The war on terror that failed: British counter-insurgency in Palestine 1945–1947 and the ‘Farran Affair’

Abstract

This essay examines the disappearance in 1947 of a young Jewish insurgent fighting the British in Palestine, Alexander Rubowitz. Kidnapped by a secret British army unit led by Major Roy Farran, Rubowitz's body has never been found. Farran was suspected of responsibility and detained but he escaped from custody twice before he was put on trial for the abduction and alleged murder of the youth. The ‘Farran Affair’ became a cause célèbre and it was taken up by contending sides in the propaganda battle over the future of Palestine. A year after Farran's acquittal a letter bomb was sent to his family in the UK by members of the Jewish underground seeking revenge. This essay looks at the emergence of new thinking by the British on how best to defeat insurgent forces and why officially sanctioned counter-terror such as Farran's ‘special squads’ did not work in Palestine.

Keywords:

• Palestine
• death squads
• Roy Farran
• Alexander Rubowitz
• Stern Gang
• LEHI
• assassination

Acknowledgements

This chapter is derived from my book Major Farran's Hat. Readers are referred to the book for the full range of references to primary sources and bibliographical information. I would like to thank the staff of the National Archives, the library and archives of the Imperial War Museum, the Middle East Centre, St Antony's College, Oxford, and the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College, London, for their assistance researching this subject and permission to use documents in their possession.

Notes

 1. Details regarding the abduction of Alexander Rubowitz are drawn from the police investigation: Report on the Alleged Abduction and Murder of Alexander Rubowitz, and Subsequent Police Investigation, by K.P. Hadingham, Superintendent of Police, Jerusalem District, 19 June 1947, The National Archives [TNA], CO 537/2302, [hereafter Hadingham Report, CO 537/2302, TNA]. For biographical details of Alexander Rubowitz, see Goodman, ‘Who Killed Alexander Rubowitz’.

 2. Bowyer Bell, Terror Out of Zion, 108–9. On LEHI in general, see Katz, Lechi.

 3. These details are derived from evidence given during the judicial proceedings connected with the abduction as reported in The Times, New York Herald Tribune and Palestine Post (2 October 1947).

 4. Palestine Post (22 May 1947); Hadingham Report, CO 357/2302, TNA.

 5. New York Times (2 October 1947); Hadingham Report, CO 357/2302, TNA.

 6. Statement by Nehamiah Rubowitz, June 1947, S25/6200, Central Zionist Archives [CZA], Jerusalem.

 7. Ha'aretz (9 May 1947); Palestine Post (13 May 1947).

 8. HaBoker (20 May 1947); HaMashkif (21 May 1947).

 9. Palestine Post (22 May 1947); Davar (26 May 1947). A copy of the letter is in the archives of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency: Anonymous to Mrs Rubowitz, 23 May 1947, S25/6200, CZA.

10. Palestine Post (30 May 1947).

11. For Farran's biographical details, see the obituaries in Daily Telegraph (5 June 2006), The Times (6 June 2006), and Calgary Herald (12 June 2006). However, all these contain inconsistencies and inaccuracies. So does Farran's own CV submitted to the Progressive Conservative party in Calgary, Canada, when he entered Canadian politics: Papers of the Alberta Progressive Conservative Party, M1744, file 94, Glenbow Archive, Calgary. See also the interview by Edward Romaine, ‘The Charmed Life of Roy Farran’, Weekend Magazine 6/50 (1956). wrote two terrific autobiographical accounts of his war service: Winged Dagger and Operation Tombola. Amateur psychologists may also peruse his novels – Jungle Chase, The Search, and Never Had a Chance – for hints as to his character and his experiences.

12. Farran, Winged Dagger, 341–2.

13. Farran, Winged Dagger, 344–7.

14. For biographical information about Bernard , see the superb memoir he wrote concentrating on his war service entitled The Trumpet in the Hall and, more generally, Travel Warrant. For a detailed account of his exploits in Burma, see his own account, Beyond the Chindwin. See also his obituary, The Times (29 November 1980).

15. For the latest and well-balanced account of the origins of British involvement in the Middle East, see Schneer, The Balfour Declaration. For the early development of the Mandate, see Wasserstein, The British in Palestine. The Palestinian side of the story is set out in Pappé, A History of the Palestinians. For the diplomatic wrangling in the 1930s, see Rose, The Gentile Zionists. Internal developments in Palestine are brilliantly covered by Segev, One Palestine, Complete. The unravelling of British policy is analysed in Cohen, Retreat From the Mandate and Cohen, Palestine and the Great Powers 1945–1948. The classic account of the origins of the Jewish insurgency remains Bauer, From Diplomacy to Resistance. For detailed accounts of Britain's diplomatic writhing in the 1940s, see Jones, Failure in Palestine and Ovendale, Britain, the United States and the End of the Palestine Mandate.

16. For the most recent account of the conflict, see Rose, ‘A Senseless, Squalid War.’ The classic analysis of the British military response is Charters, The British Army and Jewish Insurgency. Bethell, The Palestine Triangle remains the most readable overview of both military and diplomatic developments, although some of the detail is now outdated.

17. Montgomery briefing to Army Commanders, 25 July 1946, Papers of Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, Imperial War Museum [IWM], BLM175/1 [hereafter BLM/ etc]. Diary of Field Marshal Montgomery, Part 1, 1 May–29 September 1946, chapter 3, BLM175/1. On Montgomery's impact, see Charters, The British Army and Jewish Insurgency, 18–24.

18. Gale, Call To Arms, 168–9; Wilson, Cordon and Search, 56–62.

19. Hoffman, The Failure of British Military Strategy, 22; Clarke, By Blood and Fire.

20. See Cabinet discussions in Hoffman, The Failure of British Military Strategy, 112–15.

21. Barker to Colonial Office, 22 July 1946, Cunningham Papers, Box 1/1, Middle East Centre [MEC], St Antony's Oxford; Dempsey to Montgomery, 24 July 1946, WO 216/194, cited in Hoffman, The Failure of British Military Strategy, 109–10; Cunningham to Colonial Office, 23, 24, and 27 July 1946, Cunningham Papers, Box 1/1, MEC; Colonial Office to Cunningham, 25, 26 July 1946, Cunningham Papers, Box 1/1, MEC. Charters, The British Army and Jewish Insurgency, 119–20.

22. Gregory Blaxland, The Regiments Depart, 27–59; Charters, The British Army and Jewish Insurgency, 88–9, 145–8.

23. Jeffries, The Colonial Police 157–9; Sinclair, At the End of the Line, 22; the file in CO 537/3846, TNA, gives monthly returns that expose the yawning gap between the establishment and those available for deployment. Required replacements were usually 50% of the total strength.

24. For the debate about police tactics, see Horne, A Job Well Done, 557–8, 564–5; Smith, ‘Communal Conflict and Insurrection in Palestine’, 70–6; Jones, Postwar Counterinsurgency and the SAS, 28–9; Sinclair, At the End of the Line, 108–10. On Gray, see Bernard, The Story of 45 Royal Marine Commando, passim.

25. Montgomery, Memoirs, 467–8; Cohen, Palestine and the Great Powers, 177–83, 229–35. For differently weighted accounts of the clash of strategies and personalities, see Hoffman, The Failure of British Military Strategy, 17–34; , ‘Sir Alan Cunningham and the End of British Rule in Palestine’. See also Townshend, Britain's Civil Wars, 115–16; Charters, The British Army and Jewish Insurgency, 100–7; Jones, Postwar Counterinsurgency and the SAS, 26–8; and Newsinger, British Counterinsurgency, 20–4.

26. Bernard Fergusson to Permanent Under Secretary, Colonial Office, ‘Secondment of Army Officers to Palestine Police’, 12 February 1946, CO 537/2270, TNA. Jones, Postwar Counterinsurgency and the SAS, 35–6, argues that the Palestine ‘special squads’ were brought into existence by a clique of senior officers promoting the idea of special forces. Townshend, Britain's Civil Wars, 118–19, detects the influence of Orde Wingate on Fergusson. Wingate set up ‘Special Night Squads’ in Palestine in the late 1930s, highly trained small units of Jewish policeman who tracked and hunted down Arab guerrillas. Fergusson served under Wingate in Burma.

27. Cunningham to Gray, 5 February 1947 and Fergusson to Gray, 6 February 1947, CO 537/2270, TNA. Fragment of ‘Secondment of Army Officers to Palestine Police’, 12 February 1946 referred to in William Mathieson, Colonial Office, to Mr Howe, Home Office, 22 September 1947, CO 537/2302, TNA.

28. Sir Eric Speed to Sir Thomas Lloyd, 6 February 1947; Cunningham to Colonial Office, 11 February 1947; J. Martin to Mr Lloyd, 13 February 1947; Minute by J. Martin, 13 February 1947; Lloyd to Speed, 13 February 1947, all in CO 537/2270, TNA.

29. For significantly different versions of Farran's recruitment and his briefing, see Farran, Winged Dagger, 346–7 and Fergusson, Trumpet in the Hall, 225–6.

30. Farran, Winged Dagger, 348; Fergusson, Trumpet in the Hall, 225–6.

31. On the recruitment of the squad personnel, see Farran, Winged Dagger, 348–50. See also, Sinclair, ‘“Hard-Headed, Hard-Bitten, Hard-Hitting and Courageous Men”’, 204, fn 41. The training regimen is described in Fergusson, Trumpet in the Hall, 227–8 and Farran, Winged Dagger, 349. For critical observations, see Horne, A Job Well Done, 335, 517 and rather more objectively but no less harshly, Jones, SAS: The First Secret Wars, 80–1.

32. Fergusson, Trumpet in the Hall, 227–8; Farran, Winged Dagger, 349–50.

33. See Farran, Winged Dagger, 379. On the mistrust and lack of coordination between the police and the army, as well as their respective failings, see Charters, ‘British Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign’, 123–32 and Smith, ‘Communal Conflict and Insurrection’, 77. Sir Richard Catling, one time head of the Jewish Department of the Palestine CID, was caustic about their limitations: interview recorded September 1988, 10392/9, Imperial War Museum Sound Archive.

34. On ‘special squad’ operations, see Farran, Winged Dagger, 374–9. There is almost no independent evidence of their activities. The exception is Mitchell, Having Been A Soldier, 61. Mitchell was one of Farran's fans and sought to emulate his exploits.

35. Hadingham Report, CO 537/2302, TNA.

36. Gray to Sir Henry Gurney, Chief Secretary of the Palestine Administration, 24 June 1947, CO 537/2302, TNA; Fergusson, Trumpet in the Hall, 206.

37. Gray to Gurney, 24 June 1947, CO 537/2302, TNA.

38. Cunningham to Colonial Office, 19 June 1947, CO 537/2302, TNA; Gray to Gurney, 24 June 1947, CO 537/2302, TNA.

39. Hadingham Report, CO 537/2302, TNA; Fergusson, Trumpet in the Hall, 228–9.

40. Farran, Winged Dagger, 366–7. C.A.F. Dundas, British Legation in Damascus to High Commissioner, Jerusalem, 15 June 1947, CO 537/2302, TNA. Palestine Post (17 June 1947).

41. Farran, Winged Dagger, 365–6; Fergusson, Trumpet in the Hall, 233–4.

42. Farran, Winged Dagger, 366–7; Fergusson, Trumpet in the Hall, 235–6. Scrivener, Damascus, to Foreign Office, 9 June 1947 and Cunningham to Colonial Office, 13 June 1947, CO 537/2302, TNA; C.A.F. Dundas, British Legation in Damascus to High Commissioner, Jerusalem, 15 June 1947, CO 537/2302, TNA; Palestine Post (17 June 1947).

43. Summary of Evidence of Court of Inquiry into Escape of Major Roy Farran, 23 June 1947, CO 537/2302, TNA; Gray to Gurney, 20 June 1947, CO 537/2302, TNA. On Farran's reappearance, see Captain W.B. MacDavid, Assistant Camp Commander HQ Palestine, the Duty Officer who, logged Farran's surrender at 11.50 a.m., in Palestine Post (3 October 1947); Cunningham to Colonial Office, 29 June 1947, CO 537/2302, TNA; Yediot Aharanot (29 June 1947); Daily Telegraph (30 June 1947); Farran, Winged Dagger, 368.

44. Palestine Post (1 July 1947); The Times (3 July 1947). On the extent of the scandal and its ramifications, see Cesarani, Major Farran's Hat, 142–8, 155–65.

45. The pre-trial process and procedure for trial by general court martial are set out in Rubin, Murder, Mutiny and the Military, 20–31.

46. New York Herald Tribune (2 October 1947); The Times and Palestine Post (2 and 3 October 1947); Daily Telegraph, Guardian, Daily Mail, Daily Express, Daily Mirror, Daily Herald (3 October 1947); New York Herald Tribune (3 October 1947); and Fergusson, Trumpet in the Hall, 238. Farran was whisked away in an armoured car, flown from Gaza to Port Said, and embarked on a troopship to England. His acquittal and return were covered in every British paper and made the front page day after day in the Daily Mail, the Daily Express, and the Daily Telegraph. When he disembarked at Liverpool, on 13 October 1947, he was, in his own words, ‘received like a popular hero’. ‘The troops on the decks and the dockers with sweat rags around their necks cheered as I walked down the gangway’: Farran, Winged Dagger, 382. For the extensive press coverage, see Guardian, Daily Telegraph, Daily Mail, New York Herald Tribune, and Palestine Post (14 October 1947).

47. Christian Science Monitor (3 October 1947). The scandal was adduced as evidence that Britain was not fit to hold the Mandate: Jewish Agency for Palestine, The Jewish Plan, 42; Garciá-Granados, The Birth of Israel, 6, 17, 48–9, 113.

48. Charters, ‘British Intelligence in the Palestine Campaign’, 115–40. Compare the more recent and positive appreciation by Walton, ‘British Intelligence and the Mandate of Palestine’, 435–62.

49. Charters, ‘Special Operations in Counter-Insurgency’, 56–61.