘Al-Qaedastan’; Hussain, Frontline Pakistan, 122; CitationO'Hanlon, ‘Pakistan Index’; CitationMasood, ‘Pakistan's Military Examines its Options in North Waziristan’.
47. Masood, ‘Pakistan's Military Examines its Options in North Waziristan’.
48. Gunaratna, ‘Al-Qaedastan’.
49. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, 300.
50. Khan, ‘Bajaur Agency’.
51. CitationHumphreys and Weinstein, ‘Who Fights?’, 437–8, 449, 450, 452.
52. CitationWhite, ‘From Peace Protest to Guerilla War’, 1279, 1293–5.
53. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, 9, 43.
54. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, 9.
55. Nawaz, FATA – A Most Dangerous Place: 13.
56. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, 49, 102–3, 139.
57. Imtiaz Gul, Telephone interview, 16 June 2010.
58. CitationRodriguez, ‘Taliban taps the Punjab heartland’; Abbas, Pakistan's Troubled Frontier, 27.
59. Nawaz, FATA – A Most Dangerous Place, 27; Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop, 39.
60. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, 47–48, 98, 102–4.
61. ‘Pakistan: Countering Militancy in FATA’, i, 10.
63. ‘Pakistan: Countering Militancy in FATA’, 7–8.
64. ‘World Drug Report Citation2010’, 60, 138.
65. Hussain, Frontline Pakistan, 147; Abbas, Pakistan's Troubled Frontier, 52, 107, 110, 138; Syed, ‘US in Back-Channel Talks with Afghan Taliban’, 7.
66. Masood, ‘Pakistan's Military Examines its Options in North Waziristan’.
67. Masood, ‘Pakistan's Military Examines its Options in North Waziristan’
68. Nawaz, FATA – A Most Dangerous Place, 18.
69. Abbas, Pakistan's Troubled Frontier, 72.
70. ‘Pakistan: Countering Militancy in FATA’, 4.
71. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, 97.
72. Nawaz, FATA – A Most Dangerous Place, 19; CitationBennett-Jones, ‘Pakistan Inequality Fuelling Taliban Support’.
73. CitationFilkins, ‘Right at the Edge’; Bennett-Jones, ‘Pakistan Inequality Fuelling Taliban Support’.
74. Nawaz, FATA – A Most Dangerous Place, 27; Masood, ‘Pakistan's Military Examines its Options in North Waziristan’.
75. CitationLatif, ‘Taliban Finds Fertile Recruiting Ground in Pakistan's Tribal Refugee Camps’.
76. ‘As if Hell Fell on Me’, 7, 8.
77. Abbas, Pakistan's Troubled Frontier, 131, 174, 245. A teacher from Swat reported that militants took over his school and began training boys how to fight; ‘As if Hell Fell on Me’, 59.
80. CitationHussain, ‘From Suicide to Safety’.
81. CitationMeo, ‘Taliban Recruits Teenage Suicide Bombers for Revenge Attacks’.
82. CitationShah, ‘Taliban Exploit Shi'a-Sunni Divide’.
83. Weinstein, Inside Rebellion, 37.
84. CitationShah, ‘Pakistan After Musharraf: Praetorianism and Terrorism’, 22. Human Rights Watch has been pointing out and issuing appeals against the Pakistani military's violations since at least 2006: Citation‘Pakistan: End Excessive Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations’.
85. ‘Citation2009 Human Rights Report: Pakistan’.
86. Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, 237.
87. ‘Pakistan: Countering Militancy in FATA’, i, 1.
88. CitationKhan, ‘Pakistani Government Offensive in Swat Heading for the Taliban of Waziristan’.
89. Shah, ‘Pakistan After Musharraf: Praetorianism and Terrorism’, 22.
90. Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, 237–8.
91. Latif, ‘Taliban Finds Fertile Recruiting Ground in Pakistan's Tribal Refugee Camps’.
92. ‘As if Hell Fell on Me’, 49; Citation‘Pakistan: Avoid Civilian Casualties’.
93. Abbas, Pakistan's Troubled Frontier, 164, 235.
94. Abbas, Pakistan's Troubled Frontier, 159.
95. Nawaz, FATA – A Most Dangerous Place, 15.
96. Citation‘The Year of the Drone’; ‘Over Citation700 killed in 44 drone strikes in 2009’. The figures are sharply disputed by Farhat Taj; see CitationTaj, ‘The Year of the Drone Misinformation’. Taj's own claims, however, cannot be verified because the institute that carried out the research no longer exists, and its findings are not available.
97. Nawaz, FATA – A Most Dangerous Place, 18.
98. ‘Operation Rah-e-Nijat and the Actual Facts by Hakeemullah Mehsud (Ameer Taliban Pakistan) Part-Citation1 1/3’. Translated by the author.