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Abstract
In the course of the 2006 Lebanon War the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) employed special operations forces (SOF) for raids against Hizb'allah's command and control structure. This article argues that a faulty conceptualization of the value of special operations and misguided expectations determined by the new IDF concept of operations impacted adversely on the employment of SOF for this kind of operations. Both these elements contributed in turn to substantially degrade SOF performance in the context of the war.
Notes
1. CitationAnglim, ‘Orde Wingate and the Special Night Squads’, 36.
2. CitationVan Creveld, Tsahal, 73; CitationAllon, The Making of Israel's Army, 8–11; CitationDayan, Story of My Life, 44–48.
3. Anglim, ‘Orde Wingate and the Special Night Squads’, 35.
4. CitationGray, Explorations in Strategy, 154.
5. CitationMorris, Vittime, 192.
6. CitationYaniv, ‘Special Operations’, 114; CitationSchiff, ‘On the Origins of Targeted Assassinations’.
7. CitationGelber, ‘Sharon's Inheritance’; CitationVardi, ‘Learning Without Reference’.
8. CitationVardi, ‘Pounding Their Feet’, 299; CitationPedahzur, The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle against Terrorism, 24.
9. Vardi, ‘Pounding Their Feet’, 299.
10. CitationFarrell, ‘Culture and Military Power’, 412.
11. The scholarly literature on the IDF frequently employs the broad category of ‘elite units’ or ‘special units’ encompassing also the Sayarut, which are the reconnaissance units active within the majority of IDF brigades. Although the Sayarut perform special operations to a certain extent, their structure and modus operandi differs significantly from that of SOF. For these reasons, this article will include in the category of SOF only Sayeret MATKAL, Shayetet 13, and Shaldag. CitationSpulak, A Theory of Special Operations, 12.
12. CitationEisenstadt, ‘Israel's Approach to Special Operations’, 23; Pedahzur, The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism, 37; http://www.isayeret.com (accessed 23 May 2011).
13. CitationCordesman, Israel and Syria, 115; http://www.isayeret.com (accessed 10 July 2010).
14. CitationHarel, ‘Commando Units Vie for Supplying New Top Brass’; http://www.isayeret.com (accessed 23 May 2011).
15. CitationRodman, Defense and Diplomacy in Israel's National Security Experience, 56; CitationTerrill, ‘The Nature and Value of Commando Operations’; http://www.isayeret.com (accessed 23 May 2011).
16. Vardi, ‘Pounding Their Feet’, 309.
17. Cordesman, Israel and Syria, 93.
18. Pedahzur, The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle against Terrorism, 64; CitationAnglim, ‘Special Forces – Strategic Asset’, 16.
19. Schiff, ‘On the Origins of Targeted Assassinations’.
20. Pedahzur, The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle against Terrorism, 30–65.
21. CitationGray, Explorations in Strategy, 150.
22. CitationLeslau, ‘Worth the Bother?’, 523; Vardi, ‘Pounding Their Feet’, 299.
23. Pedahzur, The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle against Terrorism, 46; CitationJones, ‘One Size Fits All’, 279; CitationAlmog, ‘Cumulative Deterrence and the War on Terrorism’.
24. The only exception seems to be the targeted killing campaign carried out against Hamas during the Al-Aqsa Intifada, where a detailed plan for the elimination of the entire Hamas leadership was not only approved but ultimately carried out; CitationHarel and Isacharoff, La Septième Guerre d'Israël, 262–5.
25. Leslau, ‘Worth the Bother?’; http://www.isayeret.com (accessed 20 May 2011); CitationHenriksen, The Israeli Approach to Irregular Warfare, 15.
26. CitationKober, ‘The Israel Defense Forces in the Second Lebanon War’, 9, 16.
27. CitationGordon, ‘The Vulture and the Snake’; CitationKober, ‘The Israel Defense Forces in the Second Lebanon War’, 18.
28. CitationAdamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation, 93, 99.
29. CitationCohen, Israel and Its Army, 104.
30. Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation, 99–105.
31. Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation, 101; CitationNaveh, ‘The Cult of Offensive Preemption’, 182.
32. Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation, 100, 106.
33. CitationBatschelet, Effects-based Operations, 2.
34. CitationDe Czege, ‘Systemic Operational Design’.
35. CitationSmith, Effects Based Operations, xv; CitationVego, ‘Commentary: Effects-Based Operations: A Critique’.
36. Naveh, ‘The Cult of Offensive Preemption’, 181.
37. Gordon, ‘Who Needs a Pyrrhic Victory?’ [Hebrew], Ma'arachot (February 1983), 34–7, quoted in CitationE. Cohen et al., Knives, Tanks & Missiles, 84–5; Naveh, ‘The Cult of Offensive Preemption’.
38. CitationGray, ‘Handful of Heroes on Desperate Ventures’, 5; S. CitationCohen, Israel and Its Army, 50.
39. Leslau, ‘Worth the Bother?’, 518.
40. E. Cohen et al., Knives, Tanks & Missiles, 119; CitationBonen, ‘Sophisticated Conventional War’; Gordon, ‘The Vulture and the Snake’.
41. CitationDemchak, ‘Technology's Knowledge Burden’, 86; CitationJohnson, Military Capabilities for Hybrid War, 2.
42. Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation, 107; CitationS.G. Jones, ‘Fighting Networked Terrorist Groups’; Kober, ‘The Israel Defense Forces in the Second Lebanon War’, 26.
43. CitationKaplinski, ‘The IDF in the Years Before the Second Lebanon War’, 34; CitationHarel, ‘Elite Shayetet Unit often Carries Army's Heaviest, most Secretive Burdens’; CitationHarel, ‘The Navy's Convinced it Belongs in the Territories’.
44. Spulak, A Theory of Special Operations, 12.
45. Naveh, ‘The Cult of Offensive Preemption’, 170; CitationWeizmann, ‘Lethal Theory’, 60.
46. Adamsky, The Culture of Military Innovation, 109.
47. CitationC. Jones, ‘Israeli Counter-Insurgency Strategy and the War in South Lebanon 1985–1997’; E. Cohen et al., Knives, Tanks & Missiles, 32; Harel, ‘Elite Shayetet Unit Often Carries Army's Heaviest, Most Secretive Burdens’.
48. CitationHarel and Issacharoff, 34 Days, 127.
49. CitationRoggio, ‘IDF Commando Raid South of Tyre; Abandoning the Litani?’.
50. Kober, ‘The Israel Defense Forces in the Second Lebanon War’, 27; CitationSiboni, ‘The Military Campaign in Lebanon’, 69.
51. Pedahzur, The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism, 111–16.
52. CitationHarel, ‘Elite Shayetet Unit often Carries Army's Heaviest Most Secretive Burdens’.
53. CitationKatz, ‘IDF Commandos Operate South of Tyre’.
54. Pedahzur, The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism, 133; Harel, ‘IDF Officer Killed in Commando Raid in East Lebanon’.
55. Yaniv, ‘Special Operations: The Israeli Experience’, 118; Pedahzur, The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle Against Terrorism, 85–8.
56. CitationSchleifer, ‘Psyoping Hezbollah’, 224.
57. CitationBar-Joseph, ‘Israel's Military Intelligence Performance in the Second Lebanon War’, 586.
58. CitationBar-Joseph, ‘Israel's Military Intelligence Performance in the Second Lebanon War’, 588.
59. CitationBar-Joseph, ‘The Hubris of Initial Victory’, 158.
60. CitationRodman, ‘Israel's National Security Doctrine’.
61. Kober, ‘From Blitzkrieg to Attrition’, 219.
62. CitationKiras, Special Operations and Strategy, 3.
63. CitationRodman, ‘Regime-Targeting’.
64. Kiras, Special Operations and Strategy, 3.
65. Schleifer, ‘Psyoping Hezbollah’, 225.
66. CitationTira, ‘The Limitations of Standoff Firepower-Based Operations’, 25.
67. CitationSobelman, ‘Hizbollah – From Terror to Resistance’; Byman, Understanding Proto-Insurgencies, Appendix A.
68. Tira, ‘The Limitations of Standoff Firepower-Based Operations’, 43–4; Bar-Joseph, ‘The Hubris of Initial Victory’, 158–9.
69. Tira, ‘The Limitations of Standoff Firepower-Based Operations’, 29–31.
70. Schleifer, ‘Psyoping Hezbollah’, 233.
71. E. Cohen, Commandos and Politicians, 49.
72. Harel and Isacharoff, Spider Webs [Hebrew] quoted in Bar-Joseph, ‘The Hubris of Initial Victory’, 154.
73. Gray, Explorations in Strategy, 165, 166, 170.
74. Tira, ‘The Limitations of Standoff Firepower-Based Operations’, 26.
75. Gray, Explorations in Strategy, 149.