Rubber match: a third Lebanon war

Abstract

Israel and Hezbollah have applied the lessons learned from the 2006 Lebanon War and have been preparing for a future conflict with both sides aiming for a more decisive victory. With improved capabilities from 2006, future hostilities will be far more destructive. This article analyzes their performance in 2006 and the lessons they have drawn to predict what a future conflict is likely to look like. The article analyzes both parties in three categories: ground forces; rockets, missiles, and anti-armor weapons; and lastly, Israel's air and sea dominance and Hezbollah's efforts to counter that dominance. Finally, this article argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, a large-scale conflict between Israel and Hezbollah is unlikely to become a larger regional conflict involving Syria and Iran.

Keywords:

• Lebanon
• Israel
• IDF
• Hezbollah
• military capabilities assessment

Notes

 1. STRATFOR Global Intelligence, ‘Israeli Tanks and Hezbollah Countermeasures’.

 2. For more on the implications of Hezbollah's success for Western militaries, see Biddle and Friedman, The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare.

 3. For more on Hezbollah as the premiere non-state/hybrid actor, see Crawford and Miscik, ‘The Rise of the Mezzanine Rulers’. For more on how militaries are pursuing similar tactics to Hezbollah, see Mattis, Statement Before the House Armed Services Committee.

 4. For more on North Korean assistance to Hezbollah, see Manyin, North Korea: Back on the Terrorism List?

 5. Exum, ‘Hizbullah at War’, 5.

 6. Even during the second intifada Israel avoided large-scale military operations for two years until Operation Defensive Shield in March–April 2002. For more on why the intifada – and Palestinian conflict more generally – play differently with Israeli public opinion see Shamir and Shikaki, Palestinian and Israeli Public Opinion, 39–41.

 7. Kulick, ‘Hizbollah vs. the IDF’, 3.

 8. Blanford, ‘Deconstructing Hizbullah's Surprise Military Prowess’, 3.

 9. Exum, ‘Hizbullah at War’, 3.

10. Exum, ‘Hizbullah at War’, 10.

11. Mahnaimi, ‘Humbling of the Supertroopers Shatters Israeli Army Morale’.

12. Nizar-Hamzeh, In the Path of Hizbullah, 92.

13. Blanford, ‘Return to Arms’, 2.

14. The IDF's slow advance partially compensated for this, giving Hezbollah more time to react.

15. Exum, ‘Hizbullah at War’, 10.

16. Blanford, ‘Return to Arms’, 4.

17. Hezbollah veterans told Jane's Intelligence Review that in a future conflict it will be Hezbollah who is asked to withdraw from Israel, not the other way around.

18. Charles Levinson (Wall Street Journal Jerusalem Bureau Chief), personal interview (16 December 2010).

19. Cordesman and Nerguizian, ‘The Arab-Israeli Military Balance’, 9.

20. Drezner, ‘How Bad was Hezbollah Hurt?’.

21. Harel et al., ‘IAF Strikes Religious Building in Southern Lebanon, 4 Wounded’.

22. Hirst, Beware of Small States, 396.

23. This was mentioned to the author by soldiers who took part in Operation Phantom Fury.

24. Blanford, ‘Return to Arms’, 10.

25. Cordesman, ‘Lessons of the Israeli-Lebanon War’, 6–7.

26. Kulick, ‘Hizbullah vs. The IDF’, 3; Blanford, ‘Deconstructing Hizbullah's Surprise Military Prowess’, 7.

27. Hirst, Beware Small States, 337.

28. Hirst, Beware Small States, 347.

29. Cordesman, ‘Iran's Support of the Hezbollah in Lebanon’, 6–7.

30. Harari, Strategic Challenges Facing the Israeli Defense Force.

31. Hirst, Beware of Small States, 347.

32. Blanford, ‘Return to Arms’, 3.

33. ‘Hezbollah Warns Israel: We Have List of IDF Targets for Future War’.

34. Quoted from Klein, ‘Israel Claims Iran Weapons Shipment’.

35. Blanford, ‘Return to Arms’, 2.

36. For examples, see Schiff, ‘The War's Surprises’; Katz, ‘Israeli Military Studies Hezbollah Resilience’; Greenberg, ‘Why Did the Armored Corps Fail in Lebanon’.

37. Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+ Obstacle+to+Peace/Terrorism+from+Lebanon-+ Hizbullah/Israel-Hizbullah +conflict-+ Victims+of+rocket+attacks+and+IDF+casualties+July-Aug+2006.htm.

38. Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism- + Obstacle+to+Peace/Terrorism+from+Lebanon- + Hizbullah/Israel-Hizbullah+conflict- + Victims+of+rocket+attacks+and+IDF+casualties+July-Aug+2006.htm

39. Drawn from the author's experience in Iraq in 2006–2007.

40. Greenberg, ‘Why Did the Armored Corps Fail in Lebanon?’.

41. Statistics vary on this but the numbers result in a range from 15–22 armor penetrations, 32–47% of tanks hit were penetrated.

42. Greenberg, ‘Why Did the Armored Corps Fail in Lebanon?’

43. Katz, ‘New Training Aims to Help Tanks Cope in Hostile Territory’.

44. Cited from Israel Aerospace Industries' website on 1 December 2010: http://www.iai.co.il/34475-41105-en/Groups_ELTA_SystemsSensors.aspx?btl = 1.

45. Hirst, Beware of Small States, 350.

46. Exum, ‘The Next War’.

47. Cordesman and Nerguizian, ‘The Arab-Israeli Military Balance’, 48.

48. Schneider, ‘Hezbollah's Relocation of Rocket Sites to Lebanon's Interior Poses Wider Threat’.

49. Blanford, ‘Return to Arms’, 3.

50. Ynet, ‘Halutz: “Mr PM, We Won the War”’.

51. Middle East Media Research Institute, ‘Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah Threatens to Bring Down Buildings in Tel Aviv’.

52. Katz, ‘IDF Expects Hizbullah to Target Roads’.

53. Beeston and Blanford, ‘Hezbollah Stockpiles 40,000 Rockets Near Israel Border’.

54. White, ‘If War Comes’, 10.

55. Reuven Pedatzur, a Tel Aviv University professor and former IAF fighter pilot, says that because Arrow is not 100% effective, and only one nuclear weapon poses an existential threat, the system as a whole is useless. Regarding Iron Dome, his issues center on the short flight time of a Kassam rocket (14 seconds) from Gaza to Sderot. Iron Dome reportedly takes 15 seconds to identify a launch, acquire a target, and launch. Effectively meaning that Iron Dome is useless against anything fired from within 5 km. In addition, says Pedatzur, each Iron Dome missile costs $100,000 compared to relatively cheap rockets of both Hamas and Hizbullah. (Cited from Hartman, ‘Iron Dome Doesn't Answer Threats’).

56. United States Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Patriot System Performance, 1.

57. Levinson, ‘Syria Gave Scuds To Hezbollah, U.S. Says’.

58. The US Congress voted on 20 May 2010 to approve President Obama's request to fund 10 more Iron Dome batteries.

59. Yagna and Pfeffer, ‘Israel Speeds Up Third Iron Dome Battery in Wake of Gaza Attack’.

60. Ben-David, ‘Iron Dome Advances to Meet Qassam Threat’, 1.

61. Rubin, ‘Hizballah's Rocket Campaign Against Northern Israel’, 1.

62. Hezbollah did shoot down a CH-53 using an anti-tank missile, the only aircraft it successfully shot down during the conflict.

63. In 1999, during NATO's air campaign over Serbia, a US F-117 was shot down by antiquated Serbian SAM capabilities. In addition, a US F-16 was downed by a Serbian SA-3.

64. Blanford, ‘Deconstructing Hizbullah's Surprise Military Prowess’, 4–5.

65. White, ‘If War Comes’, 12.

66. As an example of air strikes and indirect fire being insufficient, in 2006 Hezbollah repeatedly launched rockets from a densely forested hillside between the southern villages of Naqoura and Alma al-Shaab. Multiple air strikes and indirect fire missions were unable to stop the launches, which continued throughout the war.

67. Matthews, ‘Hard Lessons Learned’, 26–7.

68. Matthews, ‘Hard Lessons Learned’, 26–8.

69. Blanford, ‘Return to Arms’, 6.

70. White, ‘If War Comes’, 20–1.

71. Sharp, Syria: Background and U.S. Relations, 9–10.

72. Hokayem, ‘Iran and Lebanon’, 181.

73. Cambanis, A Privilege to Die, 210–11; further analysis taken from a personal interview with Thanassis Cambanis (10 December 2010).