Taliban adaptations and innovations

 1. An earlier version of this paper was delivered to the St. Andrews Workshop on Innovation in Terrorism, 6–7 October 2011, St. Andrews University, St. Andrews, Scotland.

Abstract

Since 1978, insurgents in Afghanistan have endured a state of constant conflict, facing two occupying forces that have fielded modernized, highly capable militaries with a multitude of numerical and technological advantages over them. The asymmetry of these conflicts drove a rapid cycle of adaptation and innovation on the part of the insurgents that continues today. The Taliban way of war and approach to governance focuses on turning populations against political weakness and fielding simple and effective governance at the local and provincial levels. The Taliban has proven to be a highly adaptive, innovative, and resilient organization, drawing on tactics from conflicts in Iraq, Pakistan, and their own experience in Afghanistan to fight an effective and enduring defensive jihad. The introduction of improvised explosive devices, suicide bombers, and more recently a rising rate of assassinations all demonstrate the Taliban's ability to adapt tactically and innovate at the strategic level. These innovations are even more significant when one considers the cultural, social, and ideological barriers to change and how the Taliban overcame those barriers to include in their arsenal formerly taboo actions, such as suicide bombing. Understanding the innovation shown by insurgents in Afghanistan provides critical insights into the conflict the US-led coalition faces today and how it may be fought tomorrow.

Keywords:

• Taliban
• innovations
• complex attacks
• shadow government
• assassinations

Notes

 1. An earlier version of this paper was delivered to the St. Andrews Workshop on Innovation in Terrorism, 6–7 October 2011, St. Andrews University, St. Andrews, Scotland.

 2. Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop, 97.

 3. An ‘adaptation’ will be defined as an instance of individual departure from the standard application of force or capabilities. Adaptations occur at the lowest level and are often spontaneous and unscripted responses to unique circumstances. These adaptations, if adopted and applied at the operational/organizational level as best practices then represent ‘innovations’. An ‘innovation’ will be defined as any strategy, tactic, or organizational method that constitutes a departure from earlier patterns of behavior for a given group. It is assumed that this departure could come about dramatically or gradually, and it may be planned or serendipitous.

 4. The term ‘insurgent’ will be used to describe non-state actors who are engaged in open conflict in Afghanistan. Although we believe the best description of the Taliban is ‘insurgents wrapped in the narrative of jihad’. While this article focuses on Taliban innovations and adaptations, the term insurgent may also include members of al Qaeda and the Haqqani Network among others. Insurgents in Afghanistan are unique in that unlike traditional revolutionaries they are committed to an Islamist-Jihadi ideology.

 5. Innovation and transformation as they pertain to US forces have recently received significant attention; see Russell, Innovation, Transformation, and War.

 6. Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, ‘Interview with the Administrator of the Islamic Emirate Website’.

 7. Afsar et al., ‘The Taliban’. By comparison, ISAF provides access to its website in Dari, English, and Pashto: http://www.isaf.nato.int/ (accessed 10 December 2011).

 8. Johnson and DuPee ‘Analyzing the New Taliban Code of Conduct (Layeha)’; Clark, The Layha: Calling the Taliban to Account.

 9. Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop, 121.

10. Schmidt, ‘From Islamic Warriors to Drug Lords’, 63.

11. Schmidt, ‘From Islamic Warriors to Drug Lords’, 64.

12. Schmidt, ‘From Islamic Warriors to Drug Lords’, 66 (derived from Senate committee on foreign relations and UNODC, ‘Reveals Devastating Impact of Afghan Opium’).

13. Johnson and DuPee ‘Analyzing the New Taliban Code of Conduct (Layeha)’.

14. Taber, War of the Flea.

15. King, ‘Killing our Troops Softly with those Rules of Engagement’.

16. For an early statement on this dilemma, see: Loney, ‘Civilian Deaths Undermine West's Afghan Mission’.

17. McChrystal, COMISAF Initial Assessment, 1–2.

18. Gutman, ‘Afghanistan War’.

19. Author interview with USMC Officer involved USMC southern Afghanistan operations, July 2011.

20. http://www.captainsjournal.com/2009/02/12/marines-taliban-and-tactics-techniques-and-procedures/.

21. See Johnson and DuPee, ‘Analyzing the New Taliban Code of Conduct (Layeha)’.

22. See Witte, ‘Taliban Shadow Officials Offer Concrete Alternative’; and ‘Taliban Shadow Government Pervades Afghanistan’.

23. Giustozzi, ‘Hearts, Minds and the Barrel of a Gun’, 72.

24. Giustozzi, ‘Hearts, Minds and the Barrel of a Gun’, 72

25. In 2009 Abdul Khaliq served as the main Taliban Judge for the Kandahar where he traveled throughout the province to adjudicate cases. (Thomas H. Johnson's Kandahar Field Notes, 6 June 2009).

26. Giustozzi, ‘Hearts, Minds and the Barrel of a Gun’, 74.

27. Giustozzi, ‘Hearts, Minds and the Barrel of a Gun’, 74

28. Giustozzi, ‘Hearts, Minds and the Barrel of a Gun’, 74, 75.

29. Thomas H. Johnson interviews of Afghan citizenry in Panjwayi, Kandahar, August 2010.

30. Thomas H. Johnson interview with Senior US Intelligence Official, spring 2006, Monterey California.

31. Barker, ‘Improvised Explosive Devices in Southern Afghanistan and Western Pakistan, 2002–2009’, 14.

32. Witte, ‘Suicide Bombers Kill Dozens in Afghanistan’.

33. The Taliban's innovative use of propaganda will be discussed below.

34. Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop, 102.

35. Rashid, Jihad, 87; Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism, Afghanistan Suicide Attack Query.

36. Human Rights Watch, ‘The Human Cost, 2007’, 7; Johnson, ‘On the Edge of the Big Muddy’, 98.

37. Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop, 117.

38. Johnson, ‘On the Edge of the Big Muddy’, 98; Human Rights Watch, ‘The Human Cost, 2007’, 7.

39. See Figure 2 and footnote 30 for references.

40. Giustozzi, Koran, Kalashnikov, and Laptop, 109.

41. Johnson and Waheed, ‘Analyzing Taliban Taranas (Chants)’, 32.

42. Thomas H. Johnson's Camp Bastion Field Notes; based on interviews with US Special Forces personnel, Camp Bastion, Helmand, 8 August 2008.

43. Livingston and O'Hanlon, ‘Afghanistan Index, October 31, 2011’, 12.

44. Gutman, ‘Afghanistan War’.

45. Gutman, ‘Afghanistan War’

46. Barker, ‘Improvised Explosive Devices’, 10.

47. Thomas H. Johnson's Camp Tombstone Field Notes; based on interviews with US Special Forces personnel, Camp Tombstone, Helmand, 9 August 2008.

48. UNAMA, Afghanistan: Annual Report 2010 Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 13.

49. Aljazeera, ‘Afghanistan's Long Legacy of Assassinations’.

50. Ghanizada, ‘Concerns Over Assassination of High Profile Afghan Officials’, 1.

51. International Crisis Group, ‘The Insurgency in Afghanistan's Heartland’, 22.

52. Thomas H. Johnson's Kandahar Field Notes; based on interview with Afghan intelligence analyst, 5 June 2009, Kandahar City.

53. UNAMA, Afghanistan: Annual Report 2010 Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict, 5.

54. University of Chicago, ‘Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism’, http://cpost.uchicago.edu/search.php (accessed 27 August 2011).

55. University of Chicago, ‘Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism’, http://cpost.uchicago.edu/search.php (accessed 27 November 2011).

56. Thomas H. Johnson's Kandahar Field Notes; based on interviews with Afghan elders, Kandahar City, 6 June 2009.

57. Forsberg, The Taliban's Campaign for Kandahar, 45.

58. Amoore, ‘Taliban Hit Squads Target Village Elders’.

59. Durani, ‘Since 2002 Kandahar has Witnessed the Assassinations of More than 515 Tribal Leaders in Only 13 Districts’.

60. Amoore, ‘Taliban Hit Squads Target Village Elders’, 1.

61. Ulema is a collective term for doctors of Islamic studies and graduates of Islamic studies or private studies with a alim (one who processes the quality lim or knowledge of Islamic law, theology, and traditions).

62. Nadem, ‘Religious Scholar Shot Dead in Kandahar’; Nazim, ‘Religious Scholar, Four Guards Killed in Kandahar’; and Jamali, ‘Taliban Forces Are Now Attacking Sunni Leaders in Afghanistan’.

63. Nadem, ‘Religious Scholar Shot Dead in Kandahar’; Nazim, ‘Religious Scholar, Four Guards Killed in Kandahar’; and Jamali, ‘Taliban Forces Are Now Attacking Sunni Leaders in Afghanistan’

64. See Johnson, ‘Religious Figures, Insurgency, and Jihad’.

65. Gopal, ‘Insurgents Increasingly Employing Complex Attacks in Afghanistan’.

66. Barker, ‘Improvised Explosive Devices’, 10.

67. See BBC, ‘Kabul's Intercontinental Hotel Attacked by Gunmen’.

68. This attack appears to have been the work of the Haqqani Network which operates in Eastern Afghanistan. The Haqqani Network are affiliated with the Taliban, but operate independent of the Quetta Shura and are also closely aligned with al Qaeda ideology.

69. Murphy, ‘Afghanistan: Overinterpreting the Kabul Attack’.

70. DuPee, ‘Afghan NDS Continues Crackdown on Counterfeit Uniforms’.

71. Thomas H. Johnson's interview with a Senior US Intelligence Analyst, spring 2007, Alexandria, VA.

72. DuPee, ‘Afghan Forces Uncover Clandestine “Military Uniform-Making Factory”’.

73. DuPee, ‘3rd “Turban Bomb” Attack Rocks Southern Helmand Province’.

74. DuPee, ‘3rd “Turban Bomb” Attack Rocks Southern Helmand Province’

75. A well-placed intelligence analyst in Afghanistan believes that the use of women and children in suicide acts is based primarily on psychological reasons to raise concerns and fear with the Afghan public – ‘the Americans have failed, nobody is safe.’ (Thomas H. Johnson's Bagram Field Notes; Bagram Air Base, 5 August 2008).

76. Roggio, ‘Taliban Use Females in Recent Suicide Attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan’.

77. Associated Press, ‘Woman Suicide Bomber Hits Afghan Government Office’.

78. Gutman, ‘Afghanistan War’.

79. Gutman, ‘Afghanistan War’

80. Dreazen, ‘Allyn: Use of Children in Suicide Attacks Part of “Ruthless” Escalation for Taliban’.

81. Popalzai, ‘Afghan Police Intercept Suspected Suicide Bomb Children’.

82. Human Rights Watch, ‘Afghanistan: Taliban Should Stop Using Children as Suicide Bombers’.

83. McMeekiin, ‘Suicide Bomber Who Wounded Australian Aid Worker Was a Child’.

84. Thousands of MANPADs are reported to have gone missing following the popular uprising in Libya. Ross and Cole, ‘Nightmare in Lybia’.