Population-centric counterinsurgency and the movement of peoples

Abstract

The theory of population-centric counterinsurgency rests upon the untenable premise that the population within a theater of operations is fixed in place. By showing that people tend to move away from contested rural areas towards the relative safety and prosperity of counterinsurgent-controlled areas, this article demonstrates that this crucial premise is empirically false. Furthermore, a theory of counterinsurgent resource deployment, population movement, and incumbent strategic ineffectiveness is presented. Ultimately, the application of counterinsurgency resources actually dislocates the population from their place of residence and causes them to move into cities. When the urban areas' ability to absorb newcomers is overwhelmed, localized negative externalities emerge and can give rise to crime and insecurity. Such increased insecurity then creates an incentive for the counterinsurgency to retrench its resource use into the cities. As more physical territory is conceded to the insurgency, the relative strategic effectiveness of the counterinsurgency declines.

Keywords:

• Afghanistan
• COIN
• internal migration
• ISAF
• population-centric counterinsurgency

Notes

 1. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 52; James Helis cited in McGreal and Boone, ‘US Launches new Afghan Counterinsurgency Strategy’, 2; The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, No. 3-24; No. 3-33.5, 137.

 2. McChrystal, ‘Initial United States Forces – Afghanistan (USFOR-A) Assessment’, 1.

 3. Some conflicts are fuelled by natural resources rather than popular support. See, for example, Collier et al., ‘Beyond Greed and Grievance’.

 4. Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, 93.

 5. Vo Nguyen Giap cited in Boot, The Savage Wars of Peace, 297.

 6. McChrystal, ‘Initial United States Forces – Afghanistan (USFOR-A) Assessment’, 19–20. Emphasis added.

 7. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 58. Emphasis added.

 8. Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 10. Emphasis added.

 9. Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla, 146. Emphasis in original.

10. Huntington, ‘The Bases of Accommodation’, 648.

11. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, 155.

12. Clutterbuck, The Long, Long War, 21.

13. Nagl, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife, 75.

14. Stubbs, Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare, 233.

15. UNDESA, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2009 Revision, 44.

16. The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual , No. 3-24; No. 3-33.5, 34.

17. Race, War Comes to Long An, 216.

18. Urban, War in Afghanistan, 157–8.

19. Chaliand, Report From Afghanistan, 64.

20. Ghobadi et al., Moving out of Poverty, 7.

21. Opel, Bound for the City, 11.

22. ‘Canada's Afghan “Model Villages” Praised by U.S. General’.

23. Anonymous CIDA official cited in Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires, 188.

24. Simon Heatherington cited in Anonymous CIDA official cited in Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires, 316.

25. This section is a non-formal application of the Todaro Model of rural–urban migration. See, for example, Todaro, ‘A Model of Labor Migration and Urban Unemployment in Less Developed Countries’; Harris and Todaro, ‘Migration, Unemployment, and Development’.

26. Opel, Bound for the City, 9.

27. Opel, Bound for the City, 9

28. Opel, Bound for the City, 9

29. Huntington, ‘The Bases of Accommodation’.

30. Reliable estimates find that Afghanistan has an urban population of approximately 22.3% of the population. Iraq, in contrast, has an urban population of around 66.3% of the whole population. See, for example, UNDESA, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2009 Revision, 18–19.

31. Henderson, ‘The Sizes and Types of Cities’.

32. Sovani, ‘The Analysis of Over Urbanization’.

33. Yousaf and Adkin, The Battle For Afghanistan, 145.

34. ‘Afghanistan: Kabul Air Pollution Prompts Advice on Use of Masks’, 1–2.

35. ‘Afghanistan: Toilet Tribulations’, 1–2.

36. Opel, Bound for the City, 20.

37. Ghobadi et al., Moving out of Poverty, 9.

38. Ahmad Wali cited in ‘Afghanistan: Military Convoys put Civilians “at risk”’, 1–2.

39. Fawad Tokhi cited in Ahmad Wali cited in ‘Afghanistan: Military Convoys put Civilians “at risk”’, 1–2

40. Ahamadullah Nazak cited in ‘Canadian Soldiers Debut Afghan “Model Village”’, 1.

41. Gurr, Why Men Rebel.

42. UNDESA, World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision, 274.

43. Esser, ‘The City as Arena, Hub and Prey’.

44. Esser, ‘The City as Arena, Hub and Prey’, 33.

45. ‘Afghanistan: Concern Over Crime in Kabul’, 1. Emphasis added.

46. ‘Afghan Blast Kills Ten Labourers in Kandahar Province’.

47. The U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, No. 3-24; No. 3-33.5, 23.

48. Thayer, War Without Fronts, 141.

49. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 58. Emphasis added.

50. Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency, 10. Emphasis added.

51. Huntington, ‘The Bases of Accommodation’.

52. Many of the points in this final section on the sources of strategic ineffectiveness for a counterinsurgency are based upon arguments found in , ‘Urban Bias in Counterinsurgency Operations’; ‘City Gods and Village Deities’; and ‘The Insurgent's Response to the Defense of Cities’.

53. Luttwak, Strategy.

54. Saleh, Strategy of Insurgents and Terrorists in Afghanistan cited in Jones, In the Graveyard of Empires, 163–4.

55. Race, War Comes to Long An, 83.

56. Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, 9–38.

57. Wou, Mobilizing the Masses, 374; Laqueur, Guerrilla Warfare, 23.

58. Bejar, ‘The Failure of the Guerrillas in Peru’, 292.

59. Kaplan, Soldiers of God, 116.

60. Thruelsen, ‘The Taliban in Southern Afghanistan’, 267.

61. Tariq et al., Afghanistan 2010, 54.

62. Baron, ‘“Model” Canadian Village Handed over to U.S. in Afghanistan’, 2.

63. Trinquier, Modern Warfare, 42.

64. Poole, Outmaneuvering the Taliban, 161.

65. Jardine, ‘City Gods and Village Deities’.

66. Yousaf and Adkin, The Battle For Afghanistan, 57.

67. Mao Tse-tung, On Protracted War, 60.

68. Nym Wales, Inside Red China (New York: Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1939), 56–7 cited in Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century, 152–3.

69. Labignette, ‘The Communist Insurrection in Greece’, 264.

70. Nguyen Van Thieu, ‘Our Strategy for Guerrilla War’, 311.

71. Jalali and Grau, Afghan Guerrilla Warfare, 125.

72. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, 198.

73. Ho Chi Minh cited in Morrison, The Elephant & the Tiger, 14.

74. Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 23–5.

75. Dick, ‘Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War’, 6–8.

76. Yousaf and Adkin, The Battle For Afghanistan, 225–6.

77. McGirk, ‘Taliban Stepping Up Attacks on NATO Supply Convoys’, 1.